Prosecuting Attorney of Hendricks County and Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Randy L. Hammer (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 29 2017, 11:45 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Brian J. Johnson
Attorney General of Indiana Danville, Indiana
Aaron T. Craft
Patricia C. McMath
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Prosecuting Attorney of December 29, 2017
Hendricks County and Indiana Court of Appeals Case No.
Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 32A01-1705- MI-1107
Appellant-Respondent, Appeal from the Hendricks
Superior Court
v. The Honorable Stephenie LeMay-
Luken, Judge
Randy L. Hammer, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Petitioner. 32D05-1611-MI-230
Mathias, Judge.
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[1] The Hendricks Superior Court granted Randy L. Hammer’s (“Hammer”)
petition for specialized driving privileges. Approximately three months later,
the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“the BMV”) filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion to
set aside the judgment arguing that the Hendricks Superior Court did not have
jurisdiction to grant specialized driving privileges on a suspension arising from
a habitual traffic violator conviction in the Morgan Superior Court. The trial
court denied the motion to set aside, and the BMV appeals.
[2] Concluding that the Hendricks Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over the case and the alleged legal error should have been raised on direct
appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Hammer, a resident of Hendricks County, has a long history of traffic offenses
and driving related convictions in both Hendricks County and Morgan County.
In November 2016, Hammer had six active suspensions of his driving
privileges. It is undisputed that the BMV imposed three of the six suspensions.
The other three suspensions resulted from Hammer’s convictions for operating
a vehicle while his privileges were suspended because he is a habitual traffic
violator. Two convictions occurred in Hendricks Superior Court, and one
occurred in Morgan Superior Court.
[4] On November 22, 2016, Hammer filed a petition in Hendricks Superior Court
requesting specialized driving privileges pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-30-
16-3. Specifically, Hammer asked the court to stay his current suspensions to
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allow him to drive to work and use his vehicle for work purposes. Appellant’s
App. p. 13.
[5] If a suspension is court-ordered, Indiana Code section 9-30-16-3 requires a
petition for specialized driving privileges to be filed in the court that issued the
suspension. If the suspension was administratively imposed by the BMV,
Indiana Code section 9-30-16-4 requires the petition to be filed in the
individual’s county of residence.
[6] The Hendricks County Prosecutor appeared on behalf of the State and the BMV
at the hearing held on the petition. During the hearing, the BMV objected only
to Hammer’s request with regard to the Morgan County conviction and
resulting suspension of his driving privileges. The trial court indicated that it
viewed the suspension arising from the Morgan County conviction as an
administrative suspension. Tr. p. 5. The trial court granted the petition over the
BMV’s objection. And on January 18, 2017, Hammer was granted specialized
driving privileges on all of his active suspensions. The court’s order noted that
Hammer’s petition complied with the pleading requirements of Indiana Code
section 9-30-16-4, and categorized his suspensions as administrative
suspensions.
[7] Three months later, the BMV filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from
judgment. The BMV argued that only the Morgan Superior Court had authority
to grant specialized driving privileges to Hammer for the suspension of his
driving privileges imposed as a result of his Morgan County conviction for
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operating after being adjudged a habitual traffic violator. Appellant’s App. Vol.
II, p. 17. The BMV also argued that a court of equal jurisdiction, in this case the
Hendricks Superior Court, did not have authority to stay or modify an order of
the Morgan Superior Court.1 Id. at 19–20.
[8] The trial court denied the BMV’s motion and issued the following order:
The Court interprets the BMV’s Motion for Relief from
Judgment as a motion to correct error which the BMV is
phrasing as a Motion for Relief from Judgment. The State of
Indiana was represented in this matter. The time to file a motion
to correct error has passed.
Id. at 6. The BMV now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[9] The BMV argues that the Hendricks Superior Court lacked “subject matter
jurisdiction to stay, vacate, modify, or in any way control the execution of
orders issued by another trial court of similar jurisdiction or equal rank.”
Appellant’s Br. at 12–13. Consequently, the BMV contends that the Hendricks
1
Although the BMV argued lack of subject matter jurisdiction in its motion, it cited to Indiana Trial Rule
60(B)(1), addressing mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect, 60(B)(2) addressing relief from a final judgment
on any ground for a motion to correct error if the error could not be discovered within the time limits
established in Trial Rule 59, and 60(B)(8) allowing relief from judgment for any reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. Trial Rule 60(B)(6), which was not cited in the BMV’s motion, allows relief
from judgment if the judgment is void. See Clark v. State, 727 N.E.2d 18, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining
that a judgment made when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void).
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Superior Court’s judgment granting specialized driving privileges on the
suspension arising out of Morgan Superior Court is void.
[10] As we noted above, a petition for specialized driving privileges for a court-
ordered suspension must be filed in the court that has “ordered or imposed a
suspension of the individual’s driving privileges.” Ind. Code § 9-30-16-3. But if
the suspension is administratively imposed by the BMV, the petition must be
filed “in the county in which the individual resides.”2 Ind. Code § 9-30-16-4.
[11] Hammer referenced Indiana Code section 9-30-16-3 in his petition, and filed the
petition in Hendricks County, even though one of the six suspensions was
imposed following his conviction for felony operating while a habitual traffic
violator in Morgan County. In this appeal, Hammer argues that even though
the suspension was imposed as a result of his conviction, it is an
administratively imposed suspension. And the trial court characterized all of
Hammer’s suspensions as administrative suspensions in its order granting
Hammer specialized driving privileges and found that his petition complied
with the requirements of Indiana Code section 9-30-16-4. Because this appeal
can be resolved without considering whether a suspension imposed as a result
of a felony conviction for operating while a habitual traffic violator is a court-
2
If the individual is not currently a resident of Indiana, the petition must be filed “in the county in which the
individual’s most recent Indiana moving violation judgment was entered against the individual.” I.C. § 9-30-
16-4.
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ordered suspension or administratively imposed suspension, we leave that
question for another day.
[12] The BMV failed to appeal the trial court’s order granting Hammer specialized
driving privileges. It seeks to avoid waiver by arguing that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to grant Hammer’s petition on the suspension
resulting from the Morgan County conviction. And now for the first time, the
BMV argues that Hendricks County Superior Court No. 5 lacked jurisdiction to
address Hammer’s petition for the suspensions arising from convictions out of
Hendricks Superior Courts Nos. 2 and 3.
[13] In K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 2006), our supreme court clarified that
only judgments issued by courts without subject matter jurisdiction are void and
may be collaterally attacked. “For some time, Indiana has adhered to the rule
that the judgment of a court ‘having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit
and of the person, however irregular, is not void and not impeachable
collaterally, unless it may be for fraud.’ . . . By contrast, a judgment rendered
without jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked.” Id. at 541 (quoting Mishler v.
County of Elkhart, 544 N.E.2d 149, 151 (Ind. 1989)).
[14] “The question of subject matter jurisdiction entails a determination of whether
a court has jurisdiction over the general class of actions to which a particular
case belongs.” Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind. 2000). Personal
jurisdiction requires that appropriate process be effected over the parties. K.S.,
849 N.E.2d at 540. “Where these two exist, a court’s decision may be set aside
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for legal error only through direct appeal and not through collateral attack.” Id.
The Court observed that “[a]ttorneys and judges alike frequently characterize a
claim of procedural error as one of jurisdictional dimension” and that “[t]he
fact that a trial court may have erred along the course of adjudicating a dispute
does not mean it lacked jurisdiction.”3 Id. at 541.
[15] “[T]he subject matter jurisdiction of our courts is generally created by statute or
constitutional provision[.]” In re Adoption of J.T.D., 21 N.E.3d 824, 829 (Ind.
2014) (quoting N. Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist. v. Chicago SouthShore and South
Bend R.R., 685 N.E.2d 680, 695 (Ind. 1997)). The Hendricks Superior Court has
“original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil and in all criminal cases[.]” See
Ind. Code § 33-29-1-1.5.
[16] The Hendricks Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
petitions for specialized driving privileges. Whether Hammer filed his petition
in the proper court as provided in Indiana Code sections 9-30-16-3 and -4 is a
question of legal error, not jurisdictional error. The BMV failed to appeal the
trial court’s judgment adjudicating Hammer’s request for specialized driving
privileges. Thus, the BMV forfeited its argument that the Hendricks Superior
Court erred when it concluded that the suspensions were administrative, and
therefore, properly before the court pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-30-16-4.
3
Our supreme court explained that “[r]eal jurisdictional problems would be, say, a juvenile delinquency
adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a judgment rendered without any service of process.” K.S.,
849 N.E.2d at 542.
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See Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A) (stating that the right to appeal shall be forfeited if
the notice of appeal is not timely filed).
[17] The BMV’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion constitutes an improper collateral attack
on the trial court’s judgment, and we therefore conclude that the trial court
properly denied the motion.
[18] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.
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