Angelica Ramirez Gonzalez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Apr 03 2020, 8:08 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Shannon R. Mears Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Angelica Ramirez Gonzalez, April 3, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2391
v. Appeal from the Hendricks
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark A. Smith,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
32D04-1808-CM-1195
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 1 of 9
Case Summary
[1] Angelica Ramirez Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) appeals her convictions for
Operating a Vehicle with a Blood Alcohol Content of .08% per 100 milliliters of
blood, a Class C misdemeanor,1 and a Class C traffic infraction for failure to
use a turn signal when changing lanes.2 We affirm.
Issues
[2] Gonzalez presents two issues for review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence obtained in violation of Gonzalez’s rights under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution; and
II. Whether sufficient evidence supports the traffic infraction
conviction.
1
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1.
2
I.C. § 9-21-8-24(3). Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24 provides: “A person may not:
(1) slow down or stop a vehicle;
(2) turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway; or
(3) change from one (1) traffic lane to another;
unless the movement can be made with reasonable safety. Before making a movement described in this
section, a person shall give a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn if any pedestrian may be affected by
the movement and give an appropriate stop or turn signal in the manner provided in sections 27 through 28
of this chapter if any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.”
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Facts and Procedural History
[3] At around 2:30 a.m. on August 14, 2018, Hendricks County Sheriff’s Deputy
Travis Kahl (“Deputy Kahl”) was traveling westbound on U.S. 40 in Plainfield
when he observed Gonzalez move her vehicle from the left traffic lane into a
turn lane without first activating her turn signal.3 Deputy Kahl initiated a traffic
stop. He detected an odor of alcohol emanating from Gonzalez’s vehicle and
observed that Gonzalez had bloodshot eyes. Deputy Kahl administered three
field sobriety tests, two of which Gonzalez failed. After Gonzalez provided an
insufficient breath sample for testing, she consented to a blood draw. The
results indicated that her blood alcohol content was 0.119 per 100 milliliters of
blood.
[4] The State charged Gonzalez with Operating While Intoxicated, with
endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor,4 Operating a Vehicle with a Blood
Alcohol Content of .08 or more, and failure to signal a lane change. On August
13, 2019, Gonzalez was tried in a bench trial.
[5] Gonzalez moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of her detention,
arguing that Deputy Kahl lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.
At the conclusion of Deputy Kahl’s testimony, the trial court denied the motion
to suppress and proceeded with the trial. Gonzalez was acquitted of the Class
3
After the lane change, Gonzalez used a turn signal and turned into a gas station.
4
I.C. § 9-30-5-2.
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A misdemeanor and convicted of the Class C misdemeanor and infraction as
charged. She was sentenced to 60 days imprisonment, with 58 days suspended.
Gonzalez filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied.
Gonzalez now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Admission of Evidence
[6] The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence.
Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). Generally, evidentiary rulings
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and reversed when admission is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. However, when
a challenge to an evidentiary ruling is predicated on the constitutionality of a
search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that is reviewed de
novo. Id. The State has the burden to demonstrate that the measures it used to
seize information or evidence were constitutional. State v. Rager, 883 N.E.2d
136, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We review conflicting evidence most favorable
to the trial court’s ruling. Hansbrough v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1112, 1114 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016), trans. denied.
[7] Gonzalez claims that the circumstances known to Deputy Kahl when he
initiated the traffic stop failed to provide reasonable suspicion of criminality as
required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. She
acknowledges that Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24 requires that lane changing
be accompanied by a turn signal if any other vehicle may be affected.
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Additionally, Gonzalez acknowledges Deputy Kahl’s testimony that he
personally observed her change lanes without first signaling. However,
Gonzalez suggests that she was operating her vehicle adequately under the
circumstances, that is, there was a concrete median leading up to the turn lane
(so no traffic could approach on that side), and there was significant space
between her vehicle and Deputy Kahl’s vehicle, the sole vehicle nearby.
[8] The Fourth Amendment “regulates all nonconsensual encounters between
citizens and law enforcement officials.” Thomas, 81 N.E.3d at 625. The Fourth
Amendment guarantees that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
[9] The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and a
traffic stop is a seizure that must comply with the Fourth Amendment. McLain
v. State, 963 N.E.2d 662, 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. To conduct a
traffic stop, an officer needs “at least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has
been violated.” Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869-70 (Ind. 2009) (citing
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). Reasonable suspicion
entails a minimum level of objective justification for a stop that is more than an
inchoate and unparticularized hunch. Cardwell v. State, 666 N.E.2d 420, 422
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(Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. The “decision to stop a vehicle is valid so
long as [the officer’s] on-the-spot evaluation reasonably suggests that
lawbreaking occurred.” Id. at 870. “[E]ven a minor traffic violation is
sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.”
Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013).
[10] Deputy Kahl testified that he observed Gonzalez make a lane change without
signaling, and that he was driving in proximity such that he could have been
affected. The State established that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion.
[11] Also, Gonzalez argues that the traffic stop was an unreasonable intrusion
conducted in violation of her rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
[12] “Although this language tracks the Fourth Amendment verbatim, we proceed
somewhat differently when analyzing the language under the Indiana
Constitution than when considering the same language under the Federal
Constitution.” Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Ind. 2006). “Instead of
focusing on the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, we focus on the
actions of the police officer, concluding that the search is legitimate where it is
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reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.” Id. The State has the
burden to demonstrate that the police intrusion was reasonable. D.F. v. State, 34
N.E.3d 686, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
[13] When reviewing whether the police intrusion was reasonable, we will consider
the following factors in assessing reasonableness: “1) the degree of concern,
suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion
the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities,
and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356,
361 (Ind. 2005).
[14] The degree of intrusion is viewed from the point of view of the defendant. See
Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 19 (Ind. 2010). Gonzalez characterizes the
intrusion into her activities as “minimal,” but argues that Deputy Kahl did not
reasonably have a “high degree of concern” because Gonzalez did not commit
“an egregious offense.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. We would agree with
Gonzalez that failure to employ a traffic signal in these circumstances is not an
egregious offense. However, concern that a violation has been committed is not
dependent upon the severity of the violation. Deputy Kahl personally observed
Gonzalez change lanes without a signal. As for the extent of law enforcement
needs, Deputy Kahl was assigned to patrol the public highway during early
morning hours and look out for public safety. Again, his focus was not
constrained to severe offenses. Given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy
Kahl did not act unreasonably, in violation of the Indiana Constitution, when
he initiated the instant traffic stop.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence
[15] Gonzalez claims that she was found guilty of a violation of Indiana Code
Section 9-21-8-24(1) (pertaining to unsafe slowing or stopping of a vehicle) and
that the conviction lacks sufficient evidentiary support. Notwithstanding the
apparent scrivener error in the Chronological Case Summary, Gonzalez was
charged with, and convicted of, a violation of Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-
24(3) (pertaining to lane change without a signal).
[16] To establish this offense, which was reflected in the Complaint and Summons5
served upon Gonzalez, the State had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
Gonzalez changed lanes but failed to give a signal when another vehicle may
have been affected. See Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24(3).
[17] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal
conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Henley v.
State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind.2008). “We consider only the evidence
supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
such evidence.” Id. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative
value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
5
Indiana Code Section 34-28-5-1 provides that a complaint and summons described in Indiana Code Section
9-30-3-1 may be used to allege a traffic infraction or ordinance violation.
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[18] Deputy Kahl testified that he observed Gonzalez driving in the left lane and
move into the turn lane without using a signal. He testified that he was driving
in proximity to Gonzalez such that his vehicle could have been affected.
Gonzalez’s suggestion that Deputy Kahl was confused about which infraction
was implicated is, at most, an invitation to reweigh the evidence. Sufficient
evidence supports Gonzalez’s conviction for the traffic infraction of failure to
use a signal when changing lanes.
Conclusion
[19] The trial court did not admit evidence obtained in violation of Gonzalez’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution. Sufficient evidence supports her conviction of the charged traffic
infraction.
[20] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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