Allen L. Grogg v. State of Indiana

FILED
Oct 21 2020, 8:57 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Anthony S. Churchward Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anthony S. Churchward, PC Attorney General of Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Steven J. Hosler
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Allen L. Grogg, October 21, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-809
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Frances C. Gull,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D05-1906-F3-42
Bradford, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In April of 2019, Teisha Gonzalez and Allen Grogg became engaged in a
relationship after meeting on Facebook. After a few weeks of speaking
remotely, Gonzalez and Grogg began meeting in person and discussed living
together. On May 28, 2019, Gonzalez called 911 and reported that she was the
victim of a domestic incident involving Grogg. A no-contact order was issued,
restricting Grogg from contacting Gonzalez. Grogg was subsequently charged
with and convicted of, inter alia, Level 5 felony domestic battery. Both prior to
and during trial, the State alleged that Grogg committed contempt of court by
violating and attempting to violate the no-contact order. Following trial, the
trial court found that Grogg had committed four separate acts of contempt and
imposed an aggregate 450-day sentence.
[2] On appeal, Grogg contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his Level
5 felony domestic battery conviction. He also contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing a 450-day sentence for his contemptuous
behavior. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Gonzalez met Grogg on Facebook in April of 2019. After speaking remotely
for “a couple of weeks,” Gonzalez met Grogg in person. Tr. Vol. II p. 61.
Soon thereafter, the relationship “was getting serious” and Gonzalez and Grogg
discussed the possibility of Grogg moving in with Gonzalez. Tr. Vol. II p. 61.
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Gonzalez “was a little bit more hesitant” about cohabitating than Grogg. Tr.
Vol. II p. 71. Grogg “was ready.” Tr. Vol. II p. 71.
[4] At 1:44 p.m. on May 28, 2019, Gonzalez called 911 and indicated that “she had
been in a domestic and was tased.” Tr. Vol. II p. 98. Fort Wayne Police
Officer Michael Bodeker responded to the dispatch. When Officer Bodeker
arrived at Gonzalez’s residence, he observed that Gonzalez “was angry, afraid,
apologetic. She was crying. She was nervous and she was pretty fearful.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 98.
[5] Gonzalez informed Officer Bodeker that she and Grogg began arguing the night
before about whether Grogg should move in with Gonzalez and that at some
point, she fell asleep. Grogg, who “had a taser/flashlight, one end was a
flashlight, the other end was a taser; he shocked her in the back and woke her
up.” Tr. Vol. II p. 99. When Gonzalez “got up,” Grogg “tased her in the chest
area over the heart.” Tr. Vol. II p. 99. Gonzalez was particularly concerned
about being “tased” in the chest because she “had a heart monitor … that she
had just got hooked up to ‘cause she was worried about some kind of heart
condition.” Tr. Vol. II p. 99. Officer Bodeker also observed “two little red
marks consistent to a — the taser or a taser” on Gonzalez’s chest. Tr. Vol. II p.
100.
[6] Before being apprehended, Grogg led police on a vehicle pursuit. Fort Wayne
Police Officer Daniel Nerzig assisted in the pursuit of Grogg’s vehicle and
testified that upon searching Grogg’s vehicle, he found a flashlight that looked
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as if the edge was “machined.” Tr. Vol. II p. 156. However, “[o]n closer
inspection, [Officer Nerzig] found a toggle switch on the bottom, when you
flipped you’d hit a button, the edge of the flashlight would activate with a spark,
like an arc.” Tr. Vol. II p. 156. Officer Nerzig further described the object,
stating
there’s exposed metal, which is uncommon, especially with a
powder—coated black flashlight. On the bottom, there’s a toggle
switch, on/off. Most flashlights have only a switch … only a
switch that turns them on and off up here. There’s an on/off
switch; when the switch is depressed, it would arc.
Tr. Vol. II p. 157. Officer Nerzig indicated that he tested the “taser” portion of
the object on May 28th and “it did produce a spark.” Tr. Vol. II p. 157.
[7] On June 3, 2019, the State charged Grogg with Level 3 felony criminal
confinement, Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 5 felony criminal
confinement, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting
of a crime, Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident, and Class C
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. A no-contact order was issued on
June 5, 2019, prohibiting Grogg from contacting Gonzalez.
[8] On August 20, 2019, the State alleged that between June 5, 2019 and August
20, 2019, in violation of a no-contact order, Grogg (1) “contacted or attempted
to contact” Gonzalez 861 times via the Allen County jail phone system and (2)
contacted Gonzalez “using the messaging system at the Allen County jail.”
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Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 53. Citing to Grogg’s violations of the no-contact
order, the State subsequently filed a verified petition to revoke Grogg’s bond.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s petition on August 29,
2019.
[9] On January 10, 2020, the State alleged that between December 18, 2019 and
January 10, 2020, Grogg had called Gonzalez 422 times and contacted her
using the messaging system at the jail “nearly every day.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 160. Following a hearing on the second contempt information, on
January 14, 2020, the trial court suspended Grogg’s communication privileges,
except for communication with his attorney.
[10] On January 23, 2020, the State alleged that after Grogg’s communication
privileges were limited to contact with his attorney on January 14, 2020, he
“used another Inmate’s tablet messaging to contact Dawn Prather” and asked
“her to contact [Gonzalez] through another party.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.
223. The trial court conducted a hearing on the third contempt information and
continued the matter until after trial.
[11] Beginning January 28, 2020, the trial court conducted a two-day jury trial. On
the second day of trial, the State filed an oral motion to dismiss the Class A
misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime charge. The trial court
granted the State’s motion. Also on the second day of trial, the State alleged
that Grogg “attempted again to make contact with [Gonzalez] while [Grogg]
was being escorted in the hallway at the Allen County Courthouse, in the
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presence of Bailiffs.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 249. The jury acquitted
Grogg of the criminal confinement charges and found Grogg guilty of the
remaining charges. Following trial, the trial court also found Grogg guilty of
each of the four contempt charges.
[12] On March 5, 2020, the trial court sentenced Grogg to an aggregate six-year
term for his underlying criminal convictions. The trial court also sentenced
Grogg to an aggregate 450-day term for his four acts of contempt and ordered
that the sentence stemming from the contempt charges run “consecutive to the
sentence imposed in this cause.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 74.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[13] Grogg contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
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evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and
quotations omitted).
[14] In order to convict Grogg of Level 3 felony domestic battery, the State was
required to prove that Grogg knowingly or intentionally “touche[d] a family or
household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner” and “[t]he offense
[was] committed with a deadly weapon.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(2) &
(c)(2). Grogg does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he
knowingly or intentionally touched Gonzalez in a rude, insolent, or angry
manner. He argues only that the State failed to prove that the offense was
committed with a deadly weapon.
[15] Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-86(a) provides that “‘deadly weapon’ means the
following:
(2) A destructive device, weapon, device, taser (as defined in IC
35-47-8-3) or electronic stun weapon (as defined in IC 35-47-8-1),
equipment, chemical substance, or other material that in the
manner it:
(A) is used;
(B) could ordinarily be used; or
(C) is intended to be used;
is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.
“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of
death or that causes: (1) serious permanent disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness;
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(3) extreme pain; (4) permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function
of a bodily member or organ; or (5) loss of a fetus.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-292.
[16] The question of whether a weapon is “deadly” is determined
from a description of the weapon, the manner of its use, and the
circumstances of the case. Whether an object is a deadly weapon
based on these factors is a question of fact. The original purpose
of the object is not considered. Rather, the manner in which the
defendant actually used the object is examined.
Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations
omitted). Grogg acknowledges that “it does not matter if serious bodily injures
were sustained by the crime victim, provided the defendant had the apparent
ability to injure the victim seriously through his use of the object during the
crime.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16 (citing Miller v. State, 500 N.E.2d 193, 196–97
(Ind. 1986)).
[17] The State accused Grogg of using a “flashlight type electrical device that was
either a ‘taser’ or a ‘stun gun’” during the commission of the offense.
Appellant’s Br. p. 16. A “taser” is defined as “any mechanism that is: (1)
designed to emit an electronic, magnetic, or other type of charge or shock
through the use of a projectile; and (2) used for the purpose of temporarily
incapacitating a person.” Ind. Code § 35-47-8-3. A “stun gun’ is defined as
“any mechanism that is: (1) designed to emit an electronic, magnetic, or other
type of charge that equals or does not exceed the equivalency of a five (5)
milliamp sixty (60) hertz shock; and (2) used for the purpose of temporarily
incapacitating a person.” Ind. Code § 35-47-8-2. A mechanism is a “electronic
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stun weapon” if the charge “exceeds the equivalency of a five (5) milliamp sixty
(60) hertz shock[.]” Ind. Code § 35-47-8-1.
[18] We have previously concluded that the evidence of the strength of shock
emitted from a stun gun is not required to prove that the stun gun was used as a
deadly weapon that was readily capable of causing bodily injury. In McClellan
v. State, 13 N.E.3d 546, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), we concluded that a jury
could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed battery by means of a
deadly weapon, i.e., a stun gun that could ordinarily be used in a manner
readily capable of causing serious bodily injury, despite the fact that the State’s
witness “could not determine the strength of the electric shock emitted from the
stun gun.” Likewise, in Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), we concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the stun gun
in question was a deadly weapon that was readily capable of causing serious
bodily injury when the evidence established that the stun gun shocks left marks
on the victim’s skin and caused the victim to feel pain.
[19] In this case, the evidence reveals that Grogg was in possession of an object that
had a flashlight on one end and a taser or stun gun on the other. Grogg used
the taser/stun gun portion of the object to shock Gonzalez twice. The first
shock was to Gonzalez’s back and was strong enough to awaken Gonzalez.
Grogg subsequently shocked Gonzalez in the chest, near her heart. The shock
left red marks on Gonzalez’s skin consistent with marks made by a taser or stun
gun. Gonzalez, who was under observation for a potential heart condition, was
placed in fear as a result of Grogg’s actions. Gonzalez expressed her fear both
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to Officer Bodeker and in a text message sent to Grogg in which she told Grogg
that “I hate the cops… they are a last resort and you made me so scared I had
to call them!” State’s Ex. 40 (ellipsis in original).
[20] While we are unable to determine from the record whether the object used by
Grogg to shock Gonzalez would properly be classified as a taser or a stun gun,
the object qualified as a deadly weapon because it had the apparent ability to
cause serious bodily injury and Grogg acted in a manner that put Gonzalez in
fear for her life. See Merriweather v. State, 778 N.E.2d 449, 458 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (providing that pellet guns or BB guns qualified as deadly weapons
because “the weapons had the apparent ability to cause serious bodily injury
and because they were used in a threatening manner, put the victims in fear.”).
As such, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Grogg, using a
deadly weapon, knowingly or intentionally touched Gonzalez in a rude,
insolent, or angry manner. Grogg’s claim to the contrary effectively amounts to
an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Robey v. State,
7 N.E.3d 371, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (providing that on review, “we do not
reweigh the evidence.”).
II. Sentencing
[21] Grogg also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218
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(Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the
reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
[22] In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, Grogg
asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an aggregate 450-
day sentence for his contemptuous behavior.
Contempt is a sui generis proceeding neither civil nor criminal in
nature, although both of those labels are used to describe certain
categories of contempt. Contempt proceedings may be generally
categorized as civil or criminal, according to the nature and
purpose of the sanction imposed. A civil contempt is a violation
of a court order resulting in a proceeding for the benefit of the
aggrieved party. As such, any type of penalty in a civil contempt
proceeding must be coercive or remedial in nature.
By contrast, criminal contempt actions are punitive and are
carried out in response to an act directed against the dignity and
authority of the court which obstructs the administration of
justice and which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. Accordingly, a criminal contempt sanction is punitive
in nature because its purpose is to vindicate the authority of the
court, and it benefits the State rather than the aggrieved party.
Buford v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1074, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
[23] The State filed four separate contempt informations. On August 20, 2019, the
State alleged that between June 5, 2019 and August 20, 2019, in violation of a
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no contact order, Grogg (1) “contacted or attempted to contact” Gonzalez 861
times via the Allen County jail phone system and (2) contacted Gonzalez
“using the messaging system at the Allen County jail.” Appellant’s App. Vol.
II p. 53. On January 10, 2020, the State alleged that between December 18,
2019 and January 10, 2020, Grogg called Gonzalez 422 times and contacted
her using the messaging system at the jail “nearly every day.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 160. On January 23, 2020, the State alleged that after Grogg’s
communication privileges were limited to contact with his attorney on January
14, 2020, he “used another inmates tablet messaging to contact Dawn Prather”
and asked “her to contact [Gonzalez] through another party.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 223. On January 29, 2020, the State alleged that Grogg
“attempted again to make contact with [Gonzalez] while [Grogg] was being
escorted in the hallway at the Allen County Courthouse, in the presence of
Bailiffs.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 249. Following the underlying criminal
trial, the trial court found Grogg guilty of each allegation.
[24] We have previously adopted the approach used by the Vermont Supreme Court
in State v. North, 186 Vt. 27, 978 A.2d 435 (2009), to determine whether
behavior represented separate, discrete contempts or a single contemptuous
episode. Mockbee v. State, 80 N.E.3d 917, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). In North,
the Vermont Supreme Court indicated that one should consider the factors of
time and place and whether the offenses were motivated by a single criminal
objective. Mockbee, 80 N.E.3d at 922 (citing North, 978 A.2d at 439). It is clear
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from the allegations set forth in each of the informations that each was based on
behavior that occurred at separate and distinct times.
[25] While the parties agree that Grogg’s four contempt convictions resulted from
indirect criminal contempt charges that were filed due to his repeated violations
of the no-contact order and the order suspending Grogg’s communication
privileges, Grogg recognizes that “the four (4) Informations were filed in
succession after he had been made aware of each of them.” Appellant’s Br. p.
21. Grogg argues, however, that because “[t]he conduct all involved the same
protected person and the same conduct,” the trial court “abused its discretion
by ordering the four (4) separate sanctions to be served consecutively to each
other.” Appellant’s Br. p. 21. Grogg further argues that the trial court
could have suspended a large portion of the sentence on the
condition that he not have any further contact with Ms.
Gonzalez since the No Contact Order remained in effect. This
would have satisfied the coercive need for punishment while
furthering the remedial goal of enforcing the No Contact Order
in the future.
Appellant’s Br. p. 21. In raising this argument, Grogg proposed one possible
punishment that the trial court could have imposed. However, he failed to cite
to any authority indicating that the aggregate 450-day sentence imposed by the
trial court constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
[26] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees to
defendants in criminal cases the right to trial by jury. While petty
contempts like other petty crimes may be tried without a jury,
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serious criminal contempts must be tried with a jury if the
defendant insists on this mode of trial.… There is a fixed
dividing line between petty and serious offenses: those crimes
carrying a sentence of more than six months are considered
serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months or less
are considered petty crimes. Thus sentences up to six months
may be imposed for criminal contempts without guilt or
innocence being determined by a jury. Sentences exceeding six
months may not be imposed absent a jury trial or waiver thereof.
Holly v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1176, 1177–78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (internal citations
omitted). Stated differently, “[s]entences exceeding six months may not be
imposed absent a jury trial or waiver thereof.” Fearman v. State, 89 N.E.3d 435,
437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
[27] In sentencing Grogg for the four separate acts of contempt, the trial court
imposed an aggregate 450-day sentence, stating as follows:
As it relates to the contempts that were filed against you: At the
conclusion of your jury trial, the Court found you in contempt of
court for your willful violations of the contempt informations
that were filed August 20th of 2019, January 10th of 2020,
January 23rd of 2020, and January 29th of 2020. For your
contemptuous behavior, Mr. Grogg, you are ordered committed
to the Allen County Confinement Facility for a period of 60 days
for the first contempt, a period of 90 days for the second
contempt, a period of 120 days for the third contempt, and a
period of 180 days for the fourth contempt, all to be served
consecutive and consecutive to 02D05-1906-F3-42.
Tr. Vol. III p. 50. Grogg’s guilt was determined by the trial court, not by a jury.
As such, pursuant to Holly, the maximum sentence that the trial court could
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impose for each of the guilty findings was six months. None of the individual
sentences imposed by the trial court exceeded six months.
[28] Furthermore, a defendant may be punished by consecutive sentences for
multiple separate contemptuous acts so long as the acts did not arise during a
single criminal trial where the trial court waited until after the conclusion of the
trial to consider whether the defendant acted in contempt of court. See generally
Wine v. State, 147 N.E.3d 409, 418–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Codispoti v.
Pa., 418 U.S. 506, 515) (providing that when a trial judge waits until after trial
to make a determination as to whether various acts of alleged contempt that
allegedly occurred during the trial, the acts should be treated as one act of
contempt because there is no ongoing overriding necessity for the contempt
determination to preserve order during the trial), trans. denied. In this case,
while the trial court waited until after the conclusion of Grogg’s trial to
determine whether Grogg’s conduct constituted contempt, the no-contact order
remained in effect. All of the charges included alleged distinct violations of the
no-contact order, with three allegedly occurring prior to trial. Given that the
no-contact order remained in place following trial, there was a risk of continued
contemptuous behavior by Grogg and there was an ongoing necessity for the
trial court to ensure compliance with the court’s order. As such, we conclude
that the trial court acted within its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences.
[29] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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