A.W. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Jan 30 2020, 10:38 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kelly Starling Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana Myriam Serrano
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
A.W., January 30, 2020
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JV-1789
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Hon. Marilyn A. Moores,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
The Hon. Geoffrey A. Gaither,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D09-1904-JD-467
Bradford, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In April of 2019, the then-sixteen-year-old A.W. led police on a car chase that
ended in a four-vehicle accident. A.W. was found to have committed what
would be Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Class C misdemeanor
operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license if committed by an adult.
The juvenile court ordered A.W. committed to the Indiana Department of
Correction (“the DOC”) for a recommended term of six months. A.W.
contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to establish that he
committed resisting law enforcement and that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in ordering him committed to the DOC. Because we disagree with
both contentions, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] A.W. was born on November 25, 2002. On April 27, 2019, Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Officer Jordan Huffman was dispatched to 34th Street and
Moller Road to investigate a report of a stolen silver Toyota Camry with
Alabama license plates. While westbound on 34th Street, Officer Huffman
passed an eastbound silver Camry bearing Alabama plates. Officer Huffman u-
turned, activated his lights and siren, and began pursuit. As Officer Huffman
pursued the Camry, it sped up, “barreled around […] the double solid yellow
lines and blew through the red light at 34th and Moller.” Tr. Vol. II p. 83. Once
through the intersection, the Camry took a “sharp south right turn into
Watergate causing a four vehicle crash.” Tr. Vol. II p. 83. Officer Huffman
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approached the Camry and determined that A.W., its lone occupant, was the
driver and did not possess a valid driver’s license.
[3] On April 29, 2019, the State alleged that A.W. committed what would be Level
6 felony auto theft, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, Class A
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor
marijuana possession, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle without
ever receiving a license if committed by an adult. On June 25, 2019, the
juvenile court adjudicated A.W. to be a juvenile delinquent by virtue of
committing what would be Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Class
C misdemeanor operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license if
committed by an adult. On July 7, 2019, the juvenile court ordered A.W.
committed to the DOC for a recommended term of six months.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[4] When reviewing claims of insufficient evidence in a juvenile case, appellate
courts apply the same standard of review as if it were an appeal of a criminal
conviction. K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013). In reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or
assess the credibility of witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind.
2005). “It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts to assess witness
credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to
support a conviction.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We
look only to evidence in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling and
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must affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the
elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126. The
evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Craig v.
State, 730 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Ind. 2000).
[5] A.W. contends only that the State failed to establish that he committed Level 6
felony resisting law enforcement. “A person who knowingly or intentionally
[…] flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or
audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer’s siren or
emergency lights, identified himself and ordered the person to stop; commits
resisting law enforcement,” a Level 6 felony if “the person uses the vehicle to
commit the offense[.]” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), -(1)(c)(1)(A) (version
effective from July 1, 2016, to July 1, 2019). “Flight has been defined as ‘a
knowing attempt to escape law enforcement when the defendant is aware that a
law enforcement officer has ordered him to stop or remain in place once
there.’” D.W. v. State, 903 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting
Wellman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)), trans. denied.
[6] Here, Officer Huffman, in a fully-marked police vehicle, was dispatched to
investigate a report of a stolen silver Toyota Camry with Alabama plates. (Tr.
V01. II 81, 82). While on the way, Officer Huffman found a vehicle matching
that description, activated his emergency lights and siren, and began pursuit.
A.W., instead of stopping, sped up, crossed the double yellow lines into the
oncoming traffic lane, “barreled around” the vehicle in front of him, ran a red
light, and took a sharp turn at high speed, causing an accident. This is more
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than sufficient evidence to support a finding that A.W. was well aware of
Officer Huffman’s pursuit and engaged in a dangerous, high-speed car chase in
an attempt to elude him. A.W. argues that the short duration of the incident
and his reckless driving are evidence not of flight but, rather, of inexperience.
This argument is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, one
that we decline. See, e.g., McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126.
II. DOC Commitment
[7] A.W. also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering him
committed to the DOC for six months. A juvenile court is accorded “wide
latitude” and “great flexibility” in its dealings with juveniles. J.S. v. State, 881
N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “[T]he choice of a specific disposition of a
juvenile adjudicated a delinquent child is a matter within the sound discretion
of the juvenile court and will only be reversed if there has been an abuse of that
discretion.” Id. The juvenile court’s discretion in determining a disposition is
subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of
the community, and the policy of favoring the least-harsh disposition. Id. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court’s action is “clearly
erroneous” and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before
it. Id.
[8] The goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation rather than punishment. R.H.
v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “Accordingly, juvenile
courts have a variety of placement options for juveniles with delinquency
problems, none of which are considered sentences.” Id. Indiana Code section
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31-37-18-6(1)(A) provides that “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community
and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional
decree that is in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate
setting available.” “[T]he statute contains language that reveals that a more
restrictive placement might be appropriate under certain circumstances.” J.S.,
881 N.E.2d at 29. The law requires only that the disposition selected be the
least restrictive disposition that is “consistent with the safety of the community
and the best interest of the child.” D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005).
[9] Given A.W.’s alarming history with the juvenile-justice system and the failure
of less-restrictive placements to rehabilitate him, we cannot say that the juvenile
court abused its discretion. A.W. has an extensive history of previous
delinquency referrals, including referrals for truancy in January of 2015; battery
resulting in bodily injury in July of 2017; battery resulting in bodily injury to a
public safety officer, battery against a public safety officer, and disorderly
conduct in September of 2017; auto theft and operating a vehicle without a
license in November of 2017; possession of a controlled substance and violation
of release conditions in May of 2018; resisting law enforcement and escape in
June of 2018; robbery and violation of release conditions in February of 2019;
and escape in February of 2019. A.W.’s referrals have resulted in adjudications
for what would be two counts of Level 6 felony escape, Level 5 felony robbery,
two counts of Level 5 felony battery resulting in injury to a public official, Level
6 felony receiving stolen auto parts, and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting
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in bodily injury if committed by an adult and three counts of modification of
probation technology/runaway.
[10] Many placements less restrictive than the DOC have been tried, but none have
caused A.W. to reform himself. A.W. was placed at Options Treatment
Facility from July of 2018 until January of 2019. After that, A.W. was placed
at Youth Outlook Group Home. While on a home pass from Youth Outlook
Group Home in February of 2019, A.W. stole an elderly woman’s purse from
her lap as she was being pushed in a wheelchair and was charged with robbery.
Following a true finding in that case, A.W. was placed on GPS monitoring,
which he cut off before running away from Youth Outlook Group Home. At
the time A.W. was arrested in this case, his whereabouts had been unknown to
his mother and the court for approximately two months. These actions
demonstrate that the less-restrictive placements have not been successful in
rehabilitating A.W.
[11] Moreover, multiple witnesses opined that A.W. was in need of a more-
restrictive placement than had been tried in the past. Following A.W.’s most
recent arrest, he participated in a physiological examination by Dr. Jim Dalton,
Psy.D. After considering A.W.’s needs and the risks to the community, Dr.
Dalton recommended commitment to the DOC. Dr. Dalton determined that
A.W. needs “a very high level of supervision, structure, and direction if there is
to be any improvement in his risk profile.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 160.
The probation department noted that A.W. “has received nine delinquency
referrals in the last two years, his charges have continued to escalate, he has
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been offered numerous community based services as well as two residential
placements previously, yet, those services did not deter him from committing
further delinquent acts.” Tr. Vol. II p. 98.
[12] In adopting the recommendations for DOC commitment, the juvenile court
noted that A.W. “has had the benefit of just about every service we have here.”
Tr. Vol. II p. 114. The juvenile court also stated that “he has been to placement
on two different occasions at least and there have been a number of things we
have ordered and yet here we are again.” Tr. Vol. II p. 114. The juvenile court
reasoned that the other placements and services that had been provided to A.W.
had not been successful and the “only thing we haven’t done, is been to the
[DOC].” Tr. Vol. II p. 114. The juvenile court determined that the structure,
security, and separation that the DOC offers would fit A.W.’s needs and that it
is in his best interests to be removed from his home environment:
[R]emaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the
child because:
• the child needs protection that cannot be provided in the
home.
• the child has special needs that require services for care
and treatment that cannot be provided in the home.
• the nature of the probable cause affidavit.
• the child has received numerous services with this court.
• Detention is essential to protect the Child.
• Detention is essential to protect the community
• The Respondent has been placed outside of the home at
Youth Outlook and Options, for delinquent behaviors.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 13.
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[13] In summary, the juvenile court has offered A.W. less-restrictive placement
options multiple times to no avail. The juvenile court must consider the “safety
of the community and the best interest of the child” when making dispositional
decisions. Ind. Code § 31-37-16-6. The ever-worsening nature of A.W.’s
criminal activity, along with the failure of less-restrictive options, renders the
DOC an appropriate placement that can offer services to rehabilitate A.W.
while providing structure and supervision. We conclude that the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion when it ordered A.W. committed to the DOC for a
recommended term of six months.
[14] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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