Troy L. Neal v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 02 2020, 9:02 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David W. Stone IV Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
John R. Millikan
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Troy L. Neal, July 2, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2280
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
State of Indiana, Court
Appellee-Plaintiff The Honorable Angela Warner
Sims, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C01-1801-F1-2787
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 1 of 10
May, Judge.
[1] Troy L. Neal challenges his thirty-five-year sentence for Level 2 felony
attempted voluntary manslaughter. 1 Neal argues: (1) his sentence is
inappropriate based on his character and the nature of his offense, and (2) the
trial court abused its discretion when it considered his criminal history as an
aggravating factor, while disregarding two mitigating circumstances. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Neal and Kimberley Puckett married in July 2015 but formally separated in
October 2018. The couple lived in Chesterfield, Indiana, but Neal moved to
Losantville, Indiana, after their separation. Neal continued to watch and spy
on Puckett, because he was suspicious that she was seeing another man and
because he hoped for reconciliation. Although they were separated, Puckett
continued to stay in touch with Neal to assist him with healthcare needs and
day-to-day activities.
[3] Puckett met Axel Scheirs at the beginning of September 2018 at her place of
work and the two developed a friendship. On October 25, 2018, Puckett invited
Scheirs and his children to her house for dinner. At approximately 7:00 p.m.,
while Puckett and Scheirs were making dinner, Neal entered the home and
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a) (voluntary manslaughter); Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (attempt).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 2 of 10
demanded to know whether Puckett was dating Scheirs. Puckett did not
answer Neal’s question but instead asked Neal what he was doing at her house.
Visibly upset, Neal pulled out a “SWAT knife,” (Tr. Vol. I at 119), and stabbed
Scheirs, who was sitting at the dinner table, hitting Scheirs five times in the
back. Scheirs attempted to ward Neal off with a gun that he had holstered at
his right side. With the help of Puckett’s son, D.J., Scheirs was able to get Neal
to leave the house. As Neal left, he slashed one of Scheirs’ tires before driving
off in his own truck.
[4] Following the attack, Scheirs was transported via ambulance to the hospital for
Level 1 Trauma injuries to his thorax, chest, and back, which required
immediate emergency treatment. The attending trauma surgeon described
Scheirs’ injuries as follows:
He had one (1) wound in the emergency room that had a skin
bleeder and a large hematoma that was developing under that.
We put a quick figure of eight (8) whip stitch in that just to kind
of put some pressure on it, which took care of the bleeding. We
then got a cat scan of the chest, which showed that he had a
small numal thorax on the left, which is just an air cavity that
indicates that something has penetrated the lung cavity. If the
lung goes down, it means that there’s been a wound, [an]
entrance and exit wound somewhere into the lung cavity. On the
right side, he had a numal thorax as well, the same, talking about
[a] hemothorax, which there was a pocket of blood within the
lung cavity itself, so some vessel had been hit and he was
bleeding into the lung cavity.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 3 of 10
(Tr. Vol. I at 191.) The surgeon explained that because Scheirs’ injuries were
located near vital organs and thin soft tissue, Scheirs was lucky that his wounds
were not more serious or fatal.
[5] Later in the evening on October 25, two police officers who heard about the
incident on the police radio confronted Neal at local gas station. Neal got into
his vehicle and drove away, which resulted in a multi-vehicle high-speed chase.
The pursuit ended after Neal exited his vehicle and attempted to escape into the
woods on foot. The officers warned Neal to get on the ground, however after
Neal did not listen to several orders to stop, police deployed a taser. Police
subsequently placed Neal into handcuffs and took him to the police station.
[6] On October 31, 2018, the State charged Neal with Level 1 felony attempted
murder, 2 Level 1 felony burglary with intent to commit a felony, 3 Level 2 felony
burglary with intent to commit a felony with a deadly weapon, 4 and Level 6
felony resisting law enforcement. 5 On March 18, 2019, the State additionally
alleged Neal was a habitual offender. 6
[7] After a jury trial, the trial court found Neal guilty of the lesser-included offense
of Level 2 felony attempted voluntary manslaughter. Neal admitted he was a
2
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (murder); Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (attempt).
3
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.
4
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(3)(A).
5
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).
6
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 4 of 10
habitual offender, and the trial court adjudicated him as such. Following a
sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a thirty-five-year sentence, based on
twenty-five years for the felony and a ten-year enhancement for his habitual
offender adjudication.
Discussion and Decision
1. Inappropriate Sentencing
[8] We will reverse only if we determine Neal’s sentence is inappropriate based on
the nature of the crime and Neal’s character. See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)
(allowing appellate review of sentences based on defendant’s character and
nature of the offense). The defendant ultimately bears the burden of
demonstrating the inappropriateness of his sentence. Patterson v. State, 909
N.E.2d 1058, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). When considering the nature of the
offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point to determine the
appropriateness of a sentence. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). The minimum penalty for a Level 2 felony is ten years and the
maximum penalty is thirty years, with a seventeen-and-a-half-year advisory
period. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5
[9] Regarding the nature of his crime, Neal attempts to minimize the injuries he
inflicted upon Scheirs by emphasizing that they had no permanent physical
effect on Scheirs nor did they require extensive hospitalization. (Br. of
Appellant 15.) This minimizing sentiment is not shared by Scheirs, who
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 5 of 10
confirmed that the immediate pain from the five knife wounds to separate parts
of his body was the worst pain he had experienced in his life. Even after his
twenty-four-hour hospitalization, Scheirs required two additional weeks of pain
management medication, without which he felt extreme pain. Furthermore,
although Scheirs required only twenty-four hours of hospitalization, the
attending trauma surgeon testified that Scheirs was “lucky” the wounds were
not more serious or fatal. (Tr. Vol. I at 193–94.) Indeed, Neal himself admitted
that the only reason he did not inflict even more damage was due to the layout
of the rods on the back of the chair where Scheirs was sitting. Neal fully
recognized the potential severity and the purpose of his actions, and he
admitted during his police interview that he was “trying to kill” Scheirs, (id. at
118), that he was going to “take [Scheirs’] life[,]” (id. at 115), that he did not
thrust the knife as hard as he could have, and that he was not sorry for stabbing
Scheirs. These admissions demonstrate that Neal’s actions, albeit fueled by
passion, inflicted unnecessary pain on an unsuspecting victim and could have
potentially resulted in a needless fatality.
[10] When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the
defendant's criminal history. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007). The pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) elucidated Neal’s
criminal history, which included convictions for felony auto theft, felony sexual
battery, felony burglary, misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and
misdemeanor operating a vehicle with alcohol concentration of .15 or more.
Additionally, Neal was out on bond for pending charges of Level 6 felony
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 6 of 10
operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person and misdemeanor
operating a vehicle with alcohol concentration of .15 or more when he stabbed
Scheirs, indicating a serious disregard for law and order. Although the extent
to which a defendant’s criminal history may be used to guide an appropriate
sentence “varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in
relation to the current offense,” it is indicative as a “poor reflection on the
defendant’s character, [as] it may reveal that he or she has not been deterred
even after having been subjected to the police authority of the State.” Cotto v.
State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 (Ind. 2005). Consequently, Neal’s lengthy criminal
record reflects poorly on his character. See Mateo v. State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 75
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (defendant failed to show that his sentence of twenty years
for inflicting great bodily injury upon an unarmed victim was inappropriate
given his numerous criminal offenses), trans. denied.
2. Abuse of Discretion
[11] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 211
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Pursuant to their statutory authority, trial
courts may impose any sentence that is statutorily and constitutionally
permissible “regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances
or mitigating circumstances.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d).
[12] The trial court considered four aggravating factors that guided its sentencing
decision: (1) Neal’s extensive criminal history beginning in 1990; (2) Neal’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 7 of 10
being out on bond for a pending offense in Delaware County when he stabbed
Scheirs; (3) the injuries suffered by Scheirs exceeded what was required to prove
attempted voluntary manslaughter; and (4) the multiple injuries and stab
wounds inflicted upon Scheirs. Neal argues the trial court abused its discretion
in considering his criminal history as an aggravating factor, but he does not
challenge the other three aggravating factors that guided the trial court during
sentencing. It is well-established that a single aggravating factor may support
the enhancement of a sentence. Miller v. State, 634 N.E.2d 57, 64 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994). As there were three unchallenged aggravators upon which Neal’s
sentence could have been based, we need not consider whether the trial court’s
consideration of his criminal history as an aggravator was an abuse of
discretion. 7
[13] Neal further argues the trial court failed to give credence to two proposed
mitigators: (1) the offense was not likely to recur, because the present incident
had stemmed out of Neal’s continuing aspiration and motive to reconcile with
Puckett, and (2) Neal was gainfully employed as a heavy equipment mechanic
7
We note, however, that the trial court is permitted by statute to consider a defendant’s “history of criminal
or delinquent behavior” when sentencing him. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(2). We do not agree with Neal’s
contention that his criminal history is not a relevant aggravating factor. Although Neal argues that his only
violent crime was for sexual battery twenty-five years ago and is thus unrelated, it is nonetheless similar to
that of attempted voluntary manslaughter because both crimes involve physical harm to another person. See
Long v. State, 867 N.E.2d 606, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (defendant attempted to downplay the “gravity and
proximity in time” of his twenty-year criminal history, however at least one of his convictions, criminal
conversion and forgery, was similar to theft; such crimes involved the common factor of dishonesty).
Further, a “record of arrest, particularly a lengthy one, may reveal that a defendant has not been deterred
even after having been subject to the police authority of the State.” Barber v. State, 863 N.E.2d 1199, 1207
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 8 of 10
for many years. (Br. of Appellee 8.) However, Neal did not argue these factors
were mitigating during his sentencing hearing. “If the defendant does not
advance a factor to be mitigating at sentencing, this Court will presume that the
factor is not significant and the defendant is precluded from advancing it as a
mitigating circumstance for the first time on appeal.” Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d
1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000). Waiver notwithstanding, to show that the court failed
to find a valid mitigating factor, a defendant must establish that the mitigating
evidence is “both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer v.
State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 493 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind.
2007). However, the Court is not obligated to credit mitigating circumstances
in the same manner as would the defendant. Id.[14] Although Neal attempts to persuade us that he is unlikely to commit a similar
offense in the future, the trial court was not required to credit his assertion.
Neal had an excessive and violent response to seeing Puckett with a man she
was not even dating at the time. Neal asserts that his crime was one of sudden
passion, yet this does not reassure us that he will be able to control his emotions
if a similar encounter occurs in the future. Further, Neal on multiple occasions
emphasized his lack of remorse for stabbing Scheirs and his lone regret of
failing to thrust the knife harder into Scheirs’ back.
[15] As his final mitigating factor, Neal argues that his status as a long-term
employee, a productive member of society, is enough to warrant mitigation of
his sentence. This is not persuasive because “[m]any people are gainfully
employed such that this would not require the trial court to note it as a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 9 of 10
mitigating factor or afford it the same weight as [the defendant] proposes.”
Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.
[16] Finally, when a trial court is found to have abused its discretion in the process
used to sentence the defendant, the error is harmless if the sentence imposed
was not inappropriate. Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d 546, 556 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007). As stated supra, we conclude that Neal’s sentence is not inappropriate.
Therefore, we also conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
sentenced Neal.
Conclusion
[17] We hold that Neal’s sentence was not inappropriate given his character and the
nature of the crime he committed, and Neal has not demonstrated the trial
court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
[18] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2280 | July 2, 2020 Page 10 of 10