Karl G. Woodall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Apr 08 2020, 12:14 pm
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Deborah B. Markisohn Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Karl G. Woodall, April 8, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1022
v.
Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana,
The Honorable Lisa F. Borges,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G04-1704-MR-12404
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Karl Woodall (Woodall), appeals his sentence for
murder, a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Woodall presents the court with one issue, which we restate as: Whether the
trial court abused its discretion when it identified the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances for sentencing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] In March 2017, Stefanie Coulson (Coulson) lived on the southside of
Indianapolis in a home on Pleasant Run Parkway. Coulson was friends with
her neighbors, Michael and Amy Fenton (Michael and Amy, respectively), who
lived three houses down from Coulson. It was not unusual for friends and
acquaintances to come and go from Coulson’s home.
[5] On March 26, 2017, Coulson was at home using methamphetamine with
several people, including Woodall. Later in the day, Woodall took a nap at
Coulson’s home. Early in the morning of March 27, 2017, while Woodall was
asleep, Coulson took the keys to Woodall’s 2008 Honda minivan, picked up
Amy, and ran errands, eventually stopping at a Dollar General store on the
eastside of Indianapolis to root in the store’s dumpster for items of interest.
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[6] Around 2:00 a.m. on March 27, 2017, Woodall was awakened when Devin
Achenbach (Achenbach) and Dusti Hutchins (Hutchins) knocked on the door
of Coulson’s home. When Achenbach and Hutchins pointed out that
Woodall’s minivan was not parked in Coulson’s driveway, Woodall became
enraged. Woodall went to the Fentons in search of his minivan. Michael was
at home. Woodall called Coulson on Michael’s cellphone and ordered her to
return with his minivan. Woodall told Michael that “if his van wasn’t back in
15 minutes that someone was gonna die that night.” (Transcript Vol. III, p.
20). Michael was the only person present when Woodall made the statement.
Michael was scared by Woodall’s anger and his statement.
[7] Woodall returned to Coulson’s home to await her return with the minivan.
Woodall used Achenbach’s cell phone to text David Patrick (Patrick) and ask
Patrick to bring a single barrel shot gun to Coulson’s house, which Patrick did.
Coulson eventually returned with Woodall’s minivan and parked at the Fenton
home. At Woodall’s request, Achenbach drove Coulson back to her home in
Woodall’s minivan. Woodall and Coulson began a very heated argument.
Woodall would not allow anyone but Coulson in her home. However, at one
point, Woodall came outside and ordered Achenbach, who was carrying a 9-
millimeter Hi-Point handgun, to kill Coulson. When Achenbach refused,
Woodall took Achenbach’s handgun and told him, “You got 30 seconds to get
out of here. If not, you’re gonna be dead with her.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 111).
[8] Woodall went back into Coulson’s home. Woodall used Achenbach’s handgun
to shoot Coulson twice, once through the jaw and once through her neck,
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severing her spinal cord. Woodall also stabbed Coulson approximately thirty-
four times in her head, neck, arms, and hands. Coulson died from these
wounds. She was found later that morning by her roommate. Amy called the
police.
[9] After Coulson was killed, Patrick drove Achenbach to Patrick’s house on the
eastside of Indianapolis. Woodall arrived later and changed his clothes.
Patrick asked Woodall if “he had “cleaned up good[,]” and Woodall assured
him that he had. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 115-16). Woodall told Achenbach that “if [he]
was to tell . . . anything about the situation, [he] would be dead.” (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 117).
[10] Law enforcement’s investigation quickly revealed Achenbach, Hutchins, and
Woodall as potential sources of information about Coulson’s death. Hutchins
was known to the police through her dealings with a confidential informant,
who, at the request of the police, arranged a controlled drug buy with Hutchins.
On March 30, 2017, Hutchins was driven to the location of the controlled buy
by Woodall in his 2008 Honda minivan.
[11] Woodall was taken into custody. Further police investigation revealed that cell
phone records placed Woodall in the vicinity of Coulson’s home during the
murder. In addition, Woodall’s fingerprint was found on a fired cartridge case
located close to Coulson’s body.
[12] On April 4, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Woodall with
murder. On February 25, 2019, the trial court convened Woodall’s three-day
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jury trial. Achenbach and Hutchins testified that only Woodall and Coulson
were in the home at the time that they heard gunshots. The jury found
Woodall guilty as charged.
[13] The pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) filed on April 5, 2019, indicated the
following facts. Woodall had prior convictions for Class B misdemeanor
disorderly conduct and Class D Felony theft. In addition, at the time that he
committed the instant offense, Woodall was on pre-trial release for three open
criminal cases in Marion County: one for Class A misdemeanor driving while
suspended; a second for Level 6 felony theft with a prior theft conviction; and a
third for Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony criminal confinement, two
Counts of Level 6 felony domestic battery, and Class B misdemeanor criminal
mischief. Woodhall had served in the United States Marine Corps for five
years and was honorably discharged. Woodall reported having been diagnosed
with ADD as a child and PTSD in 2011. He had been prescribed medication
for his PTSD condition but did not take it consistently. Woodall also reported
having night terrors since 2007.
[14] On April 10, 2019, the trial court held Woodall’s sentencing hearing. In its oral
sentencing statement, the trial court found as an aggravating circumstance that,
while his criminal history was minimal, Woodall had violated the terms of his
pre-trial release in his open Marion County criminal cases by committing the
instant offense. The trial court also found as an aggravating circumstance that
“[t]here were witnesses that were threatened, and that was clear in the trial. It
was difficult. There was pre-trial, getting everything ready, partly because of
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that.” (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 76). The trial court also found the nature of the offense
to be an aggravating circumstance, in that the injury to Coulson was greater
than necessary to accomplish the offense and that the offense was brutal. In
discussing the nature of the offense, the trial court observed that “[n]o one
deserves to have their life taken that way. And certainly not by someone they
trusted. That they had opened their home to. That they had been a friend to.”
(Tr. Vol. IV, p. 77). The trial court also noted that Woodall had a history of
substance abuse, he had adequate time to change his mind about killing
Coulson, he had planned to commit the offense by arranging for Patrick to
bring the shot gun, and he had asked Achenbach to kill Coulson before killing
her himself in a rage. The trial court acknowledged Woodall’s military service
but found that it could not “give it the weight I would like to be able to give.”
(Tr. Vol. IV, p. 77). In its written sentencing order, the trial court found that
Woodall “threatened witnesses to try to prevent them from testifying.”
(Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. III, p. 74). The trial court sentenced Woodall to
sixty-three years.
[15] Woodall now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[16] Woodall challenges the propriety of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances found by the trial court. So long as a sentence imposed by a trial
court is within the statutory range for the offense, it is subject to review only for
an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007),
clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of the trial court’s
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sentencing discretion occurs if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect
of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and
actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion
when it fails to enter a sentencing statement at all, its stated reasons for
imposing sentence are not supported by the record, its sentencing statement
omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for
consideration, or its reasons for imposing sentence are improper as a matter of
law. Id. at 490-91.
I. Aggravating Circumstances
[17] Woodall contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it identified as
aggravating circumstances his position of trust with Coulson and his threats to
witnesses. Woodall argues that neither of these factors were supported by the
record. We address each in turn.
A. Position of Trust
[18] Our review of the trial court’s oral and written sentencing statements leads us to
conclude that Woodall’s contention that the trial court found that he was in a
position of trust with Coulson is based on a mischaracterization of the trial
court’s ruling. At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that Woodall was in
a position of trust with Coulson, but we find no indication that the trial court
adopted the State’s argument. Rather, when discussing why it found that the
nature of the offense was an aggravating circumstance, the trial court noted that
Coulson had trusted Woodall, she had opened her home to him, and she had
considered him a friend, none which equates to a finding that Woodall was in a
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position of trust with Coulson. Woodall does not argue that the trial court
abused its discretion when it found the nature of the offense to be aggravating.
In addition, the trial court’s written sentencing statement does not indicate that
it found that Woodall was in a position of trust with Coulson. Because the
factual underpinning of Woodall’s argument is misplaced, we find no abuse of
the trial court’s discretion.
B. Intimidation of Witnesses
[19] Woodall’s argument pertaining to this aggravating circumstance is that the trial
court erred because he only threatened one witness, Achenbach, not more than
one witness, as found by the trial court. Woodall claims that the trial court’s
finding is supported as to Achenbach because there was evidence that he told
Achenbach on the day of the murder that he “would be dead” if he said
anything about Coulson’s killing. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 117). However, Woodall
argues that the record did not support that he threatened Hutchins by telling her
that she and her children “would be killed if she discussed the matters in this
case[,]” as argued by the State at sentencing. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 72). The State
counters that the trial court’s finding was supported by evidence that Woodall
threatened Achenbach and Michael on the day of the murder.
[20] We find that Woodall’s argument on this point and the State’s response are
based on a misunderstanding of the trial court’s finding. In its oral sentencing
statement, the trial court did not specify which witnesses it found Woodall had
threatened but noted that the threats had made trial preparation more difficult.
In its written sentencing statement, the trial court found that Woodall had
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“threatened witnesses to try to prevent them from testifying.” (Appellant’s
Conf. App. Vol. III, p. 74). The trial court’s written statement indicates to us
that its finding was based on threats made by Woodall after the murder charge
had been filed against him because testifying was not a possibility until then.
We note that, prior to Woodall’s trial, Achenbach, Patrick, Hutchins, and
Woodall were all in custody in the Marion County Jail. On June 1, 2017, and
on September 4, 2018, the State filed motions to separate Woodall and
Achenbach in the jail, alleging that “[t]he State fears for Devin Achenbach’s
ability to give fair and impartial testimony due to [his] proximity and ability to
be intimidated by Defendant.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, pp. 79, 142).
On September 28, 2017, the State filed a similar motion pertaining to Patrick.
The trial court judge, who presided over Woodall’s trial and sentencing
hearings, granted all the State’s motions. Woodall does not address the trial
court’s grant of these motions which lend some support from the record for the
trial court’s finding that Woodall had threatened witnesses to prevent them
from testifying.
[21] Assuming, without deciding, that this aggravating circumstance was not clearly
supported by the record and was, therefore, an abuse of discretion, we do not
find that remand for resentencing is necessary. When a trial court abuses its
discretion by considering an improper aggravating circumstance, we remand for
sentencing only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would
have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy
support in the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Here, the trial court
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found as additional aggravating circumstances Woodall’s violation of the terms
of his pre-trial release in three other open criminal cases and the nature of the
offense. The trial court made a detailed statement about why it considered the
nature of the offense to be aggravating, citing the brutality of the crime
committed against a victim who had trusted Woodall and opened the door of
her home to him, Woodall’s history of substance abuse, his planning of the
offense, Woodall’s request to Achenbach to kill Coulson, and the fact that
Woodall could have changed his mind at any time but did not. In light of these
other aggravating circumstances which Woodall does not dispute were valid,
we can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same
sentence even if it had not considered the fact that Woodall threatened
witnesses. See id.
II. Mitigating Circumstances
[22] Woodall argues that the trial court also abused its discretion when it identified
and weighed the mitigating circumstances. We begin by noting that a trial
court is not obligated to credit a defendant’s claim as to what constitutes a
mitigating circumstance. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind. 2000). In
order to be persuasive, a claim that the trial court failed to find a mitigating
circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence
was both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868
N.E.2d at 493.
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A. Military Service
[23] Woodall contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to
accord his military service more weight as a mitigating circumstance. However,
the relative weight ascribed by a trial court to a mitigating factor is no longer
subject to our review on appeal. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. The trial
court acknowledged that Woodall’s honorable military service was a mitigating
circumstance but found that it could not “give it the weight I would like to be
able to give.” (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 77). Our scope of review precludes us from
crediting Woodall’s argument. See id.
B. Mental Health
[24] Woodall’s final argument is that the trial court abused its discretion when it
failed to find his mental health to be a mitigating circumstance because it was
advanced at sentencing, was clearly supported by the record, and was
significant. However, our supreme court has suggested that a trial court
exercise a high degree of discernment when considering if a claimed mental
illness has mitigating weight. Covington v. State, 842 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind.
2006). Factors to be considered by the trial court include “the extent of the
inability to control behavior, the overall limit on function, the duration of the
illness, and the nexus between the illness and the crime.” Id.
[25] Here, the record contains scant support apart from Woodard’s self-report in his
PSI that he had ADD and PTSD. Even if the existence of those conditions
were clearly supported by the record, the record is utterly devoid of any
evidence that Woodall’s ADD and PTSD resulted in any inability to control his
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behavior, limited his function, or had any nexus with Coulson’s murder
whatsoever. Indeed, on appeal, Woodall does not even attempt to argue that
his PTSD and ADD had anything to do with murdering Coulson. Therefore,
we find that his argument on this issue also fails. See Weedman v. State, 21
N.E.3d 873, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding no abuse of the trial court’s
discretion in failing to identify Weedman’s mental health as a mitigating
circumstance where he failed to show a nexus between his mental health and
the offense), trans. denied.
CONCLUSION
[26] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it identified the aggravating and mitigating circumstances for
sentencing.
[27] Affirmed.
Mathias, J. and Tavitas, J. concur
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