Cameron Wood v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 29 2020, 9:19 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Donald E.C. Leicht Josiah Swinney
Peru, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Cameron Wood, May 29, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-3075
v. Appeal from the Howard Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William C.
Appellee-Plaintiff Menges, Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
34D01-1812-MR-1923
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Cameron Wood appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to level
4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (SVF) and
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level 5 felony reckless homicide. He contends that his sentence violates the
Indiana Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy and Indiana Code
Section 35-50-1-2. Concluding that his arguments are without merit, we affirm
his sentence. However, he also argues, and the State concedes, that the trial
court erred in calculating his credit time. We agree and therefore remand with
instructions to correct Wood’s credit time.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On November 22, 2018, Wood shot and killed Jamea Parker. Wood possessed
the handgun that he used to kill Parker, while having previously been convicted
of class B felony rape and class C felony criminal confinement. The State
charged Wood with murder, two counts of level 3 felony attempted aggravated
battery, level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF, level 5
felony reckless homicide, level 5 felony involuntary manslaughter, and level 5
felony criminal recklessness. On December 17, 2018, police arrested Wood.
[3] On December 3, 2019, Wood pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to level 4
felony unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF and level 5 felony reckless
homicide, in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. The plea
agreement left sentencing to the trial court’s discretion. The same day the trial
court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court found as aggravating factors
Wood’s juvenile history, his conviction for resisting law enforcement, and that
he was on probation when he killed Parker. The trial court found that the
aggravating factors substantially outweighed any mitigating factors and
sentenced Wood to consecutive terms of twelve years for the level 4 felony
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conviction and six years for the level 5 felony conviction for an aggregate term
of eighteen years. The trial court’s sentencing order states that Wood “has jail
time credit as of December 3, 2019 in the sum of 337 actual days or 449 credit
days, served while awaiting disposition in this matter.” Appealed Order at 1.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – Wood’s arguments against his sentence are
meritless.
[4] We first address Wood’s challenge to his sentence. First, he asserts that the
imposition of consecutive sentences violates the Indiana Constitution’s
prohibition against double jeopardy. He argues that the trial court should have
merged both counts into one for sentencing and requests that we reverse the
trial court’s order that his sentences be served consecutively. We need not go
into detail regarding the law on double jeopardy, and we express no opinion on
whether his convictions violate double jeopardy principles. It is enough to note
that “[a] violation of double jeopardy principles requires that we vacate the
conviction with the less severe penal consequences.” Johnston v. State, 126
N.E.3d 878, 890 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Although Wood is entitled
to contest on direct appeal the merits of the trial court’s sentencing discretion
because he pled guilty pursuant to an open plea, Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d
394, 396 (Ind. 1996), he has waived his right to challenge his convictions on
double jeopardy grounds. See Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2002)
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(“Mapp waived his right to challenge his convictions on double jeopardy
grounds when he entered his plea agreement.”).
[5] Wood also argues that even if consecutive sentences are permitted, Indiana
Code Section 35-50-1-2(d) limits the aggregate term of his imprisonment to
fifteen years. Subsection 2(d) limits the term of imprisonment for convictions
arising out of an episode of criminal conduct. However, pursuant to subsection
2(c), the term limits in subsection 2(d) do not apply to convictions for crimes of
violence. Wood was convicted of crimes of violence. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-
2(a)(5), -(19). As such, subsection 2(d) is inapplicable. Accordingly, we affirm
Wood’s sentence.
Section 2 – Remand is necessary to correct Wood’s credit
time.
[6] Pursuant to the Indiana Penal Code, prisoners receive credit time that is applied
to reduce their term of imprisonment. Purdue v. State, 51 N.E.3d 432, 436 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2016). “The time spent in confinement before sentencing applies
toward a prisoner’s fixed term of imprisonment.” Id. (citation omitted).
“Accrued time” is the amount of time that a person is imprisoned or confined.
Ind. Code § 35-50-6-0.5. “Good time credit” is the reduction in a person’s term
of imprisonment or confinement awarded for the person’s good behavior while
imprisoned or confined. Id. “Credit time” is the sum of a person’s accrued
time, good time credit, and educational credit. Id. A person, like Wood, who
is not a credit restricted felon and is imprisoned awaiting trial or sentencing for
a crime other than a level 6 felony or a misdemeanor is initially assigned to
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class B for purposes of determining good time credit. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-4. A
person assigned to class B “earns one (1) day of good time credit for every three
days the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or
sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1(c). “Because pre-sentence jail time credit
is a matter of statutory right, trial courts generally do not have discretion in
awarding or denying such credit.” Perry v. State, 13 N.E.3d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014) (citation omitted).
[7] Here, the trial court gave Wood accrued time of 337 days and good time credit
of 112 days based on Wood’s class B status for a total credit time of 449 days.
Wood was arrested on December 17, 2018, and remained in jail until his
sentencing on December 3, 2019. Thus, his accrued time was 351 days.
Accordingly, we remand with instructions to correct the sentencing order and
provide Wood with accrued time of 351 days and good time credit of 117 days
for a total credit time of 468 days. 1
[8] Affirmed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
1
The State argues that “it is unclear how much good-time credit Wood earned because the presentence
investigation [report] listed that Wood amassed five separate jail sanctions while awaiting trial, some of
which resulted in a lockdown or a suspension.” Appellee’s Br. at 9 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
We presume that the trial court was aware of the sanctions but did not believe that they warranted
deprivation of Wood’s good time credit.
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