Anthony T. Williams v. State of Indiana

FILED
Oct 13 2017, 10:36 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas W. Vanes Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Crown Point, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Anthony T. Williams, October 13, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A05-1702-CR-314
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Salvador Vasquez,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G01-1312-MR-12
Barnes, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Anthony Williams appeals his convictions for murder, Class A felony
attempted murder, and Class B felony carjacking. We affirm.
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Issue
[2] The sole issue is whether the trial court properly denied Williams’s motion for
change of judge.
Facts
[3] Early in the morning of December 2, 2013, Williams shot and killed his friend,
Damian Reedus, in a van belonging to Aja Jester that Reedus was borrowing.
Williams also shot Jester in the neck, but not fatally. Williams then pulled
Jester out of the van, straddled her, pointed the gun at her face, and told her she
had to die because she had seen his face. Although Williams pulled the trigger
twice, the gun failed to fire. Jester then managed to run away, and Williams
drove away in the van. Jester underwent surgery on her neck. She still suffers
pain and psychological trauma, including post-traumatic stress disorder, from
the shooting.
[4] On December 5, 2013, the State charged Williams with multiple counts,
including murder, Class A felony attempted murder, and Class B felony
carjacking. On February 27, 2015, the State and Williams reached a plea
agreement that Williams would plead guilty to murder and Class A felony
attempted murder. The agreement expressly provided for a sentence of fifty-five
years for murder and thirty years for attempted murder, with the sentences to be
served concurrently. The trial court took the plea under advisement and
ordered preparation of a presentence report.
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[5] On April 1, 2015, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Before accepting the
plea, the trial court heard victim impact testimony from Jester. Jester expressed
displeasure with the plea agreement, stating that she did not believe a term of
fifty-five years was long enough for Williams. At the conclusion of Jester’s
testimony, the trial court stated:
I’m not comfortable giving Mr. Williams the pass on shooting
you. Because, as I see it, that’s exactly what’s taking place here.
I would not reject the plea on the 55 years for the charge of
murder, but I’m not comfortable on the 30 years concurrent term,
because that gives Mr. Williams essentially a pass for shooting
you. If you are also not comfortable with the plea, the plea is
rejected and this matter goes to trial.
App. Vol. IV p. 205. After defense counsel made a record objecting to rejection
of the plea, the trial court further stated:
And, to be perfectly clear, it’s the concurrent nature of the
sentences that—that rejects the plea. I’m not in any way
suggesting that I would not accept a negotiated term in the
future. I will suggest that there’s no chance that I would accept a
negotiated term that would give a concurrent term. That’s what
I’m—that’s why the plea is rejected. I came into this hearing
uncomfortable with the plea, in any event, as I already indicated.
Id. at 209.
[6] Williams’s case proceeded to jury trial on April 4-13, 2016. The same trial
judge who had rejected Williams’s guilty plea presided over this trial. Williams
did not move for a change of judge before or during this trial. It ended with a
deadlocked jury and a mistrial.
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[7] On April 21, 2016, a new trial was scheduled to begin on October 31, 2016,
which was later continued to November 29, 2016. The same judge still was
presiding over the case. On September 8, 2016, Williams filed a motion for
change of judge. Among the claimed grounds for such a change was the judge’s
rejection of Williams’s plea agreement.1 The trial court denied Williams’s
motion. After the second jury trial, Williams was found guilty as charged. The
trial court imposed sentences of sixty-two years for murder, forty-three years for
attempted murder, and fifteen years for carjacking, to run consecutively for an
aggregate term of 120 years. Williams now appeals.
Analysis
[8] Williams’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court judge erred in
denying his motion for change of judge. Indiana Criminal Rule 12(B) provides:
In felony and misdemeanor cases, the state or defendant may
request a change of judge for bias or prejudice. The party shall
timely file an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or
prejudice against the state or defendant. The affidavit shall state
the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice
exists, and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the
attorney of record that the attorney in good faith believes that the
historical facts recited in the affidavit are true. The request shall
be granted if the historical facts recited in the affidavit support a
rational inference of bias or prejudice.
1
The motion alleged other grounds as well, but this is the only basis about which Williams argues on appeal.
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A decision on whether to grant a motion for change of judge under this rule is
reviewed for clear error. Lehman v. State, 55 N.E.3d 863, 866 (Ind. Ct. App.
2016) (quoting Sturgeon v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1173, 1182 (Ind. 1999)), trans.
denied. “Reversal will require a showing which leaves us with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Sturgeon, 719 N.E.2d at 1182.
[9] Aside from the merits of Williams’s motion for change of judge, it is well-
settled that “a defendant is not entitled to a change of judge where the mandates
of Criminal Rule 12 have not been followed.” Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d
1051, 1059 (Ind. 2000). One of those mandates is the time period for filing such
a motion. Id. at 1059-60. Specifically, Criminal Rule 12(D) states:
In any criminal action, no change of judge or change of venue
from the county shall be granted except within the time herein
provided.
(1) Thirty Day Rule. An application for a change of judge or
change of venue from the county shall be filed within thirty (30)
days of the initial hearing. Provided, that where a cause is
remanded for a new trial by the court on appeal, such application
must be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the defendant
first appears in person before the trial court following remand.
(2) Subsequently Discovered Grounds. If the applicant first
obtains knowledge of the cause for change of venue from the
judge or from the county after the time above limited, the
applicant may file the application, which shall be verified by the
party specifically alleging when the cause was first discovered,
how it was discovered, the facts showing the cause for a change,
and why such cause could not have been discovered before by the
exercise of due diligence. Any opposing party shall have the
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right to file counter-affidavits on such issue within ten (10) days,
and after a hearing on the motion, the ruling of the court may be
reviewed only for abuse of discretion.
[10] Here, not only was Williams’s motion filed well past the initial thirty-day time
limit, it was not filed for nearly a year-and-a-half after the trial court rejected his
plea agreement, which is now the sole stated basis upon which Williams claims
the motion should have been granted. In fact, Williams acquiesced to this very
same judge presiding over his first trial and did not object to that judge’s
continued presiding over his case until the month before his second scheduled
trial date—several months after it was scheduled. Williams does not allege any
“subsequently discovered grounds” for filing his motion at such a late date.
Williams’s failure to adhere to the time limits of Criminal Rule 12 necessarily
means the trial court properly denied his motion for change of judge. See
Flowers, 738 N.E.2d at 1059-60.
[11] To the extent Williams implies the trial judge should have nevertheless sua
sponte recused himself from his case, we disagree. Williams cites Indiana Rule
of Judicial Conduct 2.11, which states in part, “A judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned . . . .” “The law presumes that a judge is unbiased and
unprejudiced in the matters that come before the judge.” Flowers, 738 N.E.2d at
1060. A judge has discretion to recuse sua sponte if any semblance of judicial
bias or impropriety comes to the judge’s attention, and must recuse sua sponte
if he or she has an actual bias. Id. “The record must show actual bias and
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prejudice against the defendant before a conviction will be reversed on the
ground that the trial judge should have been so disqualified.” Id. As a general
rule, prior adverse rulings by a judge against a party are not enough by
themselves to show bias or prejudice against that party. Voss v. State, 856
N.E.2d 1211, 1217 (Ind. 2006). As Williams recognizes, a trial court’s rejection
of a plea agreement also is not enough by itself to warrant a finding that the
judge is biased or prejudiced against the defendant. See Haynes v. State, 656
N.E.2d 505, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Hoover v. State, 582 N.E.2d 403, 410 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991) adopted by Hoover v. State, 589 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1992).
[12] Here, when he rejected the plea agreement, the judge stated his disagreement
that there should be concurrent sentences for murder and attempted murder.
The judge made this statement after Jester made her victim impact statement,
but also stated he was “uncomfortable” with the plea even before that. App.
Vol. IV p. 209. In Ellis v. State, 744 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 2001), our supreme court
addressed the propriety of a trial court’s rejection of a plea agreement under
similar circumstances. In that case, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to four
counts of rape for separate incidents. The plea agreement provided that all the
sentences would be served concurrently. However, after hearing the victim
impact testimony of one of the victims, the trial court rejected the plea
agreement and said that it would accept a plea agreement only if it provided for
consecutive sentences with respect to that victim. Our supreme court found no
impropriety in the trial court’s action and held that it did not render the
defendant’s subsequent guilty plea involuntary. Ellis, 744 N.E.2d at 429-30.
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[13] The Ellis opinion did not directly analyze whether the trial judge’s rejection of
the original plea agreement for being too lenient indicated bias or prejudice on
the judge’s part. It did observe, however:
[A] court may offer guidance as to what sentence it might find
marginally acceptable, taking into account a presentence report
prepared by the probation department. The message must not, of
course, carry any express or implied threat that the defendant
may be denied a fair trial or punished by a severe sentence if he
or she declines to plead guilty.
Ellis, 744 N.E.2d at 430. We do not believe the judge here crossed the line into
threatening Williams with an unfair trial or severe sentence when he rejected
the plea agreement.2 Rather, he provided guidance as to what kind of plea he
would find acceptable. In doing so, the judge acted properly and did not
demonstrate actual bias or prejudice against Williams. As such, the judge was
under no mandate to sua sponte recuse himself from the case.
Conclusion
[14] The trial court did not clearly err in denying Williams’s motion for change of
judge. We affirm his convictions.
[15] Affirmed.
2
The trial judge did end up imposing what might be described as a severe sentence against Williams, but he
did not threaten Williams with such a sentence when he rejected the plea agreement.
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May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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