Corey Phelps v. State of Indiana

Jan 15 2015, 8:55 am
FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
PATRICIA CARESS McMATH GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
WILLIAM HACKL BRAINARD
MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
COREY PHELPS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1401-CR-30
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Daniel Pflum, Judge
Cause No. 49G20-1305-FA-29024
January 15, 2015
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Judge
Case Summary and Issues
Corey Phelps appeals his maximum eight-year sentence for possession of cocaine,
a Class C felony, raising one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its
discretion when it imposed the maximum sentence for a Class C felony after expressing
disagreement with the jury’s verdict finding Phelps not guilty of a Class A felony.
Concluding the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse and remand with instructions
to vacate Phelps’s sentence and to sentence him to a term of six years executed at the
Department of Correction.
Facts and Procedural History
At 9:45 p.m. on May 2, 2013, officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department, armed with a warrant, executed a no-knock search of a residence. Several
persons were found in or around the residence, and Phelps was among those individuals.
Daniel Henson, a medic with the SWAT team that executed the search, witnessed Phelps
throw a small object out of a second-story window. A bag containing 12.43 grams of
crack cocaine was found in the yard outside the window from which Phelps had thrown
something. Inside the house, the police found 0.77 grams of marijuana, a scale, plastic
bags, a pipe, and $1,225 in cash.
The State charged Phelps with dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony, and
possession of cocaine, a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, Phelps was found guilty
of possession of cocaine but not guilty of dealing in cocaine. At the sentencing hearing,
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prior to announcing Phelps’s sentence, the trial court made the following statement
concerning the jury’s decision to find Phelps not guilty of dealing in cocaine:
The State . . . pointed out that as what he considered an aggravating factor,
was the fact that you were dealing in cocaine. [Defense counsel] brought
out the fact that that can’t be considered an aggravating factor because you
were found not guilty of that. And she is correct, to that extent. I will say
however, that I don’t know why the jury didn’t find you guilty of that
offense. . . . I don’t really know what they did. Or what their reasoning was
behind it. Your attorneys did a really good job of getting them confused . .
. [The jury] found you guilty not of the – not possession of the twelve
grams but I think they did find – that’s what they did find you guilty of.
They said more than three grams. The evidence clearly showed that you
threw the twelve grams out the window. And it was recovered. And in
fact, had this been tried to the Court initially, had this been tried to the
Court instead of to a jury . . . I would have clearly found you guilty of
dealing. Because I think the evidence showed that. But the [sic] said that
you weren’t so that’s – that’s the rule there.
Transcript at 446-47. Immediately after that statement, the trial court laid out a number
of aggravating factors, including two prior felony convictions, numerous probation
violations, juvenile history, and Phelps’s risk to reoffend. The trial court then imposed a
maximum sentence of eight years imprisonment. Phelps now appeals his sentence,
claiming his sentence may be a result of the court’s disagreement with the jury verdict.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
“[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d
482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of
discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances. Id. The trial court may abuse its discretion in sentencing by:
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(1) failing to enter a sentencing statement, (2) entering a sentencing
statement that explains reasons for imposing the sentence but the record
does not support the reasons, (3) the sentencing statement omits reasons
that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or
(4) the reasons given in the sentencing statement are improper as a matter
of law.
Kimbrough v. State, 979 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2012) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at
490-91).
II. Phelps’s Sentence
Phelps contends that the maximum sentence imposed by the trial court may have
been compensation for the court’s belief that the jury incorrectly found Phelps not guilty
of dealing in cocaine. In making his argument that the trial court abused its discretion,
Phelps relies on our supreme court’s decisions in Gambill v. State, 436 N.E.2d 301 (Ind.
1982) and Hammons v. State, 493 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. 1986). In both Gambill and
Hammons, our supreme court found an abuse of discretion where the trial court made a
statement at the sentencing hearing expressing disagreement with the jury’s decision to
acquit the defendant of a greater offense.
In Gambill, the defendant was charged with murder, but the jury found defendant
guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a Class B felony. After finding that certain statutory
aggravators were present, the trial court made the following statement:
I think the facts of the occurrence justify, and the evidence would justify a
conviction of murder. I think in fact that was the offense committed. The
jury, as it had a right to do, returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter for
whatever reason, and I think it was not the right verdict. Further than that I
think the police did an exemplary job of developing this case.
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Gambill, 436 N.E.2d at 304. The court then sentenced the defendant to a term of twenty
years imprisonment. Our supreme court concluded that “the trial court enhanced the
sentence to compensate for what he believed to be an erroneous verdict.” Id. at 305. The
court went on to say that the trial court “invaded the province of the jury. From [the trial
court’s] comments, any enhancement by [it] would be suspect . . . .” Id. The court
remanded with instructions to resentence the defendant to the presumptive term of ten
years. Id.
Similarly, in Hammons, supra, the defendant was charged with murder but found
guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. A sentencing hearing was held at which the trial
court said: “I feel there is ample evidence to justify a finding on the murder count itself.
Therefore, Mr. Hammons, the Court is going to sentence you at this time . . . [for] a
period of twenty years . . . .” Hammons, 493 N.E.2d at 1251 (emphasis omitted). Upon
the State’s motion, the matter was remanded for resentencing because the trial court
failed to adequately state facts supporting an enhanced sentence. At the resentencing
hearing, while recounting the aggravating circumstances, the trial court said: “I tended to
disagree with the jury’s verdict in this particular matter and while I cannot sentence for a
murder conviction, I have sentencing alternatives within the manslaughter class B
felony.” Id. at 1252 (emphasis omitted). The trial court then imposed the maximum
sentence allowed for voluntary manslaughter. Our supreme court held that the trial court
abused its discretion and that the sentence appeared to be compensation for a supposedly
incorrect jury verdict. The court reasoned that the trial court’s act of intermingling its
opposition to the jury verdict with a discussion of a legitimate aggravating circumstance
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“does not remove the suspect nature of the enhancement.” Id. at 1253. The court also
distinguished the case from Wilson v. State, 458 N.E.2d 654 (Ind. 1984), in which a trial
judge had shown “mild skepticism” of the jury verdict but was not “resolutely opposed”
to it. Hammons, 493 N.E.2d at 1253.
Here, the State does not dispute that the trial court expressed disagreement with
the jury verdict. Instead, the State argues the trial court appropriately enhanced Phelps’s
sentence by relying on other proper aggravating circumstances. We believe, however,
that the presence of aggravating circumstances justifying an enhanced sentence does not
wash away the stain left by a trial court’s blatant disagreement with the jury verdict at
sentencing. Indeed, in Gambill, our supreme court found error despite stating that “the
circumstances of the crime may well have warranted the assessment of a maximum
sentence . . . .” 436 N.E.2d at 305. And in Hammons, the court remanded for
resentencing notwithstanding its holding that the defendant’s sentence was not
unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.1 493
N.E.2d at 1255-56.
In cases such as this, the appearance of fairness and the need to promote public
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system are considerations carrying as much
weight as any other. In both Gambill and Hammons, our supreme court balked at the
“suspect” nature of the sentence enhancements—a direct consequence of the trial court’s
outspoken disagreement with the jury verdicts in those cases. The sentence in this case is
1
At the time Hammons was decided, our appellate rules permitted reviewing courts to revise a sentence if
it was “manifestly unreasonable.” The current version of Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), effective January 1, 2003,
allows us to revise sentences that are “inappropriate.”
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equally suspect, where the trial court stated it believed Phelps was “clearly” guilty and
that it did not understand why the jury reached the verdict it did. Tr. at 446-47.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion.
Phelps requests that we remand with instructions to enter an advisory sentence of
four years.2 We do not believe that an advisory sentence would be appropriate here. The
trial court’s imposition of the maximum sentence is suspect due to the trial court’s stated
disagreement with the jury’s refusal to find Phelps guilty of a greater offense;
nevertheless, this case presents several aggravating factors that are totally independent of
the nature of the charges in this case. Phelps, who was twenty-four at the time he
committed this offense, has prior felony convictions for burglary and possession of
cocaine, and he also has a significant juvenile history. In addition, Phelps has violated
probation multiple times and was on probation when he committed this offense. With
these aggravators in mind, we believe an executed sentence of six years is appropriate,
rather than the four-year advisory sentence requested by Phelps.
Conclusion
We conclude the trial court abused its sentencing discretion and that the trial
court’s stated disagreement with the jury’s not-guilty verdict concerning a greater offense
renders the trial court’s maximum sentence a suspect enhancement. We remand with
instructions that Phelps’s sentence be vacated and that the trial court sentence Phelps to
six years with the Department of Correction. Furthermore, we direct the trial court to
2
At the time of Phelps’s offenses, the advisory sentence for a Class C felony was four years, with a
sentencing range of two to eight years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2013).
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correct the order of judgment of conviction, which erroneously indicates that Phelps was
convicted of a Class A felony.
Reversed and remanded.
BAILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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