Randolf S. Sargent v. State of Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jessica R. Merino Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
J. Merino Law Attorney General
Granger, Indiana FILED
Ellen H. Meilaender Oct 21 2020, 8:51 am
Supervising Deputy Attorney CLERK
General Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Randolf S. Sargent, October 21, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-1142
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D03-1307-FA-39
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1142 | October 21, 2020 Page 1 of 7
Case Summary
[1] Randolf S. Sargent appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for sentence
modification. The trial court determined that it did not have statutory authority
to consider the merits of Sargent’s motion. We disagree and therefore reverse
and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 2, 2014, Sargent pled guilty to class A felony attempted dealing in
methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced Sargent to thirty years in the
Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) with five years suspended to
probation. Sargent appealed his sentence as inappropriate, and we issued a
memorandum decision affirming it. Sargent v. State, No. 20A03-1409-CR-338,
slip op. at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. April 17, 2015), trans. denied.
[3] In late 2015, Sargent filed a pro se motion to participate in the Purposeful
Incarceration Program (PIP). The trial court denied the motion, but stated that
it would reconsider its decision upon receiving a progress report from the DOC.
After receiving the progress report, the trial court reaffirmed its denial of
Sargent’s motion. Then, in July 2018, Sargent filed a motion for modification
of sentence. The trial court denied the motion but again ordered a progress
report from the DOC and stated that it would reconsider the motion after
reviewing the report. After receiving the report, the trial court reaffirmed its
denial of Sargent’s motion for sentence modification.
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[4] On August 1, 2019, Sargent filed a second motion for sentence modification.
The State filed an objection to the modification request, arguing that Sargent
failed to give any meritorious reasons to support a modification of his sentence.
The trial court held a hearing, during which it questioned whether it had
authority to entertain the motion for modification. The court stated that it
believed that this was Sargent’s third motion for sentence modification, and that
the applicable statute permitted only two such motions absent prosecutor
consent, which the parties agreed had not been given here. The parties
submitted briefs on the issue, and on May 11, 2020, the trial court issued its
order determining that it lacked the authority to consider the merits of the
current motion for sentence modification. Specifically, the trial court
concluded that Sargent’s December 2015 pro se motion to participate in the PIP
“should count as a motion to modify” pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-
1-17, and that such motion, coupled with his 2018 motion for sentence
modification, meant that he had exhausted his allowable motions for
modification prior to the filing of his most recent motion. Appealed Order at 4.
Accordingly, the trial court denied Sargent’s current motion for sentence
modification. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] In most cases, we review the denial of a motion to modify sentence for an abuse
of discretion. Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ind. 2010). However, in
denying Sargent’s motion for sentence modification, the trial court determined
that it lacked the statutory authority to modify Sargent’s sentence. We review
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this matter de novo on appeal. See State v. Holloway, 980 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012) (noting that question of trial court’s authority to modify
sentence presents pure question of law that we review de novo).
[6] A trial court generally has no authority over a defendant after sentencing. State
v. Harper, 8 N.E.3d 694, 696 (Ind. 2014). Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17
provides a notable exception to this general rule that gives trial courts authority
under certain circumstances to modify a sentence after it is imposed. Johnson v.
State, 36 N.E.3d 1130, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Specifically,
Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17(e) provides, “At any time after: (1) a
convicted person begins serving the person’s sentence; and (2) the court obtains
a report from the [DOC] concerning the convicted person’s conduct while
imprisoned” the trial court “may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a
sentence that the court was authorized to impose at the time of sentencing.”
Relevant here, our legislature has determined that a convicted person such as
Sargent “who is not a violent criminal” may file a petition for sentence
modification “(1) not more than one (1) time in any three hundred sixty-five
(365) day period; and (2) a maximum of two (2) times during any consecutive
period of incarceration; without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.” Ind.
Code § 35-38-1-17(j). The trial court concluded that it had no authority to
consider the merits of Sargent’s current petition for modification because the
court determined that he had already filed two such petitions during his
consecutive period of incarceration. Accordingly, the question is whether
Sargent’s 2015 pro se motion to participate in the PIP constituted a motion for
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sentence modification pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-18-1-17. We think
not.
[7] The PIP is a project with Indiana Court Systems, through which the DOC
“works in collaboration with Judges who can sentence chemically addicted
offenders and document that they will ‘consider a sentence modification’
should the offender successfully complete [a DOC] Therapeutic community.”
Marley v. State, 17 N.E.3d 335, 338 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted),
trans. denied. Specifically, a trial court recommending a defendant for the PIP
would include the following language in its sentencing order: “Upon successful
completion of the clinically appropriate substance abuse treatment program as
determined by IDOC, the court will consider a modification to this sentence.”
Hogan v. State, 95 N.E.3d 181, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Purposeful
Incarceration FAQ, https://secure.in.gov/idoc/files/PI% 20FAQ%
20Updated% 2012.15.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (emphasis removed)).
Although a trial court may make a recommendation, actual participation in the
program is left to the discretion of the DOC. Miller v. State, 105 N.E.3d 194,
196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “[T]rial courts themselves have no authority to
require the DOC to place a particular defendant into a program.” Id. (citing
Cohn v. Strawhorn, 721 N.E.2d 342, 348-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that
Indiana law does not create “a statutory entitlement to educational [or
therapeutic] programming for all, every, any, or each person committed to the
DOC[.]”), trans. denied (2000)). This Court has explained that a trial court’s
limited role in relation to purposeful incarceration is simply to identify which
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defendants should be flagged as individuals most likely to benefit from
participation in the program. Id.
[8] In his 2015 pro se motion to participate in the PIP, Sargent was not requesting a
reduction or suspension of his sentence. 1 He was essentially requesting that the
trial court amend its original sentencing order and/or abstract of judgment and
recommend him for participation in programming offered by the DOC that he
believed he would benefit from during his incarceration. 2 Another panel of this
Court, albeit under different factual circumstances, has rejected the argument
that such a request constitutes a request for sentence modification. Hogan, 95
N.E.3d at 184 n.4. 3 Indeed, it is clear that while participation in the PIP may
lead to a subsequent sentence modification, the request for a participation
recommendation is not, in itself, a request for modification. We conclude that
Sargent’s 2015 pro se motion to participate in the PIP did not constitute a
motion for sentence modification pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-18-1-17.
1
The State directs us to Keys v. State, 746 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) in which another panel of this
Court determined that a defendant’s post-sentencing request to modify his placement to a community
corrections program constituted a request for a modification of sentence under section 35-38-1-17. The State’s
reliance on Keys is misplaced, as Sargent’s request to participate in the PIP is not akin to a request to modify
placement to a community corrections program.
2
Whether such a request is valid or proper more than fifteen months after sentencing is not at issue.
3
The State attempts to distinguish Hogan on the basis that the trial court in that case had already stated its
intent to recommend the defendant for the PIP during the sentencing hearing, but simply failed to include
language to that effect in its sentencing order. Be that as it may, that fact does not transform a request to
participate in the PIP into a request for sentence modification. The Hogan panel emphasized that the trial
court would be required “only to consider a petition to modify” after the defendant “completes a therapeutic
community[,]” and the “possibility” of future modification is “all that is promised by the Purposeful
Incarceration literature, and it is all we are expecting the trial court to provide.” Hogan, 95 N.E.3d at 185 n.5.
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[9] Because Sargent has only made one prior motion for sentence modification, the
trial court erred when it concluded that it lacked the statutory authority to
consider the merits of Sargent’s current motion. Therefore, we reverse and
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[10] Reversed and remanded.
Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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