State of Indiana v. Matthew Stidham

FILED
Sep 06 2018, 6:15 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. David W. Stone, IV
Attorney General of Indiana STONE Law Office & Legal
Research
Ellen H. Meilaender
Anderson, Indiana
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, September 6, 2018
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A02-1701-PC-68
v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
Court
Matthew Stidham, The Honorable Kimberly S.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Dowling, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
18C02-1602-PC-3
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 1 of 27
[1] The State of Indiana appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of a petition for
post-conviction relief filed by Matthew Stidham. The State raises one issue
which we revise and restate as whether the post-conviction court erred by
granting Stidham post-conviction relief. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The relevant facts as discussed in Stidham’s direct appeal follow:
On the night of February 23, 1991, [Stidham] and several of his
friends, including the decedent in this case, drove to the
decedent’s apartment where they drank whiskey and played
guitars. They eventually started “trading punches.” This
evidentially started as horseplay but grew into an angry
encounter between [Stidham] and the decedent.
As the fight escalated, the others joined with [Stidham] in beating
the decedent. Not only did they beat and kick the decedent, but
they also struck him with a wooden club. They then loaded
much of the decedent’s electronic equipment into his van, gagged
him, placed him in the back of the van and drove off. They
eventually arrived at a secluded area near the Mississinewa River
where the decedent was removed from the van and again beaten
and stabbed some forty-seven times before his body was thrown
into the river. After visiting with friends, who they told of the
killing, [Stidham] and his associates drove into the State of
Illinois where they were arrested.
Stidham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 1994).
[3] A jury trial resulted in the conviction of Stidham for murder, robbery as a class
A felony, criminal confinement as a class B felony, battery as a class C felony,
and auto theft as a class D felony. Id. In February 1993, the Indiana Supreme
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 2 of 27
Court reversed Stidham’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.
Id. (citing Stidham v. State, 608 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. 1993)).
[4] After retrial and convictions on all counts, Stidham appealed. Id. In that
appeal, he contended in part that his 141-year sentence was unreasonable and
disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 144. He argued “in sharp contrast to his
behavior prior to his original sentencing, his behavior in prison had been
exemplary, that he had obtained a GED, and that he actively participated in a
substance abuse program as certified by a letter to Judge Dailey from Linda
Poe[,] the substance abuse supervisor at the institution.” Id. He also argued
that the record disclosed that he was an abused child. Id.[5] In an opinion issued in July 1994, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded:
“Given the extreme brutality of the crimes committed in this case, the trial
judge was well within his discretion in refusing to mitigate the sentences either
on [Stidham’s] subsequent conduct in the prison or the abuse he had received as
a child.” Id. The Court observed: “As pointed out by the trial judge, two of
[Stidham’s] brothers had received the same treatment but had become
upstanding citizens in their community.” Id. The Court concluded that the
sentence was defective in one regard, remanded to the trial court for the
purpose of vacating the auto theft conviction as it should have been merged
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 3 of 27
with the robbery conviction, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. 1
Id.[6] On February 8, 2016, Stidham filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief
contending that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution. On
February 12, 2016, the State filed an answer to Stidham’s petition, and on
October 27, 2016, the court held a hearing. Stidham’s counsel offered an
exhibit “which is a full and complete transcript, which is a fair and accurate
copy of the original and that includes everything from the beginning through
the sentencing and all the appendices.” October 27, 2016 Transcript at 5. The
prosecutor had no objection, and the court admitted it as Petitioner’s Exhibit 1.
Delonda Lee Hartman testified that Stidham was her student when she was
teaching for Ball State University at Indiana State Prison in Michigan City. She
stated she thought Stidham was one of those students highlighted in a video
titled Cell Block Scholars. Stidham’s counsel offered the video as an exhibit,
and the prosecutor objected on the basis of relevance. Stidham’s counsel
argued that the video supports that “juveniles should be treated differently by
the Court” and that “juveniles need to have the ability to be reformed.” Id. at 8-
9. The court overruled the objection and admitted the exhibit. Hartman
1
Justice Sullivan, with Justice DeBruler concurring, dissented with respect to the sentence. 637 N.E.2d at
144.
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 4 of 27
testified that Stidham matured, was very helpful in class, and was an exemplary
student.
[7] Stidham indicated that he had “no real formal education” prior to being
sentenced but had become a full-time firefighter in prison, taught the biohazard
certification program and for an apprenticeship program, and was the firefighter
instructor. Id. at 12.
[8] On November 29, 2016, he filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, which concluded that his sentence should be ordered reduced to time
served. On January 3, 2017, the post-conviction court entered an order
granting Stidham’s petition and stating in part:
*****
2. [Stidham] was seventeen (17) years old at the time of the
offense.
*****
8. The Petition raises a single issue for consideration by this
Court: Whether [Stidham’s] sentence violates the 8th
Amendment of the US Constitution and Article 1 Sec 16
of the Indiana Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment.
9. Based upon the sentence imposed by this Court, if
[Stidham] is still alive, he will be eighty two (82) years of
age when his sentence is complete.
10. Since [Stidham] was sentenced much research has been
done on the brains of juveniles and their ability to change.
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 5 of 27
11. Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court had access
to this information and research since it did not exist at
that time.
12. Furthermore, [Stidham’s] actions and progress in prison is
a testament to this research.
13. There is no question that the crimes committed were
heinous.
14. The question for the Court, however, is whether the
sentence imposed was excessive in light of the research
done and cases decided in the meantime.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
15. The United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) held that the
imposition of mandatory life sentences without parole on
juveniles is forbidden.
16. Miller requires the sentencing judge to “take into account
how children are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime
in prison” [132] S. Ct. at 2469.
17. While Stidham was not sentenced to life without parole, it
is the functional equivalent.
18. Other courts in other jurisdictions have held similarly in
cases involving juveniles. Hayden v. Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d
1000 (E.D.N.C. 2015) cites several cases where de facto
life sentences for juveniles were held to be cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the 8th Amendment of
the Constitution.
19. The Indiana Supreme Court relied on Miller in two
separate 2014 cases.
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 6 of 27
20. In Brown v. State[,] 10 N.E.3d 1 (Ind. 2014)[,] and Fuller v.
State, [9 N.E.3d 653 (Ind. 2014),] the Court held that
imposition of juveniles of two consecutive 75 year
sentences for two (2) murders was improper.
21. The Court in those cases discussed the U.S. Supreme
Court’s observations that first, a juvenile lacks maturity
and has an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; second
that they are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,
and they have limited control over their own environment
and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific,
crime-producing settings; and third a child’s character is
not as well formed as an adult’s and his actions are less
likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity.
22. The Court in Fuller found that the maximum consecutive
sentence means denial of hope; it means that good
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it
means that whatever the future might hold in store for the
mind and spirit of the juvenile convict, he will remain in
prison for the rest of his days.
23. As a result, this Court finds that [Stidham’s] sentence was
excessive in light of his age at the time of the offense and
his Petition should be GRANTED.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume 2 at 51-52 (underlining omitted).
[9] The State appealed. In a memorandum decision, we held that the post-
conviction court had not entered “an appropriate order with respect to the
conviction or sentence” or complied with Section 6 of Ind. Post-Conviction
Rule 1 and we remanded for further proceedings. See State v. Stidham, No.
18A02-1701-PC-68, slip op. at 8 (Ind. Ct. App. June 14, 2017).
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 7 of 27
[10] The State petitioned for rehearing and argued that this Court should have
addressed its arguments that Stidham’s sentencing claim was barred from
review by procedural default, that his sentence did not violate the Eighth
Amendment, and that the post-conviction court could not revisit a sentence
found not unreasonable or disproportionate by the Indiana Supreme Court.
The State also argued that we should grant rehearing to clarify a jurisdictional
issue, i.e., whether this Court had retained jurisdiction or whether a new notice
of appeal would be necessary. We granted rehearing to clarify that we retained
jurisdiction and remanded for the post-conviction court to issue a sentencing
order. See State v. Stidham, No. 18A02-1701-PC-68 (Ind. Ct. App. October 18,
2017).
[11] On December 13, 2017, the State filed a Verified Motion for Writ in Aid of
Appellate Jurisdiction asserting that the post-conviction court scheduled a
resentencing hearing for March 8, 2018, and requested that this Court order the
post-conviction court to issue an amended post-conviction order within fifteen
days specifying the relief granted so that this Court could adjudicate the State’s
appeal and to refrain from holding new sentencing proceedings. Stidham filed
a response. On January 20, 2018, this Court entered an order denying the
State’s motion and stating in part:
In an affidavit attached to [Stidham’s] Response, Stidham’s
counsel asserts that an unrecorded conference occurred on
October 26, 2016, at which he and the deputy prosecutor were
present and at which it was agreed that the case would proceed in
two phases, that the first phase was to be limited to whether or
not Stidham was entitled to post-conviction relief, and that the
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second phase was to be devoted to evidence on what sentence
should be imposed if it was determined by the trial court in the
first phase that the defendant was entitled to post-conviction
relief. See Affidavit of John C. Reeder at 1. Neither party
previously mentioned the October 26, 2016 conference or that the
parties had agreed to proceed in two phases, which we find
disappointing. We disapprove of what appears to be a failure of
candor with this Court in the briefing process.
January 10, 2018 Order at 2.
[12] On March 15, 2018, the post-conviction court held a resentencing hearing and
incorporated prior proceedings at the request of Stidham’s counsel. Cynthia
Morris, Stidham’s aunt, testified that since he had been incarcerated Stidham
received his GED, his associate’s degree, and his bachelor’s degree, that he
became the captain of the fire department, and that he was “completely
changed.” March 15, 2018 Transcript at 7. She testified that Stidham suffered
severe abuse from other family members and foster homes including starvation,
someone trying to make him eat dog feces, being struck, and being stabbed with
scissors. She offered that Stidham could live with her sister and stated that he
had several job offers, that she spoke with people in the community who were
aware that he would be eligible to work with volunteer fire departments, and
that his family would help him financially.
[13] Stidham testified that he continued his education and training since the last
hearing and had become certified as a module A and a module B firefighter,
which includes technical rescue awareness, hazardous response operations, and
first responder awareness. When asked what had changed since the earlier
sentencing hearings in the 1990s, he answered in part:
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 9 of 27
I would like to say that if there’s one (1) thing that changed the
most is, you know, as a kid I was given a lot of opportunities.
People tried to help me. I refused it. You know, I destroyed
every relationship I ever come in contact with. And the biggest
thing that I think I’ve overcome is the fact that when I see
opportunities I try to take advantage of them. You know, even
when I fell or fumble, you know, I, I pick myself back up and I
put myself back on the right track. And that was something that
I was incapable of doing as a kid.
Id. at 16. He testified he had not received any conduct reports for any acts of
violence while incarcerated. Stidham’s institutional behavior listed in
Defendant’s Exhibit B included: refusing to obey an order in 1993, smoking
where prohibited in 1997, refusing to obey an order in 1998, unauthorized use
or possession of an electronic device in 2007, disruptive, unruly, rowdy conduct
in 2009, and unauthorized use or possession of an electronic device in 2014.
[14] On cross-examination, Stidham testified that he was sixty days shy of turning
eighteen years old when the offense occurred. On redirect examination, he
stated that one of his co-defendants received a sentence modification to be
released from the Department of Correction and another received a plea
agreement for only thirty-five years incarceration.
[15] After Stidham rested, the State presented the testimony of Mary Ann Barker,
who testified that she had known Daniel Barker, the victim in this case, and
that her husband was the victim’s brother. She stated that Daniel was a “quiet,
soft spoken person that wouldn’t hurt anybody,” “just wanted a friend,” and
“thought he found friends.” Id. at 26. When asked if anything had lessened the
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 10 of 27
pain of the murder that occurred in 1991, she answered: “No, it has not.” Id. at
27. She stated that her husband was not emotionally able to testify, and that
she thought Stidham should serve his full sentence.
[16] That same day, the court entered an order, stating:
This Court granted that petition for post-conviction relief on June
21, 2017.
The Court now proceeds to re-sentencing.
The Court has considered the pre-sentence investigation report
with the attached addendum from the 1993 sentencing, together
with the evidence as presented and the final comments of
counsel.
The Court, being duly and sufficiently advised in this cause, now
finds as follows:
Circumstances Supporting an Enhanced Sentence:
1. The defendant has a lengthy history of juvenile criminal
activity, which ultimately resulted in his commitment to the
Indiana Boys School on two occasions; and the Court gives this
factor some weight.
2. The defendant is in need of correctional or rehabilitative
treatment that can best be provided by commitment of the person
to a penal facility, and prior attempts at correctional treatment
and rehabilitation through juvenile probation and incarceration
has not been successful; and the Court gives this factor some
weight.
3. Imposition of a reduced or suspended sentence would
depreciate the seriousness of the crime; and the Court gives this
factor some weight.
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 11 of 27
4. The victim was likely mentally challenged; and the Court
gives this factor some weight.
5. The crime was particularly devastating to the victim’s family
members, and or relatives; and the Court gives this factor some
weight.
6. The defendant took substantial steps to conceal the crime and
evade capture; and the Court gives this factor some weight.
7. While incarcerated in the Madison County Jail, the defendant
was involved in an escape attempt on May 16, 1991[,] and was
placed on lockdown status; and the Court gives this factor some
weight.
8. This crime was savagely committed. The acts build upon
themselves, and the defendant had the opportunity to stop his
actions at any time, however, he chose to proceed to the ultimate
level without stepping away; and the Court gives this factor some
weight.
Circumstances Supporting a Reduced Sentence:
1. The defendant was of youthful age, that being 17 years of age
and this is his first felony conviction as an adult; and the Court
gives this factor some weight.
2. The defendant was severely and brutally abused by his
adopted mother while he was growing up; and the Court gives
this factor significant weight.
3. The defendant was first sentenced in 1991, and then again in
1993. Between those dates the defendant served approximately
two (2) years at the Indiana Department of Corrections. During
that time, the defendant earned his GED; and the Court gives
this factor some weight.
4. Also during the two years prior to the re-sentencing in 1993,
the defendant’s attitude completely had changed, he had learned
why he had had such a difficult time getting along with others
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 12 of 27
and was very polite during the second interview with probation;
and the Court gives this factor some weight.
5. The defendant had learning difficulties and was not well
educated; and the Court gives this factor some weight.
6. Also during the two years at the Department of Corrections
between sentencings, defendant had taken advantage of
substance abuse counseling and general counseling; and the
Court gives this factor some weight.
In weighing the above factors, the Court finds the circumstances
supporting an enhanced sentence outweigh the circumstances
supporting a reduced sentence.
The nature of the offense would support an enhanced sentence.
Defendant participated with others to confine another, kill him
brutally and steal items. All of these were senseless acts.
Defendant’s character supports the advisory sentence. Defendant
has a juvenile history, albeit a lengthy one, and no prior adult
convictions. The Court is going to take this opportunity to point
out the obvious: we are here today, almost 25 years after the
second sentencing. While the Court in re-sentencing must go
back and look at the laws and circumstances as of 1993, we
cannot ignore the accomplishments of the Defendant in prison
during that 25 years, and the Court is doing so as part of the
Defendant’s character. The Defendant has been a model
prisoner. He has earned his Associates and Bachelor’s Degrees
from Ball State University, was on the Dean’s List every
semester, graduated Magna Cum Laude, became a certified
firefighter and has spent 15 years as a paid full time firefighter
through the Department of Corrections, earned additional
certifications as a firefighter such that he is only one (1) of (11)
people certified in the United States as a Structural Firefighter, is
an instructor in firefighting, assists with education programs, and
participated in a documentary about the positive changes people
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can make in the Department of Corrections, produced by Ball
State University.
Therefore, as to Count 1, Murder, a felony, Defendant is
committed to the custody of the Indiana Department of
Correction for a period of sixty (60) years executed.
As to Count 2, Robbery, a Class A Felony, the Defendant is
committed to the custody of the Indiana Department of
Correction for a period of fifty (50) years, executed, which shall
be served concurrently with the sentence imposed under Count 1.
As to Count 3, Criminal Confinement, a Class B Felony, the
Defendant is committed to the custody of the Indiana
Department of Correction for a period of twenty (20) years,
executed, which shall be served concurrently with the sentence
imposed under Counts 1 and 2.
As to Count 4, Battery, a Class C Felony, the Defendant is
committed to the Indiana Department of Correction for a period
of eight (8) years, suspended, which shall be served consecutively
to the sentences imposed under Counts 1, 2, and 3.
The Defendant should be given credit for nine thousand eight
hundred eighty-one (9,881) days of jail time served as follows:
The original 851 days assessed at the time of sentencing in
1993
06/24/1993-12/31/1993 191 days
01/01/1994-03/14/2018 8839
Together with one thousand two hundred seventy-six (1,276)
days granted as a time cut by the Indiana Department of
Corrections while incarcerated, for a total of eleven thousand one
hundred fifty-seven (11,157) days served.
Defendant shall be given Class I Credit Time for the jail time
credit of nine thousand eight hundred eighty-one (9,881) days.
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The Court finds the executed sentence imposed under Count 1
has been satisfied.
Further, the Court finds that the Defendant has served two
hundred seven (207) days of the eight (8) years imposed under
Count 4. Therefore, the Defendant shall serve seven (7) years
and one hundred fifty-eight (158) days of the eight (8) years
suspended sentence on supervised probation. The Defendant
shall pay all associated costs and fees associated with supervised
probation.
This Court assessed costs of $113.00 at the time of sentencing in
1993, but found the defendant indigent. This Court will not
assess any further fines or costs.
*****
The State of Indiana requests the Court to stay the portion of the
Order releasing the Defendant to supervised probation pending
resolution of the appeal that is currently before the Indiana Court
of Appeals.
Argument heard and concluded.
The Court denied the State’s request.
Defendant ordered released in this matter.
March 15, 2018 Order on Sentencing Hearing at 1-4.2
Discussion
[17] The issue is whether the post-conviction court erred by granting Stidham post-
conviction relief. “Post-conviction proceedings are not super-appeals and
2
On March 16, 2018, this Court granted the State’s motion for stay.
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 15 of 27
provide only a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges.” State v.
Oney, 993 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind. 2013) (quoting State v. Cooper, 935 N.E.2d 146,
148 (Ind. 2010)). Generally, freestanding claims are unavailable in post-
conviction proceedings. See Reed v. State, 866 N.E.2d 767, 768 (Ind. 2007)
(holding that only issues not known at the time of the original trial or issues not
available on direct appeal may be properly raised through post-conviction
proceedings); Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002) (holding that in
“post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are
generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective
counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal”
and that it is wrong to review the petitioner’s fundamental error claim in a post-
conviction proceeding); Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 2001)
(holding that post-conviction procedures do not provide a petitioner with a
“super-appeal” or opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the original
trial court committed error and that such claims are available only on direct
appeal), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S. Ct. 1082 (2002).
[18] Where, as here, the State appeals a judgment granting post-conviction relief, we
review using the standard in Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). Oney, 993 N.E.2d at
161.
On appeal of claims tried by the court without a jury or with an
advisory jury, at law or in equity, the court on appeal shall not
set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of witnesses.
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Id. (quoting State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 150 (Ind. 2012)). Under the clearly
erroneous standard of review, we review only for the sufficiency of the
evidence. Id. We neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of
witnesses. Id. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the judgment and reverse only on a showing of clear
error. Id. Clear error is “that which leaves us with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. We do not defer to the post-
conviction court’s legal conclusions. Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 269 (Ind.
2014).
[19] The State argues that Stidham’s challenge of his sentence is barred by res
judicata. Stidham argues that his direct appeal addressed whether double
jeopardy barred some of his sentences and whether his sentence was
unreasonable. He argues that no claim was made that his sentence was
unconstitutional.
[20] “Res judicata is a legal doctrine intended ‘to prevent repetitious litigation of
disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding
against both the original parties and their privies.’” Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v.
Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d
697, 700 (Ind. 2013)). “It applies ‘where there has been a final adjudication on
the merits of the same issue between the same parties.’” Id. (quoting Gayheart v.
Newnam Foundry Co., Inc., 271 Ind. 422, 426, 393 N.E.2d 163, 167 (1979)). The
Indiana Supreme Court has held:
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Stated in more detail:
1. the former judgment must have been rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction;
2. the former judgment must have been rendered on the
merits;
3. the matter now in issue was or might have been
determined in the former suit; and
4. the controversy adjudicated in the former suit must have
been between the parties to the present action or their
privies.
Id. (quoting Chemco Transp., Inc. v. Conn, 527 N.E.2d 179, 181 (Ind. 1988)). If
any element is absent, res judicata does not apply. Id. “[I]ssues decided on
direct appeal may not be collaterally attacked on post-conviction review.” Allen
v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1178 (Ind. 2001), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1061, 122 S. Ct. 1925 (2002).
[21] In Stidham’s brief filed with the Indiana Supreme Court on November 22,
1993, he specifically cited the Eighth Amendment and Article 1, § 16 of the
Indiana Constitution, which are the same provisions cited in his petition for
post-conviction relief. See Appellant’s November 22, 1993 Brief at 27.3 In his
1993 brief, Stidham raised the arguments of improvements while in prison. He
argued that he did not have any conduct write-ups in prison, obtained his
3
The State did not include a copy of Stidham’s 1993 brief in the record. However, Ind. Evidence Rule 201
provides that we “may judicially notice . . . the existence of . . . records of a court of this state.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana |Opinion 18A02-1701-PC-68 | September 6, 2018 Page 18 of 27
G.E.D., and participated in a substance abuse program and religion classes.
Stidham also pointed to the abuse he suffered as a child.
[22] In responding to Stidham’s arguments, the Indiana Supreme Court issued an
opinion in July 1994 which held:
Appellant points out that he was resentenced after the second
trial nearly two years after his first trial and that during that
period of time he was incarcerated in the Indiana State Prison.
Appellant contends that, in sharp contrast to his behavior prior to
his original sentencing, his behavior in prison had been
exemplary, that he had obtained a GED, and that he actively
participated in a substance abuse program as certified by a letter
to Judge Dailey from Linda Poe the substance abuse supervisor
at the institution.
Appellant further states that the record discloses he was an
abused child, a fact which should be taken into consideration as a
mitigating factor. Although the trial judge considered these
factors in rendering his sentence, he was not required to make an
affirmative finding expressly negating each potential mitigating
factor. Stout v. State (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 476; Hammons v.
State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1250.
Given the extreme brutality of the crimes committed in this case,
the trial judge was well within his discretion in refusing to
mitigate the sentences either on appellant’s subsequent conduct
in the prison or the abuse he had received as a child. As pointed
out by the trial judge, two of appellant’s brothers had received the
same treatment but had become upstanding citizens in their
community.
Stidham, 637 N.E.2d at 144.
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[23] Based upon the arguments in his 1993 brief and in his petition for post-
conviction relief, we conclude that the controversy adjudicated by the Indiana
Supreme Court in 1994 determined this issue and that the doctrine of res judicata
precludes Stidham’s claim. See Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1187 n.3
(Ind. 2001) (“Wrinkles contends on post-conviction that his death sentence
constitutes ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ because of ‘unfair and unreliable
sentencing procedures.’ We reviewed Wrinkles’ death sentence on direct
appeal and found it to be appropriate. To the extent Wrinkles now seeks to
relitigate the appropriateness of his death sentence, his claim is barred by res
judicata.”), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019, 122 S. Ct. 1610 (2002); Allen, 749 N.E.2d
at 1178 (holding that issues raised by the petitioner were barred by res judicata);
Marts v. State, 478 N.E.2d 63, 64-65 (Ind. 1985) (“The precise issue, i.e.
whether his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the State and Federal Constitutions, regardless of how it is now phrased, was
presented to this Court and determined adversely to his position in his direct
appeal. Hence, the issue was not reviewable in a subsequent post-conviction
proceeding.”) (citations omitted).
[24] To the extent Stidham’s claims are based upon improvements since 1994, he is
essentially requesting a sentence modification. At the time Stidham filed his
petition for post-conviction relief on February 8, 2016, Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17was titled “Reduction or suspension of sentence,” and subsection (k) provided:
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This subsection applies to a convicted person who is a violent
criminal.[4] A convicted person who is a violent criminal may,
not later than three hundred sixty-five (365) days from the date of
sentencing, file one (1) petition for sentence modification under
this section without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.
After the elapse of the three hundred sixty-five (365) day period,
a violent criminal may not file a petition for sentence
modification without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.
[25] In his 1993 brief, Stidham asserted that his sentence was unconstitutional, and
the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the claim. Accordingly, despite his
argument to the contrary, Stidham is essentially requesting a modification of his
sentence. See Marts, 478 N.E.2d at 65 (“In the case at bar, however, this Court
had previously determined that the sentence was not unconstitutional, Marts v.
State, 432 N.E.2d [18, 22 (Ind. 1982)], the only ground upon which Petitioner
claims error; hence, he is clearly requesting a modification, not a correction, of
his sentence.”). Stidham does not allege that he filed a petition for sentence
modification or that he had the consent of the prosecuting attorney.
Accordingly, we cannot say that Stidham filed a proper modification of his
sentence pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(k) or that the post-conviction court
had the authority to modify the sentence. See id. (holding that the post-
conviction court had no authority to modify the petitioner’s sentence following
the time limit in Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17 and “in light of the fact that the Post-
Conviction Rules do not provide for modification of a sentence which has been
4
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(d) defines a “violent criminal” as a person convicted of murder.
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established by the Legislature as appropriate for the offense and which has been
found to be constitutional”).
[26] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the post-conviction court’s grant of
Stidham’s petition for post-conviction relief.
[27] Reversed.
Pyle, J., concurs.
May, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A02-1701-PC-68
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
Matthew Stidham,
Appellee-Plaintiff.
May, Judge, concurring in result.
[28] The doctrine of res judicata undoubtedly performs functions essential to the
success of our American legal system, as it prevents repetitious litigation that
would keep parties in interminable conflict, bog down our system, and delay or
prevent the administration of justice. See, e.g., Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v.
Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014) (res judicata ‘prevent[s] repetitious
litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final
judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies’”) (quoting
Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013)). Nevertheless, our Indiana
Supreme Court has also explained:
With due respect for the doctrine of res judicata this Court has
always maintained the option of reconsidering earlier cases in
order to correct error. “A court has the power to revisit prior
decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance,
although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence
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of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision
was ‘clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.’”
State v. Lewis (1989), Ind., 543 N.E.2d 1116[, 1118] (quoting
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817,
108 S. Ct. 2166, 2178, 100 L.Ed.2d 811, 831 (1988)). Finality
and fairness are both important goals. When faced with an
apparent conflict between them, this Court unhesitatingly
chooses the latter.
State v. Huffman, 643 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ind. 1994).
[29] Our understanding of juvenile offenders and of the factors to consider when
determining an appropriate sentence for juveniles have changed greatly in the
twenty-five years since seventeen-year-old Stidham received his 141-year
sentence:
In holding death sentences and mandatory life without parole
sentences for those under the age of eighteen to be
unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court has
underpinned its reasoning with a general recognition that
juveniles are less culpable than adults and therefore are less
deserving of the most severe punishments. See Graham [v.
Florida], 560 U.S. [48,] 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011 [2010]. This
presumption that juveniles are generally less culpable than adults
is based on previous and ongoing “‘developments in psychology
and brain science’” which “‘continue to show fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult minds’” in, for instance,
“‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control.’” Miller [v.
Alabama], [567 U.S. 460, 471-72,] 132 S. Ct. [2455,] 2464
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011). The Supreme
Court has discerned “three significant gaps between juveniles and
adults.” Id. First, “[a]s compared to adults, juveniles have a
‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.’”
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (quoting Roper v.
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Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1(2005) (quotation omitted)). Second, “they ‘are more vulnerable
or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure,’” Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 125
S. Ct. 1183), and “they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own
environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from
horrific, crime-producing settings.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464(alteration in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S. Ct.
1183). Finally, “a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an
adult’s . . . and his actions [are] less likely to be ‘evidence of
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S. Ct. 1183). “These salient
characteristics mean that ‘[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’”
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (alteration in original)
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183). Even justices
not finding categorical Constitutional violations in these juvenile
cases agree with this precept. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 90, 130 S.
Ct. 2011 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“Roper’s
conclusion that juveniles are typically less culpable than adults
has pertinence beyond capital cases.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 599,
125 S. Ct. 1183 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It is beyond cavil
that juveniles as a class are generally less mature, less
responsible, and less fully formed than adults, and that these
differences bear on juveniles’ comparative moral culpability.”).
Consistent with the [United States] Supreme Court’s reasoning
this Court has not been hesitant to reduce maximum sentences
for juveniles convicted of murder. In Carter v. State, we reduced
to fifty years a fourteen-year-old’s maximum sixty-year sentence
for the brutal murder of a seven-year-old girl, recognizing among
other things his young age. 711 N.E.2d 835, 836-37 (Ind. 1999).
In the case of a sixteen-year-old who brutally beat his adoptive
parents to death while they slept, we reduced a maximum 120-
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year sentence to eighty years. Walton v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1134,
1135, 1137 (Ind. 1995). And in Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529,
530 (Ind. 1995), the seventeen-year-old defendant and his two
eighteen-year-old cohorts planned to rob a woman as she made a
night deposit after work. In executing the crime, the defendant
fired multiple shots at the victim, killing her. In the days after the
robbery the perpetrators spent the proceeds of their crime at the
mall, going to the movies and out to eat. Finding additional
mitigating circumstances not recognized by the trial court, we
concluded the defendant’s seventy-year sentence was manifestly
unreasonable and reduced it to an aggregate term of fifty years.
Id. at 530-31, 534.
Similar to a life without parole sentence, Brown’s 150 year
sentence “‘forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.’” Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2465 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S. Ct.
2011). Indeed, Brown’s sentence essentially “‘means denial of
hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement
are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in
store for the mind and spirit of the [juvenile] convict, he will
remain in prison for the rest of his days.’” Graham, 560 U.S. at
70, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 779
P.2d 944, 944 (1989)).
Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 6-8 (Ind. 2014). Thus, were we able to consider the
merits of Stidham’s argument, it may be that his 141-year sentence is
inappropriate in light of his offenses and character.
[30] However, Stidham challenged his sentence on 8th Amendment grounds in his
1993 appellate brief and our Indiana Supreme Court addressed his sentencing
arguments. See Stidham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ind. 1994). While a
court has “the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate
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court in any circumstance,” Huffman, 643 N.E.2d at 901 (quoting Lewis, 543
N.E.2d at 1118), we are not a “coordinate court” of our Indiana Supreme
Court. Cf. Inferior Court, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Any
court that is subordinate to the chief appellate tribunal within a judicial
system.”). And see, e.g., American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co.,
800 N.E.2d 1015, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The trial court is not a
coordinate court to this court; thus, it has no power to alter an appellate
decision.”). Therefore, I am constrained to concur with the majority’s
determination that the doctrine of res judicata prohibits us from reconsidering
the appropriateness of Stidham’s sentence.
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