A.C. v. State of Indiana

FILED
Apr 01 2020, 9:19 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Paula M. Sauer Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Danville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
A.C., April 1, 2020
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JV-2510
v. Appeal from the Hendricks
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Karen M. Love,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
32D03-1905-JD-70
Friedlander, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-2510 | April 1, 2020 Page 1 of 8
[1] A.C. appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order, challenging the court’s
authority to award wardship of him to the Department of Correction (DOC).
We affirm.
[2] On May 4, 2019, seventeen-year-old A.C. was involved in an altercation with
his father which lead to police being called. Upon being detained in a police
vehicle, A.C. spit in his father’s face. As a result of this incident, the State filed
a delinquency petition alleging that A.C. had committed one count of battery
and one count of battery by bodily waste, both Class B misdemeanors if
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committed by an adult. A.C. admitted to the battery by bodily waste, and the
State dismissed the other count of battery. The State and the probation
department recommended that A.C. be placed in a residential facility where his
behavioral issues, as well as any substance abuse issues and trauma as a result
of physical and psychological abuse, could be addressed and where family
counseling would be required. A.C. agreed with this recommendation. The
juvenile court found A.C. to be a delinquent child, placed him under the
supervision of the probation department and in treatment at Transitions
Academy and ordered him to serve a four-month term of probation upon
completion of the residential treatment. A.C. entered Transitions Academy on
May 30.
1
Ind Code § 35-42-2-1 (2018).
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[3] On June 27, the State filed a Motion to Modify Supervision with the juvenile
court, alleging that A.C. had violated the dispositional order and the conditions
of his probation by leaving the Transitions Academy facility for three days
without permission and by testing positive for marijuana. At a hearing on the
motion, A.C. admitted that he violated the court’s order by leaving the facility
without permission. A representative of Transitions Academy testified that the
facility was willing to allow A.C. to remain in treatment. The State
recommended that A.C. remain at Transitions, and the court ordered A.C.’s
continued placement at Transitions.
[4] On September 12, the State filed a second Motion to Modify Supervision. On
this occasion, the State alleged that A.C. had violated the terms of the
dispositional order and the conditions of his probation by assaulting other
residents on at least three different occasions, failing to fully engage in therapy,
refusing to take responsibility for his actions, refusing to engage in an
appropriate manner, behaving aggressively, threatening to assault his therapist,
using profanity toward staff and court personnel, and failing to control his
behavior from escalating. At a hearing on this motion, A.C. admitted to the
assault of another resident by kicking him in the head. The CEO of Transitions
testified that A.C. had struggled the entire time he had been at the facility. She
stated that he was “still not taking any responsibility” and that he “has a very
short fuse.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 98, 99. She further testified that A.C. “poses a risk
to others more than [he] poses a risk to himself” because, when he gets very
angry, he becomes “very verbally aggressive” and “very physically aggressive.”
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Id. at 99. Finally, she testified that A.C. could not remain at the facility because
he had no interest in engaging in therapy and that he needed a placement that
“eliminates all choice for him” and that the only program she knew of that
offered that is the DOC. Id. at 101. Both A.C.’s probation officer and the CEO
of Transitions recommended that A.C. be placed in the DOC. The court
accepted A.C.’s admission and modified its original dispositional order to
award wardship of A.C. to the DOC. A.C. now appeals.
[5] A.C. challenges the juvenile court’s authority to commit him to the DOC. The
gist of A.C.’s argument is that his violation of the court’s dispositional order
and the conditions of his probation is the same as a violation of probation in a
criminal case. Accordingly, he argues the juvenile court had no authority to
order him committed to the DOC for a probation violation without a portion of
his “sentence” being suspended in the court’s original dispositional order.
Appellant’s Br. p. 11. In support of his argument, he cites criminal statutes
regarding misdemeanor plea agreements and probation violation and
revocation.
[6] In presenting this argument, A.C. completely overlooks the character of the
juvenile system and its differences from the criminal system. On this topic, our
Supreme Court has said:
[A] juvenile case is a civil and not a criminal matter. Juvenile
adjudications do not constitute criminal convictions.
The nature of the juvenile process is rehabilitation and aid to the
juvenile to direct his behavior so that he will not later become a
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criminal. For this reason the statutory scheme of dealing with
minors is vastly different than that directed to an adult who
commits a crime. Juvenile judges have a variety of placement
choices for juveniles who have delinquency problems, ranging
from a private home in the community, a licensed foster home, a
local juvenile detention center, to State institutions such as the
Indiana Boys School and Indiana Girls School. None of these
commitments are considered sentences.
Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987) (internal citation omitted).
[7] Once a child is determined to be a delinquent child pursuant to either Indiana
Code sections 31-37-1-1 (1997) or 31-37-2-1 (1997), the juvenile court is
required to hold a dispositional hearing to, among other things, consider the
alternatives for the care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-37-18-1 (1997). If the child is determined to be delinquent
pursuant to Section 31-37-1-1, as A.C. was in the present case, the juvenile
court has the choice of several dispositions and may choose more than one. See
Ind. Code §§ 31-37-19-5 (2012), -6 (2009). Examples of disposition alternatives
are supervision of the child by the probation department, outpatient treatment,
emancipation of the child, and community service. See Ind. Code § 31-37-19-
5(b). Still others are wardship to the DOC, confinement in a juvenile detention
facility, and placement in a shelter care facility. See Ind. Code § 31-37-19-6(b).
[8] The choice of the specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated to be delinquent
is a matter within the sound discretion of the juvenile court. J.S. v. State, 881
N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The juvenile court is accorded wide
latitude and great flexibility in its dealings with juveniles. Id. This discretion is,
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however, subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the
safety of the community, and the policy of favoring the least harsh disposition.
M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); see also Ind. Code § 31-
37-18-6 (1997) (setting forth factors juvenile court must consider when entering
a dispositional decree). We will reverse a juvenile disposition only for an abuse
of discretion, which occurs when the juvenile court’s action is clearly erroneous
and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court,
or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences drawn therefrom. C.C. v.
State, 831 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[9] Here, in its first dispositional order, the juvenile court placed A.C. under the
supervision of the probation department and ordered placement at Transitions
Academy. This was clearly within the court’s discretion and statutory powers.
See Ind. Code §§ 31-37-19-5(b)(1) (juvenile court may, in addition to an order
under § 31-37-19-6, order supervision of child by probation department), 31-37-
19-6(b)(2)(D) (juvenile court may enter any dispositional decree specified in §
31-37-19-5 and place child in shelter care facility).
[10] The State subsequently filed two motions to modify A.C.’s supervision, alleging
that A.C. had violated the terms of his probation. Any change in a juvenile’s
disposition order, including revoking his probation, is accomplished by
modification of the original order pursuant to Section 31-37-22-1 (2017), as the
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court did in this case. Following the hearing on the State’s second motion to
modify supervision, the juvenile court awarded wardship of A.C. to the DOC in
its modified dispositional order. This disposition is also a statutory alternative.
See Ind. Code § 31-37-19-6(b)(2)(A)(i) (juvenile court may award wardship to
the department of correction).
[11] Pursuant to the juvenile statutory scheme, probation and wardship to the DOC
are just two of several statutory disposition alternatives available to the juvenile
court. Section 31-37-19-5(b)(1), under which the court may order supervision of
the juvenile by the probation department, does not require a suspended
sentence as a prerequisite to the imposition of probation; rather, a term of
probation stands alone as a distinct disposition and is treated as any other
disposition alternative in the juvenile setting. This is distinct from probation in
the criminal setting where probation is a criminal sanction in lieu of
imprisonment. See Bratcher v. State, 999 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
trans. denied.
2
The juvenile court is required to advise the child and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian of the
modification procedures. See Ind. Code § 31-37-18-8 (1997). A.C. does not claim that he was not informed
of these procedures. Indeed, at A.C.’s fact-finding/disposition hearing he was advised that if he is placed on
probation and is later found to have violated a condition of that probation, the court may modify its original
dispositional order and impose any of the dispositional options that could have been imposed. Tr. Vol. 2, p.
30. Moreover, A.C. specifically initialed the paragraph in the court’s order of probation that states: “If the
Court finds that I have violated any conditions of probation, the Court may modify the original dispositional
order and impose any of the dispositional options that could have been imposed, to include removal from the
home and commitment to secure or residential placement for an indeterminate period.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. 2, p. 63. In addition, at the hearings on the State’s motions to modify supervision, the court warned
A.C. of the possible consequences of a finding that he violated his probation: “[T]he Court can, uh, change
the conditions of your probation. I could order probation to last for a longer period of time. I could change
your placement. I could send you to the Department of Correction[ ].” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 55; see also id. at 70, 92.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-2510 | April 1, 2020 Page 7 of 8
[12] In this case, when A.C. failed to abide by the court’s original dispositional order
(i.e., comply with the terms of his probation and participate in treatment at
Transitions), the court modified its order to award wardship of A.C. to the
DOC. In doing so, the court followed the juvenile statutory scheme, which
does not require a suspended commitment to the DOC in order for a juvenile to
be placed on probation.
[13] Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court was within its statutory
authority when it modified its original dispositional order and ordered wardship
of A.C. to the DOC.
[14] Judgment affirmed.
Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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