Justin Craig v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 28 2017, 9:03 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael G. Moore Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Justin Craig, July 28, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1611-CR-2488
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela Dow
Appellee-Plaintiff Davis, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1603-F6-8543
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1611-CR-2488 | July 28, 2017 Page 1 of 8
Case Summary
[1] After breaking into his ex-girlfriend’s apartment, Justin Craig was arrested and
convicted of two counts of Level 6 felony residential entry (entering through the
balcony and re-entering through the front door) and two counts of Class B
misdemeanor criminal mischief (damage to the front door and to his ex’s
iPhone).
[2] On appeal, Craig raises multiple arguments. He contends that the two
convictions for residential entry violate the continuous-crime doctrine and that
he cannot be convicted of both offenses. He also argues that his convictions for
residential entry through the front door and for criminal mischief for damage to
that same door violate the actual-evidence test of our double-jeopardy clause.
Last, Craig argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for
criminal mischief for damage to the iPhone. The State concedes that Craig’s
convictions for residential entry through the front door and for criminal
mischief regarding the same door constitute double jeopardy. Finding no other
errors, we affirm in part and remand in part.
Fact and Procedural History
[3] On the evening of March 2, 2016, Keana Jackson was at her apartment in
Indianapolis with her friend Antonio and her daughter. At some point Jackson
called Craig, her ex-boyfriend, but did not speak with him. Craig tried calling
Jackson back, but she did not answer. Approximately thirty minutes after
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1611-CR-2488 | July 28, 2017 Page 2 of 8
receiving the call from Jackson, Craig showed up at her apartment. Rather
than enter through the front door, Craig climbed up Jackson’s balcony and
entered her apartment through the open balcony door. Once Antonio saw
Craig inside the apartment, Antonio “immediately ran out of the front door.”
Tr. Vol. II p. 6. Craig ran out of the apartment after Antonio, following him to
the stairs. Jackson shut and locked the front door behind them.
[4] Jackson’s daughter was upset by the commotion, so Jackson went to tend to
her. While calming down her daughter, Jackson heard a noise and walked back
into the living room to see that Craig had broken through the front door and
was standing in her apartment. Jackson grabbed her iPhone and tried calling
for help, but Craig ripped the phone away from her and threw it against the
wall, cracking the glass screen protector. See Ex. 8.
[5] Despite Jackson being unable to call for help, the police arrived at her
apartment. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Matthew
Musselman questioned Jackson and Craig. Jackson told the officer that Craig
had broken into her home through the balcony door and the front door, that he
had headbutted her, and that he had broken her phone. Craig admitted to the
officer that he had entered the apartment through the balcony door and broken
Jackson’s front door. The State charged Craig with two counts of Level 6
felony residential entry (entry through the balcony and entry through the front
door), one count of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, and
two counts of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief (damage to the front
door and damage to Jackson’s phone).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1611-CR-2488 | July 28, 2017 Page 3 of 8
[6] A bench trial was held in August 2016. At the conclusion of the trial, the court
found Craig not guilty of battery resulting in bodily injury but guilty on both
counts of residential entry and both counts of criminal mischief. Craig was
sentenced to a total of 545 days in jail with 529 days suspended to probation.1
[7] Craig appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Craig raises three arguments on appeal. First, he contends that his two
convictions for residential entry violate the continuous-crime doctrine. He also
argues that, even if we affirm the entry of judgment on both residential-entry
counts, his convictions for residential entry through the front door and criminal
mischief for damage to the front door violate Indiana’s double-jeopardy clause.
Last, he asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for
criminal mischief for damage to Jackson’s phone.
I. Continuous-Crime Doctrine
[9] Craig argues that his two entries into Jackson’s apartment were part of one
continuous act and therefore his multiple convictions for the same crime violate
Indiana’s continuous-crime doctrine. This is a question of law that we review
de novo. Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2015).
1
Craig was also charged with one count of Level 6 felony battery in the presence of a minor. After the State
rested, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Craig on this count.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1611-CR-2488 | July 28, 2017 Page 4 of 8
[10] The continuous-crime doctrine is “limited to situations where a defendant has
been charged multiple times with the same offense.” Id. The doctrine “does
not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distinct
chargeable crimes; rather, it defines those instances where a defendant’s
conduct amounts only to a single chargeable crime.” Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d
287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Thus, the doctrine “prevents the
State from charging a defendant twice for the same continuous offense.” Id.The continuous-crime doctrine provides that “actions that are sufficient in
themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in
terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to
constitute a single transaction.” Id.[11] Craig contends that both of his entries into Jackson’s apartment occurred
during “a very short period of time” and that the events occurred “in the space
between [the] two entry points of Jackson’s apartment.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8.
He further contends that his purpose for both entries into the apartment was to
talk with Jackson since she would not answer his calls and that his actions were
continuous from the time he entered through Jackson’s balcony door. We
agree with Craig that both entries into the apartment occurred within a
relatively short period. However, that is where our agreement ends.
[12] Craig entered Jackson’s apartment through two different entry points. He first
gained entry by climbing Jackson’s balcony and walking through the open
balcony door to talk to her about why she would not answer his calls. Upon
entering the apartment, Craig abandoned this mission and chased Antonio out
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1611-CR-2488 | July 28, 2017 Page 5 of 8
the front door, following him to the stairwell. Craig then returned to Jackson’s
apartment and broke down her front door. Given that Craig entered the
apartment through two different entrances and that his actions were not part of
a single transaction, we affirm his two convictions for Level 6 felony residential
entry.
II. Double Jeopardy
Craig argues that, even if we uphold both of his residential-entry convictions,
his convictions for Count II, residential entry through the front door, and Count
V, criminal mischief for damage to the front door, violate the actual-evidence
test under the double-jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution. The State
“agrees” that these convictions “violate the principles of double jeopardy.”
Appellee’s Br. p. 10. To find a double-jeopardy violation under the actual-
evidence test “we must conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the
evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of
one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a
second challenged offense.” Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013)
(quotations omitted).
[13] Craig gained entry into Jackson’s apartment by damaging the front door. The
State concedes that the same evidentiary facts were used to establish residential
entry through the front door and criminal mischief to the front door. Thus, we
remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate Craig’s conviction and
sentence on Count V.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1611-CR-2488 | July 28, 2017 Page 6 of 8
III. Sufficiency of Evidence
[14] Craig’s final argument is that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction for criminal mischief for damage to Jackson’s iPhone. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor
determine the credibility of witnesses; that role is reserved for the factfinder.
Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). “The evidence—even if
conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in a light
most favorable to the conviction.” Id. A conviction will be affirmed “if there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime
from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.[15] Craig contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
damaged Jackson’s iPhone. The charging information on this count states,
“On or about March 3, 2016, JUSTIN CRAIG did, without the consent of
Keana Jackson, recklessly, knowingly or intentionally damage or deface the
property of Keana Jackson, to-wit: phone[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19.
Craig concedes that the glass screen protector cracked when he threw the
phone. See Appellant’s Br. p. 5. Nevertheless, he argues that the State failed to
prove that he damaged the actual phone. We disagree.
[16] When consumers purchase smartphones they often purchase protective gear,
such as screen protectors and/or phone cases, for their phones. Once attached
to the phone, the protective gear becomes part of the phone. The evidence
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1611-CR-2488 | July 28, 2017 Page 7 of 8
presented showed that Jackson had a glass screen protector attached to her
iPhone when Craig threw it against the wall. See Ex. 8. Thus, when Craig
threw the phone against the wall and cracked the glass screen protector, he
damaged the phone. The evidence is sufficient to support Craig’s conviction for
Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief for damage to Jackson’s phone.
[17] Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1611-CR-2488 | July 28, 2017 Page 8 of 8