Kristen Joy McGuinness v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 10 2020, 9:25 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Alexander W. Robbins Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bedford, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Benjamin J. Shoptaw
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kristen Joy McGuinness, September 10, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-460
v. Appeal from the Hendricks
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark A. Smith,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
32D04-1808-F5-99
Altice, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Kristen McGuinness pled guilty to Level 5 felony causing death while operating
a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court sentenced her to four years in
the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), with one year suspended to
probation, and ordered her driver’s license suspended for six years. She asserts
that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her and challenges the
length of her driver’s license suspension.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] Around midnight on June 17, 2018, McGuinness, age nineteen, was driving her
vehicle eastbound on US 40. She was alone in her car. McGuinness rear-
ended a pick-up truck in which Brittany Fields was a passenger. The collision
caused the pick-up to spin, enter the median, and roll over. Fields was ejected
from the vehicle and landed in the lanes of US 40. McGuinness and Fields’s
husband, Zane Fields, who had been driving the pick-up, were attempting CPR
when Hendrick’s County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Andrew Thomas arrived
on the scene. Zane told Deputy Thomas that he had observed a vehicle
approaching from the rear at a high rate of speed so he switched lanes to allow
it to pass but it struck their vehicle.
[4] While speaking with McGuinness, Deputy Thomas detected the smell of
alcohol on her breath. McGuinness told Deputy Thomas that a third car struck
her vehicle and caused her to hit the pick-up, but Deputy Thomas saw no
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damage to the rear of McGuinness’s vehicle and Zane recalled only one set of
headlights approaching. McGuinness provided a breath sample, which had a
blood alcohol content of .15. She later provided a blood draw which indicated
a blood alcohol concentration equivalent of .122 grams of alcohol per one
hundred milliliters of her blood. Fields was transported to Indianapolis with
significant head injuries as well as other serious injuries.
[5] On June 18, 2018, the State charged McGuinness with Count 1, Level 6 felony
operating while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury and Count 2, Class C
misdemeanor minor consuming alcohol. McGuinness was arrested on June 18,
2018 and posted bond the next day. She remained out on bond under enhanced
pretrial supervision.
[6] Fields died from her injuries on July 31, 2018, never having been released from
the hospital. On August 14, 2018, the State moved to add Count 3, Level 5
felony causing death while operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and
Count 4, Level 5 felony causing death when operating a vehicle with a BAC of
.08 or more. The State’s motion included an attached copy of alcohol testing
results “for purposes of defendant’s mandatory license suspension.” Appellant’s
Appendix at 25. On August 16, the trial court granted the motion and ordered
McGuinness’s license “suspended immediately.” Id. at 26.
[7] On December 2, 2019, McGuinness and the State entered into a plea agreement
in which she pled guilty to Count 3, Level 5 felony operating while intoxicated
causing death. The agreement provided for an open sentence with executed
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time not exceeding four years, and the State agreed to dismiss all remaining
counts. At a guilty plea hearing that same date, the court accepted the plea and
set the matter for a sentencing hearing on January 3, 2020.
[8] At the sentencing hearing, Fields’s mother, Fields’s father, and Zane’s mother
each made a statement to the court. Their statements reflected the pain and
suffering that Fields endured while hospitalized and expressed the anguish and
sadness that her death left in their lives. They also advised the court of Fields’s
young son, who would be too young to remember her.
[9] McGuinness presented the testimony of four witnesses: the human resources
director at Indy Vet, where McGuinness worked at the time of the accident and
was still employed, the owner of Indy Vet, and two longtime family friends.
The testimony of the Indy Vet witnesses reflected that McGuinness was a
reliable and good employee, had never come to work under the influence, and
was helpful to other employees and that Indy Vet was willing to employ
McGuinness with stipulations related to having a felony conviction. Written
testimony from others reflected that McGuinness was a trustworthy person, the
incident was out of character for her, she had never exhibited any signs of
substance abuse, and she very remorseful for what occurred. The court also
admitted a letter written by McGuinness’s therapist indicating that McGuinness
was diagnosed with PTSD in May 2019 and continued to see a therapist for
treatment. The presentence investigation report reflected that McGuinness had
no prior criminal history, is a high school graduate, and possessed an associate
degree in Veterinary Technology.
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[10] McGuinness also testified, reading a statement in which she apologized to
Fields’s family and friends, expressed remorse and regret, and took
responsibility for her actions. McGuinness testified to attending a Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (MADD) class in July 2018 and completing a substance
abuse program in the summer and fall of 2018. On cross-examination,
McGuinness said that, on the night in question, she had consumed alcohol at a
gathering for someone who had returned from the Army.
[11] The State asked the court to impose six years with four years executed and to
suspend her driver’s license for six years. The defense asked the court to
impose three years of incarceration, all suspended. At the hearing, before
pronouncing its sentence, the court advised:
It’s not my job to extend forgiveness, there has been a lot of talk
about forgiveness here this morning. My job is to follow the law
and apply it to the facts, and that is what I try to do. I’m not
supposed to be swayed by sympathy, bias, prejudice, or any of
those types of things. So, what I’ve tried to do is craft a sentence
that I believe is appropriate based upon the law and the facts that
I’ve heard here this morning[.]
Transcript at 86.
[12] Thereafter, the trial court, at the hearing and in its written sentencing order,
found the following two aggravators: (1) McGuinness was under twenty-one
years old at the time the act was committed, and (2) “the emotional impact on
the siblings, the family, and the son who has to grow up without a mother.” Id.
at 88. The trial court found the following mitigators: (1) McGuinness has no
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criminal history; (2) she is likely to respond to probation or short-term
imprisonment; (3) her character and attitude indicate that she is unlikely to
commit another crime; and (4) she entered into a plea and accepted
responsibility for the offense. The trial court sentenced McGuinness to four
years in the DOC with one year suspended to probation on home detention,
ordering McGuinness to perform eighty hours of community service, with forty
being involved on victim impact panels. The court also ordered her driver’s
license suspended for six years. McGuinness now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
I. Sentencing
[13] McGuinness argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced
her and asks us to vacate her sentence and remand with instructions to impose
no more than three years. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion
of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on
reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs where the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom. Moyer v. State, 83 N.E.3d 136, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans.
denied. When sentencing, a trial court abuses its discretion if it, among other
things, “considers reasons that ‘are improper as a matter of law.’” McCain v.
State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 981 (Ind. 2020) (citing Buford v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1074,
1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) and quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). If the
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trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing “if we
cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same
sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.”
Buford, 139 N.E.3d at 1081 (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). The
relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which
should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id.
[14] McGuinness asserts that the trial court erred when it found the impact on
Fields’s family to be an aggravating factor. We agree. This court has
explained:
Under normal circumstances, the impact upon a victim’s family
is not a proper aggravating circumstance for purposes of
sentencing. See Bacher v. State, 686 N.E.2d 791, 801 (Ind. 1997).
In Bacher, our supreme court explained that because the impact
on family members accompanies almost every case dealing with
the death of a victim, it is not appropriate to consider that impact
as an aggravating factor unless that impact was of such a
destructive nature not normally associated with the commission
of the offense in question and the impact was foreseeable to the
defendant. Id. Here, Rodriguez was charged with operating a
vehicle while intoxicated causing death being an essential
element of the offense. Therefore, it is not appropriate to
consider the impact of the victim’s death on her family, because
death is normally associated with the commission of the offense
in question; although its impact was not necessarily foreseeable
to the defendant. See id.
Rodriguez v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1169, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), superseded by
statute on other grounds, trans. denied. Accordingly, the trial court abused its
discretion when it considered the impact of Fields’s death on her family.
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[15] That said, a single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a
sentence. Buford, 139 N.E.3d at 1081. When a trial court considers an
improper aggravator but other valid aggravating circumstances exist, a sentence
enhancement may still be upheld. Id. Here, the trial court’s other identified
aggravator was that McGuinness was under the age of twenty-one, specifically
nineteen, and thus under the legal age for drinking alcohol. There is no
challenge to this aggravator, and we find that it is valid. Our Supreme Court
has held that a sentence may be upheld where a single aggravating factor
supports it, so long as we can say with confidence that in the absence of the
invalid aggravator(s) the trial court would have imposed the same sentence.
McCain, 148 N.E.3d at 981 (quotation omitted); see also Phelps v. State, 914
N.E.2d 283, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Bacher v. State, 722 N.E.2d 799,
803 (Ind. 2000)).
[16] Here, the court was faced with a tragic accident with horrible consequences on
both sides of the equation. It delivered a thorough explanation for its
sentencing decision, recognizing that Fields’s family obviously suffered a severe
and traumatic loss and that McGuinness made a terrible decision, which she
appeared to deeply regret. As the court recognized, however, the accident and
loss of life was “totally preventable” and stemmed from a “selfish act.”
Transcript at 87. The advisory sentence for a Level 5 felony, which McGuinness
requests, is three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. Here, the court imposed four
years, with one suspended. Based on the record before us, we can say with
confidence that the court would have imposed the same sentence absent the
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invalid aggravator. 1 We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing McGuinness.
II. License Suspension
[17] McGuinness next argues that her six-year driver’s license suspension is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character, and she
asks us to revise it under our authority pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). 2
The State asserts, among other things, that license suspensions are not criminal
punishments and not reviewable under App. R. 7(B), and, therefore,
McGuinness has waived her claim. We agree with the State insofar as license
suspensions are not punitive in nature, as explained below, but decline to find
that McGuinness has waived her challenge to the length of the suspension.
[18] We begin by observing that “[t]here exists no absolute right to obtain and keep
a driver’s license in Indiana.” Schrefler v. State, 660 N.E.2d 585, 587 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996) (citing Ruge v. Kovach, 467 N.E.2d 673, 677 (Ind. 1984)). Rather,
driving privileges are an entitlement that may be withheld, suspended, or
revoked by the State for reasons of public safety. Id. at 587-88.
1
To the extent that McGuinness argues that the trial court improperly weighed the aggravators and
mitigators, we note that trial courts no longer have any obligation to weigh aggravating and mitigating
factors against each other when imposing a sentence, and a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its
discretion in failing to “properly weigh” such factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.
2
App. R. 7(B) provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the
trial court’s discretion, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.”
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[19] Ind. Code § 9-30-16-2(c), regarding suspension of driving privileges for
operating a vehicle while intoxicated, provides, in pertinent part:
If a person is convicted of an offense that includes the element of
causing the death of another person and the offense involved the
operation of a motor vehicle or was an offense under IC 9-30-5,
the court shall order that the person’s driving privileges are
suspended for a period of at least two (2) years and not more than
the maximum allowable period of incarceration of the criminal
penalty for the offense.
The plain language of this statute provides that, when the predicate conviction
occurs, the trial court shall suspend a defendant’s driving privileges for at least
two years and not more than the maximum allowable period of incarceration
for the offense. In this case, McGuinness was convicted of a Level 5 felony, the
sentencing range for which is between one and six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b).
Therefore, pursuant to I.C. § 9-30-16-2(c), the trial court could suspend
McGuinness’s license for between two and six years. That decision was left to
the court’s discretion. Cf. Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 797 (Ind. 2012)
(addressing now-repealed Ind. Code § 35-48-4-15 – which made license
suspension mandatory when a motor vehicle was “used” in the commission of
certain drug offenses – and stating, “The statute leaves the court discretion to
decide the length of the suspension, but not whether to order it.”) (emphases in
original); Mitchell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 112, 114 (Ind. 1995) (applying now-
repealed statute requiring trial court to suspend a defendant’s driver’s license
upon conviction for possession of cocaine and observing that, once a conviction
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is obtained, trial court must suspend driving privileges and “[t]he trial court’s
discretion extends only to the length of the suspension”).
[20] The State argues that license suspension is not a criminal penalty. We agree.
Our Supreme Court, in addressing a lifetime driver’s license forfeiture following
conviction for driving while suspended as a habitual traffic violator, explained:
A sanction is a criminal punishment when its purpose is punitive
rather than remedial. A collateral consequence, by contrast, is a
civil penalty or disability imposed either by operation of law at
the time of conviction or because of a subsequent, separate
proceeding by a court or administrative agency. These
consequences may apply indefinitely or for a limited period[.] . . .
Some collateral consequences impose onerous, long-lasting
burdens on an individual. Other collateral consequences serve
important public interests. A driver’s license suspension falls
under this latter category.
State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 713 (Ind. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
[21] In Moala v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), this court addressed a
defendant’s double jeopardy claim related to his convictions for Class C
misdemeanor operating while intoxicated, which carried an automatic license
suspension upon conviction, and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication.
The court expounded on the remedial purpose of the license suspension
statutes, stating:
[T]he administrative suspension scheme was “designed to
promote the State’s interest in keeping its highways safe from
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intoxicated drivers” and although “the suspension of driving
privileges has some punitive impact on the offender . . . [it] is
merely incidental to the overriding remedial purpose of the
statute.”
Id. at 1066 (quoting Schrefler, 660 N.E.2d at 588). In sum, “[w]hether it be for
life or for a more limited time, the suspension of one’s driving privileges does
not constitute punishment.” Hazelwood v. State, 3 N.E.3d 39, 43 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014).
[22] With the above in mind, our task is to determine whether the trial court’s
decision to suspend McGuinness’s license for a period of six years was an abuse
of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision clearly
contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.
Adams, 960 N.E.2d at 796-97. Here, McGuinness acknowledges that her
actions resulted in Fields’s death, but urges that a “relatively low alcohol
concentration,” no observable signs of impairment at the scene beyond the odor
of alcohol on her breath, and her immediate attempts to assist Fields at the
scene mitigate in her favor. Appellant’s Brief at 18. She also highlights aspects of
her character such as her education and employment, as well as the facts that
she voluntarily sought out substance abuse treatment, was genuinely
remorseful, and suffers from PTSD due to the accident. The State reminds us
that McGuinness “blew almost twice the legal limit,” “was driving at a high
rate of speed” when she hit the pick-up, and was initially dishonest at the scene,
telling Deputy Thomas that another car had hit her and caused her to collide
with the pick-up truck. Appellee’s Brief at 15, 16-17.
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[23] The trial court had the unenviable task of crafting a sentence and determining
the length of license suspension in this sad case. The record reflects thoughtful
consideration by the trial court. McGuinness has failed to persuade us that the
trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that McGuinness’s license be
suspended for six years.
[24] Judgment affirmed.
Riley, J. and May, J., concur.
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