Grange Mutual Casualty Co., Mark Madejek, and Alice Blaisdell v. Estate of Stephen P. Stetz, by Jeffrey and Dana Stetz, Personal Representatives

FILED
Feb 28 2018, 9:03 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer E. Davis Charles P. Rice
Garan Lucow Miller, PC Patrick D. Murphy
Merrillville, Indiana Murphy Rice, LLP
South Bend, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Grange Mutual Casualty Co., February 28, 2018
Mark Madejek, and Alice Court of Appeals Case No.
Blaisdell,1 71A05-1708-CT-1720
Appellant-Defendants, Appeal from the
St. Joseph Circuit Court
v. The Honorable
John E. Broden, Judge
Estate of Stephen P. Stetz, by Trial Court Cause No.
Jeffrey and Dana Stetz, Personal 71C01-1511-CT-420
Representatives,
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Kirsch, Judge.
1
Although Mark Madejek and Alice Blaisdell are not parties to this appeal, we include them in the caption
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), providing that “[a] party of record in the trial court . . . shall be a
party on appeal.”
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[1] Jeffrey and Dana Stetz, as Personal Representatives for the Estate of Stephen P.
Stetz (together, “the Estate”) filed suit against Grange Mutual Casualty Co.
(“Grange”) seeking coverage for their deceased son, Stephen P. Stetz
(“Stephen”), who died from injuries he sustained after being hit, while a
pedestrian, by an uninsured motorist. The Estate and Grange each filed a
motion for summary judgment, and, after a hearing, the trial court granted the
Estate’s motion, finding that Grange was liable for coverage. Grange appeals
and raises the following restated issued: whether the trial court properly found
that Stephen was a covered family member under his parents’ automobile
policy and granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate and against
Grange.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Jeffrey and Dana Stetz (“Parents”) are residents of Uniontown, Ohio. Stephen
was born in 1988 in Michigan, and when he was six or seven years old, the
family moved to Uniontown. Stephen graduated from high school in nearby
Akron, Ohio, and he thereafter attended Holy Cross College in South Bend,
Indiana, graduating in 2012. After college, Stephen moved back to Parents’
home in Uniontown and obtained a job with North American Breweries, where
he had an assigned sales territory in nearby Kent, Ohio. He lived and worked
out of Parents’ home. In April or May 2014, Stephen obtained and began a
new sales job with Chicago Beverage, headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. He
signed a one-year lease on an apartment in the Lincoln Park area of Chicago,
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and when that expired, he signed a lease and moved to another apartment in
the Chicago area.
[4] In August 2015, Parents renewed their Personal Auto Policy Ohio (“the
Policy”) with Grange, for the period of August 26, 2015 to February 26, 2016.
Appellant’s App Vol. II at 82. The Declarations page identifies the Policy as a
Family Auto policy type and identifies the named insured and address as:
Jeffrey Stetz and Dana Stetz of “1889 White Chapel Cir NW Uniontown OH
44685.” Id. The Policy listed and covered five vehicles, including a 2004
Honda Civic and a 2008 Honda Civic, and all five of the vehicles were owned
by Parents, were registered in Ohio, and had Ohio license plates. The Policy’s
Rating Information Page listed four drivers, namely Jeffrey, Dana, Stephen,
and his older sister. Id. at 87. Stephen began driving the 2004 Civic when he
was a senior in high school and continued driving it other than when it was
being repaired, when he drove the 2008 Civic. Stephen did not own his own
vehicle.
[5] With regard to uninsured motorists coverage, the Policy provides in relevant
part:
PART C – UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
(Includes Underinsured Motorists Coverage)
Insuring Agreement
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A. We will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled to
recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle because of:
1. Bodily Injury sustained by the insured and caused by an
accident; and
2. Property damage . . .
The owner’s or operator’s liability for these damages must arise
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured
motor vehicle. . . .
B. “Insured” as used in this Part means:
1. You or any family member.
2. Any family member who does not own a motor vehicle.
3. Any other person while occupying your covered auto
with a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do
so, if that person is not insured for Uninsured Motorists
Coverage under another policy.
Id. at 105. The Policy excludes uninsured coverage as follows:
Exclusions
A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for bodily
injury sustained by any person.
...
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6. When the person actually suffering the bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death is not an insured under the
policy.
Id. at 106. The Policy provides the following relevant definitions:
DEFINITIONS
A. The terms defined below appear in bold type throughout this
policy. You and Your refer to the named insured, which
includes the individual named on the Declarations page or that
person’s spouse if a resident of the same household. . . .
B. “We”, “us” and “our” refer to Grange Mutual Casualty
Company.
....
F. “Family member” means a person related to you by blood,
marriage or adoption and whose principal residence is at the
location shown in the Declarations. If a court has adjudicated
that one parent is the custodial parent, that adjudication shall be
conclusive with respect to the minor child’s principal residence.
Id. at 97 (bold in original; emphasis added with underlining). The Policy does
not define the words “principal” or “residence.”
[6] On October 15, 2015, Stephen was in South Bend, and, as a pedestrian, he was
struck by a vehicle driven by Mark Madejek (“Madejek”). Madejek was
operating a vehicle owned by his mother, Alice Blaisdell (“Blaisdell”). Stephen
died from his injuries on October 23, 2015. Madejek was uninsured, and
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Blaisdell did not have any insurance that applied to the vehicle Madejek was
driving.
[7] Following his death, Parents opened an estate in the St. Joseph County probate
court for the administration of the Estate.2 On November 20, 2015, the Estate
filed suit in the St. Joseph Circuit Court against Madejek and Blaisdell for the
wrongful death of Stephen, and it amended the complaint in February 2016 to
add Grange as a defendant, seeking uninsured motorists coverage.3 Id. at 16-20.
More specifically, the Estate’s Complaint alleged that Stephen was an insured
family member under the Policy. Grange’s Answer maintained that Stephen’s
principal residence was in Chicago, Illinois at the time of his death, and,
therefore, he did not meet the definition of insured family member under the
Policy and was not entitled to uninsured motorists coverage. Id. at 22-32.
[8] On August 24, 2016, the Estate filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing
that Stephen was entitled to uninsured motorists coverage as a family member
under the Policy. Id. at 38. The Estate designated evidence that Stephen, while
in Chicago, drove a parent-owned car, which had Ohio license plates, he had
an Ohio driver’s license with the Uniontown address, he had a key to the
Uniontown house, and a garage door opener, he received some mail at the
2
Steven was single, never having been married.
3
The Estate’s claim against Madejek and Blaisdell asserted negligence and intentional tort. In January 2016,
the trial court entered a default judgment against Madejek and Blaisdell. That same month, Madejek pled
guilty to felony charges of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death of another person and driving
while suspended resulting in death of another person.
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Uniontown address, and he was registered to vote, and did vote, in Ohio. The
designated evidence also showed that Stephen would visit “fairly often,” for
holidays, vacations, to visit friends, with at most a stretch of a month or two of
not coming back to Parents’ home, and he did not bring a duffel or suitcase
with him when he came back because “he had everything that he needed,”
including clothes, toiletries, and the like, and usually only brought things like
his computer, coat, and gloves. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 217, 221. He kept his
local Key Bank account in Uniontown, and he did not do banking in Chicago,
other than visits to an ATM. Parents still provided some financial support to
Stephen for the period of time that he was in Chicago, as Mother co-signed on
his two Chicago apartment leases, Parents paid his first and last month’s rent
and the security deposits, and they bought furnishings for his apartments, and
Stephen remained at all times on the family’s cell phone plan. He also
continued to work with his accountant in Akron, Ohio and with his financial
planner in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. In September 2015, Stephen was treated in
Ohio by his long-time family doctor, and, while in Chicago, Stephen also
continued to be under the care of his dentist in Ohio and his eye doctor in Ohio.
Stephen told his mother and a long-time friend, Amy, of his plan and intent to
return to the Stetz family home in Ohio after his work assignment in Chicago.
A few weeks before he died, Stephen was at the Uniontown home and told his
mother that he was considering leaving his job at Chicago Beverage and said, “I
think I might want to come home.” Id. at 141. Stephen did not submit any
change of address notification form that would forward his mail from
Uniontown to Chicago. Id. at 143.
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[9] On February 27, 2017, Grange filed a Combined Response that (1) opposed the
Estate’s motion and (2) supported its own cross-motion for Summary
Judgment. Grange did not assert that any material issue of fact precluded
summary judgment for the Estate. Rather, Grange asserted that no genuine
issue of material fact precluded summary judgment in its favor. Id. at 62, 64,
79. Grange’s position was that Stephen maintained his “principal residence” in
Chicago and was, therefore, not an insured and was excluded from coverage
under the Policy. Grange designated evidence showing: Stephen was a college
graduate; he had a full-time job in Chicago since April or May 2014 and was
past the probationary period; he had an apartment in Chicago and was part-way
through his second one-year lease; many of his bills, including utility bills, were
mailed to his Chicago address; he paid his own rent and utilities; he saw a
doctor in the Chicago area for a medical issue; and his obituary stated that he
was living in Chicago at the time of his death, as did his Facebook page.
[10] After the Estate filed a reply and supplemental designation of evidence, the trial
court held a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment on May 1,
2017. The trial court issued an order (“Order”) on May 25, 2017.4 In it, the
trial court observed:
4
The trial court’s Order noted, “The legal issue before the Court was exceptionally well briefed and
succinctly stated by the parties[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 9. We agree with the trial court in that regard,
both as to briefing at the trial court level and, here, on appeal.
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It is clear to the Court that Stephen was “living” in Chicago at
the time of his death. However, the language in the insurance
policy in question does not reference where one is “living”, but
rather the insurance policy employs the words “principal
residence”. The word “residence” has always envisioned a great
deal more than where one finds themselves living at any snapshot
in time and its definition has vexed many courts, election boards,
and auditor’s officers in making such determinations. Whether it
be the graduate student, the Peace Corps volunteer, military
personnel, or, in Stephen’s case, the young adult who is
branching out on his own but certainly has yet to attain full
independence, many people find themselves living in a particular
physical place but they still maintain a primary or principal
residence somewhere else, typically the place where they are
from and intend to return.
Id. at 12. The trial court opined that Stephen’s situation “much more resembled
a graduate student away at school than he did someone who has fully moved
and relocated to a new city leaving his childhood home behind[,]” id. at 13, and
it ultimately determined that Stephen was a principal resident of Parents’ home
in Uniontown, Ohio and was entitled to coverage under the Policy’s uninsured
motorists coverage. In reaching its decision, the court also considered the
following:
Because Grange Insurance chose not to define the words
“principal residence” in the Stetz’ family auto insurance policy,
the term is implicitly ambiguous and capable of multiple different
interpretations. Because of this ambiguity, under Ohio law, the
language is to be strictly construed against Grange and liberally
construed in favor of coverage for [the Estate]. [The Estate]
correctly points out the word residence has no fixed meaning
under Ohio law. Further, adding the modifier “principal” in
front of residence does not resolve the ambiguity. [The Estate]
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correctly points out the Black Law Dictionary definition of
“principal” contains multiple definitions and these varying
definitions are not all synonymous with each other.
Id. at 14. The trial court granted the Estate’s motion and denied Grange’s
motion. Thereafter, the Estate, with the agreement of Grange, filed an Indiana
Trial Rule 54(B) Motion for Entry of Final Appealable Judgment as to the
Order, which the trial court granted. Id. at 7, 228. Grange now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[11] When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, we apply the same
standard applicable to the trial court. Summary judgment is proper only when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We do not weigh the
evidence, but will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. 2009). If there are no
genuine issues of material fact, we will affirm a summary judgment on any legal
theory supported by the record. Matteson v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 844 N.E.2d
188, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
[12] The parties agree that Ohio substantive law controls.5 Appellant’s Br. at 12;
Reply Br. at 6; Appellee’s Br. at 19. Under Ohio law, “The interpretation of an
5
Grange is an Ohio corporation with its “Home Office” in Columbus, Ohio. Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 54.
Parents are residents of Ohio, and they procured the Policy through an Ohio agency. The five vehicles listed
in the Policy were registered in Ohio. The Policy is titled “Personal Auto Policy Ohio.” Id. at 23.
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automobile liability insurance policy presents a question of law that an
appellate court reviews without deference to the trial court.” Wetzel v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 60 N.E.3d 27, 29 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016), discretionary appeal not
allowed. In construing terms of an insurance policy, the Ohio Supreme Court
has explained:
When confronted with an issue of contractual interpretation, the
role of a court is to give effect to the intent of the parties to the
agreement. We examine the insurance contract as a whole and
presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the language
used in the policy. We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of
the language used in the policy unless another meaning is clearly
apparent from the contents of the policy. When the language of
a written contract is clear, a court may look no further than the
writing itself to find the intent of the parties.
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. CPS Holdings, Inc., 875 N.E.2d 31, 33-34 (Ohio 2007)
(citations and quotations omitted). As a matter of law, a contract is
unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal meaning. Id. at 34. However,
where provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably susceptible of more
than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against the insurer and
liberally in favor of the insured. Wetzel, 60 N.E.3d at 29. That is, in cases of
ambiguities, policy terms will be construed in favor of coverage. Fahlbush v.
Crum-Jones, 891 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). This rule, however,
will not be applied so as to provide an unreasonable interpretation of the words
of the policy. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 875 N.E.2d at 34. Ambiguous words will be
construed in favor of coverage “with greater force to language that purports to
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limit or to qualify coverage.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Merillat, 854 N.E.2d 513,
518 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (quotations omitted).
[13] In the present case, the relevant facts are not in dispute. Rather, the
disagreement is whether Stephen was a “family member” under the terms of the
Policy. The clause at issue provides, in relevant part:
F. “Family member” means a person related to you by blood,
marriage or adoption and whose principal residence is at the
location shown in the Declarations.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 97 (underlining added). The location “shown in the
Declarations” was the Uniontown Stetz home address. Thus, to determine the
existence or non-existence of coverage, the inquiry is whether Stephen’s
“principal residence” at the time of his death was in Chicago or was in
Uniontown.
[14] Grange argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it granted summary
judgment for the Estate because Stephen’s “principal residence” was in Chicago
and not at Parents’ Uniontown address. Grange urges that the relevant point in
time is where Stephen was living at the time that he died, not where he was
living before that point in time or where he planned to live at some later date.
Grange urges that the designated evidence shows that, at the time of his
passing, Stephen was living, working, and supporting himself in Chicago, first
living in one apartment for a year, and then in another for part of a year, until
the fatal accident. Thus, argues Grange, although Stephen was certainly
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welcome at his Parents’ Uniontown home, his principal residence was his own
dwelling in Chicago. The Estate maintains that the trial court’s decision,
determining that the Estate was entitled to uninsured motorists coverage, was
correct for a number of reasons, including that the term “principal residence”
was ambiguous, such that the Policy should be construed against Grange. We
agree with the Estate.6
[15] Here, the Policy does not define “residence,” nor does it define “principal.”7
We acknowledge that the failure to define a term in an insurance policy does
not automatically render the policy ambiguous. Fahlbush, 891 N.E.2d at 1246.
A court must give undefined words used in an insurance contract their plain
and ordinary meaning. Collins v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 80 N.E.3d 542, 548
(Ohio Ct. App. 2017). However, provisions that are “reasonably susceptible of
more than one interpretation” are ambiguous and “will be construed strictly
against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.” Crabtree v. 21st Century
Ins. Co., 892 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). When a word is
undefined, Ohio courts have directed that “we examine the common meaning
6
The Estate also argues that the trial court’s decision was correct because (1) the undisputed facts establish
that Stephen’s principal residence was in Uniontown, and (2) the premium charged was based in part on the
number of rated drivers listed on the Policy’s “Rating Information Page” and Stephen was a “rated driver.”
Because we find the ambiguity issue dispositive, we do not reach the other proffered arguments.
7
Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Eyster, 939 N.E.2d 1274, 1276 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (where policy defines
“Resident” as “a person who physically resides in your household with the intention to continue residence
there. . . . Your unmarried dependent children while temporarily away from home will be considered
residents if they intend to resume residing in your household.”).
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of the word and Ohio case law involving the language at issue.” Merillat, 854
N.E.2d at 517.
[16] With regard to the first undefined term, “principal,” the Ohio Supreme Court,
in State ex rel. Kilburn v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 438 N.E.2d 422, 423 (Ohio
1982), a worker’s compensation case, addressed the terms “principal
business[,]” namely whether an employer’s “principal business” consisted of
building and demolition work. In reaching its decision that the employer’s
principal business was to supply water, and not to engage in building work, the
Kilburn Court considered the definitions of “principal” found in Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary and in Black’s Law Dictionary. Id.Webster’s defined “principal” as “most important, consequential, or
influential” and Black’s Law Dictionary defined it as “[c]hief; leading; most
important or considerable; primary; original.” Id.[17] Ohio courts have held the term “resident” has “no fixed meaning in the law.”
See Merillat, 854 N.E.2d at 518 (stating “the term ‘resident’ has no fixed
meaning in the law”); Entenman v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 737 N.E.2d 119, 124
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“The term ‘resident’ is not defined in the Auto-Owners
insurance policy and has no fixed meaning in the law.”). The Estate urges that
the appellate decision of Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Koby, 705
N.E.2d 748 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), discretionary appeal not allowed, is particularly
relevant and applicable. We agree.
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[18] In Koby, Edgar Koby Jr. (“Koby”) was a 32-year-old captain in the Army,
stationed in Texas. Id. at 749. While visiting his parents’ home in Ohio, Koby
was target shooting in his parents’ backyard, and he accidentally struck and
injured another man, who filed suit against Koby and his parents. His parents’
Prudential homeowner’s policy provided coverage for the insured and
“residents of your household.” Id. Prudential asserted that it had no duty to
defend because Koby was not a resident in the household of his parents, but
instead, “has his own residence in Texas, where he is stationed.” Id. The trial
court entered summary judgment for Koby and against Prudential, and
Prudential appealed.
[19] The Ohio court of appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment for Koby, and, in analyzing the issue, the court initially
observed that the term “resident” was not defined in the Prudential insurance
contract. Id. The Koby court examined Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition: “a
dweller, habitant or occupant; one who resides or dwells in a place for a period
of more, or less, duration.” Id. at 750. The court next examined Ohio case law
and stated:
The words “resident,” “residence” and “residing” have no
precise, technical and fixed meaning applicable to all cases.
“Residence” has many shades of meaning, from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. It is difficult to give an
exact or even satisfactory definition of the term “resident,” as the
term is flexible, elastic, slippery and somewhat ambiguous. * * *
Definitions of “residence” include “a place of abode for more
than a temporary period of time” and “a permanent and
established home” and the definitions range between these two
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extremes. This being the case, our courts have held that such
terms should be given the broadest construction and that all who
may be included, by any reasonable construction of such terms,
within the coverage of an insurance policy using such terms,
should be given its protection.
Id. at 750 (internal citation omitted). The Koby court opined, “The factual
pattern of the case plays a significant role in determining whether one is a
resident of a household.” Id. at 751. The Koby court recognized that Koby had
a residence in Texas, was thirty-two, and was self-supporting, but also
recognized that Koby regularly made visits to his parents’ home, and had other
connections to his parents’ household, including his Ohio driver’s license, Ohio
voting record, and his expressed intention to return to his parents’ home or area
after his enlistment term was completed. Given this fact scenario, the Koby
court found that Ohio’s dual residency rule was applicable. Id. at 752-53. After
analyzing case authorities, “and construing the term ‘resident’ liberally and in
favor of the insured,” the Koby court held that Koby qualified as a “resident” of
his parents’ household for purposes of the Prudential policy. Id. at 753.
[20] As stated, a contract is unambiguous as a matter of law if it can be given a
definite legal meaning. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 875 N.E.2d at 34. However, as the
Koby court observed, the term residence has “shades of meaning” ranging from
“a place of abode for more than a temporary period of time” to “a permanent
and established home[.]” Id. at 750. Principal may mean “primary,” as Grange
suggests, but it may also mean “most important, consequential, or influential”
or “original.” Id. Accordingly, we find that the words principal residence
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cannot be given “a definite legal meaning.” Id. Rather, the Policy’s undefined
terms “principal residence” are reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation, are ambiguous, and therefore must be construed against Grange
and liberally in favor of coverage.8 The trial court did not err in finding that
Stephen was a family member under the Policy and in granting summary
judgment for the Estate and against Grange.
[21] Affirmed.
[22] Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
8
Even if we were to find that the language was not ambiguous, we find that the designated evidence
demonstrates that Stephen’s principal residence was at the Uniontown address and that the Estate was
entitled to summary judgment. “[T]he fact pattern of a particular case plays a significant role in determining
whether an individual is a resident of a household,” and “Ohio courts usually examine several factors
including ‘the amount of time the person spends at the household, the person’s age, the person’s intent, and
whether the insured is ‘legally obligated’ to the person.’” Martin v. Wandling, 65 N.E.3d 103, 126 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2016) (quoting Prudential Property & Cas. Co. v. Koby, 705 N.E.2d 748, 750-751 (1997)). Here, Stephen
had been in Chicago for less than two years, Parents were continuing to help him financially, by co-signing
for and furnishing his apartments, as well as providing him with a cell phone and a vehicle to drive, and
Stephen had told his mother and a friend not long before he died of his intention to find a job and move back
to Uniontown. Additionally, he visited Parents’ home with regularity, not going more than a month or two
without coming back, and kept clothing and toiletries at the residence. He also did not change his driver’s
license or voter registration from Ohio to Illinois.
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