State Public Defender Vs. Iowa

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 29 / 04-2028
Filed May 11, 2007
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR WOODBURY COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Brian L.
Michaelson, Associate Juvenile Judge.
State Public Defender petitioned for a writ of certiorari, challenging
the juvenile court’s authority to grant recovery on the basis of quantum
meruit. WRIT SUSTAINED.
Thomas G. Becker, State Public Defender, Mark C. Smith, First
Assistant State Public Defender, and Julie A. Miller, Senior Assistant State
Public Defender, Des Moines, for plaintiff.
Elizabeth A. Rosenbaum, Sioux City, for defendant.
2
LARSON, Justice.
Attorney Elizabeth Rosenbaum was appointed by the juvenile court to
act as guardian ad litem in a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding.
Rosenbaum was not under contract with the State Public Defender. Upon
completion of her representation, Rosenbaum submitted her fee claim to the
public defender. The public defender denied that portion of Rosenbaum’s
fee claim in excess of statutory fee limitations because Rosenbaum did not
submit to the juvenile court her application to exceed fee limitations prior to
exceeding the fee limitations, and there was no finding of good cause for the
late filing of her application in the court’s order authorizing her to exceed.
The public defender filed a petition for writ of certiorari after the juvenile
court ordered it to pay Rosenbaum’s entire fee claim on the basis of
quantum meruit. We conclude that quantum meruit cannot serve as the
basis for recovery when the statutory requirements for compensation of
court-appointed attorneys have not been met. Writ sustained.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
In October 2003 the juvenile court for Woodbury County appointed
Elizabeth Rosenbaum as guardian ad litem in a child-in-need-of-assistance
proceeding. Rosenbaum was not under contract with the public defender at
the time of the appointment, though she had, in the past, been under such
a contract. The court appointed Rosenbaum to this particular case because
she had represented the child in a prior proceeding and was familiar with
the child’s background and the complicated case history.
In March 2004 Rosenbaum submitted a fee claim of $2194.81 for her
representation of the child pursuant to Iowa Code section 815.7 (2003).
Because Rosenbaum’s fees exceeded the statutory limit of $1000, an
application and order to exceed fee limitations, both filed March 17, 2004,
were attached to the fee claim. The public defender reduced Rosenbaum’s
3
fee claim to $1117.31 (the $1000 fee limit for appointment as a guardian ad
litem in a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding plus $117.31 for
reasonable expenses), explaining that Rosenbaum’s application to exceed
was untimely because it was not filed, and approved, prior to actually
exceeding the fee limitations. See Iowa Code § 815.10A(2). Further, the
order authorizing Rosenbaum to exceed did not contain a finding of good
cause for the late filing of the application, as required by Iowa Code section
815.10A(2).
Rosenbaum filed a motion for review of her fee claim, arguing she was
entitled to her entire fee claim on the basis of quantum meruit. Rosenbaum
asserted that she had previously been permitted to obtain any necessary
orders to exceed statutory fee limitations at the time she submitted her fee
claim, and the public defender had honored such orders. After a hearing on
the matter, the juvenile court concluded that, although Rosenbaum did not
comply with the statutory requirements governing compensation of court-
appointed attorneys, she was entitled to fees in excess of the fee limitations
under a theory of quantum meruit. The juvenile court stated:
Although there is a statute [Iowa Code section 815.10A(2) and
Iowa Administrative Code rule 493-12.6(3)] setting forth the
rule cited by the Public Defender, it has not been enforced until
recently. To hold a party responsible for a rule that has
consistently been ignored does not conform to equity
principles. Moreover, this rule is one of procedure and seems
to be something of a technicality. Even though Rosenbaum
has completed a great amount of work in this case, the Public
Defender claims she should not be paid for 50% of her fee
claim because she did not file the correct paper at the correct
time. This Court finds that to deny Rosenbaum her fee does
not comply with principles of equity.
The public defender filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we
granted. The public defender argues that Rosenbaum did not properly raise
the issue of quantum meruit in her motion for review and that quantum
4
meruit cannot be used to supersede the statutory requirements of Iowa Code
section 815.10A(2).
II. Standard of Review.
In a certiorari case, we review the district court’s ruling for correction
of errors at law. State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 721 N.W.2d 570, 572
(Iowa 2006).
“A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or
court has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally
.... ‘Illegality exists when the court’s findings lack
substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has not
properly applied the law.’ ”
Id. (quoting State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 633 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa
2001) (citations omitted)). We are bound by the district court’s factual
findings, if well supported. State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 644 N.W.2d
354, 356 (Iowa 2002).
III. Merits.
The public defender is statutorily authorized to review fee claims for
representation of indigents in Iowa. Iowa Code § 13B.4(4). Because
Rosenbaum was not under contract with the public defender, Iowa Code
sections 815.7 and 815.10A govern her compensation. The public defender
is required to establish fee limitations for particular categories of cases, and
the fee limitation for an attorney appointed as guardian ad litem for a minor
in a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding is $1000. Iowa Code § 13B.4(a);
Iowa Admin. Code r. 493-12.6. An attorney may recover fees in excess of
this fee limitation for good cause. The procedure for recovering fees in
excess of fee limitations is set forth in Iowa Code section 815.10A(2):
An attorney shall obtain court approval prior to exceeding the
fee limitations established by the state public defender
pursuant to section 13B.4. An attorney may exceed the fee
limitations, if good cause is shown. An attorney may obtain
court approval after exceeding the fee limitations, if good cause
5
is shown. The order approving an application to exceed the fee
limitations shall be effective from the date of filing the
application unless the court order provides an alternative
effective date. Failure to file an application to exceed a fee
limitation after exceeding the fees shall not constitute good
cause. The application and the court order approving the
application to exceed fee limitations shall be submitted with
any claim for compensation.
(Emphasis added.)
The reasonableness of Rosenbaum’s fee claim is undisputed. Thus,
had she filed a timely application to exceed fee limitations, the court likely
would have found good cause for her to exceed and would have issued an
order to that effect. As the juvenile court emphasized, this was an
extremely complicated case involving a contested emergency removal and
allegations of severe child abuse by adoptive parents. Rosenbaum’s prior
involvement with the child and her knowledge of the past case history
improved the quality of representation for the minor child. We commend
Rosenbaum for her willingness to act as a court-appointed attorney in these
difficult cases and for providing quality representation for indigents.
However, it is clear that she did not comply with the requirements set forth
in section 815.10A(2). A testament to the difficulty of this particular case,
Rosenbaum exceeded the $1000 fee limitation on November 8, 2003, a full
three months before she completed her representation. Unfortunately, she
did not file her application to exceed until March 17, 2004. Although the
juvenile court approved her application, thus finding good cause for her to
exceed the fee limitation, it did not find good cause for Rosenbaum’s failure
to file a timely application. Therefore, pursuant to Iowa Code section
815.10A(2), the public defender was clearly entitled to deny that portion of
Rosenbaum’s fee claim in excess of the fee limitation.
Nonetheless, the juvenile court concluded that, under a theory of
quantum meruit, Rosenbaum was entitled to her entire fee claim. We do not
6
address the public defender’s contention that Rosenbaum failed to properly
raise this issue in her motion for review, as required by Iowa Administrative
Code rules 493-12.9(1)(b) and 493-12.9(2)(d), and assume, for purposes of
this certiorari action, that the issue was properly pled.
Quantum meruit is a quasi-contractual theory of recovery providing
that, “ ‘[when] one person renders services for another which are known to
and accepted by him, the law implies a promise on his part to pay
therefor.’ ” In re Estate of Walton, 213 Iowa 104, 105-06, 238 N.W. 577, 577
(1931) (quoting Scully v. Scully’s Ex’r, 28 Iowa 548, 550-51 (1870)). The
theory of quantum meruit is premised on the idea that it is unfair to allow a
person to benefit from another’s services when the other expected
compensation. While it is tempting to allow recovery under a theory of
quantum meruit in the instant case, especially considering the hard work
and quality representation Rosenbaum provided to the minor child, we
cannot do so.
In enacting section 815.10A(2), the legislature set forth clear
requirements with which a court-appointed attorney must comply in order
to receive compensation in excess of statutory fee limitations. This
legislation serves to protect both the court-appointed attorney and the
taxpayer by ensuring that the attorney will be compensated for all
reasonable services provided, and the taxpayer will not be saddled with
costs that are unnecessary for the representation in each particular case.
Requiring prior approval to exceed the fee limitations provides a level of
control over the indigent-defense fund, which is necessary to ensure that all
those who are entitled to legal representation receive it. Allowing a theory of
quantum meruit to supersede clear statutory requirements would serve to
undermine the legislature’s purpose in enacting section 815.10A(2).
7
We have considered this issue previously in other contexts and have
concluded that quantum meruit cannot be used to supersede the affirmative
requirements of a statute. See Equal Access Corp. v. Utils. Bd., 510 N.W.2d
147, 151 (Iowa 1993) (quoting Madrid Lumber Co. v. Boone County, 255 Iowa
380, 387, 121 N.W.2d 523, 527 (1963)) (“ ‘[The court is] bound by positive
provisions of a statute . . . and where the contract is void because not in
compliance with express statutory provisions, a court . . . cannot give
validity to the contract [under a theory of quantum meruit].’ ”); Maynes Real
Estate, Inc. v. J.F. McPherron, 353 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1984). As we stated in
Maynes,
[u]nder the plaintiffs’ theory, it would make little difference
whether the statutory requirement of a writing had been
complied with or not if they could fall back on the theory of
quantum meruit. Clearly, the result would defeat the purpose
of the rule . . . .
....
We hold since plaintiffs cannot recover on an oral
contract of employment, neither can they recover for the same
services on a quantum meruit theory.
Maynes Real Estate, Inc., 353 N.W.2d at 427-28. We conclude that the
juvenile court exceeded its authority by ordering the public defender to pay
Rosenbaum fees in excess of statutory fee limitations on the basis of
quantum meruit.
IV. Conclusion.
Iowa Code section 815.10A(2) clearly sets forth the requirements with
which a court-appointed attorney must comply in order to recover fees in
excess of statutory fee limitations. Although it appears the public defender
has, in the past, failed to consistently enforce these requirements, a theory
of quantum meruit cannot be asserted in order to circumvent affirmative
statutory requirements. We sympathize with Rosenbaum and understand
her frustration with the public defender’s denial of her fee claim. However,
8
as we have stated in the past, “[i]f this rule works some ‘inequities in
particular cases, it is within the purview of the legislature and not this court
to correct what is now well-settled public policy.’ ” Maynes Real Estate, Inc.,
353 N.W.2d at 428 (quoting Wright v. Smith, 249 A.2d 56, 57 (R.I. 1969)).
The juvenile court exceeded its authority by ordering the public defender to
pay Rosenbaum fees in excess of statutory fee limitations on the basis of
quantum meruit. We sustain the public defender’s writ of certiorari.
WRIT SUSTAINED.