Scott K. Jordan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 16 2017, 11:15 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stanley L. Campbell Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Scott K. Jordan, May 16, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A05-1612-CR-2780
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Frances C. Gull,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1607-MR-2
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Scott K. Jordan (Jordan), appeals his sentence following
his conviction for murder, a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Jordan raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether
Jordan’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his
character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
[4] In March of 2016, the family of Jacqueline Vanduyn (Vanduyn) contacted the
Fort Wayne Police Department (FWPD) to report that Vanduyn, a resident of
Fort Wayne, Allen County, Indiana, was missing. On April 19, 2016, the
FWPD interviewed the property manager at Vanduyn’s apartment complex,
who stated that she had previously been informed of the missing person’s report
by Vanduyn’s family. As a result of the family’s inquiry, the property manager
had gone to Vanduyn’s apartment to locate her. However, it was Vanduyn’s
boyfriend, Jordan, who answered the door and indicated that Vanduyn was at
1
Both Jordan and the State have relied upon the Probable Cause Affidavit to set forth a recitation of the
facts; we now do the same. The Probable Cause Affidavit, which was not introduced as evidence but was
attached to the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and included as part of the record, has been included in the
confidential version of Jordan’s appendix. To the extent that it contains information that is excluded from
public access, we note that discussion of the contents therein is essential to the resolution of this matter. Ind.
Administrative Rule 9(G)(7)(a)(ii)(c).
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work. Because Jordan was not listed on the lease and was in possession of the
sole key issued for Vanduyn’s apartment, the property manager ordered him to
leave the apartment and immediately had the lock changed. The property
manager further explained to the FWPD that she received a money order for
Vanduyn’s rent on April 1, 2016, but the signature on the money order differed
from Vanduyn’s signature on the lease and prior rent checks.
[5] The FWPD subsequently interviewed Jordan, who was incarcerated at the
Allen County Jail following his recent arrest for a robbery at a pharmacy.
Jordan stated that Vanduyn had kicked him out of her apartment in March of
2016, at which time she had also moved out. However, Jordan claimed that
Vanduyn instructed him to pay her rent on April 1, so he obtained a money
order, signed her name, and deposited it at the apartment complex’s office. The
FWPD also reviewed surveillance footage from outside Vanduyn’s apartment
complex. Although Vanduyn had a consistent routine in “coming and going
from the apartment daily,” after she entered her apartment on March 6, 2016,
she was not seen again. (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11).
[6] On April 25, 2016, the FWPD obtained a search warrant for Vanduyn’s
apartment. Upon opening the door, officers detected the odor of a decaying
corpse. In a closet, the officers discovered a black plastic bag, which “appeared
to have blood coming out of it.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11). Once
the coroner arrived, the bag was opened, and Vanduyn’s body was observed to
be “face down inside.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11). It appeared that
Vanduyn had been “deceased for some time and her legs were tied together and
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her mouth was taped shut.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11). In
addition, Vanduyn’s body was covered with numerous water bottles, and
officers found more than twenty frozen water bottles in the freezer. The officers
deduced that “someone had been exchanging frozen bottles of water on
[Vanduyn’s body] in an attempt to keep her cold, thus decreasing the
decomposition of the body.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 11).
[7] On May 3, 2016, Vivian Jordan, a resident of Lakeland, Florida, contacted the
Allen County Sheriff’s Department to report that she had received a letter from
her son, Jordan, in which he had confessed to killing Vanduyn. The letter was
forwarded to the FWPD. Upon review of the letter, the FWPD discovered that
Jordan had admitted that he caused Vanduyn’s death by “getting on top of her
and choking the life outta her” and added that he “got so mad that I killed her.”
(Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 12). On June 23, 2016, Vanduyn’s autopsy
results established that the cause of her death “was asphyxia due to
strangulation and suffocation.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p. 12).
[8] On July 8, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Jordan with Count I,
murder, a felony, I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1); and Count II, altering the scene of death
of a person, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 36-2-14-17(b). At a hearing on October 14,
2016, Jordan pled guilty to the murder charge without the benefit of a plea
agreement. At the State’s request, the trial court dismissed Count II of the
Information concerning Jordan’s alteration of the crime scene. With respect to
a factual basis for the plea, Jordan simply admitted that sometime between
March 6, 2016, and April 19, 2016, during which period he lived in Vanduyn’s
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apartment, he “knowingly or intentionally killed” her. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 10). The
trial court accepted Jordan’s guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction.
On November 8, 2016, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and ordered
Jordan to execute sixty-five years in the Indiana Department of Correction,
with said sentence to run consecutive to Jordan’s sentences in other cases.
[9] Jordan now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[10] Jordan claims that his sixty-five-year sentence is inappropriate. It is well
established that “‘sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the
trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.’” Parks v. State, 22
N.E.3d 552, 555 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222
(Ind. 2008)). Yet, even if a trial court imposes a sentence that is authorized by
statute, our court may revise the sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial
court’s decision, [we] find[] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule
7(B).
[11] Appellate Rule 7(B) provides for sentence review in an “attempt to leaven the
outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged
with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived
‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. Ultimately,
“whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our
sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage
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done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id.
at 1224. On review, we focus on “the length of the aggregate sentence and how
it is to be served.” Id. Jordan bears the burden of persuading this court that his
sentence is inappropriate. Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014).
[12] With respect to the nature of the offense, “the advisory sentence is the starting
point [that] our legislature has selected as [an] appropriate sentence for the
crime committed.” Richardson v. State, 906 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494, clarified on reh’g, 875
N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). The advisory sentence for murder is fifty-five years,
with a maximum sentence of sixty-five years and a minimum term of forty-five
years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a). Here, the trial court, in imposing the maximum
sentence permitted by statute, described the circumstances of the murder as
“[e]xtraordinarily egregious” and “reprehensible.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 10). On
appeal, Jordan asserts that his strangulation of Vanduyn is no more egregious
than any other murder, such that the trial court should have ordered the
advisory term of fifty-five years.
[13] The record reveals that, in an apparent fit of anger, Jordan strangled and
suffocated Vanduyn. Whether done before or after the murder, Jordan also
bound Vanduyn’s legs and taped her mouth shut. He then stuffed her into a
plastic bag, which he stowed in a closet in Vanduyn’s apartment. For several
weeks thereafter, Jordan used frozen water bottles in an effort to keep
Vanduyn’s body from decomposing while he continued to live in her apartment
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and present a façade to Vanduyn’s family and others that she was simply
temporarily unavailable. To the extent that Jordan now argues that his conduct
following Vanduyn’s murder (i.e., his efforts to conceal her death) is irrelevant
as a consideration for his murder sentence in light of the fact that his charge for
altering the crime scene was dismissed at the time of his guilty plea, we note
that “we may look to any factors appearing in the record” in considering the
appropriateness of a sentence. Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011). 2 “The nature of the offenses is found in the details and circumstances of
the commission of the offenses and the defendant’s participation.” Id.
Notwithstanding that Jordan was not specifically convicted of altering the crime
scene as initially charged, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
murder are highly relevant to the nature of the offense as a whole.
[14] As to Jordan’s character, the record reveals nothing particularly redeemable
that would warrant anything less than the maximum sentence imposed by the
trial court. Although Jordan pled guilty without the benefit of a plea
agreement, the trial court found that Jordan had never expressed any genuine
remorse for his conduct. Moreover, Jordan’s extensive criminal history is
2
Jordan also appears to assert that the trial court improperly considered his post-murder conduct as an
aggravating factor in his sentence for murder. The consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
is a matter left to the trial court’s discretion. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 489-91. As our court has previously
stated, “inappropriate sentence and abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately.” King v. State,
894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). Accordingly, because
Jordan has failed to present a separate, cogent argument with the appropriate standard of review regarding
the trial court’s sentencing discretion, we find that he has waived the issue for appellate review. See Ind.
Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)-(b).
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illustrative of his poor character. Dating back to 1990, when he was just
nineteen years old, Jordan’s criminal record includes nine misdemeanor
convictions and sixteen felony convictions, which he accumulated in three
different states. Among others, Jordan’s convictions include misdemeanors for
battery, resisting arrest, conversion, and criminal trespass; and felonies for
burglary, robbery, theft, forgery, and selling methamphetamine. Jordan has
had his probation revoked on four occasions and has had a suspended sentence
modified. Despite claiming substance abuse issues, Jordan has never
participated in substance abuse treatment even though he has had ample
opportunity to do so while incarcerated. Furthermore, according to the Pre-
Sentence Investigation Report, Jordan had been unemployed for several years
and sold illegal drugs to earn money. Thus, it is clear that all prior efforts to
rehabilitate Jordan and persuade him to lead a law-abiding life have failed. As
the trial court aptly noted, Jordan will likely spend the rest of his life in prison
as a result of his own poor choices. Accordingly, we cannot say that Jordan’s
sentence is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
[15] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Jordan’s sixty-five-year sentence is
not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
[16] Affirmed.
[17] Najam, J. and Bradford, J. concur
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