State of Indiana v. Pebble Stafford

FILED
Dec 27 2018, 8:56 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Jason J. Pattison
Attorney General of Indiana Madison, Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, December 27, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
39A04-1705-CR-930
v. Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit
Court
Pebble Stafford, The Honorable Darrell M. Auxier,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
The Honorable W. Gregory Coy,
Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
39C01-1307-FB-696
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] On June 10, 2014, Pebble Stafford pled guilty to three offenses each under a
separate cause number, and her plea agreement provided that she would receive
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consecutive sentences of six years executed, thirty days in jail, and four years
executed with direct placement in community corrections. The trial court
accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Stafford accordingly. In 2017,
Stafford petitioned the trial court for a sentence modification. Over the State’s
objection, the trial court granted Stafford’s motion. The State appealed.
[2] We issued an opinion in this case in October 2017 and determined that in light
of the legislature’s 2014 amendment to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17, Stafford did not
waive her right to sentence modification by entering into a fixed plea
agreement, and thus, the trial court was authorized to modify her sentence
without the approval of the prosecutor. We therefore affirmed the trial court’s
modification of Stafford’s sentence, but asked the legislature for clarification.
[3] Likely in response to our request, the legislature amended I.C. § 35-38-1-17
effective on July 1, 2018. Our Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated our
original opinion in this case, and remanded to us with instructions to reconsider
in light of this amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we now conclude
that the trial court was not authorized to amend Stafford’s sentence as it was
pursuant to a fixed plea agreement.
[4] Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.
Facts & Procedural History
[5] On July 18, 2013, the State charged Stafford with Class B felony dealing in a
controlled substance. At that time, Stafford also faced two unrelated charges
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under two separate cause numbers. On June 10, 2014, Stafford entered into a
plea agreement with the State resolving all three cases. Stafford agreed to plead
guilty to Class B felony dealing in a controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor
possession of a substance to interfere with a screening test, and Class C felony
battery. The plea agreement provided that Stafford would receive consecutive
sentences of six years in the Department of Correction (DOC) with none
suspended for the Class B felony; thirty days in the Jefferson County Jail for the
Class B misdemeanor; and four years in the DOC with direct placement in
community corrections for the Class C felony battery. The plea agreement
contained no provision for sentence modification. The trial court accepted the
plea agreement and sentenced Stafford in accordance therewith.
[6] Effective July 1, 2014, weeks after Stafford pled guilty, the legislature amended
I.C. § 35-38-1-17 in an effort to relax the rules regarding sentence modification.
On January 30, 2017, Stafford filed a petition to modify her sentence. The
State objected, citing Ind. Code § 35-35-3-3(e), which dictates that a trial court
is bound by the terms of the plea agreement. Following a hearing, the trial
court granted Stafford’s petition on April 12, 2017. In relevant part, the trial
court found as follows:
2. The plea agreement was silent as to the right of [Stafford]
to seek a modification; nor did it preclude her from doing
so.
3. [Stafford] has completed a therapeutic community
[program] for which she was given credit toward her
sentence.
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4. After completion of the CLIFF program [Stafford] served
as a mentor in the program.
5. [Stafford] also obtained a GED, completed a course in
Problem Solving, and took courses in building trades.
6. [Stafford’s] plan upon release is to go to the Ruth Haven
halfway house, obtain a full time job, remain clean, and
continue her education at IVY Tech as a part time student.
***
10. This court finds that there is no purpose in requiring
[Stafford] to remain in the DOC until her current release
date of August, 2019; she has completed multiple
programs while at DOC and no further programs or
treatment are available there which will avail [Stafford] of
any further opportunity to improve herself or her situation
at DOC and has been rehabilitated to the extent the DOC
is able to do so.
11. [Stafford] can seek to become employed and educated if
released from imprisonment.
12. The Court finds that the remainder of [Stafford]’s sentence
should be suspended to probation with monitoring by the
community corrections department.
Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 118-19. The trial court ordered that Stafford be on
supervised probation for three years, but that after successful completion of one
year of probation, she could petition for unsupervised probation. The State
appeals.
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Discussion & Decision
[7] In our original decision, we considered the legislature’s 2014 amendment to
I.C. § 35-38-1-17, in which the following language was added:
A person may not waive the right to sentence modification under
this section as part of a plea agreement. Any purported waiver of
the right to sentence modification under this section in a plea
agreement is invalid and unenforceable as against public policy.
This subsection does not prohibit the finding of a waiver of the
right to sentence modification for any other reason, including
failure to comply with the provisions of this section.
I.C. § 35-38-1-17(l).1 We determined that with the addition of this language, the
legislature “plainly stated that a person may not waive the right to sentence
modification as part of a plea agreement—any plea agreement [including fixed
plea agreements].” State v. Stafford, 86 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017),
trans. granted. Thus, although Stafford entered into a fixed plea agreement, she
did not thereby waive her right to seek modification of her sentence. We
therefore held that notwithstanding Stafford’s fixed plea agreement, the trial
court was authorized to modify her sentence without the prosecutor’s approval.
Id.
[8] In a later dissent regarding the same issue in Rodriguez v. State, 91 N.E.3d 1033,
1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. granted, Senior Judge Rucker focused on the
1
When originally added, this language was found in subsection (i). Through a subsequent amendment, the
language was moved to subsection (l).
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last sentence of the 2014 amendment: “This subsection does not prohibit the
finding of a waiver of the right to sentence modification for any other
reason . . . .” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(l). In light of this language, Senior Judge
Rucker reached a contrary interpretation of the statute:
[T]he trial court lacked the authority to modify [a sentence] not
because of a “waive[r] to the right of sentence modification … as
part of a plea agreement.” [See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(l).] Instead, the
trial court lacked such authority for a wholly different reason – or
in the language of the statute “for any other reason”—namely:
because of the bargain . . . struck with the State of Indiana.
91 N.E.3d at 1040. In other words, the “other reason” the trial court lacked
authority to modify the sentence was because, pursuant to I.C. § 35-35-3-3(e),
the trial court remained bound by the terms of the plea agreement.
[9] “[I]f a statute admits of more than one interpretation, then it is ambiguous; and
we thus resort to rules of statutory interpretation so as to give effect to the
legislature’s intent.” Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016). Upon
further reflection, we conclude that the 2014 amendment rendered I.C. § 35-38-
1-17 ambiguous, in that the statute was reasonably susceptible to (1) the
interpretation Senior Judge Rucker articulated in his Rodriguez dissent, i.e., that
waiver of modification is permissible when the defendant has negotiated a fixed
plea agreement; and (2) the interpretation we articulated in our original
decision—an interpretation also reached by the majority in Rodriguez—i.e., that
a defendant cannot waive the right to modification under these circumstances.
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[10] Notably, in our original decision, we called upon the legislature to clarify its
intent. In direct response to our call for clarification, the legislature, at its first
opportunity in the next legislative session, amended I.C. § 35-38-1-17. The
legislature added language to both subsection (e) and subsection (l), which is
emphasized in italics below:
(e) At any time after:
(1) a convicted person begins serving the person’s
sentence; and
(2) the court obtains a report from the department of
correction concerning the convicted person’s conduct
while imprisoned;
the court may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a
sentence that the court was authorized to impose at the time of
sentencing. However, if the convicted person was sentenced under the
terms of a plea agreement, the court may not, without the consent of the
prosecuting attorney, reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a
sentence not authorized by the plea agreement. The court must
incorporate its reasons in the record.
***
(l) A person may not waive the right to sentence modification
under this section as part of a plea agreement. Any purported
waiver of the right to sentence modification under this section in
a plea agreement is invalid and unenforceable as against public
policy. This subsection does not prohibit the finding of a waiver
of the right to:
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(1) have a court modify a sentence and impose a sentence not
authorized by the plea agreement, as described under subsection
(e); or
(2) sentence modification for any other reason, including
failure to comply with the provisions of this section.
I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e), (l) (emphasis supplied).
[11] Through its amendment, the legislature made a definitive statement that trial
courts are not authorized to modify sentences that were imposed by virtue of a
plea agreement unless the agreement itself contemplated such a modification
and/or the prosecuting attorney agrees to the modification. In other words, it is
now clear that the sentencing parameters of a plea agreement continue to bind a
trial court during subsequent modification proceedings. See I.C. § 35-35-3-3(e).
[12] Just as inaction by the legislature can be viewed as acquiescence in a judicial
interpretation of a statute, “the opposite is also true, i.e., that action by the
legislature to amend a law can help clarify the legislature’s original intent in
adopting the law.” In re J.S., 48 N.E.3d 356, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). When
the legislature disagrees with judicial rulings, it can act swiftly to assert that a
court’s interpretation of its statute is incorrect. Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v.
U-Haul Intern., 745 N.E.2d 755, 761 (Ind. 2001). “Where it appears that the
Legislature amends a statute to express its original intention more clearly, the
normal presumption that an amendment changes a statute’s meaning does not
apply.” Ind. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kitchin Hospitality, LLC, 907 N.E.2d 997, 1002
(Ind. 2009); see also Olatunji v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
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(noting that “an amendment to a statute raises the presumption that the
legislature intended to change the law, unless it clearly appears that the
amendment was passed in order to express the original intent more clearly”).
[13] Here, the legislature acted swiftly following the decisions in Stafford and
Rodriguez. We can glean from this that the legislature was simply making clear
its original intent, and thus, the 2018 amendment to I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e) and (l)
did not change the original meaning of the statute. We therefore conclude that
the legislature never intended to create a right to modification of fixed sentences
imposed under a plea agreement. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not
have authority to modify Stafford’s sentence without the prosecutor’s approval. 2
[14] In light of the foregoing, we reverse the trial court and remand with instructions
to reinstate Stafford’s sentence as provided in the plea agreement. In doing so,
we observe that I.C. § 35-38-1-17(l) still reflects the overriding public policy
against waiver-of-modification provisions. Nonetheless, the statutory
framework limits the range of possible modification to that “authorized by the
plea agreement.” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e), -17(l)(1). In this case, Stafford entered
into—and the trial court accepted—a plea agreement with just one authorized
2
In revisiting Rodriguez, the majority there adheres to its original interpretation of the 2014 amendment, and
proceeds to address the interplay between the plea agreement, the 2018 amendment, and the Contract Clause
of the United States Constitution. Rodriguez v. State, No. 20A03-1704-CR-724, slip op. at 13-17 (Ind. Ct.
App. Dec. 14, 2018). The Court ultimately concludes that retroactive application of the 2018 amendment
would be unconstitutional as applied and also fundamentally unfair. Id. at 17. We note in passing, however,
that Stafford—unlike the defendant in Rodriguez—entered her plea agreement before the effective date of the
2014 amendment. Thus, even if we shared the interpretation and approach espoused in Rodriguez, we would
discern no such constitutional infirmity or fundamental unfairness in the instant case.
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sentence, thereby leaving no room for modification. Notably, however, Indiana
trial courts retain broad discretion to accept or reject plea agreements. See I.C. §
35-35-3-3; Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994); Meadows v.
State, 428 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1981). Thus, if ever desired, a trial court
may avoid the instant issue by rejecting a “fixed sentence” plea agreement that
fails to authorize sentence modification in the case of changed circumstances.
[15] Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.
Bailey, J., concurs.
Baker, J., dissents with opinion.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, Court of Appeals Case No.
39A04-1705-CR-930
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
Pebble Stafford,
Appellee-Petitioner
Baker, Judge, dissenting.
[16] I respectfully dissent. In the legislative session that convened following our
original decision in Stafford, our General Assembly reconsidered and amended
the language included in the 2014 amendment of Indiana Code section 35-38-1-
17. In my view, the General Assembly realized that this Court’s interpretation
of the statute was both right and reasonable. For that reason, the legislature
followed our suggestion to clarify the statute.
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Pre-2018 Amendment
[17] I continue to believe that our original decision was both right and reasonable,
based on the language of the statute at that time. A plea agreement is
contractual in nature, binding upon the defendant, the State, and the trial court.
St. Clair v. State, 901 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. 2009). Once a trial court accepts a
plea agreement, it is bound by the terms of that agreement. Ind. Code § 35-35-
3-3(e).
[18] For many years, it was well established that a trial court had no authority to
later modify a fixed plea sentence unless the plea agreement reserved to the
court the right to engage in such a modification. E.g., Pannarale v. State, 638
N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994). In 2014, however, the General Assembly
amended the statute regarding sentence modification, adding the following new
provision:
A person may not waive the right to sentence modification under
this section as part of a plea agreement. Any purported waiver of
the right to sentence modification under this section in a plea
agreement is invalid and unenforceable as against public policy.
This subsection does not prohibit the finding of a waiver of the
right to sentence modification for any other reason, including
failure to comply with the provisions of this section.
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Ind. Code 35-38-1-17(l).3 This statute has explicit retroactive application to
offenders who were convicted and sentenced before July 2014. I.C. § 35-38-1-
17(a). The General Assembly also loosened other rules regarding sentence
modification with these amendments, including the elimination of all time
periods related to when a non-violent offender could seek a sentence
modification and the express authorization of sentence modification without
the consent of the prosecutor. I.C. § 35-38-1-17.
[19] It is apparent that, by relaxing the rules regarding sentence modification, our
General Assembly was guided by Article I, Section 18, of the Indiana
Constitution, which provides that “[t]he penal code shall be founded on the
principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” In keeping with this
philosophy is the legislature’s recognition of the public policy against a
purported waiver in a plea agreement of a defendant’s ability to seek sentence
modification.
[20] The State focuses on the following section of the statute:
(e) At any time after:
(1) a convicted person begins serving the person’s
sentence; and
3
When first enacted, this section was codified as subsection -17(i); it was later codified as subsection -17(l)
but is otherwise identical to the earliest version.
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(2) the court obtains a report from the department of
correction concerning the convicted person’s
conduct while imprisoned;
the court may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose
a sentence that the court was authorized to impose at the time of
sentencing. The court must incorporate its reasons in the
record.
I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e) (emphasis added). According to the State, this provision
means that a trial court may not modify a sentence following a fixed sentence
plea agreement if the right to modify was not included in the agreement:
[I]n a case involving a fixed-sentence plea, the only sentence that
the court “was authorized to impose at the time of sentencing” is
the precise sentence provided for in the plea agreement. Thus, by
the plain language of the modification statute, a court does not
have any authority to modify where it had no discretion at the
time of the original imposition of sentence. . . . If a trial court
had no authority to impose a particular sentencing term when it
originally imposed sentence, then it has no authority to impose
that term through a subsequent modification.
Original Appellant’s Br. p. 12 (internal citations omitted). And the State further
argues that subsection -17(l) does not provide the trial court with sentence
modification authority:
[Subsection -17(l)] further provides that “[t]his subsection does
not prohibit the finding of a waiver of the right to sentence
modification for any other reason.” Thus, this subsection is only
speaking to waiver provisions within a plea agreement that
would remove the authority to modify that a court would
otherwise possess under the terms of the agreement. It does not
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speak to any other way in which the right to seek a modification
could otherwise be waived, such as by entering into an agreement
to receive a specific sentence. . . . If the General Assembly had
intended to . . . allow modifications of fixed-sentence pleas, it
would have said so directly. Instead, the legislature included
language allowing trial courts to find the right to seek a
modification waived “for any other reason,” which would
include the reason that the defendant bargained for and agreed
that she would serve this specific sentence.
Id. at 13-14.
[21] I cannot agree with the State’s tortured interpretation of the plain statutory
language. First, as to what sentence the trial court is “authorized” to impose at
the time of sentencing, that authorization is bound not only by the language of
the plea agreement but also by the law. And the General Assembly has quite
clearly stated that, as of July 2014, “[a] person may not waive the right to
sentence modification under this section as part of a plea agreement.” I.C. § 35-
38-1-17(l). Therefore, following the enactment of these statutory amendments,
the legislature has declared that trial courts are not authorized to impose a
sentence that purports to waive the defendant’s right to a later modification.
[22] Second, while the State insists that subsection -17(l) does not allow
modifications of fixed sentence plea agreements, I disagree. The General
Assembly could easily have carved out an explicit exception for fixed sentence
plea agreements, but it did not do so. Instead, it plainly stated that a person
may not waive the right to sentence modification as part of a plea agreement—
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any plea agreement—and went a step further, cautioning that any such
purported waiver is invalid, unenforceable, and against public policy. Id.
[23] The statute says what it says, and we are bound to interpret and apply statutes
in a way that fulfills the legislature’s intent. And this version of the statute
clearly and unambiguously states that offenders “may not waive the right to
sentence modification . . . as part of a plea agreement.” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e).
[24] Here, the trial court explicitly found that Stafford has completed many
programs while incarcerated, has a solid plan in place for her reentry into
society, and has been rehabilitated to the extent it is possible to do so during her
incarceration. Under these circumstances, I believe that the trial court did not
err by granting Stafford’s motion to modify in this case.
2018 Amendment
[25] The 2018 amendment does not change my opinion regarding the way in which
this case should be resolved. I do not believe that the General Assembly can or
should attempt to retroactively void a court order by statute. In my view, such
an attempt violates the Indiana Constitution’s Separation of Powers provision
by overstepping and taking away the judicial power of the trial court. Ind.
Const. Art. 3, Section 1.
[26] Here, the amendment of Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17 was aimed squarely
at this Court’s Stafford decision as well as the trial court’s original order under
consideration. While it is clear that the amended statutory language precludes
future trial courts from taking the actions that were taken in this case, in my
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opinion, the after-the-fact amendment should not be allowed to vitiate what has
already occurred in this particular case. For these reasons, I would again affirm
the trial court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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