Tyler Bishop Smiley v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Nov 14 2017, 9:56 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Brooklyn, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyler Bishop Smiley, November 14, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
70A01-1706-CR-1394
v. Appeal from the Rush Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Brian D. Hill, Jr.,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
70D01-1605-F5-386
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Following a jury trial, Tyler Smiley was convicted of possession of
methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony. On appeal, Smiley argues that the State
presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] The facts most favorable to the conviction follow. On September 25, 2015,
undercover narcotics officer Alan Wombolt of the Rushville Police Department
received information from a confidential informant (CI) that Dustin Messer was
looking to sell methamphetamine.1 Officer Wombolt and the CI set up a
controlled buy to purchase one gram of methamphetamine for $120 from
Messer. The CI made arrangements for Officer Wombolt to meet Messer at a
local Village Pantry. Prior to the controlled buy, Officer Wombolt made copies
of the buy money and put on a listening device. Detective Alex Shaver also
participated in the controlled buy by conducting surveillance from a vehicle
positioned so that he could watch the transaction.
[4] Around 3:45 p.m., Officer Wombolt rode a bicycle to the Village Pantry, and
when he arrived, he saw Messer standing outside. Officer Wombolt
approached Messer and gave him $120. After Messer took the money, he told
Officer Wombolt that he had to go to the silver car behind him “to get the meth
1
Officer Wombolt had previously dealt with Messer during a controlled buy of hydrocodone pills.
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from his dude.” Transcript at 19. According to Messer, he did not have
methamphetamine to sell, so he called Smiley, who agreed to meet him at the
Village Pantry to give him methamphetamine.
[5] As Messer walked over to the silver vehicle, Officer Wombolt noted that there
were three male individuals in the car, one of whom he recognized as Smiley,
who was sitting in the front passenger seat. Detective Shaver also recognized
Smiley as the front-seat passenger. Messer knew all three occupants of the car,
although he testified that he expected to see only Smiley.
[6] Messer entered the vehicle from the rear passenger side. Messer testified that
after he got into the car, Smiley, who was “kind of tripped out”, reached into
the back of the car and tried to grab his chest to check for a wire. Transcript Vol.
II at 61. Messer also testified that Smiley questioned him as to whether he had
dealt with Officer Wombolt before. After Messer explained that he had prior
involvement with Officer Wombolt, Messer gave the money he received from
Officer Wombolt to the individual sitting in the back seat of the car. That
individual then gave the methamphetamine to Messer.
[7] While Messer was in the car, Officer Wombolt observed the occupants of the
vehicle turn to the center of the vehicle and engage in a conversation. A minute
or so later, Messer exited the car, walked over to Officer Wombolt, and handed
him a small, clear baggie that contained a “crystal-like rock substance” that was
later determined to be methamphetamine. Transcript Vol. II at 21.
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[8] On May 25, 2016, the State charged Smiley with dealing in methamphetamine
as a Level 5 felony and possession of methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony. A
jury trial was held on May 9, 2017, at the conclusion of which the jury found
Smiley not guilty of dealing in methamphetamine but guilty of possession of
methamphetamine. Smiley was sentenced to eighteen months, with one year to
be served on home detention and six months of probation. Additional facts will
be provided as necessary.
Discussion & Decision
[9] Smiley argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
possession of methamphetamine conviction. In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the
credibility of witnesses. Atteberry v. State, 911 N.E.2d 601, 609 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence supporting the conviction and
the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence
of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the
conclusion that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be disturbed. Baumgartner v. State, 891
N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[10] It is not necessary, however, that the evidence overcome every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may
reasonably be drawn from it to support the conviction. Drane v. State, 867
N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007). “A verdict may be sustained based on
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circumstantial evidence alone if that circumstantial evidence supports a
reasonable inference of guilt.” Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000).
Although presence at a crime scene alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction,
presence combined with other facts and circumstances, including the
defendant’s course of conduct before, during, and after the offense, may raise a
reasonable inference of guilt. Id.
[11] Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1 provides that “[a] person who, without a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner’s
professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses methamphetamine
(pure or adulterated) commits possession of methamphetamine.” To prove
these elements, the State is required to show that the defendant had either
actual or constructive possession of the methamphetamine. On appeal, Smiley
argues that the State failed to establish his constructive possession of the
methamphetamine. The State argues that Smiley’s argument is misplaced
because it “ignore[s] Smiley’s liability based on his role as an accomplice.”
Appellee’s Brief at 10.
[12] Instead of trying to prove that Smiley constructively possessed
methamphetamine, the State presented evidence to show that Smiley was guilty
of the charged conduct based on accomplice liability. Indeed, upon the State’s
request, the jury was instructed on accomplice liability. Under accomplice
liability, an individual is guilty of an offense if he “knowingly or intentionally
aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense.” Ind. Code § 35-
41-2-4. Under this statute, an individual who aids another person in
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committing a crime is as guilty as the actual perpetrator. Specht v. State, 838
N.E.2d 1081, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. The statute does not set
forth a separate crime, but merely provides a separate basis of liability for the
crime that is charged. Id. at 1092. Thus, a person can be charged as a principal
and convicted as an accomplice. Id.
[13] Furthermore, a person can be convicted as an accomplice even if he did not
participate in each and every element of the crime. Id. at 1093. Our Supreme
Court has identified four factors that can be considered by the fact-finder in
determining whether a defendant aided another in the commission of a crime:
(1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another engaged
in a crime; (3) failure to oppose the commission of the crime; and (4) the course
of conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime. Wieland v.
State, 736 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (Ind. 2000).
[14] It is undisputed that Smiley was at the scene of the controlled buy. Officer
Wombolt, Detective Shaver, and Messer all identified Smiley as the individual
in the front passenger seat of the car that Messer entered to obtain the
methamphetamine. The record also reveals that Messer and Smiley had known
each other for years, and when Messer needed to obtain methamphetamine, he
contacted Smiley and they agreed to meet at the Village Pantry so that Messer
could obtain the methamphetamine to sell to Officer Wombolt. Smiley’s
conduct of checking Messer for a wire and questioning Messer about previous
interactions with Officer Wombolt before Messer handed over the money and
obtained the methamphetamine from the backseat passenger lead to a
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reasonable inference that Smiley was aware of what was taking place and took
measures to keep from being caught. Thereafter, Smiley did nothing to oppose
the exchange of money and methamphetamine between Messer and the
backseat passenger.
[15] Even though Smiley did not participate in the exchange, Messer’s actual
possession of methamphetamine would not have occurred but for Smiley’s
involvement. As noted above, Messer did not have methamphetamine to sell to
Officer Wombolt, so he contacted Smiley to obtain methamphetamine. Smiley
showed up at the Village Pantry with two other individuals that Messer did not
anticipate being with Smiley and one of those individuals gave Messer
methamphetamine. This evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn therefrom sufficiently prove that Smiley knowingly or intentionally
aided, induced, or caused Messer to possess methamphetamine. 2 Cf. Schaaf v.
State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1043-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (affirming a dealing
conviction on the basis of accomplice liability where defendant, who did not
participate in the transaction, was present at the scene, suggested the meeting
2
Contrary to Smiley’s argument in his reply brief, the jury’s not-guilty verdict on the dealing charge did not
preclude his conviction as an accomplice on the possession charge. Although the verdicts may seem
inconsistent, such claims are not subject to appellate review. See McWhorter v. State, 993 N.E.2d 1141, 1146
(Ind. 2013). Instead, we tolerate inconsistent verdicts, acknowledging that they conceivably could be “‘due
to a compromise among disagreeing jurors, or to expeditiously conclude a lengthy deliberation, or to avoid
an all-or-nothing verdict, or for other reasons.’” Id. (quoting Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind.
2010)). Accordingly, the fact that the jury acquitted Smiley of the dealing charge is immaterial to the
question of whether there was sufficient evidence to find him guilty of possession of methamphetamine on
the basis of accomplice liability.
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place for the drug transaction, and sat calmly as the exchange occurred in his
truck).
[16] Judgment affirmed.
Baker, J. and Bailey, J., concur.
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