DocketNumber: No. 71T10-9703-TA-00139
Citation Numbers: 683 N.E.2d 1379
Judges: Fisher
Filed Date: 8/13/1997
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
St. Joseph County, Indiana (County) appeals a final decision of the State Board of Tax Commissioners (State Board) requiring it to proceed with petition-remonstrance procedures before continuing with its project to construct a new jail. See Ind.Code Ann. § 6-1.1-20-3.2 (West Supp.1996). The parties do not dispute the facts of the ease and both parties have filed motions for summary judgment. The County argues that the jail project is not a “controlled project” as defined by Ind.Code Ann. § 6-1.1-20-1.1 (West Supp.1996), and is therefore not subject to petition-remonstrance procedures. The specific contention of the County is that the jail project fits within an exception to the definition of a “controlled project” which excludes those projects, “required by a court order holding that a federal law mandates the project.” Ind.Code Ann. § 6-1.1-20-1.1(5). This Court, holding that the jail project is not a “controlled project,” REVERSES the final determination of the State Board and GRANTS summary judgment in favor of the County.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The lengthy history surrounding this case begins with several suits filed by past and present inmates of the St. Joseph County Jail complaining of overcrowding, substandard conditions, and various violations of U.S. Constitutional rights, particularly those protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. These suits, which sought $48,000,000 in damages and the construction of a new jail, were consolidated into class action litigation by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division (Jail Case).
ANALYSIS AND OPINION
Standard of Review
This Court gives the decisions of the State Board great deference so long as the Board acts within the scope of its authority. Bender v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 676 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (Ind.Tax Ct.1997). As such, final determinations by the State Board are only reversed by this Court when the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, constitutes an abuse of discretion, or exceeds statutory authority. Id. at 1113-14. Cross motions for summary judgment do not alter this standard. Roehl Transp., Inc. v. Department of State Revenue, 653 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind.Tax Ct.1995).
Discussion
Pursuant to Indiana law, any “controlled project” using property taxes to pay a debt service or lease rental is required to go through a petition-remonstrance process.
A “controlled project” is any project, “financed by bonds or a lease, except for the following: ... (5) A project that is required by a court order holding that federal law mandates the project.” Ind.Code Ann. § 6-1.1-20-1.1. The sole issue presented for this Court’s review is whether the jail project fits within the exception provided in subsection (5) (the Exception) and is thus not a “controlled project.” The three basic elements that must be shown to fit within the Exception are: (1) a court order; (2) requires the project; and (3) holds that federal law mandates the project. The County satisfies each portion of this test.
The first portion of the test is whether there is a court order.' In a typical case, the answer to this question would seem obvious. Either there is a court order or there is not. Here, however, this simple proposition has been elevated to a point of contention. The State Board argues that the Consent Decree
The UMted States Supreme Court has discussed the force of consent decrees. In the case of Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 16, 89 L.Ed. 3 (1944), the Supreme Court stated that rendering judgment on consent is, “a judicial function and an exercise of the judicial power.” Id. at 12, 65 S.Ct. at 22. As recently as 1992, the Supreme Court reiterated this stance. In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378, 112 S.Ct. 748, 757, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), the Court stated that a consent decree was enforceable as a court order and judicial decree. The Court also stated that a consent decree was enforceable by contempt proceedings. Id. Although a consent decree may look like a contract on its face, once it is approved and adopted by a court it becomes a court order. The contractual nature of the document is effectively subsumed into the court ordered judgment. See Ferree v. Ferree, 71 N.C.App. 737, 323 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1984).
The second prong of the test is that the court order requires the project. The language of the consent decree and the “Judgment in a Civil Case” makes clear that the project is required. Words such as shall and ordered were used by Judge Sharp in his judgment and were included in the Consent Decree in the Jail Case. Action on the part of the County is mandatory.
The final prong of the test is that, “a court order holds that federal law mandates the project.” Ind.Code Ann. § 6-1.1-20-1.1(5). Nothing less than the UMted States Constitution mandates the project. Moreover, the Consent Decree and Judge Sharp’s Judgment recognized this.
“It is axiomatic that our Federal Constitution is the law, indeed the supreme law, of the land_ Its hallowed status in our national culture cannot be gainsaid.” The Honorable J. Darnel Mahoney, Thoughts On Originalism, 72 NotRE Dame L.Rev. 1225, 1225 (1997). “This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const, art. VI. The Constitution is the federal law. If it requires improved jail facilities, then federal law mandates construction of a new jail. From a reading of the Judgment and Consent Decree adopted by Judge Sharp, one can clearly determine that tMs is precisely what Judge Sharp interpreted the Constitution to require. The Judgment issued states that the jail does not meet current federal Constitutional standards and the jail cannot be modified to meet these standards. (Stip. of Facts Ex. D, ¶¶ 31-32.) Further, the Judgment states that the only way for the County to meet federal Constitutional standards is for a new jail to be constructed. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Judge Sharp could not be more clear in Ms interpretation of what the Constitution requires were he here to personally explain it. Federal law mandates that the jail be built.
Much has been made in this case over Judge Sharp’s statement that the state and local process should work in its “own way” and that democracy can be time consuming, tiresome, and messy. (Stip. of Facts Ex. E, at 3.) Although these propositions are indeed true, they do not require the County to proceed through the petition-remonstrance process as the State Board argues. Our system of government is commonly thought of as a model democracy. It is, in actuality, a representative democracy. Democratic rights are protected by our right to vote in organized and fair elections. Instead of each
Were this Court to hold that the construction of a new jail is a “controlled project” and require petition-remonstrance proceedings, the County might never get approval of its new jail from the property owners. This is an absurd result. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana has determined that a new jail must be built. If petition-remonstrance proceedings were ordered by this Court, the County might face an unpleasant proposition. Either the County would risk being in perpetual violation of the District Court’s order or be in perpetual violation of this Court’s order. This Court will not force the County to choose between facing the Scylla or the Charybdis. Although the petition-remonstrance process is designed to be a check on unwise spending of taxpayer money, the Indiana legislature recognized that at times this process would be unworkable and in conflict with other laws. Therefore, the legislature has attempted to provide exceptions to the process. One such exception was provided for instances where a court has said federal law requires the project. That is the ease here. The County’s jail project fits squarely within the exception to the definition of “controlled project” and is therefore not required to proceed through the petition-remonstrance process. For the State Board to hold otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the final determination of the State Board is REVERSED and summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of St. Joseph County, Indiana.
. The class action litigation is captioned Winston, et al. v. Speybroeck, Cause No. 3:94CV-0150AS, 1996 WL 476692 (N.D.Ind.1996).
. The petition-remonstrance process allows taxpayers the opportunity to block the imposition of property taxes to pay a debt service or lease rental. The process for petition-remonstrance proceedings is detailed in Ind Code Ann. §§ 6 — 1.1— 20-3.1 to 3.2. Summarizing those procedures, once the statutorily defined number of signatures has been collected on a petition requesting petition-remonstrance, the owners of real property within the particular political subdivision can file either a petition supporting the project or a remonstrance opposing it. If more remonstrance signatures than petitions are obtained, the project may not proceed for at least one year. Additionally, the Court notes that there are two versions of Ind.Code Ann. §§ 6-1.1-20-3.2. This has previously been discussed in Boshart v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 672 N.E.2d 499 (Ind.Tax Ct. 1996), and would not change the result here.