Jeremy D. Cox v. State of Indiana

FILED
Dec 21 2020, 9:44 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Glen E. Koch II Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Boren, Oliver & Coffey, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Martinsville, Indiana J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeremy D. Cox, December 21, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-899
v. Appeal from the Brown Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Hon. Mary Wertz, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
07C01-1902-CM-46
Bradford, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 1 of 11
Case Summary
[1] In December of 2018, Indiana State Police Trooper Matthew Hatchett stopped
a truck in which Jeremy Cox was a passenger because it did not have a
functional license-plate light and had a broken frame. After telling Cox that he
was free to leave and could refuse his consent, Trooper Hatchett asked for
Cox’s consent to search his person, and Cox gave it. Trooper Hatchett’s search
uncovered a socket containing marijuana. The State charged Cox with Class C
misdemeanor illegal possession of paraphernalia, and, after the trial court
denied Cox’s motion to suppress evidence uncovered in the search, a jury found
him guilty as charged. Cox contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the search of his person allegedly violated
provisions of the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Because we
disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] After sundown on December 18, 2018, Trooper Hatchett was parked in a
parking lot when he observed a black Nissan pickup truck drive by on Salt
Creek Road in Brown County. Trooper Hatchett noticed that the truck had no
functioning license-plate light and that its frame appeared to be broken and
therefore unsafe, both of which constitute traffic infractions. Trooper Hatchett
stopped the truck and identified its occupants as driver Joseph Lawson and
passengers Cherie Lawson and Cox. Trooper Hatchett verified that the truck’s
frame was broken and informed the occupants that it would have to be towed
for safety reasons. Trooper Hatchett had the occupants exit the truck and told
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 2 of 11
Cherie and Cox that they were free to go and Joseph that he was free to go once
the paperwork for the infractions was complete. All three elected to stay and
wait for a ride.
[3] Because the trio elected to stay and would be in the vicinity until their ride
arrived, Trooper Hatchett asked for their consent to search their persons for
officer-safety reasons. Cherie refused to consent to a search of her person and
was not searched. Cox, who was not restrained in any fashion and was told
that he did not have to consent to the warrantless search, gave his consent.
Brown County Sheriff’s Deputy Colton Magner arrived at the scene after
Trooper Hatchett had obtained consent from Cox to search his person but did
not believe that Cox had already been searched. Trooper Hatchett found on
Cox’s person a small socket containing marijuana, which Trooper Hatchett
recognized from training and experience. At some point after Deputy Magner
arrived, Sergeant Scott Bowling of the Brown County Sheriff’s Department and
Nashville Police Officer Brenten Barrow arrived at the scene to assist. Cox was
given a summons to appear, and he, Cherie, and Joseph left the scene when
somebody came to pick them up.
[4] On February 12, 2019, the State charged Cox with Class C misdemeanor illegal
possession of paraphernalia. On September 27, 2019, Cox moved to suppress
evidence of the paraphernalia on the grounds that it was discovered in violation
of the state and federal constitutions. On January 2, 2020, after a hearing, the
trial court denied Cox’s motion to suppress. On January 22, 2020, a jury found
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 3 of 11
Cox guilty as charged, and, on March 10, 2020, the trial court sentenced Cox to
eight days of incarceration.
Discussion and Decision
[5] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). This Court will
reverse a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when it
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion involves a
decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court. Id. Moreover,
when a trial court has admitted evidence alleged to have been
discovered as the result of an illegal search or seizure, we generally
will assume the trial court accepted the evidence presented by the
State and will not reweigh that evidence, but we owe no deference
as to whether that evidence established the constitutionality of a
search or seizure.
Johnson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Cox
contends that the evidence seized following the traffic stop was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Sections 11 and 13, of the Indiana Constitution and so should have
been suppressed.
I. Fourth Amendment
[6] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 4 of 11
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. A warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable,
and the State bears the burden to show that one of the “well-delineated
exceptions” to the warrant requirement applies. M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329,
331 (Ind. 2016) (citations omitted). A voluntary and knowing consent to search
is one well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Meyers v. State,
790 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
[7] Cox’s argument is more-or-less premised entirely on his claim that he was first
detained after the purpose of the traffic stop was fulfilled and then placed in
custody, which allegedly rendered his consent invalid. A person is in custody if
he is under arrest or deprived of his freedom of movement to a degree akin to
arrest. Luna v. State, 788 N.E.2d 832, 833 (Ind. 2003). Only when an officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
person’s liberty can he be found to be in custody. Id. at 833–34 (citing Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1991)). We conclude that there is sufficient
evidence to support a finding that Cox was never in custody or detained
unnecessarily. Neither Trooper Hatchett nor any other officer handcuffed or
otherwise physically restrained Cox, and there is no evidence that any officer
used a show of authority to restrain Cox. In fact, the record indicates that
Trooper Hatchett explicitly told Cox that he was free to go and then that he
could refuse to consent to the search. We conclude that a reasonable person
would have felt free to disregard the officers’ inquiries and go about his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 5 of 11
business. We think it worth noting that Cherie seems to have done just that,
refusing Trooper Hatchett’s request for consent to search her person with no
negative consequences to herself.
[8] Cox also points to his testimony that Trooper Hatchett retained his
identification throughout the encounter and confiscated a knife from him.
Trooper Hatchett, however, testified that, while he could not specifically
remember giving Cox back his identification, he thought “that I would have
brought them back, gave them to them, because I already [had] all of his
information[,]” implying that he returned Cox’s identification once he verified
his identity and ran his license. Tr. Vol. II p. 23. Moreover, the only evidence
regarding a knife being at the scene at all is Cox’s self-serving testimony to that
effect, and, in fact, Trooper Hatchett was not even asked at the suppression
hearing if he had obtained a knife from Cox. Cox also contends that Trooper
Hatchett told him that he could not leave until the “paperwork” was done, but
Trooper Hatchett specifically testified that he only told Joseph that because
only Joseph had committed an infraction. Finally, while Cox suggests that he
felt coerced into consenting to the search by the presence of four police officers,
the record indicates that Trooper Hatchett was the only officer present when
consent was given. To the extent that Cox’s testimony conflicts with other
evidence in the record, the trial court was under no obligation to credit it, and
apparently did not. As mentioned, we generally assume on appeal that the trial
court resolved all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the State. In the end, Cox’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 6 of 11
arguments in this regard are nothing more than invitations to reweigh the
evidence, which we will not do. See Johnson, 992 N.E.2d at 957.
[9] That said, whether Cox was in custody is not the only relevant consideration in
determining if his consent was voluntary. Polk v. State, 822 N.E.2d 239, 248
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005). A consent to search is valid except where it is procured
by fraud, duress, fear, or intimidation, or where it is merely a submission to the
supremacy of the law. The voluntariness of the consent is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Id. The totality of the
circumstances includes, but is not limited to, such factors as the defendant’s
education and intelligence, whether the defendant was informed of his Miranda
rights, whether the defendant has had previous encounters with law
enforcement, whether the officer claimed authority to search without consent,
whether the defendant was told he had the right to refuse consent, whether the
officer was engaged in any illegal action prior to the request, and whether the
officer was deceptive as to his true identity or the purpose of the search. Meyers,
790 N.E.2d at 172.
[10] Although there is nothing in the record touching on Cox’s education or possible
prior contacts with law enforcement, all other relevant factors weigh in favor of
his consent being voluntary. Trooper Hatchett never told Cox that he was
being investigated for a crime and neither interrogated Cox prior to asking him
for consent to search his person nor suggested that he would suffer adverse
consequences for declining to grant consent. Trooper Hatchett also specifically
told Cox that he did not have to consent to the search. In addition, Trooper
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 7 of 11
Hatchett engaged in no illegality, was never deceptive about his true identity or
the purpose of his search, and only requested consent to search after the
occupants chose to remain on the scene, who, at the time, outnumbered him
three to one. Although Cox was not advised of his Miranda rights, no such
advisement was required because, as discussed above, Cox was never in
custody. See Meyers, 790 N.E.2d at 172; Ammons v. State, 770 N.E.2d 927, 933–
34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Moreover, Trooper Hatchett never claimed authority
to search without consent, and his interactions with Cox and the other
occupants occurred in a public setting, not in a police-dominated, institutional
atmosphere like a police station. Cox himself confirmed that he was never
handcuffed, placed under arrest, or told that he was being investigated for a
crime.
[11] In summary, the record indicates that Trooper Hatchett simply approached Cox
and asked if he could search him, which does not even implicate the Fourth
Amendment. See Bentley v. State, 846 N.E.2d 300, 305–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006);
Cochran v. State, 843 N.E.2d 980, 983–85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh’g denied; see
also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434–35 (1991). We conclude that the totality of
circumstances indicates that Cox’s consent was knowing and voluntary. See,
e.g., Navarro v. State, 855 N.E.2d 671, 675–80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding
consent voluntary even though officer retained the defendant’s driver’s license
during the investigative stop and never said he had a right to refuse consent or
advised him of his Miranda rights because the officer was not deceptive, never
implied the authority to search without consent, the defendant was not in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 8 of 11
custody, and he assisted by opening the trunk for the officer); Meyers, 790
N.E.2d at 172 (finding valid consent where the defendant was not advised of his
rights or told he could refuse consent, was not in custody, was a high school
graduate and had prior encounters with law enforcement, and the officer did
not threaten or deceive him); Ammons, 770 N.E.2d at 934 (finding valid consent
to search where two officers stopped the defendant, he was not read his Miranda
rights, and the officers did not engage in any illegal activity or deception).
Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cox’s
motion to suppress on the ground that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment.
II. Article 1, Sections 11 and 13
[12] Cox also challenges admission of the evidence pursuant to Article 1, Sections
11 and 13, of the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 11 provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
Article 1, Section 13, provides, in part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right […] to be heard by himself and counsel[.]”
[13] Although the wording of Section 11 is almost identical to that of
the Fourth Amendment, our State Constitution’s search and
seizure clause is given an independent interpretation and
application. Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (Ind. 2005). In
fact, Indiana’s Constitution sometimes offers broader protections
than those offered by the U.S. Constitution. Conley v. State, 972
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 9 of 11
N.E.2d 864, 879 (Ind. 2012). Amongst those broader protections
offered by our State Constitution is the requirement that, prior to
obtaining consent to a search, police must explicitly advise a
person in custody of her right to consult with counsel. It is unique
to Indiana and has no federal counterpart. See United States v.
LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 337 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A person in custody
has no federal constitutional right to consult with an attorney
before consenting to a search of his property. However, the
Indiana [C]onstitution does afford such a right.”).
Dycus v. State, 108 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. 2018). This rule was established by
the Indiana Supreme Court in the case of Pirtle v. State, in which the Court held
“that a person who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is
entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision
whether to give such consent.” 263 Ind. 16, 29, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975).
[14] The threshold question for purposes of Pirtle is whether Cox was in custody
when Trooper Hatchett obtained his consent to search his person. If not, Pirtle
does not apply. We have already concluded that Cox was not in custody at any
point during the encounter in question. To reiterate, the record supports
findings that none of the officers restrained Cox in any way and that Trooper
Hatchett explicitly told him that he was free to go, told him he could refuse to
consent to the search, and did not retain his license throughout the encounter.
Cox was not interrogated before consent was sought and was never told that he
was suspected of committing a crime. Moreover, there is no indication of any
other show of authority that would have made a reasonable person feel that he
was not free to leave; Trooper Hatchett was the only officer on the scene when
Cox’s consent was obtained, and the entire encounter took place beside a public
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 10 of 11
road, as opposed to a police station. Indeed, even after contraband was found
on his person, Cox was released with a summons to appear. Because Cox was
never in custody, the Pirtle requirement to advise him he had the right to consult
with an attorney before consenting to a search of his person was not triggered.
The trial court did not err in denying Cox’s motion to suppress on the alleged
ground that the search of his person violated Article 1, Sections 11 and 13, of
the Indiana Constitution.
[15] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-899 | December 21, 2020 Page 11 of 11