A.A. v. A.S. (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mar 26 2015, 9:01 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Mark A. Bates David Paul Allen
Schererville, Indiana Hammond, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
A.A., March 26, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A03-1409-PO-346
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
The Honorable Calvin D. Hawkins,
A.S., Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 45D02-1406-PO-124
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] In 2014, Appellee-Plaintiff A.S. filed for and received a protective order against
her former husband Appellant-Defendant A.A. A.A. appeals, arguing that A.S.
previously petitioned for a protective order in 2013, which was denied, and her
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2014 petition was barred by res judicata because she made no new allegations of
misconduct. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] A.A. and A.S. (collectively “the parties”) were married for twelve years before
separating in 2012. On September 24, 2013, the parties’ marriage was
dissolved. On the same day, A.S. filed a petition for protective order against
A.A. alleging that A.A. had committed multiple acts of domestic violence and
stalking against her in 2012. The trial court granted an emergency ex parte
order for protection. On October 22, 2013, the trial court dismissed the petition
due to A.S.’s failure to show that domestic violence had occurred by a
preponderance of the evidence.
[3] On June 4, 2014, A.S. again petitioned for a protective order against A.A and
appeared pro se at an ex parte hearing in front of the trial court. The only
“incident” described in her petition was the short statement “to kill me.”
Appellant’s App. p. 10. Due to a language barrier, the trial court had difficulty
understanding A.S. and questioned why she needed an order for protection
when she had already received no contact orders from the Hammond City
Court.1 Regardless, the trial court granted an ex parte order for protection and
1
Criminal charges were filed against A.A. in Hammond City Court based on allegations of domestic abuse
committed against A.S. during the marriage. As of August 28, 2014, the criminal cases relating to those
allegations were pending.
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set a hearing on the motion. On July 3, 2014, A.A. filed a motion to dismiss
the petition. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss at the outset of the
August 28, 2014 hearing. At the hearing, A.S. recounted many incidents of
domestic abuse which occurred prior to the parties’ divorce, the last of which
occurred in January of 2013. When asked by counsel if there had been any
other incidents since September 2013 (after the divorce was finalized), A.S.
responded, “No, but I don’t want any more to happen.” Tr. p. 21. The trial
court granted A.S. a one-year protective order against A.A. A.A. appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Protective orders are in the nature of injunctions. Therefore, in
granting a protective order the trial court must sua sponte make special
findings of fact and conclusions thereon. See Indiana Trial Rule 52(A);
I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a), (f); Tisdial v. Young, 925 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010) (stating that the trial court may issue or modify an order
for protection only upon a finding that domestic or family violence has
occurred).
Where, as here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions
thereon pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A), we apply a two-tiered standard
of review. Mysliwy v. Mysliwy, 953 N.E.2d 1072, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011), trans. denied.
[F]irst, we determine whether the evidence supports the
findings, and second, whether the findings support the
[order]. In deference to the trial court’s proximity to the
issues, we disturb the [order] only where there is no
evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to
support the [order]. We do not reweigh the evidence, but
consider only the evidence favorable to the ... [order].
Those appealing the ... [order] must establish that the
findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly
erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly
convinced that a mistake has been made. We do not
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defer to conclusions of law, however, and evaluate them
de novo.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Hanauer v. Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d 147, 148-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (some
citations omitted).
[5] Indiana Code section 34-26-5-2 provides as follows:
(a) A person who is or has been a victim of domestic or family
violence may file a petition for an order for protection against a:
(1) family or household member who commits an act of domestic or
family violence; or
(2) person who has committed stalking under IC 35-45-10-5 or a sex
offense under IC 35-42-4 against the petitioner.
Indiana Code section 34-26-5-9 provides:
A finding that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to
justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a
respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a
member of a petitioner’s household. Upon a showing of domestic or
family violence by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall
grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the
threat of violence.
[6] A.A. argues that his motion for dismissal should have been granted, or that
A.S.’s petition should have been denied, because A.S. made no allegations of
any new instances of misconduct since her prior petition seeking a protective
order was denied on October 22, 2013. We agree. Absent any new allegations
of misconduct, the trial court was essentially re-ruling on the same issue which
had previously been addressed by another court.
The doctrine of res judicata bars the litigation of a claim after a final
judgment has been rendered in a prior action involving the same claim
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between the same parties or their privies. Small v. Centocor, Inc., 731
N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied. The
principle behind this doctrine, as well as the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, is the prevention of repetitive litigation of the same dispute.
Id. The following four requirements must be satisfied for a claim to be
precluded under the doctrine of res judicata: 1) the former judgment
must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 2) the
former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; 3) the matter
now in issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action;
and 4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action must have
been between the parties to the present suit or their privies. Id.MicroVote Gen. Corp. v. Indiana Election Comm’n, 924 N.E.2d 184, 191 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010).
[7] In response to A.A.’s res judicata argument, A.S. argues that the previous order
denying A.S.’s first petition for protective order was not rendered “on the
merits,” as is required by the second element of the res judicata doctrine.
Appellee’s Br. 11. We find this argument unpersuasive. The order dismissing
A.S.’s 2013 petition for protection states, “The Petitioner has not shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that domestic or family violence, stalking, or a
sex offense has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an Order for
Protection.” Appellant’s App. p. 36. We think this is clearly a judgment on the
merits. Accordingly, A.S. was barred from attempting to gain a subsequent
protection order based on any allegations of domestic abuse prior to the
September 24, 2013 motion for protective order. To find otherwise would
encourage forum shopping and redundant litigation by permitting parties who
had been denied a protective order to re-petition in different courts. Under such
circumstances, there would be no finality to a denial of a protective order and
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respondents could be required to defend themselves repeatedly against the same
claims.
[8] A.S. conceded that A.A. had not committed any misconduct after September
24, 2013, and that the last reported instance of abuse/stalking occurred in
January of 2013. In its August 28, 2014 order, the trial court found that “The
Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic or
family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of this Order [for
Protection].” Appellant’s App. p. 21. The trial court was precluded, under the
doctrine of res judicata, from granting a protective order based on incidents that
occurred prior to September 24, 2013, and there were no alleged incidents of
misconduct which occurred after that date. Therefore, the trial court’s grant of
the order for protection was clearly erroneous.
[9] We note that as of the June 4, 2014 ex parte hearing, A.S. had valid no contact
orders against A.A. This decision in no way limits the effectiveness of those
orders, and, assuming they are still valid, A.S. is required to abide by the
guidelines therein.
[10] The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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