MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Dec 28 2015, 8:21 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John T. Wilson Gregory F. Zoeller
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Abigail R. Recker
Deputies Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination December 28, 2015
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of R.W. and E.W.(Minor 33A01-1505-JT-481
Children) and M.C. (Mother); Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court
M.C. (Mother), The Honorable Mary G. Willis,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
v. 33C01-1411-JT-11 and
33C01-1411-JT-12
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
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May, Judge.
[1] M.C. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to
R.W. and E.W. (collectively, “Children”). As the Department of Child
Services presented sufficient evidence termination was in the best interests of
Children, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] R.W., born January 20, 2007; and E.W., born January 23, 2010, were born in
Maryland. Children’s biological father died in 2012. In 2013, Children and
Mother moved to Indiana after Mother met and married R.C. (“Stepfather”).
On January 30, 2014, DCS filed petitions to adjudicate Children as Child in
Need of Services (CHINS) based on an allegation they were exposed to
unnecessary medical care, including approximately seventy-eight doctor and
emergency room visits in a year. The trial court held an initial hearing on the
petitions the same day and removed Children from Mother and Stepfather’s
home.
[3] The trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS on February 21, 2014, after
Mother admitted Children were in need of services. On March 14, 2014, the
trial court entered its dispositional decree requiring Mother to participate in
reunification services including participation in: home-based counseling and
case management; parenting assessment and completion of all
recommendations; substance abuse assessment and completion of all
recommendations; psychological assessment and completion of all
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recommendations; random drug screens; and supervised visitation with
Children.
[4] On June 6, 2014, the trial court held a compliance hearing and found while
Mother was adequately participating in some reunification services, she was not
completing services related to her parental obligations. Around the same time,
one of Mother’s home-based counselors had to discontinue services. The
counselor and Mother were concerned for their safety if Stepfather discovered
Mother had disclosed incidents of domestic violence to the therapist.
[5] On October 6, 2014, DCS filed a motion to discontinue reunification services,
and Mother contested that request. The trial court held a hearing and found
Mother was no longer compliant with reunification services; there was domestic
violence between Mother and Stepfather; and Mother was “unable to
understand her personality order, . . . [had] pursued inordinate emergency room
visits, . . . [was] unable to handle her own medication for her psychiatric
concerns and medical care, . . . [and was] unable to adequately manage
[Children’s] medical care and basic parenting needs.” (DCS Ex. 24 at 2.)
Children’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) also recommended
suspending reunification efforts.
[6] On November 5, 2014, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental
rights to Children. The trial court held a permanency hearing on January 23,
2015, and changed the plan for Children from reunification to adoption and
began termination proceedings. The trial court held fact-finding hearings on the
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termination petitions on February 4, 2015, and April 7, 2015. The trial court
issued an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children on April 27,
2015.
Discussion and Decision
[7] We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., D.S.,
& B.G., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh
evidence or judge credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and
reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to the
juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a
judgment terminating a parent’s rights only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S.,
717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied
534 U.S. 1161 (2002).
[8] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions
thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine first
whether the evidence supports the findings and second whether the findings
support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the
record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen
v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences
support the juvenile court’s decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at
208.
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[9] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In
re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A trial court must
subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child, however, when
evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d
at 837. The right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely
because there is a better home available for the child, id., but parental rights
may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her
parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.
[10] To terminate a parent-child relationship, the State must allege and prove:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6
that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
reunification are not required, including a description of
the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner
in which the finding was made.
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has
been under the supervision of a county office of family and
children or probation department for at least fifteen (15)
months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months,
beginning with the date the child is removed from the
home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in
need of services or a delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
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(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof
of these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g
denied. If the court finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must
terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8.
[11] The trial court’s conclusion that termination is the best interests of Children was
not error. 1 In determining what is in the best interests of children, the trial court
is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and to consider the
totality of the evidence. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In
1
Mother argues DCS did not prove the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal would not be
remedied. She does not contest the trial court’s findings supporting its conclusion the continuation of the
parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Children. DCS does not have to prove both a
reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal will not be remedied and a reasonable
probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and Children posed a threat to
the well-being of Children. The statute is written in the disjunctive, and DCS must prove either by clear and
convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. Therefore, we need not address that argument.
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so doing, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of
the children. Id. The court need not wait until children are harmed irreversibly
before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Recommendations of the
case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence the
conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by
clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children’s best interests.
Id. A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment, along with
current inability to do the same, supports finding termination of parental rights
is in the best interests of the children. Lang v. Starke Cnty Office of Family &
Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
[12] The trial court found:
18. Between January 2013 and January 2014, when [R.W.] was
in the care of Mother and [Stepfather], [R.W.] visited a doctor 45
times:
a. Some of these visits included hospitalizations,
b. This culminated with an ultimately unnecessary surgery
that inserted pins into [R.W.’s] legs, and from which at the
time of the fact-finding hearing, [R.W.] was still
recovering,
c. To contrast the number of visits while in Indiana,
[R.W.] only made 27 visits (7 of which were for necessary
eye exams) in the first five years of his life in Maryland
while he was only under the care of his Mother and
biological Father, and
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d. While in the care of Mother and [Stepfather], [R.W.]
visited medical professionals 18 more times in one year,
than he had the entire first five years of his life;
19. [E.W.] also endured excessive medical visits:
a. Between January 2013 and January 2014, when [E.W.]
was in the care of Mother and [Stepfather], she visited the
doctor 29 times[,]
b. To contrast the number of visits while in Indiana,
[E.W.] only made 11 visits in the first three years of her
life in Maryland while she was only under the care of her
Mother and biological Father, and
c. While in the care of Mother and [Stepfather], [E.W.]
visited medical professionals 18 more times in one year,
[sic] than she had the entire first three years of her life;
20. The DCS determined [Stepfather] was an unsafe individual
to care for the Children;
*****
25. With an exhibited and clear safety risk in the way of
[Stepfather] living in the home, DCS did not recommend placing
[Children] back with Mother while she was still living with
[Stepfather] for the following reasons:
a. [Stepfather] failed to show significant and substantial
improvement through the utilization of the services offered
to him,
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b. [Stepfather] never showed a significant commitment to
improvement, let alone actual improvements and the
Court authorized the DCS to cease efforts towards
reunification with Mother and [Stepfather];
26. Throughout the life of the underlying CHINS matter,
Mother remained insistent on living with [Stepfather]:
a. She would state to DCS that she did not understand
why she had to choose between her marriage and her
children;
b. DCS informed Mother that the only decision she had to
make, was that to ensure the safety of her children,
i. This was a topic of conversation and explanation
in the many visits between Mother and FCM
Amanda Harris discussed earlier in this Order;
c. Mother was also informed by her many service
providers that the safety of [Children] could not be ensured
while she still lived with [Stepfather], but she never made
any significant attempts to live without [Stepfather];
i. This was exhibited most clearly when Mother
informed her home-based case worker Heather
Morrow that it would be “pointless” to go to a
women’s shelter because she would always go right
back to [Stepfather];
d. On the date of the fact-finding [hearing], Mother was
still living with [Stepfather] at a hotel in New Castle,
Indiana;
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*****
32. The foster placement of the children has since provided
support, care, guidance, and supervision in the absence of the
same from the Mother for approximately the last six months (and
[Children were] in a therapeutic foster home the ten months
before that);
33. The Children are bonded with the placement family;
34. The Children are currently doing well in the care of [their]
foster family;
35. The foster placement is willing and able to provide a loving,
stable home[.]
(App. at 78-84.) Based on these and other findings of fact and evidence to
support them from service providers and Mother, the trial court concluded
termination was in the best interests of Children. Mother’s argument to the
contrary is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.
See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or
judge the credibility of witnesses). 2
2
Mother argues:
The procedural problems in the CHINS proceedings deprives Mother of her procedural
due process with respect to the termination of her parental rights. Here, the Henry
County Department of Child Services disregarded its mandate under I.C. 31-34-21-5.5 to
provided [sic] reasonable efforts. The DCS failed to provide services that met with
requirements of Mother’s psychological evaluation. The DCS did not follow through
with providing services that were concrete, hands on and repetitive due to Mother’s
“cognitive impairment and illiteracy.” The only thing DCS focused on was Mother
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Conclusion
[13] The DCS provided sufficient evidence termination of Mother’s parental rights
was in the best interests of Children. Accordingly, we affirm.
[14] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.
leaving her husband, and when she was not willing to do that, they [sic] proceeded to
terminate her rights.
(Br. of Appellant at 10-11.) These arguments appear to be related to services offered as part of the
CHINS adjudication, which we cannot consider as part of a termination appeal. See In re H.L.,
915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“failure to provide services does not serve as a basis
on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law”).
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