Brandenburg Industrial Service Company, an Illinois corporation v. Indiana Department of State Revenue

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER: ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
RANDAL J. KALTENMARK GREGORY F. ZOELLER
ZIAADDIN MOLLABASHY INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
BARNES & THORNBURG, LLP JOHN P. LOWREY
Indianapolis, IN ANDREW T. GREIN
DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL
MARK S. BERNSTEIN Indianapolis, IN
AKERMAN LLP
Chicago, IL
FILED
Aug 10 2016, 4:12 pm
IN THE CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
INDIANA TAX COURT Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
BRANDENBURG INDUSTRIAL SERVICE )
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Cause No. 49T10-1206-TA-00037
)
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF STATE )
REVENUE, )
)
Respondent. )
ORDER ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR PUBLICATION
August 10, 2016
WENTWORTH, J.
Brandenburg Industrial Service Company has appealed the Indiana Department
of State Revenue’s denials of its claims for a refund of the sales and use tax remitted in
2006 and 2007 as well as its assessments of sales and use tax for the same period (the
period at issue). The matter is currently before the Court on the Department’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and presents one issue for the Court to decide.1 The
Court restates the issue as whether Brandenburg was a producer of scrap steel eligible
for exemption under Indiana Code § 6-2.5-5-3 (the Equipment Exemption) and Indiana
Code § 6-2.5-5-5.1 (the Consumption Exemption) during the period at issue.2 Upon
review, the Court finds in favor of Brandenburg.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Brandenburg is an Illinois corporation that primarily processes and sells ferrous
and non-ferrous metal to steel manufacturers throughout the United States. (See Pet’r
Des’g Evid., Aff. Jack Jasinowski (“Jasinowski Aff.”) ¶¶ 27-28, 48.) Brandenburg
engages in related businesses that provide access to the metal it processes and sells
from its facilities in Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Puerto Rico, such as the
demolition of retired assets, environmental remediation (e.g., asbestos abatement, soil
remediation, or hazardous material removal), and site preparation. (See Pet’r Des’g
Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 27-28, 30-32; Resp’t Des’g Evid., About the Company,
BRANDENBURG.COM, http://www.brandenburg.com/AboutTheCompany.aspx (last visited
Apr. 29, 2016).) Brandenburg’s Indiana facility is located inside the United States Steel
Corporation’s Gary Works steel mill and is comprised of a scrap metal yard, a
fabrication shop, a data processing center, a technology department, and a receiving
department. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶ 27.)
1
The issues not before the Court in this matter concern Brandenburg’s eligibility for exemption
under Indiana Code § 6-2.5-3-2 (the Temporary Storage Exemption) as well as the propriety,
timeliness, and constitutionality of the Department’s actions under Indiana Code § 6-8.1-3-3,
Indiana Code § 6-8.1-5-2, and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. (See
Pet’r First Am. Pet. Refund Sales & Use Tax ¶¶ 40-62.)
2
The parties have designated evidence that contains confidential information. Accordingly, the
Court will only provide that information necessary for the reader to understand its disposition of
the issue presented. See generally Ind. Administrative Rule 9.
2
Brandenburg acquires the metal that it processes either by directly purchasing
retired assets (e.g., boats, machinery, or railroad scrap) or by performing services in its
related businesses, such as building demolition or environmental remediation, in
exchange for the metal. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 34-37; Resp’t Des’g
Evid., Ex. 9 (“L. Jasinowski Depo.”) at 15-16.) (See also Resp’t Des’g Evid., Ex. 12 at
3837-38, Ex. 13 at 3871-72, Ex. 15 at 3882-83 (sample contract excerpts).) Since
1993, Brandenburg has processed the metal using the following seven-step process:
1. Identification: Identify the location, quantity, and alloy
content/chemistry of the metal by reviewing pertinent
documentation, visually inspecting the metal, and using a
portable spectrometer;
2. Removal: Remove the metal from the retired asset/building by
either surgically extracting it from the object or demolishing the
object and removing the metal from the debris;
3. Decontamination: Remove contaminants, such as concrete,
brick, wood, or insulation, from the metal retrieved in Step 2;
4. Cutting: Reduce the oversized pieces of decontaminated metal
for further transporting and processing by cutting the metal to
more manageable sizes;
5. Sorting: Separate the cut metal into various categories of
ferrous (e.g., No. 1 heavy melt or plate and structural steel) and
non-ferrous (e.g., copper, brass, nickel, aluminum, or stainless
steel) metal;
6. Preparation: Ensure the metals sorted in Step 5 meet
customer specifications, which may require additional size,
shape, or thickness alterations as well as additional sorting; and
7. Staging: Stockpile the prepared metals in specific locations for
future loading and transport to customers.
(See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 38-47, 51, 59-65, Exs. S-T.) (See also Resp’t
Des’g Evid., Ex. 8 (“J. Jasinowski Depo.”) at 84-85, 93-100.)
3
In December of 2009 and 2010, Brandenburg filed four refund claims with the
Department in which it asserted that several items it used in processing metal were
exempt from sales and use tax under the Equipment and Consumption Exemptions.
(See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 8-9, 19-20, Exs. A-B, K-L.) The Department
ultimately denied all four of Brandenburg’s refund claims by, among other things,
issuing Proposed Assessments that in effect rescinded its prior approval of two of the
four claims. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 10-15, 21-22, Exs. C-H, M-N.)
Brandenburg protested the Department’s denials of its refund claims and the Proposed
Assessments, which the Department subsequently denied. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid.,
Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 16-17, 23-26, Exs. I-J, O-Q.)
On June 22, 2012, Brandenburg initiated this original tax appeal. On November
16, 2015, after the Court resolved a procedural matter,3 the Department moved for
partial summary judgment and designated, among other things, its Proposed
Assessments as evidence. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid., Exs. 1G-1H.) On April 21, 2016,
the Court held a hearing on the Department’s Motion. Additional facts will be supplied
when necessary.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper only when the designated evidence demonstrates
that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a
fact concerning an issue that would dispose of the case is in dispute or when the
undisputed material facts support conflicting inferences regarding the resolution of an
3
See Brandenburg Indus. Serv. Co. v. Indiana Dep’t State Revenue, 26 N.E.3d 147 (Ind. Tax
Ct. 2015) (denying in part and granting in part Brandenburg’s motion to compel).
4
issue. Miller Pipeline Corp. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 995 N.E.2d 733, 734 n.1
(Ind. Tax Ct. 2013). “When any party has moved for summary judgment, the court may
grant summary judgment for any other party upon the issues raised by the motion
although no motion for summary judgment is filed by such party.” T.R. 56(B).
LAW
During the period at issue, Indiana imposed a sales tax on retail transactions
made in Indiana. IND. CODE § 6-2.5-2-1(a) (2006). Indiana also imposed a use tax
when sales tax was not remitted on tangible personal property that was acquired in a
retail transaction and was subsequently stored, used, or consumed in Indiana,
regardless of where the retail transaction occurred or where the retail merchant was
located. See IND. CODE § 6-2.5-3-2(a) (2006). See also Horseshoe Hammond, LLC v.
Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 865 N.E.2d 725, 727 n.4 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2007) (providing
that the use tax is complementary to the sales tax because it is designed to reach out-
of-state purchases of tangible personal property that are subsequently used in Indiana),
review denied.
Indiana also exempted certain retail transactions by the producers of goods from
the imposition of sales and use tax (the Manufacturing Exemptions). See, e.g., Harlan
Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (Ind.
Tax Ct. 1992); IND. CODE § 6-2.5-3-4(a) (2006). For example, the Equipment Exemption
exempted transactions involving manufacturing machinery, tools, and equipment from
sales and use tax “if the person acquiring that property acquire[d] it for direct use in the
direct production, manufacture, fabrication, assembly, extraction, mining, processing,
refining, or finishing of other tangible personal property.” IND. CODE § 6-2.5-5-3(b)
5
(2006) (amended 2007). Likewise, the Consumption Exemption exempted transactions
from sales and use tax “if the person acquiring the property acquire[d] it for direct
consumption as a material to be consumed in the direct production of other tangible
personal property in the person’s business of manufacturing, processing, refining,
repairing, mining, agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, or arboriculture.” IND. CODE § 6-
2.5-5-5.1(b) (2006).
ANALYSIS
The question before the Court is whether Brandenburg was a producer of scrap
steel during the period at issue. The parties do not dispute where Brandenburg’s
process begins and ends, the absence of a chemically induced change in its raw
material metals, or the marketability of its scrap metal end product. (See, e.g., Resp’t
Reply Supp. Resp’t Mot. Summ. J. (“Resp’t Reply Br.”) at 3-5; Hr’g Tr. at 36-37, 48-51.)
The Department’s claim for partial summary judgment focuses on whether
Brandenburg’s process 1) falls within the scope of the Equipment and Consumption
Exemptions and 2) substantially transforms its raw materials into new, marketable
goods, i.e., produces “other tangible personal property.” (Compare, e.g., Resp’t Mem.
Supp. Partial Summ. J. (“Resp’t Mem.”) at 5-7, 9-16 and Hr’g Tr. at 7-15 with Pet’r
Resp. Resp’t Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“Pet’r Resp. Br.”) at 19-20, 26-30 and Hr’g Tr. at
55-60.)
(1)
The Department claims that it is entitled to partial summary judgment because
Brandenburg’s demolition process is not an activity that is expressly stated in either the
Equipment or the Consumption Exemption statutes. (See Resp’t Mem. at 5-9.) The
6
Department explains that each exemption statute contains a specific list of activities that
is “a ‘comprehensive description of [the] various means of production[,]’” and the
absence of an activity from either list “indicates that the activity probably is not
production.” (Resp’t Mem. at 6-7 (citation omitted).) As a result, the Department
asserts that because Brandenburg’s demolition activities are not specifically listed
exempt activities and are “inextricable” from its seven metal processing steps,
Brandenburg is simply not engaged in production within the meaning or scope of either
exemption as a matter of law.4 (See Resp’t Mem. at 6-7.)
Previously, this Court has explained that the lists of activities set forth in the
Equipment and Consumption Exemption statutes are an illustrative rather than an
exhaustive list of activities capable of transforming tangible personal property into a
new, marketable product. See, e.g., Rotation Prods. Corp. v. Dep’t of State Revenue,
690 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998) (explaining that a taxpayer’s eligibility for
manufacturing exemptions, like those at issue here, is not based on whether its
operations or activities fit within one of the listed terms). Indeed, when the Indiana
Supreme Court first examined the predecessor to the Equipment and Consumption
Exemptions over thirty years ago, it interpreted the juxtaposition of the various activities
expansively because a broad interpretation was the only way to give effect to the
4
The Department has also claimed that Indiana Code § 6-2.5-5-45.8 (the Recycling
Exemption), which exempts comparable transactions from sales and use tax, supports its
position because it expressly excludes demolition activities from the scope of that exemption.
(See Resp’t Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J. (“Resp’t Mem.”) at 7-9.) Moreover, the Department
claims that the 2015 amendment to the Equipment Exemption demonstrates that merely cutting
metal is outside the scope of the exemptions as a matter of law. (See Resp’t Mem. at 12-13;
Resp’t Reply Supp. Resp’t Mot. Summ. J. (“Resp’t Reply Br.”) at 5-8.) The Court finds the
Department’s reliance on these two statutory provisions tenuous at best, considering that
neither was in effect during the period at issue. See P.L. 137-2012, § 50; P.L. 250-2015, § 10.
Accordingly, the Court will not address either claim in resolving this issue.
7
Legislature’s intent of removing the burden of intermediate tax incidents from a taxpayer
that increases the number of scarce economic goods. See Indiana Dep’t of State
Revenue v. Cave Stone, Inc., 457 N.E.2d 520, 523-24 (Ind. 1983).
Keeping this scope in mind, this Court has issued a plethora of decisions that
focus on whether the facts in each case demonstrate that the taxpayer’s integrated
process transforms raw materials into new, marketable products. Indeed, the Court has
consistently examined whether a taxpayer’s integrated series of operations caused a
substantial change or transformation in tangible personal property by placing it in a
“form, composition, or character different from that in which it was acquired,” i.e., a new
product.5 See, e.g., Indianapolis Fruit Co. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 691
N.E.2d 1379, 1383-86 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998); Rotation Prods., 690 N.E.2d at 800-02;
Mechanics Laundry & Supply, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 650 N.E.2d 1223,
1229-31 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995); Harlan Sprague Dawley, 605 N.E.2d at 1226-29. See also
45 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.2-5-8(k) (2006) (see http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac). The Court
finds no reason to depart from this well-established method of analysis in favor of simply
matching a taxpayer’s activity to one of the examples identified in the Equipment or
Consumption Exemption statutes. Accordingly, the Department is not entitled to partial
summary judgment on this basis.
(2)
The Department also claims that it is entitled to partial summary judgment
because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Brandenburg’s seven-step
5
The Department has urged the Court to apply the four-part test set forth in Rotation Products
Corporation v. Department of State Revenue, 690 N.E.2d 795, 802-03 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998). (See
Resp’t Mem. at 14-16; Hr’g Tr. at 23-25.) The Court, however, need not apply that test to
resolve this matter.
8
process fails to create “other tangible personal property,” i.e., distinct, marketable
products. (See Resp’t Mem. at 9-16.) Specifically, the Department maintains that no
substantial transformation occurs at all because: a) Brandenburg’s process is
“fundamentally destructive;” and b) the metal has the same intrinsic value and specific
alloy content when it is part of a structure as it has after Brandenburg processes it.
(See, e.g., Resp’t Mem. at 15; Resp’t Reply Br. at 4-5.) Brandenburg responds,
however, that its multi-step process involves far more than demolition and substantially
transforms the metal debris it extracts from buildings and retired assets because the
metal is not useful or valuable until its seven-step process is completed. (See, e.g.,
Pet’r Resp. Br. at 11-13, 19-22; Hr’g Tr. at 57-64.)
(a) Brandenburg’s process
Throughout these proceedings, the Department has characterized Brandenburg’s
process as a single-step demolition process. (See, e.g., Resp’t Mem. at 7
(“Brandenburg’s process is inextricable from the demolition of a building”); Hr’g Tr. at 4
(“Today this Court confronts the issue of whether a demolition company is engaged in
exempt production when it destroys a building and sells a portion of the resultant
debris”).) Nonetheless, the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Brandenburg’s
multi-step process involves more activities than merely demolition. (See Pet’r Des’g
Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶¶ 38-46 (stating that demolition occurs only during the second
step of the process).) Additionally, Brandenburg’s Equipment Utilization Report, based
on time-lapsed photographs of Michigan, New York, and Tennessee jobsites and
corroborated by a statistician, indicates that Brandenburg’s metal processing and
9
demolition activities are distinct.6 (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Aff. Joseph E. Manzi, P.E. ¶¶
6-11, Ex. A; Aff. Stanley L. Sclove, Ph.D. ¶¶ 6-8, Ex. B.) Consequently, despite
Brandenburg’s admission that its metal processing and demolition activities are related
and “feed off of each other[,]” their interrelationship does not lead the Court to conclude
that Brandenburg’s seven-step process was subsumed by its demolition activities, as
the Department has urged. (See Resp’t Reply Br. at 3 (referring to Pet’r Des’g Evid.,
Jasinowski Aff. ¶ 34).)
(b) The metal’s intrinsic value and alloy content
The Department further supports its claim that Brandenburg does not make
“other tangible personal property” by asserting that the designated evidence shows that
the metal has the same value and alloy content both before and after Brandenburg’s
process. (See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 7-9, 14-19.) The Department first relies on the
testimony of Brandenburg’s secretary-treasurer, Lynn Jasinowski, stating that she
established that the processing of metal does not change its value. (See Resp’t Mem.
at 3, 15 (citing Resp’t Des’g Evid., L. Jasinowski Depo. at 57-58).) (See also Resp’t
Des’g Evid., L. Jasinowski Depo. at 8-9.) The designated portion of Ms. Jasinowski’s
deposition, however, contains information regarding only the extent of her knowledge on
the types of scrap steel Brandenburg sold, how customers used the scrap steel, the
general businesses of Brandenburg’s customers, and its contract negotiation/bidding
process. (See Resp’t Des’g Evid., L. Jasinowski Depo. at 57-58.) Consequently, Ms.
6
The Department has claimed the Equipment Utilization Report is not relevant because it was
derived from three non-Indiana jobsites and concerns dates beyond the period at issue. (See
Hr’g Tr. at 38-39.) The Report is relevant, however, to whether Brandenburg’s metal processing
and demolition activities are distinct regardless of their location because the parties do not
dispute that Brandenburg has used the same seven-step process at all of its jobsites since
1993. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Aff. Jack Jasinowski (“Jasinowski Aff.”) ¶ 38.)
10
Jasinowski’s deposition does not provide any information about the metal’s value or
support for the Department’s position.
In addition, both parties rely on the testimony of a steel manufacturing industry
expert, George William Knack. (See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 53-54, 83-84.) (See also Pet’r
Des’g Evid., Aff. George William Knack (“Knack Aff.”) ¶¶ 7-12.) The specifically
designated portions of Mr. Knack’s affidavit provide as follows:
37. Brandenburg’s role in the first stage is essential because
unprepared scrap with unidentified chemistry has no value to steel
manufacturers. As detailed above in paragraphs 26 to 33, a steel
manufacturer can only use clean steel scrap that meets certain
specifications. The length, width, thickness, cleanness, and alloy
content of steel scrap directly affect the usability of that steel scrap
as a raw material. Nonconformance with any of these
characteristics can render steel scrap unusable for the manufacture
of the intended steel products.
*****
39. The published value governing the rate per ton paid for
delivered scrap assumes a level of purity in its content. Scrap is a
purchased commodity, similar to other raw materials used in the
manufacture of raw steel. Prices per gross ton paid for various
sizes and metallic contents of scrap purchased are dictated by how
the scrap being purchased meets the parameters established in the
applicable Scrap Specifications Circular.7 Market prices paid for
various types of purchased scrap that comply with the applicable
Scrap Specifications Circular are issued monthly in two
publications. These two publications are “Iron Age” and “American
Metal Market”. To the best of my knowledge, during [the period at
issue] no steel manufacturer intentionally purchased scrap that was
unprepared or had an unknown chemistry. Scrap is a commodity,
similar to other purchased raw material, which is paid for by weight
when delivered to the steel maker.
40. A significant quantity of purchased scrap is “obsolete,”
7
The Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, Inc.’s (“ISRI”) annual published guidelines, the
Scrap Specifications Circular, provide buyers and sellers of various commodities with
internationally accepted, standardized specifications for the quality and composition of various
scrap metals. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶ 56; Aff. George William Knack ¶¶ 21-25,
Ex. B at 4354, Ex. C at 4407, Ex. D at 4464.)
11
meaning that it had a previous life as part of a building, bridge,
road, or other structure. Contaminants such as brick, cement,
wood, and drywall, if delivered with the scrap, would add excess
weight to a scrap shipment and make it impossible to establish a
fair weight on which to base payment for the scrap.
41. Further, during [the period at issue], new steel manufacturers
did not have the capacity or the economic desire to perform the
work necessary to generate an acceptable scrap product. Instead,
steel manufacturers relied upon third party companies such as
Brandenburg, which is ISO 9001 certified,8 to perform these tasks
and ultimately supply processed scrap steel in accordance with [the
Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, Inc.’s (“ISRI”)] guidelines. In
fact, it was a requirement for companies such as US Steel that any
scrap purchased conform to ISRI guidelines and be from an ISO
9001 certified or equivalent company.
(See Hr’g Tr. at 53-54, 83-84 and Pet’r Resp. Br. at 11 (citing Pet’r Des’g Evid., Knack
Aff. ¶¶ 37, 39-41) (footnotes added).) Collectively, this testimony does not support the
Department’s position that Brandenburg does not produce a new product, but merely
releases the intrinsic value of the extracted metal. Instead, as Brandenburg claims, this
expert testimony explains that the extracted metal is obsolete, valueless, and
unmarketable until Brandenburg transforms it into the end product Brandenburg
markets -- scrap steel. Accordingly, the Court not only finds that the designated
evidence fails to support the Department’s claim that Brandenburg’s process does not
transform the metal’s value, but also finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact
that Brandenburg’s process substantially transforms the metal from obsolete, valueless,
and unmarketable debris into newly marketable scrap steel.
Finally, the Department has asserted that Brandenburg has not met its burden to
8
While the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) publishes guidelines to
standardize certain practices within the steel manufacturing industry, it does not determine
whether a company is ISO compliant (i.e., ISO-certified). (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff.
¶¶ 48-50.) Instead, a third party company issues the certification after auditing and reviewing an
applicant company’s practices and procedures. (See Pet’r Des’g Evid., Jasinowski Aff. ¶ 50.)
12
show that it produces a new or distinct product because the price of the scrap steel,
whether encased in cement or not, is solely dictated by its weight and alloy content.
(See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. at 23-25, 32-36, 82-86.) The fact that the price of scrap metal is
based on certain immutable characteristics such as its weight or alloy content does not
mean, however, that encumbered metal and unencumbered metal are identical. To
focus just on weight and alloy content as the sole measure of whether raw materials are
substantially transformed would ignore other evidence of transformation. Logic dictates
that a copper wire encased within a cement block is different from a copper wire without
the encumbrance of debris, that sorted metal is different from unsorted metal, and that
long lengths of metal are different from shorter, cut lengths of metal.
Court precedent has recognized these logical conclusions finding that the measure of
whether a process transforms property inputs into other tangible personal property is
whether a taxpayer’s integrated production process yields a product that enters the
marketplace. See, e.g., Harlan Sprague Dawley, 605 N.E.2d 1227-29 (distinguishing
between rats based on their marketability); White River Envtl. P’ship v. Dep’t of State
Revenue, 694 N.E.2d 1248, 1251-52 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998) (denying an exemption not
because water inputs resulted in water outputs, but because the water outputs were not
sold); Rotation Prods., 690 N.E.2d at 802-03 (exempting items used to remanufacture
roller bearings because the repaired roller bearings were marketable). Brandenburg’s
designated evidence demonstrates that its seven-step process transformed non-
marketable metal into marketable scrap steel that it sold. See supra pp. 3, 9-12.
Therefore, the Court finds that Brandenburg produced scrap steel and is thereby
entitled to the Equipment and Consumption Exemptions during the period at issue.
13
CONCLUSION
When, as here, all of the reasonable inferences arising from the undisputed
material facts lead to but one conclusion, the Court may grant summary judgment to
either party on the issues raised in the motion. See, e.g., Popovich v. Indiana Dep’t of
State Revenue, 52 N.E.3d 73, 77-78 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2016). Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS partial summary judgment to Brandenburg. The Court will direct the parties
regarding all other remaining matters by separate cover.
SO ORDERED this 10th day of August 2016.
Martha Blood Wentworth, Judge
Indiana Tax Court
Distribution: Randal J. Kaltenmark, Ziaaddin Mollabashy, Mark S. Bernstein, John P.
Lowrey, Andrew T. Grein.
14