In Re the Adoption and Paternity of K.A.W., J.R.C. v. J.C. and D.C.

FILED
Apr 20 2018, 9:37 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joseph Leon Payne Matthew J. McGovern
Payne Law Office, LLC Anderson, Indiana
Austin, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In Re the Adoption and April 20, 2018
Paternity of K.A.W. Court of Appeals Case No.
31A01-1712-AD-2797
J.R.C.,
Appeal from the Harrison Circuit
Appellant-Respondent, Court
v. The Honorable John T. Evans,
Judge
J.C. and D.C., Trial Court Cause Nos.
31C01-1602-AD-5
Appellees-Petitioners 31C01-1512-JP-35
Baker, Judge.
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[1] J.R.C. (Putative Father) appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his petition to
establish paternity of K.A.W. (Child) and granting the petition to adopt Child
that had been filed by J.C. and D.C. (Adoptive Parents). Putative Father
argues that the trial court erred by finding that his consent to the adoption was
irrevocably implied and by granting the adoption petition without a statutorily
required affidavit. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] Child was born to D.W. (Mother) on April 15, 2014. Putative Father has been
incarcerated since before Child’s birth. Mother has also been incarcerated
periodically throughout Child’s life; Child has always lived with Adoptive
Parents, who are relatives of Mother. On December 15, 2015, Putative Father
filed a petition to establish paternity; shortly thereafter, he filed a motion for a
DNA test.
[3] On February 8, 2016, Adoptive Parents filed a petition to adopt Child. The
trial court ordered the paternity and adoption causes consolidated on April 19,
2016. In July 2016, the trial court granted Putative Father’s motion for a DNA
test. On November 17, 2016, the DNA test report was filed with the court
indicating a 99.99% probability that Putative Father is Child’s biological father.
[4] On December 9, 2016, Putative Father filed a motion to contest the adoption.
Mother consented to the adoption on August 7, 2017. Thereafter, Adoptive
Parents asked the trial court to find that Putative Father’s consent to the
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adoption was irrevocably implied. On August 26, 2017, Putative Father
registered as a putative father of Child.
[5] On August 30, 2017, the trial court entered an order staying Putative Father’s
petition to establish paternity, finding that Putative Father’s consent to the
adoption was irrevocably implied. The trial court found that Father “has never
registered as [Child’s] putative father. Thus, he was not registered at the time
[Adoptive Parents’] petition to adopt [Child] was filed, which is the relevant
deadline.” Appealed Order p. 2. Further, the failure to timely register with the
putative father registry “constitutes an irrevocably implied consent” to the
adoption. Id.
[6] In the final adoption decree, which was issued on November 7, 2017, the trial
court found as follows with respect to Putative Father:
37. [Putative Father] is incarcerated by the Indiana
Department of Correction[] in Branchville, Indiana. He
has been in custody for the last three years.
38. [Putative Father] has used illegal drugs “off and on” his
entire adult life. At the time of his arrest he was found to
be operating a methamphetamine “lab” in the [Putative
Father’s] home. His most recent charges of possession of
methamphetamine arose while he was on probation
having been convicted [of] possessing methamphetamine.
39. [Putative Father] has never seen [Child] in person.
[Putative Father] has never spoken to [Child]. Since this
case was initiated, [Putative Father] has sent two cards to
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[Child], a Christmas Card in 2016, and a Birthday Card in
2017.
***
43. [Putative Father] registered with the Indiana Putative
Father Registry on or about August, 2017.
***
45. [Putative Father] failed to register with the Putative Father
Registry within the period specified by Indiana Statute.
[Putative Father] has waived notice of this adoption
proceeding. Therefore, [Putative Father’s] waiver
constitutes his irrevocably implied consent to [Adoptive
Parents’] adoption of [Child].
Id. at 10-11. The trial court dismissed Putative Father’s petition to establish
paternity with prejudice. Putative Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Our Supreme Court has set forth the standard of review of adoption decrees as
follows:
“When reviewing the trial court’s ruling in an adoption
proceeding, we will not disturb that ruling unless the evidence
leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an
opposite conclusion.” Rust v. Lawson, 714 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999). We presume the trial court’s decision is correct,
and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
decision. Id. at 771–72.
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When, as in this case, the trial court has made findings of fact
and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review:
“we must first determine whether the evidence supports the
findings and second, whether the findings support the
judgment.” In re Adoption of T.W., 859 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006); see also Ind. Trial Rule 52(A) (providing that
where the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of
law, “the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or
judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.”). Factual findings “are clearly erroneous if the record
lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them
[and] . . . a judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported
by the findings of fact and the conclusions relying on those
findings.” T.W., 859 N.E.2d at 1217.
In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). As always, we apply a de
novo standard of review to issues of law, including issues of statutory
interpretation. E.g., In re Adoption of J.R.O., 87 N.E.3d 37, 42 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017).
[8] Putative Father first argues that the trial court erred by finding that his consent
to the adoption was irrevocably implied because he failed to register as a
putative father in a timely fashion. Indiana Code section 31-19-5-18 provides as
follows: “[a] putative father who fails to register within the period specified by
section 12 of this chapter waives notice of an adoption proceeding. The
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putative father’s waiver under this section constitutes an irrevocably implied
consent to the child’s adoption.”1
[9] To comply with Indiana Code section 31-19-5-12, Putative Father was required
to register within thirty days of Child’s birth or by the date on which Adoptive
Parents filed their petition to adopt Child. I.C. § 31-19-5-12(a).2 It is
undisputed that Putative Father did not meet either of these deadlines. Instead,
he did not register as a putative father until Child was over three years old and
the adoption petition had been pending for eighteen months. As such, the trial
court did not err by finding that his consent to the adoption was irrevocably
implied.
[10] Putative Father makes a compelling argument that the purpose of the Putative
Father Registry is to ensure that putative fathers have notice if someone is
seeking to adopt their child(ren). I.C. § 31-19-5-3. In this case, Putative Father
not only had notice, he was an active participant; first, he took the initiative to
file a pro se paternity action and then, he actively took part in the adoption
1
A putative father’s consent to adoption is also irrevocably implied if he fails to file a motion to contest the
adoption within thirty days of service of notice of the adoption. I.C. § 31-19-9-12(1). Here, Putative Father
did not file a motion to contest the adoption within that timeframe. He had already, however, filed a petition
to establish paternity, which our Supreme Court has held is equivalent to filing a motion to contest the
adoption. In re B.W., 908 N.E.2d 586, 592-94 (Ind. 2009). Therefore, Putative Father’s consent was not
irrevocably implied for this reason.
2
This statute also includes a provision permitting a putative father to register by the date of the filing of a
petition to terminate the parent-child relationship between the child and the child’s mother. I.C. § 31-19-5-
12(a)(2)(B). Although Putative Father attempts to invoke this provision, arguing that when Mother
consented to the adoption her rights were effectively terminated, it is apparent that it does not apply because
no petition to terminate was filed in this case. And even if it did, Putative Father did not register until after
Mother consented to the adoption.
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proceedings. Here, therefore, there was no true reason that he had to register.
Indeed, it feels as though this outcome is not only nonsensical, but unjust; it
feels as though his action of filing the paternity cause should have been enough
to preserve his right to object; it feels as though this is the ultimate “gotcha”
outcome. In a perfect world, we would reverse. But this world is not perfect,
and the statute says what it says, which is that the failure to register in a timely
fashion leads to irrevocably implied consent.3 We are compelled to affirm the
trial court given the plain language of the statute at issue.
[11] Next, Putative Father contends that the trial court should not have granted the
adoption petition because Adoptive Parents did not submit an affidavit from the
State Department of Health stating whether he had registered as a putative
father or had filed a petition to establish paternity. Putative Father is correct
that such an affidavit is required, see I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a)(4), but in this case its
omission was harmless. Everyone, including Adoptive Parents and the trial
court, was on notice that Putative Father had filed a petition to establish
paternity and, in the end, had registered as a putative father. Moreover,
Putative Father had actual notice of the adoption and was an active participant
in the proceedings. Consequently, any departure from statutory procedure in
this regard was harmless.
3
Therefore, the takeaway for practitioners (though we acknowledge that Putative Father instituted his
paternity action pro se) is that the best course of action under circumstances similar to these would be to
register with the Putative Father Registry contemporaneously with—or even before—the filing of a paternity
action.
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[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Kirsch, J., concurs.
Bradford, J., concurs in result without an opinion.
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