Cynequia Latria Glover v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 20 2020, 10:32 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
P. Jeffrey Schlesinger Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Office of the Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
Tina L. Mann
Crown Point, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Cynequia Latria Glover, April 20, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2572
v. Appeal from the
Lake Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Clarence D. Murray, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G02-1610-MR-3
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Following her guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter,1 Cynequia Latria Glover
(“Glover”) was sentenced to twenty years in the Indiana Department of
Correction with two years suspended to probation. Contending that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to recognize mitigating circumstances and
that her sentence is inappropriate, she now appeals.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In the early morning hours of October 8, 2016, Glover and Dan Hardy
(“Hardy”) returned to the residence they shared in Gary, Indiana. They began
to argue, and the altercation became physical. During the argument, Glover
stabbed Hardy in the abdomen with a knife. Hardy died shortly thereafter.
[4] On October 9, 2016, the State charged Glover with murder. On June 3, 2019,
the State amended the charging information to add one count of voluntary
manslaughter, a Level 2 felony. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 119. At that
time, the State and Glover entered into a “stipulated plea and agreement.” Id.
at 120-22. Pursuant to that plea agreement, Glover pleaded guilty to Level 2
felony voluntary manslaughter, and the State dismissed the murder charge. Id.
at 120-22, 139-40. On October 2, 2019, the trial court, finding that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, sentenced
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a).
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Glover to twenty years in the Indiana Department of Correction with two years
suspended to probation. Id. at 164-65. Glover now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Bethea v. State,
983 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (Ind. 2013) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482,
490 (Ind. 2007), reh’g granted on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). An
abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. A court will abuse its
discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement, relying on aggravating or
mitigating factors that are not supported by the record, failing to find factors
advanced by the parties and clearly supported by the record, or relying on
factors that are invalid as a matter of law. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91.
The trial court has no obligation to “properly weigh” these factors, and the
weight given to such factors is no longer subject to appellate review Id. at 491.
[6] Glover argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her
because it ignored several significant mitigating circumstances. Here, the trial
court found that the nature and circumstances of the crime was a significant
aggravating factor and noted that: (1) the crime was committed in the parties’
residence with Glover’s children and Hardy’s seventeen-year-old brother
present; (2) the incident was fueled by drugs and alcohol; and (3) Glover is
“volatile” and has “destructive anger management” issues. Appellant’s Conf.
App. Vol. II at 164. The trial court found the following mitigating
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circumstances: (1) Glover had no history of criminal activity and had led a law-
abiding life for a substantial period before commission of the crime; (2)
imprisonment of Glover will result in undue hardship to her dependents; (3)
Glover pleaded guilty, thus saving the court and the taxpayers the time and
expense of a trial; and (4) completed a number of self-betterment courses while
incarcerated. Id. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Glover.
[7] The trial court did not fail to take into consideration evidence that Glover was
not likely to reoffend because, although she had no criminal history, this
mitigating circumstance was not supported by the record. The trial court
reviewed the presentence report that placed Glover in the moderate risk
category to re-offend. Id. at 152. However, evidence was presented at the
sentencing hearing that Glover had been violent in the past when she was
involved in an incident with the father of her three children, where she allegedly
stabbed him, but he refused treatment because he did not want the mother of
his children to go to jail. Tr. Vol. 3 at 9, 12-13, 14, 15. The police had been
called to their house before when they had “gotten into situations” “probably a
little bit more” than two times. Id. at 15. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion because there was no evidence that clearly supported that Glover
would not continue with this pattern of violent behavior.
[8] The trial court did not fail to recognize grounds tending to excuse or justify the
crime as a mitigating factor. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated
“under any reasonable evaluation of this case, there is no justifiable reason for
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what you did. None that I can see.” Id. at 31. The trial court further stated, “I
have no reason to believe that your life or your physical safety was in issue at
the time you committed this act.” Id. Therefore, the trial court looked at the
facts presented and came to the conclusion that this mitigating factor was not
significant. Further, Glover pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. By
doing so, she admitted that (1) she had not acted in self-defense and (2) had
knowingly or intentionally killed Hardy while acting under sudden heat. See
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a).
[9] There is also no evidence that the trial court failed to recognize that Glover
would respond positively to short term incarceration. The presentence
investigation indicated that a letter was sent to Lake County Community
Corrections requesting the defendant be evaluated, but there was no response.
Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 153. No evidence was presented to support this
challenged mitigator other than Glover’s counsel’s statement, “She will respond
positively to shorter term incarceration” and a letter defense counsel sent to
community corrections confirming a conversation she had regarding Glover’s
potential acceptance into community corrections. Tr. Vol. 3 at 26-27; Appellant’s
Conf. App. Vol. II at 126. Although Glover had no criminal history, there was
evidence presented that this was not the first time that she had been involved in
violent domestic disputes, and her volatile behavior had occurred in the past.
The trial court did not have substantial evidence that Glover would respond to
short term incarceration.
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[10] Glover also contends that the trial court did not consider her remorse as a
mitigating factor. The trial court heard Glover’s statement at the sentencing
hearing, in which she expressed her remorse. Tr. Vol. 3 at 29-30. We give
substantial deference to the trial court’s evaluation for remorse because the trial
court may observe the defendant and is therefore in the best position to
determine whether the remorse is genuine. Webb v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1082,
1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied. The court is neither obligated to accept the
defendant’s arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor nor required to
give the same weight to a proposed mitigating factor as does the defendant.
Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Here, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Glover’s remorse to
be a significant mitigating circumstance. We, therefore, conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Glover.
[11] Glover also argues that her sentence is inappropriate. Pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B), this court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if,
after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the [c]ourt finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character
of the offender.” Our Supreme Court has explained that the principal role of
appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, “not to achieve a
perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225
(Ind. 2008). We independently examine the nature of Glover’s offense and his
character under Appellate Rule 7(B) with substantial deference to the trial
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court’s sentence. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015). “In
conducting our review, we do not look to see whether the defendant’s sentence
is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test
is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Whether a sentence is inappropriate
ultimately depends upon “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the
crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to
light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Glover bears the burden
of persuading us that her sentence is inappropriate. Id.
[12] Glover’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
her character. As to the nature of the offense, Glover admitted that she and
Hardy had a volatile relationship, particularly when they used drugs and
alcohol, and that, on the night in question, she had grabbed a knife and stabbed
Hardy in the abdomen during an argument. Glover committed this crime when
three of her children and Hardy’s brother, who was also under the age of
eighteen, were present in the residence.
[13] As to Glover’s character, the trial court described her as volatile due to
destructive anger management issues. This crime happened when children
were in the home, which shows that Glover had complete disregard for what
the children could possibly observe and the long-lasting effects on them if they
witnessed this violence. There is evidence that Glover had been involved in an
altercation in the past that caused injury but was never arrested, and police had
been called to the residence on previous occasions to deal with domestic
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disturbances. Glover also admitted to a police officer the night of the incident
that she “needs counseling for her anger issues but has never sought
counseling.” Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 76. Glover was aware of her
propensity to become violent and angry, but she only sought out help and
treatment after she was incarcerated. Ex. Vol. 4 at 7. We conclude that
Glover’s twenty-year-sentence with two years suspended to probation is not
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character.
[14] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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