Jason Pfledderer and Walking With Jesus Ministries v. DeParris Pratt

FILED
Feb 20 2020, 8:47 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Frank J. Agostino
South Bend, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason Pfledderer and Walking February 20, 2020
With Jesus Ministries, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Defendants, 19A-SC-1723
Appeal from the St. Joseph
v. Superior Court
The Honorable Elizabeth A.
DeParris Pratt, Hardtke, Magistrate
Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No.
71D06-1904-SC-5105
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-SC-1723 | February 20, 2020 Page 1 of 7
[1] Jason Pfledderer and Walking with Jesus Ministries, Inc. (the Ministry), appeal
the trial court’s order granting judgment in favor of DeParris Pratt on Pratt’s
complaint for wrongful ejectment after the Ministry barred Pratt from
continuing to reside at a Ministry-operated residence. Finding that the Ministry
falls under an exception to the landlord-tenant statutes, we reverse and remand
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Pfledderer and the Ministry.
Facts
[2] Pfledderer founded the Ministry, which is organized as a not-for-profit
corporation registered as a 501(c)(3) tax exempt entity. The purpose of the
Ministry is to offer people who have been convicted of a felony assistance to
reintegrate into society after being released from incarceration. Participants
must apply for acceptance into the program and meet certain ongoing
requirements, including attending church services, attending meetings that
reflect on scripture, and seeking full-time employment. Participants must pay a
program fee of $100 per week and, in exchange, receive shelter, support, and
job training. The Ministry owns multiple real properties.
[3] Pratt entered the Ministry program on March 21, 2019, after he was released
from incarceration. Pratt moved into a room in a house owned by the Ministry.
He did not sign a lease or any other written agreement. Pratt stayed at the
property for approximately four weeks, during which time he performed
approximately thirty hours of work for Pfledderer, including painting, yard
work, cleaning, moving furniture, and scrapping metal. Pratt maintained time
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-SC-1723 | February 20, 2020 Page 2 of 7
sheets documenting his work hours and did not receive any monetary
compensation for his work.1 During Pratt’s time in the program, he did not pay
any money towards the weekly fee of $100.
[4] On April 19, 2019, Pfledderer changed the locks on the property, barring Pratt
from entering the building or reclaiming his personal items. On April 22, 2019,
the property manager informed Pratt that Pfledderer wanted him to leave the
program and the property because he had violated program rules by smoking
inside and around the premises, failing to obtain full-time employment, and
failing to pay the weekly program fee. The Ministry did not file an application
with a court for immediate possession or ejectment before taking these actions.
[5] On April 23, 2019, Pratt filed a notice of claim and motion for emergency
possession of real property in small claims court, seeking damages based on lost
personal property and all other available relief. On May 3, 2019, the trial court
held a hearing. Pfledderer brought with him several bags of Pratt’s personal
items. On May 9, 2019, Pratt, by counsel, filed an amended complaint against
Pfledderer and the Ministry for emergency possession, conversion/replevin,
and breach of contract. At the May 29, 2019, bench trial, Pratt appeared pro se
and Pfledderer and the Ministry appeared by counsel.
[6] On June 26, 2019, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Pratt. It found
that the Ministry and Pratt were in a landlord-tenant relationship on a week-to-
1
Pfledderer stated that Pratt’s hours of work amounted to job training.
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week basis. The trial court acknowledged the statutory exception to the
landlord-tenant rules for religious organizations but found that Pfledderer had
failed to prove that the exception applied:
Pfledderer owns said property through his corporation, [the
Ministry]. Pfledderer is a common fixture in the St. Joseph
County Small Claims courthouse. As such, the Court notes that
Pfledderer holds many residential properties either through his
LLC or personally and commonly seeks an order for ejectment in
said court. The Court also takes note [of Pratt’s] Exhibit 2[,] a
record of Pfledderer’s other properties and cause numbers. The
Court fails to distinguish the current property in this case from
the other properties he owns in the cases listed in [Pratt’s] Exhibit
2 or the cases [in which] he has previously appeared before the
court.
Therefore, the Court finds Pfledderer was subject to [the]
Landlord Tenant Act and should have sought ejectment pursuant
to IC 31-30-2 et seq. and Pratt was wrongfully ejected from said
property.
Appealed Order p. 7. The trial court found that the bulk of Pratt’s personal
property had been returned to him and found no evidence to support Pratt’s
claims of other specific items he alleged were missing, so it found no damages
with respect to the personal property. But the trial court credited Pratt’s
testimony that he had to spend $35 per day for ten days to stay in a hotel after
he was barred from the Ministry’s property. Therefore, the trial court ordered
the Ministry to pay damages to Pratt in the amount of $350. The Ministry now
appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[7] Small claims actions involve informal trials with the sole objective of dispensing
speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law. Lae
v. Householder, 789 N.E.2d 481, 483 (Ind. 2003). We will reverse only upon
clear error, will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility, and
will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Kalwitz v.
Kalwitz, 934 N.E.2d 741, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). As always, however, we
apply a de novo standard of review to matters of statutory interpretation. Eppl
v. DiGiacomo, 946 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[8] Here, we also note that Pratt has not filed an appellee’s brief. We will not
undertake the burden of developing arguments on his behalf and will reverse if
the Ministry establishes prima facie error, meaning error at first sight, on first
appearance, or on the face of it. Wolverine Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 933 N.E.2d
568, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[9] Here, even if we accept for argument’s sake that the trial court correctly
concluded that the arrangement between the Ministry and Pratt bore the
hallmarks of a landlord-tenant relationship, we must consider the relevant
statutory exception to the Landlord Tenant Act. Specifically, the legislature has
decreed that there are a number of arrangements that do not fall under the
residential landlord-tenant statutes, including “[r]esidence at a rental unit
owned or operated by an institution that is directly related to . . . the provision
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of . . . education, counseling, religious service, . . . or a similar service.” Ind.
Code § 32-31-2.9-4(1).2
[10] It is apparent that, by creating explicit exceptions to the landlord-tenant
statutes, the General Assembly intended to encourage organizations such as the
Ministry to provide precisely the type of services it offers. Freeing such
organizations from the strictures of the Landlord-Tenant Act will allow them to
continue to help people who desperately need it—for example, people who are
attempting the monumental task of reintegrating into society following
incarceration. We infer that the legislature determined that encouraging such
services is in the best interest of the individuals who need the help as well as
society at large.
[11] It is undisputed that the residence at issue in this case is owned or operated by
the Ministry, which is an institution that is directly related to the provision of
education, counseling, religious services, and similar services such as job
training and housing. The trial court found that because Pfledderer and/or the
Ministry own multiple rental properties and have proceeded, in those cases, as
though they are in landlord-tenant relationships with the person they seek to
evict, it must mean that here, there is likewise a landlord-tenant relationship.
We do not find this analysis compelling. We do not know the facts of any of
2
The exception applies “unless the arrangement was created to avoid application of the residential landlord-
tenant statutes[.]” I.C. § 32-31-2.9-4. There is no evidence in this case suggesting that the arrangement
between the Ministry and Pratt was created to avoid application of these statutes.
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those cases, including whether there was a written lease or agreement at issue,
whether the Ministry was providing a similar service to the individuals in each
case, or whether Pfledderer, who is sometimes named in his individual
capacity, owns and operates properties separate and apart from the Ministry.
[12] All that we know are the facts of this case. Here, the relationship between the
Ministry and Pratt falls squarely under the exception to the landlord-tenant
statutes. Therefore, the trial court erred by entering judgment in favor of Pratt
and ordering the Ministry to pay damages.
[13] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to
enter judgment in favor of Pfledderer and the Ministry.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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