Gregory T. Hardin and Kelly T. Hardin v. Ruth McClintic

FILED
May 23 2019, 8:41 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Michael L. Carmin Robert S. McCrea
CarminParker, P.C. McCrea & McCrea
Bloomington, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Gregory T. Hardin and Kelly T. May 23, 2019
Hardin, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants, 53A01-1712-PL-2964
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
v. Court
The Honorable Elizabeth Ann
Ruth McClintic, Cure, Judge
Appellee. Trial Court Cause No.
53C01-1605-PL-1113
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] This appeal involves a dispute between adjacent property owners over a
property boundary and the use of a gravel driveway located on the boundary of
the two properties. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that: (1)
Appellee/Defendant Ruth McClintic (“McClintic”) had established her
counterclaims for adverse possession to land that was up to the right wheel
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track of the gravel driveway and her counterclaim for a prescriptive easement to
use the remainder of the driveway for ingress and egress to her property;1 and
(2) Gregory T. Hardin and Kelly T. Hardin (collectively, “the Hardins”) had
failed to establish their claims for injunctive relief based on trespass and
damages. The Hardins argue that the trial court erred by entering judgment in
favor of McClintic on her counterclaims and by entering judgment against them
on their claims.2 Concluding that there was no error, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether the trial court erred by entering judgment in favor of
McClintic on her counterclaims.
2. Whether the trial court erred by entering judgment against the
Hardins on their claims.
Facts
[3] Both McClintic and the Hardins own property that abuts Lake Lemon in
Monroe County. McClintic owns a rectangular tract of real estate located at
1
The trial court also determined that McClintic had established a right to use the gravel driveway based on
her counterclaim for an implied easement by prior use. Because we affirm the trial court’s judgment that
McClintic had a right to use the driveway based on the prescriptive easement, we need not address her right
to use it based on an implied easement by prior use.
2
The Hardins state that appellate review of the trial court’s judgment on their claims would be reviewable on
appeal only if our Court were to reverse the trial court’s judgment on McClintic’s counterclaims. Therefore,
we will review the Hardins’ argument regarding the counterclaims before we review their argument regarding
their claims.
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9161 East Southshore Drive (“McClintic Property”), and this tract measures
49.8 feet wide and 269 feet long and contains 0.30 of an acre “more or less.”
(Ex. Vol. at 28). The Hardins own an adjacent rectangular tract of real estate
located at 9155 East Southshore Drive (“Hardin Property”), which is located to
the west of the McClintic Property.3 The Hardin Property measures 90 feet
wide and 269 feet long and contains 0.56 of an acre “more or less.” (Ex. Vol. at
27). A gravel driveway, which is the focus of this appeal, lies on the western
border of the McClintic Property and the eastern border of the Hardin Property.
[4] These two property tracts were originally part of a larger tract of real estate
owned by Virginia Chitwood (“Chitwood”). Around 1965, Chitwood divided
her larger tract of land (“the Chitwood Property”) into several rectangular tracts
and sold them. Among the tracts of land sold were the McClintic Property and
the Hardin Property. The gravel driveway at issue was in existence at the time
Chitwood severed and conveyed these two tracts of the Chitwood Property.
[5] On July 20, 1965, Chitwood conveyed the Hardin Property to Norma Ratliff
(“Ratliff”) as trustee for a group of families, who called themselves the
Bloomington Boat Club (“the Boat Club”). The members of the Boat Club put
some trailers on the western side of their property and used the property during
the weekends. On April 5, 1966, Chitwood conveyed the McClintic Property to
3
The Hardins also own another tract of real estate at 9149 East Southshore Drive, which is west of the
Hardin Property. They purchased this other property prior to purchasing the Hardin Property. This other
property is not at issue in this appeal.
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Raymond Hacker and Gladys Hacker (“the Hackers”). The Hackers added a
cabin on their property and added a parking area by the cabin. The Hackers’
cabin is located immediately to the east of the gravel driveway. The Hackers
and the members of the Boat Club used the gravel driveway to access their
individual properties, and they “always shared the cost on it.” (App. Vol. 2 at
158).
[6] On December 24, 1970, the Hackers conveyed the McClintic Property to
Lowell Willis and Lauretta Willis (“McClintic’s parents”). Shortly thereafter,
in 1971, McClintic’s parents, after obtaining a permit from the Monroe County
Health Department for the approval of a septic system, installed a septic system
on the McClintic Property. The septic system is located on the property
between the cabin and Southshore Drive, and it encompasses almost the entire
width of the property. In August 1987, McClintic’s parents obtained a permit
to install a mobile home on the McClintic Property. Around that same time,
they also obtained a driveway permit, which was for a “pre-existing” driveway,
at the McClintic property. (Ex. Vol. at 39). As did their predecessor in title,
McClintic’s parents always used the gravel driveway for ingress to and egress
from the McClintic Property, and they contributed to the maintenance of the
gravel driveway by paying for some gravel to add to it.
[7] In 1995, McClintic began living on the McClintic Property, including in the
cabin and then in the mobile home. On June 25, 2004, McClintic’s parents
conveyed the McClintic Property to McClintic. McClintic continued to live on
the McClintic Property until 2014 or 2015, and then she rented it out to tenants.
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Both McClintic and her tenants used the gravel driveway to enter and exit the
McClintic Property.
[8] On July 18, 2007, the remaining members of the Boat Club—which included
Mary Masters, Garland Guy Robertson, Eugenia M. Goodman, Candra
Empson, Claudia Polley, and Sharon Slaughter—conveyed the Hardin
Property to the Hardins. The Hardins did not have or review a survey prior to
purchasing the property. They had planned to remove the three trailers that the
Boat Club had installed on the property, build a house on the lot, and then sell
it.
[9] In October 2007, after having a survey done of the Hardin Property, the
Hardins learned that McClintic could possibly have some rights to the gravel
driveway. At the end of 2007, the Hardins sent McClintic two letters, in which
they sought to determine if McClintic had permission or an easement to use the
gravel driveway and in which they told her that her use of the driveway would
constitute trespass. McClintic did not respond to these letters. At the beginning
of 2008, the Hardins sent McClintic two more letters, in which they stated that
they wished to avoid any confrontation and that they were granting McClintic
permission to continue using the gravel driveway.
[10] The Hardins later removed the trailers from the Hardin Property, but they did
not replace them with any other type of structure. Whenever the Hardins went
to Lake Lemon, which was about six times per year, they stayed at the home of
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their friend, Lynn McNamee (“McNamee”), who owned a property to the west
of the Hardin Property.
[11] Years later, in 2016, the Hardins put the Hardin Property on the market. In
April 2016, the Hardins had another survey done and hired a contractor to erect
a fence around their property. The contractor set stakes to mark where the area
where the fence would be installed, and that area apparently included part of
the gravel driveway. McClintic objected, and her tenant blocked the contractor
from erecting the fence.
[12] In May 2016, the Hardins filed a complaint against McClintic and sought: (1)
a permanent restraining order based on trespass to enjoin McClintic from
entering onto the Hardins’ Property, including the driveway; (2) damages from
when McClintic trespassed on their property and blocked installation of the
fence gate; and (3) damages based on McClintic’s alleged tortious interference
with the Hardins’ fencing contract. Thereafter, McClintic filed a counterclaim
and raised the following claims: (1) adverse possession of a “strip of land
encompassing the gravel driveway[;]” (2) prescriptive easement for use of the
gravel driveway to access her property; and (3) implied easement from prior
use. (App. Vol. 2 at 70, 71).4
4
McClintic later filed an amended counterclaim, adding a claim for an irrevocable license and a claim of title
by acquiescence. These claims are not at issue in this appeal.
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[13] In July 2017, the trial court held a bench trial on the Hardins’ claims and
McClintic’s counterclaims. During the Hardins’ case-in-chief on their claims,
Kelly Hardin (“Hardin”) testified that when she purchased the Hardin Property,
she saw that McClintic was using the gravel driveway. Hardin also testified
that she had “no concern” when she saw McClintic using the driveway and that
she had allowed McClintic to continue using it. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 36).
Additionally, Hardin testified that she was now revoking her permission for
McClintic to use the gravel driveway and that McClintic could put a driveway
on her own property.
[14] In support of McClintic’s counterclaims, she testified and presented testimony
from two individuals, Garland Guy Robertson (“Robertson”) and Sharon
Masters (“Masters”), who were the children of some of the charter members of
the Boat Club.5 McClintic presented evidence regarding the property boundary
for her property, the historical use of the gravel driveway, and her payment of
property taxes.
[15] McClintic testified that her parents purchased the McClintic Property in 1970 to
use for weekend getaways and that she and her parents had used the gravel
driveway continuously since that time to access the McClintic Property. She
also testified that there was never an issue with the gravel driveway until 2007
5
Robertson was the stepson of Ratliff, who was the original owner listed on the deed when Chitwood
conveyed the Hardin Property to the Boat Club in 1965, and Masters was the daughter of charter member
Mary Masters. Robertson’s testimony was introduced via his deposition, and Masters testified at trial.
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when the Hardins purchased the Hardin Property and then sent her some
letters.
[16] McClintic testified that she had discussed the location of the property boundary
with her father and that she had always understood that she, and her parents
before her, owned part of the driveway, consisting of one-third of the driveway
at the top, which corresponded approximately to the right wheel track, and two-
thirds of it at the bottom. McClintic testified that she had paid property taxes
on the McClintic Property and that she understood that her tax payments
covered the portion of the gravel driveway that she claimed that she owned.
She also introduced property tax statements showing tax payments made
between 1981-2015.
[17] McClintic testified that, throughout the years, she and her parents had helped
maintain the gravel driveway and had paid for gravel to add to the driveway.
She also testified that her tenant who was living on the McClintic Property had
also recently paid for gravel. McClintic introduced some receipts showing the
purchase of gravel. She testified that she had never asked the Boat Club for
permission to use the gravel driveway and that no member of the Boat Club had
ever given her permission to do so.
[18] McClintic’s testimony regarding the property boundary and use of the gravel
driveway was corroborated by Robertson’s and Masters’ testimony. Robertson
was a child when his parents and the other members of the Boat Club had
purchased the Hardin Property in 1965. Robertson testified that the gravel
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driveway was originally owned by Chitwood and had been in existence since
the Boat Club purchased the Hardin Property. He testified that the property
boundary between the McClintic Property and the Hardin Property was the
“right wheel track” of the gravel driveway. (App. Vol. 2 at 168). Robertson
testified that, since the time he was a child, his parents had told him to stay off
the property on the other side of the right wheel track because that was the
McClintic Property. He also testified that the use of the driveway had always
been shared by the Boat Club and the owners of the McClintic Property,
including McClintic, her parents, and the Hackers. Additionally, Robertson’s
testimony confirmed that McClintic’s parents had shared in the cost of adding
stone to the driveway.
[19] Masters also testified that the gravel driveway was in existence at the time her
family and the other members of the Boat Club purchased the Hardin Property
in 1965. She testified that the property boundary between the McClintic
Property and the Hardin Property was a “boundary down the driveway” and
that McClintic owned part of the driveway. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 47). Masters testified
that her parents and the other Boat Club members showed her the location of
the property line when the Boat Club purchased the property and that she was
told that the Boat Club owned a “[p]ortion” of the driveway. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 56).
Masters also testified that McClintic and McClintic’s parents had always used
the driveway and that the Boat Club referred to the gravel driveway as a shared
driveway. Moreover, Masters testified that neither McClintic nor her parents
had ever asked for permission to use the gravel driveway, and she testified that
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none of the Boat Club members ever objected to McClintic’s or her parents’ use
of the driveway.
[20] In defense of McClintic’s counterclaims, the Hardins offered the testimony of
their friend, McNamee, and they introduced the deposition of Sharon Slaughter
(“Slaughter”), whose family had been members of the Boat Club. The
testimony of McNamee and Slaughter suggested that the property line was
someplace other than the right wheel track as had been identified by
McClintic’s witnesses, and Slaughter testified that someone from the Boat Club
had given McClintic’s predecessors in title permission to use the gravel
driveway.
[21] In September 2017, the trial court issued detailed findings of fact and
conclusions thereon pursuant to Trial Rule 52. When determining whether
McClintic had met her burden of proving her counterclaims for adverse
possession and prescriptive easement, the trial court applied the factors and
analysis set forth in Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. 2005) and Celebration
Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Tucker, 35 N.E.3d 251, 254 (Ind. 2015). When ruling on
these counterclaims, it was clear that the trial court assigned greater weight to
the testimony of McClintic’s witnesses, and it determined that McClintic had
established her adverse possession counterclaim for the land up to the right
wheel track of the gravel driveway and had established that she had a
prescriptive easement to use the remainder of the driveway for access to her
property. At the end of the trial court’s twenty-one-page order, the trial court
“enter[ed] judgment in favor of the Defendant/Counterclaimant, Ruth
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McClintic based on the theory of adverse possession, prescriptive easement, and
easement by prior use and . . . quiet[ed] title to the driveway in McClintic’s
favor.” (App. Vol. 2 at 32). The trial court also entered judgment against the
Hardins on the claims in their complaint.
[22] Thereafter, the Hardins filed a motion to correct error, arguing that the trial
court had entered judgment on “incompatible legal theories” that created
“uncertainty and impossible performance by the parties.” (App. Vol. 2 at 108).
They specifically argued that “prescriptive easement and implied easement by
prior use, as entered by the Court in its judgment, indicate[d] that [the Hardins]
continue[] to own the land encompassing the driveway but subject to certain
easement rights in favor of [McClintic]” and that “[t]his conclusion [wa]s
incompatible with the finding of adverse possession which [wa]s a transfer of
title to [McClintic] and completely deprive[d] [the Hardins] of any continued or
future use of the driveway area.” (App. Vol. 2 at 108-09). When McClintic
responded to the Hardins’ motion to correct error, she requested the trial court
to amend its order “to differentiate the land where fee titled ha[d] been obtained
via adverse possession and the land where only a use right exist[ed] in an
easement.” (App. Vol. 2 at 130).
[23] The trial court denied the Hardins’ motion to correct error and granted
McClintic’s motion to amend its order. In the amended order, the trial court
kept its findings and conclusion intact but clarified its prior judgment in favor of
McClintic by adding the following language:
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The Court now quiets title to the land up to the right wheel
track of the gravel driveway in fee simple in favor of the
Defendant, Ruth McClintic. The Court quiets title to the
remainder of the gravel driveway in favor of the Defendant,
Ruth McClintic, in her right to use the remainder of the gravel
driveway for purposes of ingress and egress to her property.
(App. Vol. 2 at 54) (emphasis in original). The Hardins now appeal.
Decision
[24] The Hardins argue that the trial court erred by: (1) entering judgment in favor
of McClintic on her counterclaims; and (2) entering judgment against the
Hardins on their claims. We will review each argument in turn.
[25] Here, following a bench trial, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions thereon pursuant to Trial Rule 52. “In the appellate review of
claims tried without a jury, the findings and judgment are not to be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard is to be given to the trial court’s ability
to assess the credibility of the witnesses.” Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476, 482
(Ind. 2005) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52). “Indeed, ‘it is not within the province of
an appellate court to reweigh the evidence or to reassess the credibility of the
witnesses.’” Garriott v. Peters, 878 N.E.2d 431, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting Wilfong v. Cessna Corp., 838 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied.
“A judgment will be clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the
findings or the findings fail to support the judgment, and when the trial court
applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Fraley, 829 N.E.2d at
482 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “While findings of fact
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are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, appellate courts do not defer
to conclusions of law, which are reviewed de novo.” Id. We will not reverse
the trial court’s judgment unless it is clearly erroneous, that is, when our review
of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
1. McClintic’s Counterclaims
[26] The Hardins contend that the trial court erred by entering judgment in favor of
McClintic on her counterclaims for adverse possession and prescriptive
easement.
[27] “[T]he doctrine of adverse possession entitles a person without title to obtain
ownership to a parcel of land upon clear and convincing proof of control,
intent, notice, and duration[.]” Id. at 486. More specifically, the adverse
possessor must show the following:
(1) Control—The claimant must exercise a degree of use and
control over the parcel that is normal and customary considering
the characteristics of the land (reflecting the former elements of
“actual,” and in some ways “exclusive,” possession);
(2) Intent—The claimant must demonstrate intent to claim full
ownership of the tract superior to the rights of all others,
particularly the legal owner (reflecting the former elements of
“claim of right,” “exclusive,” “hostile,” and “adverse”);
(3) Notice—The claimant’s actions with respect to the land must
be sufficient to give actual or constructive notice to the legal
owner of the claimant’s intent and exclusive control (reflecting
the former “visible,” “open,” “notorious,” and in some ways the
“hostile,” elements); and,
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(4) Duration—the claimant must satisfy each of these elements
continuously for the required period of time (reflecting the former
“continuous” element).
Id. “The requisite period of time for adverse possession is ten years.” Celebration
Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Tucker, 35 N.E.3d 251, 254 (Ind. 2015). In addition to these
elements, INDIANA CODE § 32-21-7-1(a) imposes a requirement that an adverse
possessor “pay all taxes and special assessments that the adverse possessor
reasonably believes in good faith to be due on the real property during the
period the adverse possessor claims to have adversely possessed the real
property.” “Substantial compliance satisfies this statutory tax payment
requirement ‘where the adverse claimant has a reasonable and good faith belief
that the claimant is paying the taxes during the period of adverse possession.’”
Celebration Worship Ctr., 35 N.E.3d at 254 (quoting Fraley, 829 N.E.2d at 493).
“Once the elements of adverse possession are established, fee simple title to the
disputed tract of land is conferred upon the possessor by operation of law, and
title is extinguished in the original owner.” Id. at 254 n.2. “Once title vests in a
party at the conclusion of the ten-year possessory period, the title may not be
lost, abandoned, or forfeited, even where the party pays rent to the titleholder,
agrees to a survey to attempt to find the true boundary line, expresses
satisfaction with a survey whose results are inconsistent with the property
adversely possessed by him, or states that he does not claim the land and offers
to buy it.” Fraley, 829 N.E.2d at 487 (internal citations omitted).
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[28] “The Fraley formulation for adverse possession also applies to prescriptive
easements, save for those differences required by the differences between fee
interests and easements.” Celebration Worship Ctr., 35 N.E.3d at 257 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a party claiming the existence of
a prescriptive easement “must establish clear and convincing proof of[:] (1)
control, (2) intent, (3) notice, and (4) duration.” Wilfong, 838 N.E.2d at 406.
The requisite statutory period for a prescriptive easement is twenty years. See
Celebration Worship Ctr., 35 N.E.3d at 257; IND. CODE § 32-23-1-1 (explaining
that “[t]he right-of-way, air, light, or other easement from, in, upon, or over
land owned by a person may not be acquired by another person by adverse use
unless the use is uninterrupted for at least twenty (20) years”). The continuity
of use for the required twenty-year period may be shown by “tacking” from the
use of the predecessors in title. Whitman v. Denzik, 882 N.E.2d 260, 264 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008). “Where there has been use of an easement for 20 years which
is unexplained . . . such use will be presumed to be under a claim of right,
adverse, and sufficient to establish title by prescription unless that use is
contradicted or explained.” Celebration Worship Ctr., 35 N.E.3d at 257 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “In order to rebut that presumption,
the owner must explain such use by demonstrating that he merely permitted the
claimant to use his land.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“Prescriptive easements generally are not favored in the law, and, for that
reason, a party claiming a prescriptive easement must meet stringent
requirements.” Celebration Worship Ctr., 35 N.E.3d at 257 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Similar to adverse possession, the existence or
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non-existence of a prescriptive easement is a question of fact. Id. “[O]nce a
prescriptive easement has been established, the right vests by operation of law.”
Id.
[29] In regard to McClintic’s adverse possession counterclaim, the trial court
concluded that “the Fraley factors for adverse possession ha[d] been satisfied for
the portion of the driveway up to and including the right wheel tire track when
driving north along the driveway towards Lake Lemon in favor of Ruth
McClintic” and that “McClintic by and through her predecessors [in] title
including [McClintic’s Parents], ha[d] established that they ha[d] substantially
complied with the requirement to pay taxes due upon the land in satisfaction of
IC § 32-21-7-1.” (App. Vol. 2 at 46). Additionally, the trial court determined
that McClintic was entitled to judgment on her prescriptive easement
counterclaim because “the Fraley factors for adverse possession as adapted to
prescriptive easements ha[d] been satisfied by Ms. McClintic and her
predecessors in title . . . in satisfaction of the 20[-]year requirement imposed by
IC § 32-23-1-1.” (App. Vol. 2 at 44).
[30] The Hardins do not dispute that McClintic and her predecessors in title had
used the gravel driveway for more than twenty years. Nor do they challenge
the trial court’s determination that the property boundary of the two properties
was the right wheel track of the driveway. Instead, the Hardins argue that: (1)
the evidence does not support the Fraley elements for adverse possession or a
prescriptive easement because the Hardins presented evidence that the use of
the gravel driveway by McClintic and her predecessors in title was permissive
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and/or because the driveway was not used exclusively by McClintic; and (2)
the tax payment element of adverse possession was not met because McClintic
did not have a good faith belief that she had paid taxes attributable to the gravel
driveway.
[31] The Hardins’ challenge to the trial court’s judgment on adverse possession and
prescriptive easement seems to be premised on the mistaken understanding that
the trial court had determined that McClintic had both adverse possession and a
prescriptive easement of the entire gravel driveway. The trial court, however,
determined that McClintic had established her adverse possession counterclaim
for the land up to the right wheel track of the gravel driveway, resulting in
ownership of that part of the land, and that she had established that she had a
prescriptive easement to use the remainder of the driveway for ingress and
egress to her property. With that clarification in mind, we turn to the Hardins’
arguments.
[32] We first reject the Hardins’ assertion that McClintic’s counterclaims should be
reversed because McClintic’s use of the gravel driveway (and the use of her
predecessors in title) was merely permissive. The Hardins made this argument
during bench trial, and the trial court specifically rejected it. The trial court,
after weighing the credibility of McClintic’s witnesses and the Hardins’ witness,
found that McClintic and her predecessors in title had never sought permission
from the Boat Club to use the gravel driveway, nor had the Boat Club ever
granted such permission. The Hardins’ argument regarding permission
amounts to merely a request to reweigh the evidence and the trial court’s
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credibility determinations, both of which we decline to do. See Fraley, 829
N.E.2d at 482 (explaining that we will give due regard to the trial court’s
determination of witness credibility).6
[33] We also reject the Hardins’ contention that the trial court erred by entering
judgment for McClintic because she was not the only person to use the gravel
driveway and their argument that “[t]he fact that others ha[d] the right to use
the disputed parcel is fatal to the claimant’s claim” of adverse possession. (The
Hardins’ Br. 16). Again, the Hardins fail to distinguish between the ownership
of part of the land up to the right wheel track of the driveway and the use of the
remainder of the driveway. The record before us does not show that the Boat
Club ever used the land up to the right wheel track such that it would defeat
McClintic’s adverse possession counterclaim. Indeed, Robertson testified that
the Boat Club had treated the boundary between the McClintic Property and
the Hardin Property as the right wheel track of the gravel driveway and that his
parents had always told him to stay off the property on the other side of the
right wheel track because that was the McClintic Property. In regard to the
remainder of the driveway that was on the Hardin Property, the record reveals
that the members of the Boat Club knew that McClintic and her predecessors in
6
Additionally, we do not find merit in the Hardins’ suggestion that evidence that McClintic and her
predecessors in title had shared the use of the driveway with the Boat Club shows that the use was permissive
and not adverse. See Capps v. Abbott, 897 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that evidence that
claimants had used another landowner’s drive for ingress and egress for over twenty years indicated that the
landowner had knowledge that the claimants were using the drive “in a manner that was adverse to [the
landowner’s] property interest”).
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title had used that part of the driveway for ingress and egress purposes since
1966, thereby establishing McClintic’s right to use the remainder of the
driveway for ingress and egress by means of a prescriptive easement. See Capps
v. Abbott, 897 N.E.2d 984, 989-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming the trial
court’s prescriptive easement judgment for the claimants where the evidence
showed that the claimants’ and their predecessors in title’s use of the drive of a
neighboring landowner constituted an open and continuous use of the other’s
land with knowledge of that owner for the required twenty-year period).
[34] The Hardins’ argument regarding the tax payment requirement of adverse
possession also fails. They do not dispute that McClintic’s evidence that she
and her parents had paid property taxes during the relevant period for adverse
possession. Instead, they challenge the trial court’s determination that
McClintic had substantially complied with the tax statute, arguing that
McClintic did not have had a good faith belief that she had paid taxes for the
gravel driveway. McClintic, however, was not required to make that showing
for the entire driveway because she claimed that she owned only a portion of
the driveway. The evidence introduced during the bench trial showed that
McClintic, her parents, and members of the Boat Club operated with the
understanding that the gravel driveway was located on both the McClintic
Property and the Hardin Property because the boundary between the two
properties was the right wheel track of the driveway. McClintic showed that
she and her parents paid the property taxes while having a reasonable and good
faith belief that they were paying the taxes for the portion of the driveway on
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the McClintic Property, which they and the Boat Club understood to belong to
the McClintic Property. Given the inferences reasonably drawn from evidence
presented, there was clear and convincing evidence from which the trial court,
as finder of fact, could have concluded that McClintic had substantially
complied with tax statute. See Piles v. Gosman, 851 N.E.2d 1009, 1017 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006) (affirming the trial court’s adverse possession judgment for the
adverse claimants where the evidence showed that the adverse claimants
believed that a fence marked their property line and that they had paid their
property taxes with a reasonable and good faith belief that they were paying the
taxes on the property up to the fence). Accordingly, the trial court did not err
by entering judgment for McClintic on her adverse possession and prescriptive
easement counterclaims.7
2. The Hardins’ Claims
[35] The Hardins argue that the trial court erred by denying their claims for
injunctive relief based on trespass and for damages based on tortious
interference with a contract. Because the Hardins bore the burden of proof
regarding their claims and had judgment entered against them, they are
appealing from a negative judgment. On appeal, we will not reverse such a
judgment unless “the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences
7
Additionally, we reject the Hardins’ suggestion that the trial court did not apply the required standard of
proof when ruling on McClintic’s adverse possession and prescriptive easement counterclaims. The trial
court applied the applicable law, as set forth in Fraley and Celebration Worship Ctr., which explained that the
Fraley factors must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
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to be drawn from the evidence lead to a conclusion other than that reached by
the trial court.” Garriott, 878 N.E.2d at 437 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
[36] The Hardins acknowledge that their arguments regarding their claims would
only be reviewable on appeal if we were to reverse the trial court’s judgment in
favor of McClintic on her counterclaims. Because we affirm the trial court’s
judgment in favor of McClintic on her counterclaims, we need not address the
Hardins’ argument challenge to the trial court’s judgment on their claims.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
[37] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr.J., concur.
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