Armann Jamal Johnson v. State of Indiana

FILED
Jun 24 2020, 5:44 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elizabeth A. Flynn Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Myriam Serrano
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Armann Jamal Johnson, June 24, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2849
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael S.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Bergerson, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D01-1812-F3-1318
Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2849 | June 24, 2020 Page 1 of 14
Case Summary
[1] Armann Johnson appeals his conviction for battery with a deadly weapon, a
Level 5 felony. We reverse and vacate Johnson’s conviction.
Issues
[2] Johnson raises three issues on appeal; however, we revise and restate as the two
following issues.
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Johnson’s out-of-court statement.
II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Johnson’s
conviction.
Facts
[3] From August 2018 to October 2018, a series of incidents occurred between
Johnson and his on-again-off-again girlfriend, M.W. 1 Detective Arwen
LaMotte, with the Michigan City Police Department, became involved with the
investigation of the events beginning in August 2018. In the early stages of her
interactions with M.W., M.W. was not cooperative with Detective LaMotte
and did not want to file charges against Johnson. Ultimately, on October 15,
2018, Detective LaMotte was investigating a fire at M.W.’s apartment that
1
Although several incidents occurred that resulted in multiple charges against Johnson, this appeal focuses
on the facts in Johnson’s battery charge and subsequent conviction. Importantly, during the trial, testimony
was elicited regarding a physical altercation between M.W. and Johnson in August 2018; however, the
charging information on the battery charge in this case was based on the battery that occurred on October 7,
2018.
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occurred earlier that day, which was determined to be intentionally set. In the
course of her investigation, Detective LaMotte interviewed M.W.
[4] During the interview, M.W. was much more cooperative than in the past. In
the course of discussing M.W.’s past history with Johnson, M.W. advised
Detective LaMotte that Johnson had battered her one week prior to the fire. As
a result of the investigation, Detective LaMotte took photographs of bruises on
M.W.’s body and took a security stick from M.W.’s apartment. 2 As a result of
the interview, Detective LaMotte prepared a police report regarding “domestic
battery and strangulation.” Tr. Vol. III p. 105.
[5] On November 30, 2018, Johnson was charged with battery with a deadly
weapon, a Level 5 felony, based on the October 2018 battery, and several other
charges. 3 After Johnson’s arrest, Detective LaMotte interviewed Johnson.
During the interview, Johnson admitted that he was angry with M.W. and hit
M.W. with his fists while at her apartment. See State’s Ex. 11. In the interview,
Johnson told Detective LaMotte that he recalled picking up the security stick
and hitting his own hand with the stick; however, Johnson did not recall hitting
M.W. with the security stick. When asked by Detective LaMotte if it was
2
The security stick was used as reinforcement for a sliding glass door in the apartment.
3
As a result of the Detective LaMotte’s ongoing investigation, the entirety of Johnson’s convictions included:
Count I, robbery, a Level 3 felony; Count II, stalking, a Level 4 felony; Count III, battery, a Level 5 felony;
Count IV, strangulation, a Level 6 felony; Count V, arson, a Level 4 felony; and Count VI, intimidation, a
Level 5 felony. All these charges involved M.W. and came about as a result of Detective LaMotte’s
investigation of the time period from August to October 2018. After the State’s presentation of the evidence,
the State moved to dismiss Counts IV and VI, which the trial court granted. The jury found Johnson not
guilty of Counts I, II, and V. The jury found Johnson guilty only of the battery with a deadly weapon charge.
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“possible” if he did so, Johnson responded, “probably.” Id. In the interview,
Johnson also did not recall the security stick being damaged.
[6] Johnson’s jury trial began on October 7, 2019, and after a jury was empaneled,
Johnson made an oral motion in limine. In that motion, Johnson sought to
prevent the State from discussing in its opening statement certain portions of
Johnson’s out-of-court interview with police. Johnson argued the confession
may be inadmissible based on principles of corpus delicti if M.W. did not
appear to testify. The trial court denied Johnson’s motion.
[7] M.W. had moved out of state and did not appear to testify at trial after the State
subpoenaed M.W. to testify. 4 All evidence regarding the battery offense was
presented through Detective LaMotte’s testimony of what M.W. reported to
Detective LaMotte during the course of her investigation. Prior to the
presentation of any evidence on the battery charge, the parties and trial court
discussed the admission of Johnson’s prior out-of-court statement, which the
State anticipated presenting. Johnson argued that the evidence was
inadmissible because the State had “to show in some way that a crime was
committed before [Johnson’s] confession becomes relevant.” Tr. Vol. III p. 71.
The trial court took the matter under advisement until the trial court had an
opportunity to review the parties’ arguments. The trial court did not ultimately
4
In preparation for trial, on September 18, 2019, the trial court certified an interstate subpoena for M.W.
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rule on the motion until the State sought admission of the out-of-court
statement.
[8] Detective LaMotte testified that she and M.W. discussed three incidents
between Johnson and M.W. when they met on October 15, 2018, involving
arson, robbery, and a “prior unreported battery.” Id. at 88. During Detective
LaMotte’s testimony, the State sought admission of photographs of M.W. that
Detective LaMotte took while interviewing M.W. after M.W. reported to
Detective LaMotte that Johnson “battered her.” Id. at 94. Johnson objected to
Detective LaMotte’s statement as hearsay, which the trial court overruled. The
deputy prosecutor then asked Detective LaMotte what was “significant” about
the photos, to which Detective LaMotte testified that M.W. was “bruised.” Id.
at 95.
[9] The State then sought to admit the photographs, and Johnson objected to their
admission. Johnson argued the photos were not relevant because Detective
LaMotte was investigating an arson, and the “bruises that [Detective LaMotte]
saw are not relevant to what’s been presented so far.” Id. at 96. The trial court
overruled the objection saying: “[t]hat is the other (inaudible) the multiple other
complaints regarding battery.” 5 Id. The trial court, however, gave a limiting
instruction to the jury as follows:
5
There was other evidence presented at trial of a physical altercation between M.W. and Johnson. That
altercation, however, was related to the allegations that Johnson robbed M.W. in August 2018.
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I’m going to give you a limiting instruction at this point
regarding some of the evidence that you may have just heard.
And sometimes evidence is admitted for a limited purpose. Uh,
you may, [ ], read or will have heard possibly statements made by
[M.W.] to the police in the course of their investigation. The
statements allegedly made by [M.W.] are not being offered for
the truth of the matters being asserted in these statements, but
only to provide context for the statements being attributed to the
Defendant. You shall not consider the alleged statements of
[M.W.] as substantive evidence on the issue of whether the State
of Indiana has satisfied its burden of proof. However, you may
consider the statements made by the Defendant for any purpose
you see fit and give the same weight to which you think they are
entitled. Without the in-court testimony of [M.W.], you shall not
consider such evidence for any other purpose. Specifically, you
shall not consider the purported statements of [M.W.] in arriving
at your verdict.
Id. at 97. The photographs were then admitted and published to the jury as
Detective LaMotte described the photographs. Detective LaMotte testified
M.W.’s bruises appeared to be in the “healing stages[.]” Id. at 100.
[10] The deputy prosecutor then asked Detective LaMotte if, after the conversation
with M.W., “an item of evidence [was] collected at the apartment[.]” Id. at
101. Detective LaMotte responded affirmatively. The deputy prosecutor
directed Detective LaMotte to identify State’s Exhibit 24, which Detective
LaMotte identified as a “security stick for a sliding glass door” taken from
M.W.’s home. Id. at 102. The State then sought to admit the security stick.
Johnson objected that the security stick was irrelevant, that the prejudicial effect
outweighed the probative value, and that there had yet to be any connection
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between the security stick and the alleged battery. The trial court overruled the
objection, concluding that, in view of the photographs of M.W.’s injuries, it
appeared the “type of object” that caused the markings was a “lengthy one.”
Id. at 104. The trial court concluded, therefore, it would let the jury determine
whether the security stick caused the injuries. 6 Id. at 104. Detective LaMotte
provided no testimony to connect the security stick to the marks on M.W.’s
body other than the general assertion that one side of the security stick was
“damaged.” Id. at 105.
[11] Detective LaMotte testified that, a few days after she interviewed M.W.,
Johnson was arrested on October 23, 2018. Detective LaMotte interviewed
Johnson on the day of his arrest about all the events that occurred between
August and October 2018. At trial, the State sought to introduce the video
recording of Johnson’s interview. Johnson objected to the admission of his out-
of-court statements regarding the battery, arguing the State failed to establish
the corpus delicti on that charge. The trial court overruled Johnson’s objection
and Johnson’s out-of-court interview was played for the jury.
[12] The jury found Johnson guilty of battery. Johnson was sentenced to three years
at the Indiana Department of Correction with 508 days to be served in the
6
The State made a similar argument to the trial court prior to the evidence’s admission outside the presence
of the jury.
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LaPorte County Jail 7 and 587 days suspended to probation. Johnson now
appeals his conviction.
Analysis
I. Admission of Johnson’s Out-of-Court Statement
[13] Johnson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting: (1)
M.W.’s statement that Johnson battered her to Detective LaMotte; (2)
photographs of M.W.; (3) the security stick; and (4) Johnson’s confession.
“The trial court has discretionary power on the admission of evidence, and its
decisions are reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion.” Lewis v. State, 34
N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind. 2015). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision
is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Nicholson v.
State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ind. 2012). We find it necessary to address only
Johnson’s argument regarding his confession because our determination of this
issue is dispositive.
[14] Johnson argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnson’s out-
of-court confession regarding the battery with the security stick because there
was insufficient corpus delicti to establish the crime of battery with a deadly
weapon prior to the admission of the confession.
In Indiana, a person may not be convicted of a crime based solely
on a nonjudicial confession of guilt. Rather, independent proof
7
Johnson was given credit for 381 days served and 127 days of good time credit, totaling 508 days served.
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of the corpus delicti is required before the defendant may be
convicted upon a nonjudicial confession. Proof of the corpus
delicti means proof that the specific crime charged has actually
been committed by someone. Thus, admission of a confession
requires some independent evidence of commission of the crime
charged. The independent evidence need not prove that a crime
was committed beyond a reasonable doubt, but merely provide
an inference that the crime charged was committed. This
inference may be created by circumstantial evidence.
Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017). Importantly, “[t]he corpus
delicti evidence required to have a confession admitted is not the same as the
corpus delicti evidence required to sustain a conviction.” Shinnock, 76 N.E.3d
at 843. In establishing sufficient corpus delicti for the purpose of admitting a
confession into evidence, our Supreme Court “has required independent
evidence of (1) the occurrence of the specific kind of injury . . . , and (2)
somebody’s criminal act as the cause of the injury.” Cambron v. State, 322
N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind. 1975). This evidence may be circumstantial, and “there
is no requirement that all of the elements of the crime [must be] proven prior to
introduction of the confessions.” Shinnock, 76 N.E.3d at 844.
[15] During trial, after the parties argued whether the confession was admissible, the
trial court here overruled Johnson’s objection citing support from Scott v. State,
632 N.E.2d 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), and Groves v. State, 479 N.E.2d 626 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1985). In Scott, a panel of this Court found sufficient corpus delicti of
the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime to support admission of the
defendant’s confession. The independent evidence presented at trial to support
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admission of the defendant’s confession included: (1) the victim’s testimony
that he was hit by an individual seen with the defendant that night; (2)
overwhelming evidence demonstrated the victim’s injuries; (3) the victim’s
report to another individual who assisted the victim following the battery that
two men beat him up; (4) physical evidence supported the victim’s account of
battery; and (5) testimony from the doctor that the victim’s injuries were
consistent with a battery. See Scott, 632 N.E.2d at 766. Similarly, in Groves, a
panel of this Court found sufficient corpus delicti was presented regarding the
operating while intoxicated charge to support admission of the defendant’s out-
of-court statement because the defendant was found near the vehicle soon after
the accident and he was the owner of the vehicle. See Groves, 479 N.E.2d at
628.
[16] Scott and Groves, however, are distinguishable from the facts in the instant case.
Here, unlike in Groves, there is no evidence that connects Johnson to ownership
or use of the security stick. Moreover, unlike in Scott, neither M.W. nor any
other witness provided substantive evidence connecting M.W.’s bruises to a
battery. At the time Johnson’s statement was admitted, the only evidence
presented regarding the battery was: (1) Detective LaMotte’s statement that she
was investigating an unreported battery and prepared a police report regarding
domestic battery and strangulation as a result of her interview with M.W.; (2)
the photographs of M.W. showing bruises; and (3) the security stick.
[17] We conclude, based on the record before us, there was insufficient evidence to
support the inference that a crime had been committed with regard to the
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battery with a deadly weapon charge before Johnson’s out-of-court confession
regarding the battery with a deadly weapon was admitted into evidence. The
photographs merely demonstrated that M.W. had bruises. The State presented
no evidence establishing a connection between the security stick and the alleged
crime. M.W.’s statement to Detective LaMotte that Johnson battered her was
not admitted as substantive evidence and was subject to the trial court’s limiting
instruction. See, e.g. Humphrey v. State, 680 N.E.2d 836, 838 (Ind. 1997)
(discussing that “classic hearsay” is not ordinarily admissible as substantive
evidence); see also Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 566 (Ind. 2014) (“There is a
risk the jury will rely upon the out-of-court assertion as substantive evidence of
guilt—rather than for the limited purpose of explaining police investigation—
and the defendant will have no chance to challenge that evidence through cross-
examination.”).
[18] Alone, this evidence is insufficient to support the inference that a crime was
committed. Even assuming that the photographs, security stick, and M.W.’s
statement to Detective LaMotte were properly admitted, the State presented no
evidence that Johnson committed battery by means of a deadly weapon against
M.W. Accordingly, the State presented insufficient evidence to support the
requirement of the corpus delicti before admission of Johnson’s confession.
The trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnson’s confession regarding
the battery with a deadly weapon.
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II. Insufficient Evidence
[19] Johnson argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of battery with
a deadly weapon. When a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is raised,
“[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State,
51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016) (citing Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind.
1985), cert. denied), cert. denied. Instead, “we ‘consider only that evidence most
favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84). “We will affirm the
judgment if it is supported by ‘substantial evidence of probative value even if
there is some conflict in that evidence.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at
84); see also McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind. 2018) (holding that,
even though there was conflicting evidence, it was “beside the point” because
that argument “misapprehend[s] our limited role as a reviewing court”). “We
will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73
N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.
2007)).
[20] Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1(c)(1) describes battery as “knowingly or
intentionally: . . . (1) touch[ing] another person in a rude, insolent, or angry
manner; . . .” The offense is a Level 5 felony, pursuant to Indiana Code Section
35-42-2-1(g)(2) if the “offense is committed with a deadly weapon.” Indiana
Code Section 35-31.5-2-86(a)(2) defines “deadly weapon,” in part, as:
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(2) A destructive device, weapon, device, taser (as defined in IC
35-47-8-3) or electronic stun weapon (as defined in IC 35-47-8-1),
equipment, chemical substance, or other material that in the
manner it:
(A) is used;
(B) could ordinarily be used; or
(C) is intended to be used;
is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.
Here, the State alleged that Johnson touched M.W. in a rude, insolent, or angry
manner with the security stick, a deadly weapon.
[21] Without M.W.’s testimony and without Johnson’s confession, the only
evidence remaining regarding the battery charge was M.W.’s statement to
Detective LaMotte, the photographs, and the security stick. As discussed
above, M.W.’s statement to Detective LaMotte was admitted as non-
substantive evidence, and the photographs and security stick do not prove the
offense on their own. The evidence presented did not connect the security stick
to M.W.’s injuries, and none of the evidence connected Johnson to M.W.’s
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injuries. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to convict Johnson of
battery with a deadly weapon, and we reverse the conviction. 8
Conclusion
[22] The trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnson’s confession and the
remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain Johnson’s conviction for battery
with a deadly weapon. We reverse and vacate Johnson’s conviction.
[23] Reversed and vacated.
Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
8
Because the evidence is insufficient to sustain Johnson’s conviction even with admission of M.W.’s
statement to Detective LaMotte, the photographs, and the security stick, we need not address the
admissibility of that evidence.
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