Eligah Thomas v. State of Indiana

FILED
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Feb 04 2013, 9:22 am
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MICHAEL GENE WORDEN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ELIGAH THOMAS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1207-CR-528
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Deborah J. Shook, Judge Pro Tempore
Cause No. 49F08-1111-CM-78139
February 4, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
After a bench trial, Eligah Thomas (“Thomas”) was convicted of four counts of
Battery1 and one count of Resisting Law Enforcement2, both as Class A misdemeanors. He
now appeals his convictions.
We affirm.
Issues
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Thomas’s convictions where Thomas
contends that:
1. He had a defense to criminal charges based upon a statutory right to
refuse medication;
2. The State did not produce sufficient evidence to overcome his claim of
self-defense; and
3. Police officers were not engaged in the execution of their official
duties.
Facts and Procedural History
On November 2, 2011, Thomas was an in-patient of the Wishard Memorial Hospital
psychiatric ward (“Wishard”) in Indianapolis, where he would eventually be diagnosed with
schizophrenia. Thomas had been placed in treatment as part of a seventy-two-hour
emergency detention for diagnosis. That evening, medical staff at Wishard attempted to
administer an injectable medication to Thomas; Thomas, however, refused to permit nurses
to inject the medication.
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.
2
I.C. § 35-44-3-3 (West 2012) (recodified at I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1, effective July 1, 2012).
2
As a result of Thomas’s noncompliance, Wishard medical staff contacted Marion
County Special Deputy Sheriff William Snyder (“Deputy Snyder”), who was among the
police officers assigned to Wishard to provide law enforcement services and to assist hospital
staff with their duties when called. Deputy Snyder was accompanied that night by his
supervisor, Lieutenant Travis Steele (“Lieutenant Steele”).
Deputy Snyder and Lieutenant Steele responded to the medical staff’s call and found
Thomas in the hallway in front of his hospital room. Wishard staff urged Thomas to return to
his room to receive an injected medication. Thomas eventually turned to enter his room, but
continued to eye the deputies warily. Thomas refused to accept the medication, however, and
told Deputy Snyder and Lieutenant Steele that they were “going to need more help.” (Tr. at
7.) Deputy Snyder and Lieutenant Steele then called for assistance. Three additional
deputies arrived to assist them; among them were Deputies Shemara Russell (“Deputy
Russell”) and Christopher Myers (“Deputy Myers”).
The five deputies instructed Thomas to lie down and permit medical staff to
administer the injection, but Thomas continued to refuse. Deputy Snyder explained to
Thomas that if he refused, the deputies would force him to comply because the medication
had been ordered by his doctor and he was in emergency detention, and thus could not refuse
medication. Thomas continued to refuse, and the deputies began to move toward him to
permit medical staff to administer the injection.
As the deputies advanced, Thomas assumed a fighting stance and struck Deputy
Snyder across the face with an elbow, knocking off Deputy Snyder’s glasses. Thomas also
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grabbed Deputy Russell’s belt and removed a tactical baton from its holder. Deputy Snyder
used a Taser to attempt to subdue Thomas, but Thomas continued to fight, eventually kicking
Lieutenant Steele and Deputies Russell and Myers, and knocking the Taser from Deputy
Snyder’s hand.
Deputy Myers eventually placed handcuffs on one of Thomas’s wrists and the
deputies were able to force Thomas onto the floor in a prone position. Thomas continued to
resist with his other wrist pinned beneath his body. Eventually, the deputies wrested
Thomas’s other hand from under his body and handcuffed him, allowing Wishard staff to
administer the injection.
Once Thomas was subdued and his medication was administered, medical staff
retrieved a wheelchair and the deputies took Thomas into custody. At the end of the
encounter, Deputy Myers had a bleeding laceration on one of his arms. Thomas had bitten
Deputy Russell during the fight. Deputy Snyder was also injured; as a result of the fight with
Thomas, Deputy Snyder ruptured three discs in his back, suffered a fractured vertebra, and
required ongoing pain management.
On November 2, 2011, Thomas was charged with four counts of Battery—one count
each for striking Lieutenant Steele and Deputies Snyder, Russell, and Myers—and one count
of Resisting Law Enforcement, all as Class A misdemeanors.
On June 6, 2012, a bench trial was conducted, at the conclusion of which the court
found Thomas guilty as charged as to all five counts. Consequently, the trial court sentenced
Thomas to one year of imprisonment for each offense, with the sentences run concurrently
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and credit time for twenty-one days already served. The court suspended the remainder of
the sentence to non-reporting probation with eight months’ mental health treatment.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
After a bench trial, Thomas contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
convictions for Battery and Resisting Law Enforcement. Our standard of review on a claim
of insufficient evidence after a bench trial is well-settled.
This court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.
Cox v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Only the evidence
most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn therefrom will be considered. Id. If a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty based on the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, then a conviction will be affirmed. Id.
at 1028-29.
Sargent v. State, 875 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Here, Thomas was charged with four counts of Battery and one count of Resisting
Law Enforcement, all as Class A misdemeanors. To convict Thomas of each count of
Battery, as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knowingly or intentionally touched each of the four sheriff’s deputies—Lieutenant Steele and
Deputies Snyder, Russell, and Myers—in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, and that each of
the deputies was engaged in the execution of his or her official duty. App. at 25-28; I.C. §
35-42-2-1(a). To convict Thomas of Resisting Law Enforcement, as charged, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas knowingly and forcibly resisted,
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obstructed, or interfered with Deputy Snyder while he was lawfully engaged in the execution
of his duties. App. at 29; I.C. § 35-44-3-3(a) (West 2012) (recodified at I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1,
effective July 1, 2012).
Thomas advances several bases upon which he challenges his convictions for
insufficient evidence; we address each in turn.
Statutory Right to Refuse Medication
Thomas first argues that he had a statutory right to refuse the administration of
medication by Wishard medical staff, the deputies’ conduct in forcing his compliance with
the staff was a violation of that right, and thus we must reverse his conviction. Thomas
directs us to Indiana Code section 12-27-5-2, which provides:
(a) An involuntary patient who wants to refuse to submit to treatment or a
habilitation program may petition the committing court or hearing officer
for consideration of the treatment or program.
(b) In the absence of a petition made under subsection (a), the service
provider may proceed with the proposed treatment or habilitation program.
Where an individual placed in emergency detention, as Thomas was, wishes to
challenge the provision of treatment, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that (1) a current and individual medical assessment of his needs had been made; (2) this
assessment resulted in the honest belief of medical professionals that his continued care
would be of substantial benefit to treating his medical conditions; and (3) the probable
benefits of the care outweighed any risk of harm to him. See In re the Mental Commitment
of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645, 647 (Ind. 1987). Thomas argues that the State failed to carry its
burden at his criminal trial. Thus, Thomas argues, he had a statutory right to refuse treatment
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and to resist the efforts of law enforcement officers to assist Wishard medical staff in
administering medication.
Thomas is correct that the State did not produce evidence as required by M.P., but that
case is inapposite here. The standard provided in M.P. relates to the standard by which a
court reviews a petition challenging treatment during involuntary commitment to care under
Subsection 12-27-5-2(a). The State introduced testimony at trial from Deputy Snyder that
Thomas was subject to emergency detention in Wishard’s psychiatric ward, and therefore had
no right to refuse medication. Thomas did not object to this testimony or produce any
evidence to the contrary. There is no evidence that Thomas filed a petition under Subsection
12-27-5-2(a) at any point and, absent such a petition, Subsection 12-27-5-2(b) permits a
medical provider to proceed with treatment. Further, Thomas does not direct us toward any
other authority that might give rise to such a right—let alone that a statutory right to refuse
treatment serves to privilege the acts of Battery and Resisting Law Enforcement.
There is no evidence that Thomas had any statutory right to refuse treatment under
Section 12-27-5-2, and thus we cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it found him
guilty of Battery and Resisting Law Enforcement under the theory Thomas now advances.
Self-Defense
Thomas next argues that his battery of the four deputies was privileged conduct under
a theory of self-defense, and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his
claim of self-defense. “A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise
criminal act.” Green v. State, 870 N.E.2d 560, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), vacated on trans.,
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878 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. 2007), trans. vacated and opinion reinstated, 877 N.E.2d 467 (Ind.
2007). Our statutes define self-defense:
A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to
protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes
to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person:
(1) is justified in using deadly force; and
(2) does not have a duty to retreat;
if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious
bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible
felony. No person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind
whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means
necessary.
I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). A person may use reasonable force against a public servant “if the
person reasonably believes the force is necessary to protect the person … from what the
person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(i)(1).
Subsection (i) notwithstanding, “using force against a public servant” is not justified if “the
person provokes action by the public servant with intent to cause bodily injury to the public
servant” or “the person has entered into combat with the public servant or is the initial
aggressor, unless the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates … the intent to
do so and the public servant nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.”
I.C. §§ 35-41-3-2(j)(2) & (3).
“When a defendant raises the claim of self-defense, he is required to show three facts:
1) he was in a place where he had a right to be; 2) he acted without fault; and 3) he had a
reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.” Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind.
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2000). We use the same standard of review upon an appeal from a claim concerning the
sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense as for any other sufficiency of the
evidence claim. Id.Here, the evidence that favors the judgment was sufficient to rebut Thomas’s claim of
self-defense. Deputy Snyder testified that when he and Lieutenant Steele arrived in the
hallway outside Thomas’s hospital room at Wishard, Thomas was actively refusing to return
to his room and accept medication. After hospital staff persuaded Thomas to return to his
room, Thomas walked into the room while casting glances at Deputy Snyder and Lieutenant
Steele. When the two deputies entered Thomas’s room, he “just took a stance … folded his
arms in front … told us that we were going to need more help” and told the deputies that “it
would be on if we tried to touch him.” (Tr. at 7.) After additional deputies arrived, Thomas
“said he wasn’t going to take it,” (Tr. at 8) and as the deputies moved closer took a “fighting
stance” and struck Deputy Snyder across the nose with an elbow. (Tr. at 9.)
The evidence favorable to the verdict thus indicates that Thomas neither acted without
fault nor acted with a reasonable fear of death or bodily harm. See Wallace, 725 N.E.2d at
840. To the extent Thomas argues otherwise, he directs us to evidence unfavorable to the
judgment and seeks that we reweigh evidence, which we cannot do. See Sargent, 875 N.E.2d
at 767. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to overcome Thomas’s self-
defense claim at trial, and affirm his convictions for Battery.
Execution of Official Duties
Finally, Thomas contends that there was insufficient evidence that the deputies were
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engaged in the execution of their official duties, and thus his conviction for Resisting Law
Enforcement must be reversed.
Here, Thomas testified that the sheriff’s deputies were all uniformed on the day of the
incident. He insists, however, that Deputy Snyder’s testimony was insufficient evidence to
establish that Deputy Snyder was executing his duties. Deputy Snyder testified that the role
of deputies at Wishard is to “detect, deter and report any crimes … and to assist staff when
called,” (Tr. at 4) including the occasions “from time to time” when a deputy may be called
to a patient’s room in the psychiatric ward to assist in the administration of medication. (Tr.
at 6.) We cannot agree that this is insufficient to establish that the deputies’ assistance of
medical staff in administering medication to an individual who, like Thomas, was subject to
emergency mental health detention, was conduct outside the scope of the execution of
official duties required by statute to sustain a conviction for Resisting Law Enforcement. We
therefore affirm Thomas’s conviction for Resisting Law Enforcement.
Conclusion
Thomas’s acts of Battery and Resisting Law Enforcement were not privileged as a
result of any statutory right to refuse medication. There was sufficient evidence at trial to
overcome Thomas’s claim of self-defense as a justification for four acts of Battery. There
was also sufficient evidence that Deputy Snyder was executing his official duties to sustain
Thomas’s conviction for Resisting Law Enforcement.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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