Kyle Nicholas Doroszko v. State of Indiana

FILED
Oct 02 2020, 8:36 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John Kindley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kyle Nicholas Doroszko, October 2, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-1332
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sanford,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D03-1905-MR-4
Altice, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1332 | October 2, 2020 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] Kyle Doroszko appeals the denial of his motion for release on bail following his
arrest and charge for murder. Doroszko argues that the trial court was required
to grant his request because the State did not present sufficient evidence at the
bail hearing that would defeat a claim of self-defense.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On April 28, 2019, Doroszko planned to sell $400 worth of marijuana and
possibly a gun to some buyers he had met on the social media site, “Snapchat.”
Appellant’s Appendix at 23. As Doroszko was aware that “selling drugs was a
dangerous business,” he made plans to conduct the transaction in a lighted
parking lot at a South Bend bar to “keep it from going bad.” Transcript at 7.
Doroszko also armed himself with two firearms—a Glock .40 caliber
semiautomatic handgun and an AR-15 rifle—for “protection and intimidation”
purposes. Id.
[4] Doroszko’s accomplice drove an SUV to the bar with Doroszko in the
passenger seat. When the potential drug buyers arrived, two of them entered
the backseat of the SUV. One of the individuals was identified as Traychon
Taylor, who sat behind Doroszko.
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[5] At some point, two other men exited the buyers’ car wearing masks,
approached the SUV, and fired one shot into the vehicle. Doroszko then felt
“something placed against the back of his head” and he and Taylor began to
fight over the marijuana and a backpack. Id. at 9. Doroszko shot Taylor twice
with his Glock handgun. As Doroszko’s accomplice began to drive away,
Taylor fell out of the SUV into the roadway and later died from his injuries.
[6] Doroszko subsequently admitted that he had thrown the gun used to kill Taylor
into a river. The State charged Doroszko with murder and he was ordered held
without bond. Doroszko filed three motions for release on bail, all of which the
trial court denied. He now appeals. 1
Discussion and Decision
[7] In addressing Doroszko’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request for bail, we note that Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana
Constitution prohibits excessive bail. In general, “bail is excessive if set at an
amount higher than reasonably calculated to ensure the accused party’s
presence in court.” Lopez v. State, 985 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
trans. denied.
[8] A defendant charged with murder can be held without bail “when the proof is
evident, or the presumption strong.” Ind. Const. art. I § 17; Ind. Code § 35-33-
1
Doroszko’s jury trial is presently set to commence on October 19, 2020.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1332 | October 2, 2020 Page 3 of 6
8-2 (“murder is not bailable if the state proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption strong). 2 The defendant
has the right to present evidence related to an affirmative defense, such as self-
defense, at a bail hearing. Satterfield v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1271, 1279 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015). When reviewing a trial court’s denial of bail in a murder case, we
reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Rohr v. State, 917 N.E.2d
1277, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). A decision is an abuse of discretion when it
“is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Prewitt v.
State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). We will not reweigh the evidence, and
we consider any conflicting evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling. Collins
v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
[9] In general, a person may not claim self-defense when committing a crime. See
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(1). And when the State seeks to disprove a defendant’s
self-defense claim, it may establish that there was an “immediate causal
connection” between the contemporaneous crime committed and the
confrontation leading to the victim’s death. Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301,
306 (Ind. 2020). Whether an immediate causal connection exists is an issue for
the finder of fact. Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 392-93 (Ind. 2001).
[10] In this case, the evidence at the bail hearing established that Doroszko engaged
in a criminal act that immediately caused Taylor’s death. Doroszko was aware
2
Ind. Crim. Rule 26, effective January 1, 2020, sets forth provisions and conditions for a defendant’s pretrial
release “without money bail or surety” for offenses other than murder or treason.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1332 | October 2, 2020 Page 4 of 6
of the inherent dangers and potential for violence associated with drug dealing.
In preparing for the sale, Doroszko armed himself and arranged for the
transaction to be carried out in a well-lit location so it “[wouldn’t go] bad.”
Transcript at 7. The evidence also showed that Doroszko shot Taylor to prevent
him from stealing the marijuana. In short, it was reasonable for the trial court
to find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was an immediate and
causal connection to the confrontation that led to Taylor’s death.
[11] That said, we reject Doroszko’s reliance on Gammons for the proposition that
the State was obligated to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at the bail hearing
that Dorosko did not act in self-defense. The issue in Gammons dealt with the
propriety of a jury instruction that permitted the jury to disregard the
defendant’s self-defense claim on the basis of a “but-for causation” between the
crime and confrontation. Gammons, 148 N.E.3d at 304. The Gammons Court
concluded that an instruction precluding a defendant from asserting self-defense
if he or she was committing a crime that was merely “connected” to a
confrontation was an incorrect statement of the law. Id. at 304-05. Gammons
further reiterated the rule that a claim of self-defense is barred only when the
State shows that there is “an immediate causal connection between the crime
and the confrontation.” Id. Although a jury instruction in these circumstances
might be warranted at trial in accordance with Gammons, the State nonetheless
established by a preponderance of the evidence at the bail hearing that there
was an immediate causal connection between the dealing in marijuana offense
and the circumstances, i.e., the confrontation, that led to Taylor’s death.
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[12] Finally, we reject Doroszko’s alternative claims that Gammons was incorrectly
decided, in that when the matter proceeds to trial, the jurors will necessarily
apply a lesser “but-for standard even when they are instructed that they must
find an immediate causal connection between the crime and confrontation.”
Appellant’s Brief at 16. In addition to the well-established principle that this
court lacks the ability to overrule Indiana Supreme Court precedent, jurors are
presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions. Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268,
274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Regardless, Doroszko’s contention amounts to sheer
speculation. Moreover, Doroszko’s arguments essentially reject the principle
that the jury is the appropriate factfinder as to causation. The question of
causation is one of fact and jurors are the ultimate finders of fact. See Mayes,
744 N.E.2d at 394 (recognizing that it was the factfinder’s duty to determine
whether there was an immediate causal connection between the defendant’s
possession of an unlicensed firearm and the victim’s death). For all these
reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Doroszko’s request for release on bail.
[13] Judgment affirmed.
May, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.
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