Dawn Riddle and Matthew Riddle v. Dennis Cress, Haley Wilkerson, and Helen Cress (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Apr 23 2020, 8:01 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Scott A. Norrick Denise E. Hayden
Anderson, Indiana Lacy Law Office, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dawn Riddle and Matthew April 23, 2020
Riddle, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Plaintiffs, 19A-PL-1471
Appeal from the Johnson Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Marla Clark, Judge
Dennis Cress, Haley Wilkerson, Trial Court Cause No.
and Helen Cress, 41D04-1810-PL-133
Appellees-Defendants.
Shepard, Senior Judge.
[1] Dawn (“Dawn”) and Matthew (“Matthew”) Riddle (collectively “the Riddles”)
appeal from the trial court’s order granting a motion to set aside a default
judgment filed by Dennis Cress (“Dennis”), Helen Cress (“Helen”) and Haley
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Wilkerson (“Haley”) (collectively, “the Defendants”), contending that the trial
court erred in granting the motion. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The Riddles filed a complaint on October 20, 2018, alleging that the Defendants
had committed defamation and false reporting in the course of tendering to the
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) material designed to denigrate the
Riddles.
[3] Dennis and Helen received a summons and service of the complaint on
November 15, 2018, while Haley received the same on December 20, 2018.
None of the Defendants appeared or responded to the complaint, and on
January 25, 2019, the Riddles moved for a default judgment as to each of them
individually. The trial court granted their request on January 28, 2019.
[4] On February 21, 2019, the Defendants filed a motion for relief from judgment,
citing Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1). Following a hearing on the motion, the
court concluded that most of the Defendants’ arguments about excusable
neglect had been “debunked.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 13. It nevertheless
granted the Defendants relief and set aside the default judgment. This appeal
followed.
Issue
[5] The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining the
Defendants had demonstrated they were entitled to relief.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides in pertinent part that a “court may relieve a
party . . . from a judgment, including a judgment by default for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect[.]” Appellate review in the
area of default judgments is limited. “The decision whether or not to set aside a
default judgment is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Siebert
Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields, 446 N.E.2d 332, 340 (Ind. 1983). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and inferences supporting the judgment, or it is “clearly erroneous.” Bello
v. Bello, 102 N.E.3d 891, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
[7] “‘The trial court’s discretion is circumscribed and limited by the eight categories
listed in T.R. 60(B).’” Id. (quoting Ind. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 734 N.E.2d
276, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied). These are largely meant “to afford
relief from circumstances which could not have been discovered” during the
period a motion to correct error could have been filed. Snider v. Gaddis, 413
N.E.2d 322, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). “The burden is on the movant to
establish grounds for relief” under T.R. 60(B). Ind. Ins. Co., 734 N.E.2d at 279.
“‘[T]he trial court is required to balance the alleged injustice suffered by the
party moving for relief against the interests of the winning party and society in
general in the finality of litigation.’” Bello, 102 N.E.3d at 894 (quoting Indiana
Ins. Co., 734 N.E.2d at 278-79).
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[8] In so doing, “the trial court must consider the unique factual background of
each case because ‘no fixed rules or standards have been established as the
circumstances of no two cases are alike.’” Coslett v. Weddle Bros. Constr. Co. Inc.,
798 N.E.2d 859, 860-61 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Siebert, 446 N.E.2d at 340).
“Though the trial court should do what is ‘just’ in light of the facts of individual
cases, that discretion should be exercised in light of the disfavor in which
default judgments are held.” Id. at 861. “A trial court will not be found to have
abused its discretion ‘so long as there exists even slight evidence of excusable
neglect.’” Id. (quoting Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Linton, 533
N.E.2d 1245, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied).
[9] The defendants’ motion alleged the following:
5. That the Defendants neglected to file an Answer to said
Complaint in a timely fashion based upon the following:
a. Defendants, [Dennis] and [Helen] were involved in an
automobile accident in late October 2018. Helen [] sustained
injuries as a result of said accident. She was briefly hospitalized
and continued to treat with her physician.
b. That Defendants, [Dennis] and [Helen] are 75 years of age
and 66 years of age respectively and are [sic] were not aware that
an Answer to the Complaint was required to be filed. Through
the years both Defendants have received certified mail from the
Plaintiff, [Matt]. The correspondence was routinely sent by
certified mail by [Matt] and typically contained harassing and
defamatory assertions about the Defendants, individually, and
other family members. The Defendants were under the mistaken
belief the present lawsuit was nothing more than the latest of
communications from [Matt] which contained similar assertions.
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c. The Defendants, Helen and [Dennis], were at or near this time
involved in concluding a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy proceeding.
The automobile accident as referenced above further complicated
matters as they were dealing with the Bankruptcy Trustee and
their insurance carrier related to monies to be received relative to
replacing their automobile. That the Defendants, Helen and
[Dennis], were engaged in these negotiations were without
transportation for a period of time and simply misunderstood
their respective obligation to answer the Complaint in a timely
fashion.
d. That the Defendants, Helen and [Dennis] were selected by the
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) as placement of the
Plaintiff’s two children Katie and Megan Riddle in the fall of
2016 when the children were removed from the home of the
Plaintiffs. The Defendants mistakenly believed that the
Complaint was related to the CHINS matter and therefore did
not require them to answer the Complaint directly.
e. That [Haley] was moving her primary residence from 9206
Huntleigh Circle, Plainfield, Indiana to 5629 Mills Rd.,
Indianapolis [sic] Indiana 46221 between November 3 to
December 27, 2018. That the Defendant lost track of the
Complaint in the move and inadvertently failed to answer the
Complaint in a timely fashion. Further, the Defendant, [Haley],
was injured on December 3, 2018. Her injury required her to
attend physical therapy and utilize crutches during her
convalescence. The Defendant, [Haley], was focused on her
recovery and not mindful that an answer to the Complaint was
time sensitive.
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 23-25.
[10] The hearing testimony contradicts most of the assertions in the motion. Dennis
and Helen were involved in an accident, but it occurred in September 2018,
nearly two months before they were served with the complaint. Further, Helen
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was treated at a hospital, but was not hospitalized for her injuries, which did
not include a concussion. Dennis and Helen each testified that despite the
mention of their ages in the motion, they were competent.
[11] Helen testified that she had received only one letter through certified mail from
Matt and that was the complaint and summons Dennis signed for on November
14 or 15, 2018. She also agreed that the chronological case summary for the
bankruptcy case showed that the case was closed on October 31, 2018, and that
the agreed entry was signed on November 2, 2018. The bankruptcy court order
indicating that the case was closed was dated November 5, 2018. Although she
and Dennis were represented by counsel in the bankruptcy proceedings, it did
not occur to her to have her attorney review the complaint. Registration for the
vehicle that was bought to replace the one that was totaled in the crash was
dated October 11, 2018. As for Helen, she testified that after Dennis signed for
the certified mail for the summons and complaint, she read but “briefly breezed
through it.” Id. at 38. She also stated that she was aware that an answer
needed to be filed within twenty days.
[12] Dennis testified that he signed for the certified mail for both of them, opened
and read the mail. He said he simply forgot about the letter because of prior
communication with Matt. Dennis testified that he has not spoken to Matt for
fifteen years and has had no call, no visits, and no mail from him. When asked
if he understood the consequences of ignoring a court document, he first stated
that he is now aware of the consequences. Upon further questioning, Dennis
stated that prior to his retirement from the police force, he was summonsed into
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court approximately 5,000 times. He agreed that when those to whom he
issued a ticket failed to appear, there was the consequence of re-arrest.
[13] Regarding Haley’s defense, she testified that she received the complaint in
December and did not immediately open it because she claimed that Matt had
sent multiple certified letters to Helen and Dennis, her grandparents. Despite
claiming that she lost track of the complaint in the move, she stated that later in
December she read the complaint and was aware of the summons. Id. at 6. She
understood that she was required to respond within a certain timeframe. Id.
Haley did not contact a lawyer about the complaint because she believed Matt
was asserting a “bogus” claim. Tr. p. 6. She said that she turned her attention
to the complaint only after receiving a letter that the case was “defaulted,” and
she was ordered to appear. Id. at 7.
[14] In the motion for relief, Haley had claimed that she neglected to answer the
complaint because: (1) she was moving and lost track of it; (2) she was
changing residences; and (3) had to recover and rehabilitate from an injury,
which required her to use crutches. Haley testified, however, that even though
she was injured and used crutches, she was able to continue working two jobs
and found rides to and from work. At one of her jobs, she had access to a
computer with internet service. She stated that her injuries did not prevent her
from working and from moving her belongings. Further, Haley had never
received any mail from the Riddles in the past. She was aware the summons
and complaint were official court documents but failed to respond.
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[15] Rule 60(B) requires that a movant filing a motion under subsection 1 must also
allege a meritorious claim or defense. Matt testified that the underlying case
with DCS, which was based at least in part on Haley’s assertions, vindicated
him and that the case was dismissed and ordered expunged. Matt filed the
complaint against the defendants in an effort to clear his name and that of his
children.
[16] The trial court found that the defendants filed their motion less than 30 days
after the judgment was entered and that there were complications in their
personal lives such that they did not respond to the complaint. The court also
found as follows:
While Plaintiffs debunked most of the specific reasons Defendants set
forth, the Court was nonetheless left with the impression that
Defendants, unsophisticated and unrepresented by counsel, were
sincerely confused about their obligation to respond. Moreover,
the animosity between the parties was readily apparent during
the hearing. This animosity may have contributed to the
Defendants’ misunderstanding of their responsibilities with
regard to the Complaint and Summons.
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 13 (emphasis added).
[17] The court further found that Helen and Dennis testified that they made no
statement to the DCS prior to the removal of the children. The court observed
that Haley made a statement to the DCS, but her statement was based on
communication from another person. Therefore, the court concluded, there
was a sufficient showing of a meritorious defense that should be heard.
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Further, the court found that the amount of damages, if any, would be a “hotly
contested issue” and that the court did not wish to determine damages when the
issue of liability was decided by default. Id.
[18] Based on our standard of review, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in setting aside the default judgment. The court acknowledged that
most of the specific reasons set forth in the motion were “debunked,” but
concluded that the defendants were “sincerely confused about their obligation
to respond.” Id. Here, the record reflects that the defendants were aware of
their obligation to respond but chose not to do so, offering explanations in their
motion that were disproven at the hearing. As the Supreme Court said in
Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1262, “This is neglect, but not excusable neglect as the
term appears in Rule 60(B)(1).”
Conclusion
[19] In light of the foregoing, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for
further action on the merits.
[20] Judgment reversed and remanded.
Pyle, J., concur.
Riley, J., dissents with opinion.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dawn Riddle and Matthew Court of Appeals Case No.
Riddle, 19A-PL-1471
Appellants-Plaintiffs,
v.
Dennis Cress, Haley Wilkerson,
and Helen Cress,
Appellees-Defendants.
Riley, Judge dissenting
[21] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing the trial court’s
judgment setting aside the default judgment entered against Defendants because
the majority did not find there to be excusable neglect as required pursuant to
Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1).
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[22] As acknowledged by the majority’s opinion, when deciding whether or not a
default judgment may be set aside because of excusable neglect, the court must
consider the unique factual background of each case because no fixed rules or
standards have been established as the circumstances of no two cases are alike.
Coslett v. Weddle Bros. Contr. Co., 798 N.E.2d 859, 860-61 (Ind. 2003). Looking
at the particular circumstances before it, the trial court noted the complications
in Defendants’ personal lives, and touched upon its prerogative of determining
the credibility of witnesses by observing its impression that Defendants,
unsophisticated and unrepresented by counsel, were sincere in their confusion
about their obligations in these proceedings.
[23] On appeal, a trial court’s decision to set aside a default judgment is entitled to
deference and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. Any doubt of the
propriety of a default judgment should be resolved in favor of the defaulting
party. Id. As such, a trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion
so long as there exists even slight evidence of excusable neglect. Id. Cognizant
of the individualized circumstances and the parties’ testimony, I cannot
conclude that the trial court’s judgment, setting aside the default judgment, is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting its
judgment. See Bello v. Bello, 102 N.E.3d 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
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