M.C. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 15 2019, 9:13 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark F. James Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Agostino & Keller, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
South Bend, Indiana
Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
M.C., May 15, 2019
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JV-2931
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable James Fox, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
71J01-1710-JD-354
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] After the State filed a delinquency petition alleging M.C. committed child
molesting, M.C. filed a motion to dismiss arguing the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction. The juvenile court denied the motion, adjudicated M.C. a
delinquent, and entered a dispositional order placing M.C. on non-reporting
probation. M.C. appeals, presenting one issue for our review which we restate
as whether the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
proceedings. Concluding it did not, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile
court.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 5, 2017, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that M.C.
had committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would be child molesting, a
Class C felony,1 between October 10, 2011 and January 5, 2013, during which
time M.C. was over the age of fourteen but under eighteen years old. However,
M.C. was twenty-two years old at the time the delinquency petition was filed
with the juvenile court. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-30-3-2, the State
filed a motion to waive jurisdiction to criminal court.
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (2007) (“A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs
or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to
satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Class C felony.”).
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[3] M.C. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the petition and a supporting
memorandum arguing that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to
Indiana Code sections 31-9-2-13 and 31-30-1-1. He contended that when the
statutes are read together, the juvenile courts do not have jurisdiction over a
person who is twenty-one or older. Therefore, because he was not charged until
he was twenty-two, he argued the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over
him.
[4] On July 13, 2018, the juvenile court denied M.C.’s motion to dismiss and
concluded, in relevant part:
[M.C.] raises issue with the definition of “child” for purposes of
Title 31-37 outlined in IC 31-9-2-13 and IC 31-30-1-1 which
outlines where a juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction.
While the Court understands [M.C.’s] contention, this Court
notes there are numerous definitions of “child” which appear
elsewhere, and furthermore, for purposes of Title 31-37, this
definition of “child” must be interpreted in conformity with the
totality of cases which could appear before the juvenile court,
including crimes committed by individuals under the age of
eighteen (18) with no upper age limit as contemplated by IC 31-
30-1-11.
Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 2 at 27. A hearing on the State’s motion for
waiver was held on October 2, 2018 and the juvenile court also denied that
motion.
[5] On October 10, 2018, the juvenile court entered an order accepting M.C.’s
admission to the allegations set forth in the delinquency petition and M.C. was
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adjudicated a delinquent. In November 2018, the juvenile court entered a
dispositional order placing M.C. on non-reporting probation. M.C. was also
ordered to continue with outpatient therapy, provide verification of such
participation, maintain full-time employment, pay an administrative fee, and
was prohibited from direct or indirect contact with the victim of the crime.
M.C. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[6] Indiana courts must possess subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction
to adjudicate a case. Johnson v. State, 957 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Subject matter jurisdiction concerns whether a particular court has jurisdiction
over the general class of actions to which the particular case belongs. Troxel v.
Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind. 2000). Personal jurisdiction is the power of a
court to bring a person into its adjudicative process and render a valid judgment
over a person, which requires effective service of process. Johnson, 957 N.E.2d
at 662. A judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction or personal
jurisdiction is void. Id. at 662-63.; see also Troxel, 737 N.E.2d at 749 (“When a
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, its actions are void ab initio and
have no effect whatsoever.”).
[7] Juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and their jurisdiction must be
invoked by establishing the statutory jurisdictional prerequisites. M.B. v. State,
815 N.E.2d 210, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “When jurisdictional facts are not in
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dispute, we apply a de novo standard of review on the question of whether a
lower court had jurisdiction over a juvenile proceeding.” Id.II. Jurisdiction
[8] M.C. argues the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over him because he
was over the age of twenty-one at the time the delinquency petition was filed.
The State agrees the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction.
[9] A juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a proceeding in which a
“child” is alleged to be delinquent under juvenile law. Ind. Code § 31-30-1-1(1).
For purposes of the juvenile law, a “child” is defined as:
(1) a person who is less than eighteen (18) years of age;
(2) a person:
(A) who is eighteen (18), nineteen (19), or twenty (20)
years of age; and
(B) who either:
(i) is charged with a delinquent act
committed before the person’s eighteenth
birthday; or
(ii) has been adjudicated a child in need of
services before the person’s eighteenth
birthday; or
(3) a person:
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(A) who is alleged to have committed an act that would
have been murder if committed by an adult;
(B) who was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the alleged act; and
(C) who is less than twenty-one (21) years of age.
Ind. Code § 31-9-2-13(d).
[10] The age of the offender determines whether a juvenile court has subject matter
jurisdiction. Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ind. 1984). It is clear from
the definitional statute that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in delinquency
proceedings is limited to cases involving those under age twenty-one. See Ind.
Code § 31-9-2-13(d). Applied here, M.C. was not under the age of eighteen at
the time the petition was filed; although the delinquent act was committed
when M.C. was under eighteen, he was not eighteen, nineteen, or twenty years
old when the petition was filed; and he is alleged to have committed the crime
of child molesting, not murder. See id. Although the alleged delinquent act
occurred when M.C. was seventeen, he was twenty-two at the time the petition
was filed and cannot be considered a “child” under Indiana Code section 31-9-
2-13. Therefore, we agree with M.C. and the State that the juvenile court was
without subject matter jurisdiction at the time it adjudicated M.C. delinquent
and entered a disposition, and its judgment is void. See Johnson, 957 N.E.2d at
662-63.
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Conclusion
[11] For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the juvenile court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction at the time it adjudicated M.C. a delinquent and
entered a disposition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile
court.
[12] Reversed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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