Bobby D. Martin, Sr. Vs. Bobby D. Martin II

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 77 /05-0101
Filed August 18, 2006
BOBBY D. MARTIN, SR.,
Appellee,
vs.
BOBBY D. MARTIN II,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________________
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County,
Annette J. Scieszinski, Judge.
Appeal from district court judgment ordering a parcel of land to be
partitioned by sale. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED;
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED.
Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht & Siebrecht Law Firm,
Des Moines, for appellant.
Greg A. Life of Life Law Office, Oskaloosa, for appellee.
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CADY, Justice.
This is a partition action in which the plaintiff claims an interest in
land as a tenant in common by virtue of a deed from the grantor not
joined in by his spouse. The district court concluded the deed was valid
and ordered the land to be partitioned by sale. The court of appeals
reversed. On our review, we agree with the court of appeals. We reverse
the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Robert Martin Jr. (“Bobby”) purchased a forty-acre tract of land in
Appanoose County on contract for $12,000 on November 1, 1993. The
real estate contract named Bobby as the buyer, and the sellers gave
Bobby a warranty deed in 1999 after Bobby completed the payments
required under the contract. Bobby lived in a mobile home located on
the land.
Bobby’s father, Robert Martin Sr. (“Bob”), provided funds to Bobby
to assist in the purchase of the land. After the purchase in 1993, Bob
moved his personal property, equipment, and numerous items described
as “junk” onto the land, with Bobby’s assistance. In addition, Bob made
several improvements to the land. He built a pond and a driveway,
cleared trees, graded the land, and installed water pipes. Bob claimed
that Bobby acknowledged on numerous occasions that they both owned
the land.
Bobby married on June 13, 1999. His wife, Sheryl, lived in the
home located on the land until Bobby filed for divorce in November 1999.
At that time, Bobby and Sheryl separated, and Sheryl moved out of the
home. Bobby and Sheryl had two children together.
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During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Bob and Bobby
entered into an agreement, entitled “Agreement Regarding Real Property.”
Under the agreement, Bob and Bobby acknowledged they both owned the
forty-acre tract of land. They signed the agreement on February 21,
2000. That same day, Bobby executed a quitclaim deed that conveyed
the land from himself (as the sole owner) to himself and Bob as tenants
in common. Although Bobby and Sheryl were still married at the time,
Sheryl did not sign the deed. Bobby apparently placed the deed in a
safe, because he “thought it wasn’t good” at the time, and neither Bob
nor Bobby recorded the deed.
Bobby and Sheryl were divorced a year later on February 21, 2001.
The court awarded the homestead property to Bobby. On July 18, 2003,
after a dispute arose with Bobby, Bob recorded the quitclaim deed.
There was no explanation as to how or when Bob acquired possession of
the deed. Bob then filed a petition for partition on August 18, 2003. Bob
claimed that he and Bobby owned the land as tenants in common by
virtue of the quitclaim deed. He asked the court to have it partitioned by
sale. Bobby responded to the petition by claiming Bob had no ownership
interest in the land because the quitclaim deed by which Bob claimed to
have acquired his interest was not executed by Sheryl as required by
Iowa Code section 561.13 and was invalid. See Iowa Code § 651.2 (2003)
(stating the defendant’s answer in a partition action may deny the
interest of the plaintiff); accord Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1203(2). The district
court held the quitclaim deed was valid, and Bob had a one-half
undivided interest in the land as a tenant in common. The court ordered
the land to be partitioned by sale. The district court also awarded Bob
attorney fees of $2,728.52.
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The district court found that the facts of this case were unique,
and did not fall within the purpose of the statutory requirement under
section 561.13 for the spouse to join in a conveyance of the homestead.
Accordingly, it held that section 561.13 should not be applied to
invalidate the deed because to do so would result in manifest injustice.
The specific facts identified by the district court to support its conclusion
that the statute was inapplicable were that the homestead was
premarital property of Bobby, Sheryl moved from the homestead prior to
the time the quitclaim deed was executed, Bobby was granted the
homestead in the dissolution of marriage based on a stipulated
agreement between Bobby and Sheryl, and Sheryl was not asserting any
rights to invalidate the deed. Instead, the district court found Bobby was
using the statute to assert a “technical defect” and that he was not
seeking to use the statute to benefit Sheryl or the children. The district
court also found that if the statute did apply, then the stipulation
entered into by Bobby and Sheryl that included an agreement that Bobby
would be awarded the homestead constituted a ratification of the
quitclaim deed and validated the deed under section 561.13.
Bobby appealed. He claimed the quitclaim deed was invalid
because the land constituted his homestead, he was married at the time
of the conveyance, and his former wife never joined in the conveyance to
Bob. The court of appeals reversed. It held the quitclaim deed was
invalid because Bobby was married at the time the deed was executed
and his wife did not sign the deed. It rejected any notion that the statute
could be applied to support a contrary result based upon the particular
equities of the case. Bob applied for, and we granted, further review.
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II. Standard of Review
An action to partition property is an equitable proceeding. Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.1201(1). Therefore, our review is de novo. Thiele v.
Whittenbaugh, 291 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Iowa 1980) (citing Huse v. Noffke,
271 N.W.2d 682, 683 (Iowa 1978)). Nevertheless, “we are justified in
giving weight to the trial court’s findings, especially so far as they relate
to credibility of witnesses, in view of his better position to determine the
real truth.” Watts v. Archer, 252 Iowa 592, 596, 107 N.W.2d 549,
551 (1961) (citing Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 251 Iowa 414, 419, 107
N.W.2d 114, 117 (1961); Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1395, 72
N.W.2d 494, 498 (1955)).
III. Discussion
There are many statutory and legal requirements that must be met
for a deed to result in a valid conveyance. See generally Iowa Code ch.
558. One requirement is that a spouse must join in a conveyance of the
homestead. Iowa Code section 561.13 provides, in relevant part:
A conveyance or encumbrance of . . . the homestead, if
the owner is married, is not valid, unless and until the
spouse of the owner executes the same or a like instrument,
or a power of attorney for the execution of the same or a like
instrument, and the instrument or power of attorney sets
out the legal description of the homestead.
Id. § 561.13.
A conveyance by deed does not take place until the deed is
delivered. See McNertney v. Kahler, 710 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 2006) (“A
deed to be operative as a transfer of real estate must be delivered.”
(citing 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 102, at 141 (2002)); accord Orud v. Groth,
652 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2002) (“To effectuate transfer of title under a
deed, there must be delivery, actual or symbolical, accompanied with the
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intention of the grantor to transfer title without any reservation of
control.” (citing Lathrop v. Knoop, 202 Iowa 621, 623, 210 N.W. 764, 765-
66 (1926); Tutt v. Smith, 201 Iowa 107, 110-11, 204 N.W. 294, 295-96
(1925))). Bob claims the deed was not delivered until after Bobby and
Sheryl were divorced. Therefore, he argues, the “conveyance” under
section 561.13 did not occur during the time Bobby was married, and
Sheryl’s signature was not needed to pass title. See Iowa Code § 561.13
(“A conveyance or encumbrance of . . . the homestead, if the owner is
married, is not valid, unless and until the spouse of the owner executes
the same or a like instrument, or a power of attorney for the execution of
the same or a like instrument, and the instrument or power of attorney
sets out the legal description of the homestead.” (Emphasis added.)).
There is a longstanding presumption that delivery occurs on the
date the deed is signed. Orud, 708 N.W.2d at 76 (citing Conway v. Rock,
139 Iowa 162, 164, 117 N.W. 273, 274 (1908)); accord Klosterboer v.
Engelkes, 255 Iowa 1076, 1083, 125 N.W.2d 115, 119 (1963) (“In the
absence of evidence to the contrary a recorded deed is presumed to have
been delivered on the date of its execution and acknowledgment.”);
Richardson v. Estle, 214 Iowa 1007, 1009, 243 N.W. 611, 613 (1932) (“In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the deed was presumed to be
delivered on the date of its execution.”); Hall v. Cardell, 111 Iowa 206,
209, 82 N.W. 503, 504 (1900) (“The presumption is that the deed was
delivered on the day of its date or acknowledgment.” (citing McGee v.
Allison, 94 Iowa 531, 63 N.W. 322 (1895); Farwell v. Des Moines Brick
Mfg. Co., 97 Iowa 286, 66 N.W. 176 (1896); Nichols v. Sadler, 99 Iowa
429, 68 N.W. 709 (1896))). In this case, the deed was signed on February
21, 2000—when Bobby was married to Sheryl. Bob bears the burden of
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rebutting the presumption that the deed was delivered on that date “by
clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to the contrary.” Orud, 708
N.W.2d at 76 (citing Jones v. Betz, 203 Iowa 767, 768, 210 N.W. 609,
609 (1926)).
The evidence in this case fails to rebut the presumption of delivery
on the date the deed was executed. Although Bob claims in his brief
“Bobby delivered the quit claim deed later, after his marriage had been
terminated,” there is nothing in the record to support this claim. There
is no evidence of how and when Bob acquired possession of the deed.
The only evidence on the issue was Bob’s testimony that he “got it back
later.” This evidence is vague and insufficient to rebut the presumption
that the deed was delivered when signed. It certainly does not establish
that the deed was delivered after Bobby and Sheryl divorced. Therefore,
we conclude the conveyance was attempted when Bobby was married,
and the language of section 561.13 is implicated to govern the validity of
the conveyance.
Section 561.13 invalidates deeds not signed by both spouses
“unless and until the spouse of the owner executes the same or a like
instrument” that sets out the legal description of the homestead. Iowa
Code § 561.13. If the statute is not satisfied, the deed is invalid as to
both the husband and the wife. Beal Bank v. Siems, 670 N.W.2d 119,
124-25 (Iowa 2003); accord Hostetler v. Eddy, 128 Iowa 401, 406, 104
N.W. 485, 487 (1905) (holding contract not signed by wife “was void in
favor of both husband and wife”); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 113 Iowa 319,
324, 85 N.W. 31, 32 (1901) (“A conveyance of a homestead occupied by
husband and wife, in which the wife does not join, is invalid for any
purpose.”); see also Thayer v. Sherman, 218 Iowa 451, 458, 255 N.W.
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506, 509 (1934) (“The provisions of this section are for the benefit of all
who are interested in the homestead. It is designed as a protection to the
wife, the children, and the husband himself.” (citing Lunt v. Neeley, 67
Iowa 97, 24 N.W. 739 (1885))).
The district court found section 561.13 was satisfied in this case
because Sheryl executed a “like instrument” that legally described the
homestead. The “like instrument” the court relied on was the stipulated
dissolution decree between Bobby and Sheryl, which provided:
the homestead of [Bobby], which was owned by [Bobby] prior
to his marriage to [Sheryl], and legally described in Exhibit
‘1’ shall be awarded to [Bobby], solely, subject to any and all
amounts due upon said property to any party, including real
estate taxes, which [Bobby] shall assume, pay and hold
[Sheryl] harmless from any amounts due thereon.
We think the district court read the words “like instrument” too
broadly. The words “like instrument” are not meant to enlarge the class
of documents by which the spouse can join in the conveyance beyond
instruments of conveyance or encumbrance, such as deeds or mortgages.
Rather, the words “like instrument” mean only that the spouse need not
sign the same deed as the owner in order to join in the conveyance. Until
1981, the statute required a joint instrument. See Iowa Code § 561.13
(1981) (“No conveyance or encumbrance of, or contract to convey or
encumber the homestead, if the owner is married, is valid, unless the
husband and wife join in the execution of the same joint instrument, and
the instrument sets out the legal description of the homestead . . . .”). In
1981, however, the legislature amended the statute to also allow the
husband and wife to effectuate the conveyance by separate instruments:
No A conveyance or encumbrance of, or contract to
convey or encumber the homestead, if the owner is married,
is not valid, unless and until the husband and wife join in
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the execution of the same joint spouse of the owner executed
the same or a like instrument, or a power of attorney for the
execution of the same of a like instrument, and the
instrument or power of attorney sets out the legal
description of the homestead . . . .
1981 Iowa Acts ch. 81, § 1. An explanation of the bill noted that the
change
eliminates the requirement that both spouses execute the
same joint instrument in order to convey or encumber the
homestead. Instead, the spouse of the titleholder, if the
spouses do not hold joint title to the property, may execute a
like instrument or power of attorney for the execution of the
instrument or a like instrument conveying or encumbering
the homestead.
Explanation of H.F. 430, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1981).
Although a decree for dissolution of marriage may constitute a
muniment of title, a dissolution decree, or a stipulation, cannot be
viewed as a conveyance of land to a nonparty to the dissolution of
marriage. See Iowa Code § 598.21(1) (court required to divide property of
the parties in a dissolution decree and transfer title of the property by
such means as ordering the parties to execute a quitclaim deed or
ordering a change of title for tax purposes and delivery of the deed or
change of title to the county recorder). Because Bobby attempted to
convey his property while he was married, and Sheryl never signed the
quitclaim deed executed by Bobby-or another deed or like instrument
that transferred the property to Bob-section 561.13 invalidates the
conveyance.
We also reject the district court’s alternative line of reasoning that
section 561.13 did not invalidate the deed because
Sheryl has never taken any action to invalidate the Quit
Claim Deed; rather, it is Bobby who seizes the opportunity to
plead a technical defect in his own earlier, and counseled,
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act. And, he does that solely for his own benefit and not in
the stead of Sheryl or the couple’s children.
This argument has no basis in our law. Section 561.13 makes a deed
invalid—that is, void—without the signature of both spouses, not merely
voidable by the spouse who did not sign. Iowa Code § 561.13; Beal
Bank, 670 N.W.2d at 124-25; accord Hostetler, 128 Iowa at 406, 104
N.W. at 487 (holding contract not signed by wife, “was void in favor of
both husband and wife”); Goodwin, 113 Iowa at 324, 85 N.W. at 32 (“A
conveyance of a homestead occupied by husband and wife, in which the
wife does not join, is invalid for any purpose.”); see also Thayer, 218 Iowa
at 458, 255 N.W. at 509 (“The provisions of this section are for the
benefit of all who are interested in the homestead. It is designed as a
protection to the wife, the children, and the husband himself.” (Citation
omitted.)).
Moreover, while it may be tempting for trial judges to fashion
remedies viewed to be fair and just under the particular circumstances of
a case, the law has defined those concepts and must dominate the
decisionmaking process. See Iowa State Bank & Trust Co. v. Michel, 683
N.W.2d 95, 107 (Iowa 2004) (“ ‘[C]ourts of equity are bound by statutes
and follow the law in [the] absence of fraud or mistake.’ ” (quoting
Mensch v. Netty, 408 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa 1987))). Absent
constitutional concerns, it is not for courts to overlook the language of a
statute to reach a particular result deemed unjust under the particular
circumstances of a case. See Brunsdon v. Brunsdon, 199 Iowa 1099,
1113, 200 N.W. 823, 829 (1924) (“The conclusion arrived at in this case
may result in a grave injustice being done to appellees, but a court of
equity cannot so expand its proper jurisdiction as to completely override
statutes or ignore established doctrines.”).
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Our law has chosen to provide special procedures to protect
homestead rights, and has defined this protection in a comprehensive
manner. We have said:
[T]he purpose of the homestead laws is “to provide a margin
of safety to the family, not only for the benefit of the family,
but for the public welfare and social benefit which accrues to
the State by having families secure in their homes.”
Brown v. Vonnahme, 343 N.W.2d 445, 451 (Iowa 1984) (quoting In re
Marriage of Tierney, 263 N.W.2d 533, 534 (Iowa 1978)). “ ‘[T]o secure the
benevolent purposes of the homestead laws,’ we construe these laws
broadly and liberally ‘in favor of the beneficiaries of the legislation.’ ” In
re Estate of Tolson, 690 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Millsap v.
Faulkes, 236 Iowa 848, 852, 20 N.W.2d 40, 42 (1945)); accord Elliott v.
Till, 219 Iowa 649, 656, 259 N.W. 460, 464 (1935) (“That the homestead
statute must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose, there is no
question.”); Hunt, Hill & Betts v. Moore, 219 Iowa 451, 453, 258 N.W.
114, 115 (1934) (“It has been the well-settled rule of this court to
construe the homestead statute liberally in favor of the owner of the
home.”). This approach means we not only construe the protection of
section 561.13 broadly to protect the spouse who does not join in the
conveyance, but also in situations such as this, when the protection is
sought to be invoked by the owner spouse who failed to obtain the other
spouse’s signature. The statute invalidates the conveyance and makes
no distinction based on whether the non-signing spouse subsequently
loses his or her interest in the homestead.
We disagree with the district court that section 561.13 did not
invalidate the deed because Bobby sought to invoke the statute “for his
own benefit.” The statute not only exists to benefit Bobby, but the whole
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family unit, including the children who remain with the parents under a
joint custody arrangement. See generally In re Marriage of Tierney, 263
N.W.2d at 534 (noting the homestead exemption “follow[s] the
homestead’s award to one of the parties” in a dissolution). The statute
draws clear lines, and the court cannot engage in decisionmaking that
ignores those lines.
Finally, to the extent the district court relied on Sheryl and Bobby’s
estrangement at the time the deed was signed, we reject that reasoning
as well. The statute applies “if the owner is married,” Iowa Code §
561.13, and we interpret this phrase strictly, Gustafson v. Fogleman, 551
N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 1996), to include a period of separation preceding
divorce.
IV. Conclusion
The district court erred in finding section 561.13 was satisfied, or
alternatively, did not apply in this case. A conveyance was attempted
while the owner was married, and the spouse did not execute the same
or a like instrument joining in the conveyance. It was therefore void.
Title never passed to Bob through the quitclaim deed, and Bob has not
raised any other grounds to support his claim of ownership. The
partition action therefore fails. We therefore affirm the decision of the
court of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED.