Willie Steverson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 14 2020, 7:55 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Yvette M. LaPlante Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
LaPlante LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Evansville, Indiana J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Willie Steverson, February 14, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2286
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Gary Schutte,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
82C01-1905-F5-3719
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Willie Steverson appeals his conviction for battery as a level 5 felony. He raises
two issues:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of
the victim’s pending CHINS case; and
II. Whether the court abused its discretion in instructing the jury.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 17, 2019, B.C. was walking home and encountered Steverson, whom
she had been dating on and off for three years. Steverson was hostile at first
and called her a “b----,” and B.C. went with him inside an apartment located
near the intersection where they had met. Inside, “[e]veryone was getting
high,” Steverson immediately pulled out a pipe, and he and B.C. began
smoking methamphetamine. Transcript Volume II at 41. At some point,
Steverson requested that he and B.C. go for a walk, and as they left, she did not
have her cellphone. The pair walked down an alley, Steverson “kept saying,
baby you know I love you right, you know I love you,” and B.C. “just got a sick
feeling” in her stomach. Id. at 43. Upon entering a side door of an abandoned
residence, “[i]t just turned all bad,” Steverson became angry and told B.C. that
he saw messages on her phone and thought she was cheating on him, and B.C.
grew frantic. Id. at 44. Steverson dragged her to a hallway, hit her, called her a
“wh---” and a maggot, and stated that he should kill her. Id. He pulled her
hair, dragged her into a bedroom, and smacked her with an open fist. She saw
someone in the neighbor’s yard, and when she fell into a closet, Steverson said,
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“B----, if you do not, if you don’t be quite [sic],” and “I’m going to lock you in
this closet and catch this house on fire.” Id. at 45-46. He entered the closet,
closed the door, and hit her again with an open fist. She pled with him that she
could not breathe, they exited the closet, and he hit her with a closed fist
because she told him she did not cheat on him. Steverson then accused B.C. of
stealing a pipe, she explained she did not have anything of his on her, and for
the subsequent thirty to forty-five minutes, he smoked while she searched for
the pipe. At some point, he choked her with his hands and “kept hitting” her
head with a metal flashlight. Id. at 49. Giving up on searching for the pipe,
they exited the house from the back door, and Steverson said, “B----, don’t
make a scene.” Id. at 47.
[3] After cutting through the backyard and alley, B.C. saw some people down the
street, screamed, and “made a scene hollering about [her] cellphone and took
off” to her house. Id. at 49. When she arrived, her roommate noticed her
demeanor and stopped her, and B.C. broke down, explained what had
happened, and called the police. Evansville Police Officer Jeff Worthington
responded to the dispatch, found B.C. distraught, crying, and hyperventilating,
and called an ambulance, which took her to the hospital. Evansville Police
Detective Brian Turpin met with her at the hospital, and the police took
photographs of her injuries. Detective Turpin later interviewed Steverson at the
police department after advising him of his Miranda rights, and the interview
was recorded.
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[4] On May 28, 2019, the State charged Steverson with battery as a level 5 felony,
and the information explained that the charge was enhanced to a level 5 felony
because he was convicted and sentenced for domestic battery with moderate
bodily injury on January 16, 2019, in cause number 82C01-1808-F6-5815. On
June 15, 2019, the State added a count of attempted invasion of privacy as a
level 6 felony, to which Steverson later pled guilty.
[5] On July 24, 2019, the State filed several motions in limine, including one that
moved the court to prevent Steverson from offering into evidence, or making
reference to any evidence of, B.C.’s “illicit drug use prior to [] May 17, 2019,
and any evidence of pending or closed CHINS matters” involving her.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 39. Following a hearing and argument, the
court took the motion under advisement and indicated concern and preference
that, “before going into anything with the CHINS case” or “anything gets
slippery or out of control,” a hearing outside the presence of the jury would be
held to clarify the direction of the testimony. Transcript Volume II at 22-23. A
chronological case summary administrative event entry for July 29, 2019, states:
“State[’]s Motions in Limine are granted pending testimony given.” Appellant’s
Appendix Volume II at 11.
[6] During the jury trial, the State called B.C. as a witness, and she recounted the
incident of May 17, 2019. She answered affirmatively when asked if she smoked
meth while in the apartment and stated that she smoked once while in the
abandoned residence before being accused of stealing from Steverson. After the
court admitted pictures of B.C. and her injuries as State’s Exhibits 1-28 and the
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State ended its direct examination, Steverson’s counsel made an offer of proof
and examined B.C. outside of the jury’s presence. B.C. answered affirmatively
when asked whether, at the time of the incident, she had a pending CHINS
matter related to one of her children, whether she was participating in CHINS
drug court, and whether there were rules about testing positive or using illicit
drugs. She indicated that she was in court sometime before May 17th and that
the court held her in contempt but suspended the executed sentence. When
asked if that was for a violation, she answered affirmatively, and when asked
further about the violation, she stated: “I wasn’t doing what I was supposed to be
doing” and “wasn’t doing my drops,” or her drug tests. Transcript Volume II at
53. She agreed with statements of Steverson’s counsel that “smoking
methamphetamine would have triggered another violation report” and that, from
her perspective, when “the CHINS court says, I’m going to hold you in contempt
for not doing, not following the rules, was it kind of I’m going to give you one
last chance.” Id. When Steverson’s counsel added, “Before I put you in jail,”
B.C. stated, “Yeah, I’ve been on thin ice for awhile with them.” Id. She agreed
further with his counsel’s statements that she had a “pretty big” interest to not
test positive and that she believed that she was “probably going to go to jail.” Id.
at 54. When asked if she believed that she would lose custody of her children,
she stated, “No.” Id.
[7] When the prosecutor was asked to respond to the offer of proof, the following
exchange occurred:
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THE STATE[]: [B.C.], what the result, so that’s in April, May
17th happens, you admittedly smoke meth, what happens at your
next appearance in CHINS Drug Court?
A Their exact words were they put me in jail to get me off the
street, to get me clean and for my safety.
THE STATE[]: And how long were you in jail for that sanction?
A One week, and then I went to Stepping Stone.
THE STATE[]: And, when you say you went to Stepping Stone,
was that inpatient treatment or outpatient treatment?
A Inpatient.
THE STATE[]: Inpatient treatment. At the time of the staying
the executed sentence for contempt to the time of this incident,
you did not believe that you were going to lose your kids if you
dropped dirty, is that correct?
A No.
THE STATE[]: Okay. Did you make any of this story up to
avoid the CHINS Drug Court sanction?
A No.
THE STATE[]: Did they ask you, did they drug test you and you
drop dirty, or did you just say, I smoked?
A I told them.
THE STATE[]: You told them?
A Yeah. I didn’t fail any drops.
Id. at 54-55. B.C. answered “90 days” when Steverson’s counsel asked if she
remembered the amount of jail time she faced when they held her in contempt
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but then suspended it. Id. at 56. When asked if, after she “disclosed all these
events, the [c]ourt did not impose the full amount of the sentence,” she answered
in the negative and stated: “I had a choice.” Id. She indicated that she did not
ever deny to anyone that she had smoked meth. She answered affirmatively
when Steverson’s counsel asked if she told Detective Turpin on May 17th she
was forced to smoke meth and whether she told hospital staff she was forced to
smoke meth, and she answered in the negative when asked if she told her case
manager that she was forced to smoke meth.
[8] Steverson’s counsel offered her testimony under Ind. Evidence Rule 616 and
argued it was relevant and admissible, he believed a valid theory of defense to
be that “she smokes meth, she knows that she’s on thin ice, she knows that
she’s probably going to go to jail if she gets caught, and so as the [c]ourt is
aware, when people have PTR’s, they’re going to try to come in with some
reason, some excuse,” he was “sort of hamstrung to present a full theory of
defense” if the jury was not informed that there was a penalty or a consequence
to her smoking meth, and that she received “some benefit to the version she
presented to the CHINS [c]ourt.” Id. at 60. In denying Steverson’s motion, the
court stated that it did not know that “we’ve established that she has a particular
bias” against Steverson, that “what drives the day” was that she was honest with
the CHINS manager and still did receive executed time, and that “she didn’t get
the full 90 days, but I don’t know that we can attribute that to anything.” Id. at
61-62. After pointing to B.C.’s testimony that “she never thought she was going
to lose her children,” it stated: “There’s a difference between irrelevant and
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admissible evidence, it may be relevant, as [the State] touched on, there’s a lot of
relevant information, it does open up a pandora’s box of issues.” Id. at 62.
[9] During testimony from Detective Turpin, clips from his interview with
Steverson were admitted as State’s Exhibits 86 and 87. When it was published
to the jury, State’s Exhibit 86 consisted of the following:
[Steverson]: I’m telling you the truth man, we got, okay we got
(inaudible) each other though, it wasn’t nothing like that, she
(inaudible) she’s going to do that (inaudible).
DETECTIVE TURPIN: So, what happened, what happened,
what did she do to you that caused you to do that?
[Steverson]: Well, I don’t know man, got in this argument and
got in a f---ing fight man, you know what I’m saying.
DETECTIVE TURPIN: So, where are your injuries?
[Steverson]: What do you mean?
DETECTIVE TURPIN: Where are your injuries?
[Steverson]: Injuries.
DETECTIVE TURPIN: Injuries, yeah, what did she do to you,
so if you have a mutual, if you and I, if we take the cuffs off, I’m
not going to do this, this is not a threat in any way, if we take the
cuffs off, even though I’m seriously old, when we leave here, if
we decide to go at it, even though I’m seriously old, you’re going
to have injuries, I’m going to have injuries. You’re a lot younger
than me and probably in a lot better shape, so I’m probably going
to have more injuries, but you’re going to have some injuries, I
guarantee you, because that’s what a mutual fight does, that’s
what I’m trying to tell you. I keep telling you I know this story
inside and out and I need you to understand I get it man, you
found out she’s cheating on you, you get fired up about that,
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people do all the time, it’s understandable. I’m not saying that
that makes you an awful person.
[Steverson]: She got (inaudible), so I told her, she’s got to run,
(inaudible) and I’m like listen man, (inaudible), stop hitting me
man, you know, get the f--- off of me and stop hitting me, but it
wasn’t until she had, it wasn’t until she had (inaudible).
Id. at 103-104. State’s Exhibit 87 was published to the jury and contained
Steverson’s statement that “(Inaudible) some little small domestic a-- b---s---.”
Id. At the end of the trial, Steverson’s counsel proposed a final instruction on
the use of force to protect person or property based on “IN Pattern Instruction
No. 10.0300, I.C. 35-41-3-2,” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 64, stated
that, in the interview shown in State’s Exhibit 86, Steverson “says you know,
well she gets rowdy, she jumped on me and I just sort of, and did like a hand
motion of pushing her off,” and argued that there was evidence, “if she jumps
on him first, despite the lack of injuries,” that pushing B.C. off was acting in
self-defense. Transcript Volume II at 114. The State objected and argued that
allowing the self-defense instruction and permitting him to argue self-defense in
closing “opens the door to [Ind. Evidence Rule] 404(b).” Id. The court
declined to give the instruction, stating in part:
I think that the measuring stick is the evidence that was heard in
the case. The only evidence that is arguably or questionably
could be construed as in favor of self-defense was his own
statement which he said he pushed her away from him. I don’t
think that that indicates that she was an initial aggressor. There’s
no evidence he had any injuries . . . .
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Id. at 115.
[10] The jury found Steverson guilty of battery as a class B misdemeanor, he
admitted to the enhancement to a level 5 felony, and the court sentenced him to
five years for the level 5 felony to be served concurrently with a one-year
sentence for the level 6 felony for attempted invasion of privacy.
Discussion
I.
[11] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
evidence of B.C.’s pending CHINS case. The admission and exclusion of
evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the
admission of evidence only for abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d
1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs “where the decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Smith v.
State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001).
[12] Steverson argues that the trial court erred in failing to admit evidence of the
“potential consequences that smoking methamphetamine would have in [B.C.’s]
pending CHINS case,” Appellant’s Brief at 11, under a theory that B.C. had a
motive to lie to obtain a leaner consequence; that is, she “had reason to make
herself look sympathetic to avoid jail time.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5. In
support, he points to the fact that she did not receive the executed sentence she
anticipated after admitting to smoking methamphetamine but was offered the
option of completing an inpatient program instead. He argues the trial court
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erred in making a factual determination about B.C.’s credibility rather than
leaving that matter for the jury, and he contends that the State, in failing to argue
that the testimony does not demonstrate an interest of B.C. to pin her “decision
to smoke methamphetamine on pressure from Steve[r]son, rather than her own
personal choice,” concedes the consideration of relevancy. Appellant’s Brief at
12.
[13] He relies upon Mitchell v. State, in which this Court stated in a footnote:
“A witness’s bias, prejudice or ulterior motives are always
relevant at trial in that they may discredit her or affect the weight
of her testimony.” Dyson v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998) (interpreting Ind. Evidence Rule 616). However,
Mitchell concedes on appeal that he did not offer the CHINS
evidence for the purposes identified in Evidence Rule 616.[ 1]
730 N.E.2d 197, 197 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. He claims that, had
Mitchell’s counsel offered the evidence in question under Ind. Evidence Rule
616, the testimony would have been admissible and that Mitchell’s motives are
no different than those presented here; i.e., B.C.’s motive to identify Steverson as
the aggressor to receive more lenient treatment in the CHINS matter.
[14] The State maintains that the facts do not support Steverson’s defense theory. It
argues that she was completely honest and admitted to her methamphetamine
1
Ind. Evidence Rule 616 specifies that “[e]vidence that a witness has a bias, prejudice, or interest for or against
any party may be used to attack the credibility of the witness.”
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use and that it did not give rise to a motive for dishonesty “in the case of B.C.’s
relationship with CHINS,” where “she admitted her drug use to CHINS and
did not expect parent-time repercussions.” Appellee’s Brief at 12. It further
argues that the drug use, which had nothing to do with the injuries Steverson
inflicted on B.C., was irrelevant and inadmissible.
[15] We note that Ind. Evidence Rule 616 provides for the admission of evidence
showing bias or prejudice of a witness without any qualifications. See Ingram v.
State, 715 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ind. 1999). However, it “should be read in
conjunction with Rule 403’s required balancing of probative value against the
danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. Ind. Evidence Rule 403 provides that
“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”
[16] The record reveals that, during the offer of proof, B.C. indicated that, at the time
of the incident, she had a pending CHINS matter relating to one child and was
participating in CHINS drug court. She indicated a court held her in contempt
for a violation sometime before May 17th but suspended the executed sentence.
When asked about the violation, she stated that she was not doing what she was
supposed to be doing and was not participating in drug tests. B.C. testified that
she served seven days and then received inpatient treatment.
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[17] While B.C. stated she had been on “thin ice for awhile” and agreed with various
statements of Steverson’s counsel regarding an interest to not obtain a positive
drug test because, as he suggested, it would trigger an additional violation report,
she indicated she had not believed she would lose custody of her children, had
not fabricated a story to avoid the sanction of the CHINS drug court, and had
never denied smoking methamphetamine to anyone. When asked whether she
tested positive or whether she “just sa[id], I smoked,” she answered: “I told
them.” Transcript Volume II at 55.
[18] To the extent Steverson argues that the testimony about the potential
consequences in B.C.’s pending CHINS case is relevant to the charge facing him,
we note the court found that he had not established a particular bias that B.C.
held against him and that it could not attribute her receipt of less than the full
ninety-day sanction to anything. We further observe that, while B.C. indicated
she told Detective Turpin and the hospital staff at an earlier time that she was
forced to smoke meth, Steverson does not point to the record to indicate that
B.C. told persons involved in the CHINS case that he forced her to smoke. We
conclude under these circumstances that the court did not err or abuse its
discretion in excluding the evidence of B.C.’s CHINS case.
II.
[19] The next issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the
proposed jury instruction on the use of force to protect person or property.
Steverson maintains the evidence supported the tendering of the instruction. He
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asserts defense counsel based the request “from a video clip in which Steverson
told the detective he was pushing B.C. off of him.” Appellant’s Brief at 18 (citing
Transcript Volume II at 113). He argues that the court made an erroneous
factual determination in deciding his statement during the interview did not
indicate B.C. was the initial aggressor. He further argues: the “court concedes”
that the instruction was supported by the evidence; the court did not address
whether the instruction was a correct statement of the law or whether it was
repeated by another instruction; and the prosecutor did not object that the
defense failed to meet the required elements for tendering a jury instruction. Id.
at 19.
[20] The State responds the record lacks evidence that B.C. was an initial aggressor
or that Steverson feared for his life, safety, or health. It contends the evidence
demonstrates that “the victim’s injuries were visible, and [Steverson] showed no
signs of injury.” Appellee’s Brief at 15 (citing State’s Exhibits 1-28, 86-87). It
further maintains that the decision to reject the instruction was harmless and
did not affect Steverson’s rights “given the large bulk of evidence rebutting any
false claim to self-defense.” Id. at 16.
[21] The purpose of an instruction is “to inform the jury of the law applicable to the
facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case
clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Overstreet v. State, 783
N.E.2d 1140, 1163 (Ind. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150, 124 S. Ct. 1145(2004). Instruction of the jury is generally within the discretion of the trial court
and is reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 1163-1164. A trial
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court erroneously refuses to give a tendered instruction, or part of one, if: (1) the
instruction correctly sets out the law; (2) evidence supports the giving of the
instruction; and (3) the substance of the tendered instruction is not covered by
the other instructions given. See id. at 1164. Before a defendant is entitled to a
reversal, he must affirmatively show that the erroneous instruction prejudiced
his substantial rights. Lee v. State, 964 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
(citing Gantt v. State, 825 N.E.2d 874, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied.
[22] As set out above, it is Steverson’s burden to demonstrate that the evidence
supported giving the instruction. Steverson points only to his response to
Detective Turpin’s inquiry into his injuries. We agree with the trial court that
his statement does not indicate that B.C. was the initial aggressor. Based on the
record, we cannot say that Steverson has demonstrated he was protecting
himself from what he reasonably believed to be the imminent use of unlawful
force. See Dixson v. State, 22 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“When a
case does not involve deadly force, a defendant claiming self-defense must show
that he was protecting himself from what he ‘reasonably believe[d] to be the
imminent use of unlawful force.’”) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c)), trans.
denied. We find that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in
declining to give the proposed instruction.
[23] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Steverson’s conviction.
[24] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.
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