State of Iowa v. Noah Riley Crooks

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 16–0851
Filed April 20, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
NOAH RILEY CROOKS,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County, Gregg R.
Rosenbladt and James M. Drew, Judges.
Defendant convicted of second-degree murder as a youthful
offender for offense he committed at age thirteen challenges his fifty-year
prison sentence imposed at age eighteen. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers and
Denise A. Timmins, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
2
WATERMAN, Justice.
In this appeal, we must decide challenges to Iowa’s youthful
offender laws raised by a defendant who at age thirteen fatally shot his
mother. The State prosecuted him as a youthful offender in district
court, and a jury found him guilty of second-degree murder. When he
reached age eighteen, the district court sentenced him to an
indeterminate prison term of up to fifty years (with no mandatory
minimum). The defendant raises statutory and constitutional challenges
to his prosecution and sentence, arguing that as a thirteen-year-old
offender, his case should have remained in juvenile court and that at age
eighteen he should have been released on probation or placed in a
transitional facility rather than prison.
We retained his appeal and, for the reasons explained below, affirm
his conviction as a youthful offender and his fifty-year indeterminate
sentence with immediate parole eligibility. We conclude the district court
properly exercised its discretion based on an individualized assessment
of this defendant under a constitutional statutory scheme. We
acknowledge sentencing reform efforts nationwide to raise the minimum
age for prosecution in adult court. But under our constitutional
separation of powers, those efforts should be directed to the legislature.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On the evening of March 24, 2012, Noah Crooks was at home with
his mother, Gretchen Crooks. Noah was thirteen years old and an eighth
grader at Osage Middle School. He had no prior criminal record. The
Crooks lived in rural Osage, in Mitchell County. Gretchen worked as a
nurse at Mercy Hospital in Mason City and was studying to get her
master’s degree at the University of Iowa. Noah’s father, William Crooks,
3
worked at Cargill Kitchen Solutions in Mason City. William and
Gretchen had been married for seventeen years.
William was at a work-related party away from home that evening
when Noah loaded a .22 caliber rifle upstairs. Noah took the loaded rifle
downstairs and saw his mother in the kitchen facing away from him.
She was making dinner for him. Noah later told a child psychiatrist that
he could not shoot her at that moment because it would not be
honorable to shoot his mother in the back. Noah returned upstairs until
his mother called up to say his dinner was ready. He returned
downstairs with the rifle and this time found his mother sitting on the
living room sofa studying her coursework. Noah shot her twenty-two
times, killing her.
Noah sent his dad a text message at 7:30 p.m. The message
stated, “Dad, this is Noah. I killed Mom accidentally. I regret it. Come
home now please.” William thought Noah was joking and replied, “Okay.
Just throw her in the grove. We will take care of her later.”
Noah called 911 and told the Mitchell County dispatcher, Barbara
Michael, “I killed my mom with my twenty-two.” He admitted he “shot
her . . . with twenty rounds maybe.” Noah also said, “I, I tried to rape
her. . . . I didn’t do it. I tried to rape her, I couldn’t do it.” Noah talked
to the dispatcher about his concerns over his own future, stating,
I’m never gonna be able to marry. . . . I’m never gonna get,
be able to get a good job now, ‘cause it’ll be on my
resume. . . . I mean, I’ll barely be able to get a job like
McDonald’s. I mean I had plans of going to Michigan State
University to get an engineering job, making my own car
company. That’s all down the drain now.
Deputy Jeff Huftalin was dispatched to the Crooks’s residence and
knocked on the front door. Noah answered the door while he was still on
the phone with the dispatcher. Deputy Huftalin asked Noah where his
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mother was. Noah told him she was in the living room and that the gun
was on a chair. Deputy Huftalin asked Noah to sit on the porch while he
entered the house. Deputy Huftalin found Gretchen slouched on the
couch; he could see bullet holes in her chest. Gretchen’s pajama top was
unbuttoned, and she was naked from the waist down. Deputy Huftalin
confirmed that Gretchen was dead. He handcuffed Noah and put him in
the backseat of the patrol car.
Deputy Huftalin called William to tell him there had been an
accident in his house and that he needed to come home. Upon arrival,
William was told that Gretchen was dead and that Noah had shot her.
The State filed a delinquency petition four days later, alleging that
Crooks, age thirteen, committed the delinquent acts of first-degree
murder and assault with the intent to commit sexual abuse. The State
requested that the juvenile court waive jurisdiction so that Crooks could
be tried as a youthful offender in adult court, as provided in Iowa Code
section 232.45(7) (2011). Crooks filed a motion to dismiss, challenging
the juvenile court’s statutory authority to waive jurisdiction over a
thirteen-year-old. The juvenile court denied the motion. Crooks then
filed a second motion to dismiss, this time asserting the youthful
offender statute was unconstitutional. The juvenile court denied this
motion, finding Crooks failed to establish that the statute was
unconstitutional.
At the waiver-of-jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court made the
three findings required by Iowa Code section 232.45(7)(a) for transfer to
district court: (1) Crooks was fifteen years of age or younger, (2) there
was probable cause that Crooks committed the forcible felonies alleged in
the petition, and (3) the State had established that there were no
reasonable prospects for rehabilitating Crooks prior to his eighteenth
5
birthday if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction. The juvenile court
waived jurisdiction over Crooks and transferred the case to the district
court for Noah’s prosecution as a youthful offender.
The State filed a trial information in district court, alleging murder
in the first degree and assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. The
jury trial began on April 30, 2013. Crooks raised the defenses of insanity
and diminished responsibility. On May 13, the jury returned a verdict
finding him guilty of murder in the second degree and not guilty of
assault with the intent to commit sexual abuse. The court placed him on
youthful offender status and transferred his supervision to the juvenile
court for disposition under Iowa Code section 232.52.
After conducting a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court
transferred guardianship of Crooks to the director of the Department of
Human Services for placement at the State Training School in Eldora.
Crooks was under the supervision of the juvenile court until his
eighteenth birthday. The juvenile court conducted yearly review
hearings, and Crooks remained at the State Training School. He
attended school and participated in mental health treatment. He
graduated from high school on May 29, 2015.
In April 2016, the juvenile court officer (JCO) filed a youthful
offender report, and the juvenile court reported to the district court as
required by Iowa Code section 232.56. The report noted that throughout
his time at Eldora, Crooks tried to avoid addressing why he killed his
mother. The JCO mentioned that when Crooks’s father confronted him
about his matricide, he responded that “[he] thought we would be better
off without her.” The JCO report elaborated,
During a recent family meeting on April 14, 2016 with his
father and counselors, Noah was asked again about why he
killed his mother. He responded by saying, “I didn’t think of
6
the consequences. I didn’t think anything would happen. I
thought I would maybe get grounded.” This question has
been asked of Noah throughout his therapy time at the State
Training School. Any answer Noah could give would not be
an acceptable answer to his father and family members.
The district court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI). The PSI
report recommended incarceration:
The defendant was 13 years of age when he shot and
killed his mother. He will turn 18 on 07/29/16. Prior to his
arrest on the instant offense he had no criminal history. He
was involved in counseling with his family and was placed on
psychotropic medication for a couple of years. There are
reports he made comments to his peers at school about
killing his mother and it would appear he bullied other
children from time to time. It is also noted he was cruel to
animals and may have burned down his grandmother’s
home when he was 5–6 years of age. These types of
behaviors are disturbing for a child of his age. He admitted
he was “arrogant and stuck up” and didn’t really think
anything bad was going to happen to him when he killed his
mother.
The defendant professes that he came from a good
home and loved his family, yet he shot and killed his mother
in their own home. He stated he was not angry at her and
reported he was close to his mother. His behavior at the
State Training School has been pretty unremarkable with a
few minor violations. According to the defendant, he has
had no major behavioral issues at the training school
because he knows the rules and doesn’t want to suffer the
consequences that would come as a result of negative
choices he might make. He graduated from high school and
has dreams of attending college.
The real concern is for public safety and how the
defendant will conduct himself if allowed to return to society.
No one can predict the future behavior of an individual with
any certainty. He has been in institutional settings since the
age of 13 and has learned to follow rules and modify his
behavior in a structured setting. The concern is will others
be placed at risk and will he create more victims in the
future? If the defendant could offer a plausible explanation
for why he shot and killed his mother, that might offer some
insight into his thoughts and actions that day, but he can
give no explanation for why he did what he did. For the
protection of society, it is recommended the defendant be
supervised at a higher level of supervision than what
community based supervision can provide.
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In light of the above it is respectfully recommended
that the defendant be sentenced to a period of forty-five (45)
years to the custody of the Director of the Department of
Corrections. 1
The district court held a hearing on May 6 to determine Crooks’s
status after his eighteenth birthday. The attorneys presented
arguments. The State requested a fifty-year indeterminate sentence with
no mandatory minimum. Crooks’s attorney told the court,
You only have two options under the statute itself. The first
is to continue the youthful offender status itself or discharge
him. That’s it. There aren’t — In the event that you
continue the youthful offender status itself, then you have
other options. You can place him on probation. You can
confine him. You can do a number — You can suspend the
sentence and you can provide all types of restrictions on
probation, but that’s it. And that’s the position that we’ve
taken.
His attorney further argued that any confinement or probation could not
exceed five years, with credit provided for time served. He did not
specifically request placement in a transitional facility.
Crooks read to the court a statement he wrote in which he
described the groups he voluntarily joined at the State Training School
and expressed his regret for taking his mother’s life. He apologized to the
people he hurt through his actions. Several family members gave victim-
impact statements. His uncle (the victim’s brother) requested the
maximum sentence, and his maternal grandmother emphasized that he
“doesn’t have real empathy.” William, the defendant’s father, spoke last:
[F]or four years we never talked about Gretchen, not once.
He never had any remorse about his mom. I’d push him. . . .
[H]e just wanted her out of his life because he can play video
games. . . . [F]our years isn’t long enough to pay for a
wonderful woman who did so much at the hospital, for all of
1A forty-five-year recommended sentence allowed Crooks five years of sentencing
credit for his time institutionalized at Eldora.
8
us, who were all of our rocks that we had to rely on. I — he
needs to pay for his mother’s life.
And I know that’s hard to say, but it’s just what it is,
kid. It’s time you face the piper, I guess, and letting you out
today would ruin so many more lives. It honestly would.
The court determined that probation was not justified:
[T]he common theme throughout the documents that
have been submitted, and even comments made here today,
is that there has been a surprising lack of an emotional
response from Noah, something showing appropriate
remorse, empathy, which is understanding the feelings of the
other people who have been affected by your actions. And I
recognize that you are a young person, and there’s a reason
we treat young people differently. It’s because sometimes
emotionally they aren’t developed enough to maybe respond
in the appropriate way; but it is — it is very apparent to me,
in reviewing the evidence, that for one reason or another,
Noah, you just don’t want to deal with this, with what you’ve
done; and at some point in time you’re going to have to, but
it doesn’t appear to me that that’s happened yet. You’ve got
some ground yet to cover and I think that there’s work left to
be done so I don’t believe that a straight discharge at this
time is appropriate.
....
At this point I do not see sufficient evidence to
convince me that Noah has been rehabilitated. The nature
and circumstances of this offense, coupled with the lack of
emotion, remorse, and empathy, indicates that there is a lot
of ground to cover. There have been some recent
expressions of remorse and attempts to show empathy, and I
hope that those are sincere, but the fact that they are so
recent causes me to wonder. And, Noah, going forward you’ll
have the opportunity to prove to everybody that you mean
what you say. You’ve heard the saying “actions speak louder
than words,” and I suspect that’s what your family is waiting
for, and I know that’s what the rest of us will be looking for
as well.
I’m also concerned, when we talk about the
appropriateness of street probation, that you have made the
comment that you really don’t think you have any need for
future services. You made a comment, when asked whether
you perhaps would want to return to the Training School to
speak some day after you’ve been rehabilitated, you didn’t
really think so or you hoped not, I think were your words.
You changed your answer after you were pressed on it a little
bit, but those comments are concerning to me, that you still
9
don’t have a full appreciation for what you’ve done and the
legitimacy of everyone’s concerns.
I am hopeful, but I’m not yet convinced, that it is safe
for you to be free despite your young age. The lack of an
appropriate emotional response, the lack of empathy, the
lack of something that even approaches an adequate
explanation for why this happened could be an indication
that you just don’t care. We just don’t know yet. That’s the
point, we don’t know. And I don’t believe it’s appropriate to
release you on probation until we can be confident that that
isn’t the situation, but rather that you do care and that we
don’t have to worry about something like this happening
down the road. And, in short, we need more time so that we
can be confident in that determination.
So I do believe that the imposition of a sentence with
incarceration is appropriate, and to that end it is necessary
that I enter conviction.
The court entered judgment for murder in the second degree. The court
sentenced Crooks to an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed
fifty years without any mandatory minimum sentence. 2 Crooks was
therefore immediately eligible for parole.
Crooks appealed. On appeal, he argues that Iowa Code section
232.45(7)(a) (2011) does not provide statutory authority to try a thirteen-
year-old as a youthful offender. He also contends sections 232.45(7) and
907.3A violate article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, he argues that the sentencing
court abused its discretion by incarcerating him. We retained his appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
“[W]e review the juvenile court’s interpretation of statutes for
correction of errors at law.” In re A.M., 856 N.W.2d 365, 370 (Iowa 2014).
Our review of constitutional challenges to a statute is de novo. State v.
2The court also ordered Noah to pay $150,000 in victim restitution. See State v.
Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 624 (Iowa 2017) (rejecting constitutional challenges to the
$150,000 minimum restitution imposed on juvenile homicide offenders). Noah does not
challenge the restitution on appeal.
10
Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Iowa 2013). “We review the district
court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d
269, 272 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827
(Iowa 2010)).
III. Analysis.
Crooks raises several challenges to the youthful offender provisions
of the Iowa Code. We begin by providing a brief overview of the statutory
scheme. We then consider whether the statutes permitted the juvenile
court to waive jurisdiction over Crooks at age thirteen for prosecution as
a youthful offender in district court. Because we conclude the juvenile
court was statutorily authorized to do so, we next address his claim that
the youthful offender statutes constitute cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. We conclude
that the waiver provisions do not constitute punishment, and we decline
to impose a categorical bar on prosecuting thirteen-year-olds as youthful
offenders in district court. Finally, we reject his claims that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of incarceration with
no mandatory minimum.
A. Overview of the Youthful Offender Statutes. The youthful
offender statutes were enacted in 1997 as part of comprehensive
legislation related to juvenile justice. See generally 1997 Iowa Acts
ch. 126 (entitled Juvenile Justice and Youthful Offenders). Generally,
“[t]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings
concerning a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act
unless otherwise provided by law . . . .” Iowa Code § 232.8(1)(a).
However, the juvenile court may transfer cases to adult court.
After the filing of a petition which alleges that a child has
committed a delinquent act on the basis of an alleged
commission of a public offense and before an adjudicatory
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hearing on the merits of the petition is held, the county
attorney or the child may file a motion requesting the court
to waive its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged
commission of the public offense or for the purpose of
prosecution of the child as an adult or a youthful offender.
Id. § 232.45(1). Section 232.45(7)(a) sets forth the findings required for
the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction over a child who then can be
prosecuted as a youthful offender in district court.
At the conclusion of the waiver hearing and after considering
the best interests of the child and the best interests of the
community the court may, in order that the child may be
prosecuted as a youthful offender, waive its jurisdiction over
the child if all of the following apply:
(1) The child is fifteen years of age or younger.
(2) The court determines . . . that there is probable
cause to believe that the child has committed a delinquent
act which would constitute a public offense under section
232.8, subsection 1, paragraph “c”, notwithstanding the
application of that paragraph to children aged sixteen or
older.
(3) The court determines that the state has
established that there are not reasonable prospects for
rehabilitating the child, prior to the child’s eighteenth
birthday, if the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the
child and the child enters into a plea agreement, is a party to
a consent decree, or is adjudicated to have committed the
delinquent act.
Id. § 232.45(7)(a) (emphasis added). 3 The juvenile court, however, can
waive its jurisdiction over the child for prosecution as an adult only when
“[t]he child is fourteen years of age or older” and other conditions are
met. Id. § 232.45(6).
3Subparagraph (1) was amended in 2013 to require that
[t]he child is twelve through fifteen years of age or the child is ten or
eleven years of age and has been charged with a public offense that
would be classified as a class “A” felony if committed by an adult.
2013 Iowa Acts ch. 42, § 5 (codified at Iowa Code § 232.45(7)(a)(1) (2014)).
12
B. The Applicability of Iowa Code Section 232.45(7)(a) to
Thirteen-Year-Old Offenders. Crooks argues that Iowa Code section
232.45(7)(a) does not allow the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction over a
thirteen-year-old child to be tried as a youthful offender in district court.
He contends that, when related statutes are read together as a whole,
section 232.45(7)(a) is ambiguous. We disagree and conclude the
statutes unambiguously allow prosecution of a thirteen-year-old as a
youthful offender. “[O]ur starting point in statutory interpretation is to
determine if the language has a plain and clear meaning within the
context of the circumstances presented by the dispute.” McGill v. Fish,
790 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Iowa 2010).
Crooks emphasizes the different language used for the “traditional”
waiver for prosecution as an adult and waiver for prosecution as a
youthful offender. Compare Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(a) (“fourteen years of
age or older” to be prosecuted as an adult (emphasis added)), with id.
§ 232.45(7)(a)(1) (“fifteen years of age or younger” to be prosecuted as a
youthful offender (emphasis added)). He encourages us to read these
provisions together as setting a lower age limit—a “floor”—of fourteen for
children who can be prosecuted as youthful offenders. Subsections 6(a)
and 7(a) describe waiver processes with quite different consequences,
and we decline to impose the lower age limit for prosecution as an adult
on the subsection regarding prosecution as a youthful offender. The
legislature used different language in describing age limits throughout
the statute and knows how to set a lower age limit. See, e.g., id.
§ 232.52(2)(e) (“at least twelve years of age”); id. § 232.54(1)(h)(1) (“age
fourteen or over”). The legislature chose to include thirteen-year-olds
within the youthful-offender waiver provision.
13
We see no ambiguity in the phrase “fifteen years of age or younger”
whether read in isolation or in context of the entire statutory scheme.
We conclude the juvenile court could properly waive jurisdiction over
Crooks, who was age thirteen when he killed his mother, to allow his
prosecution in district court as a youthful offender.
C. The Constitutionality of Iowa Code Sections 232.45(7)(a)
and 907.3A. Crooks argues that Iowa Code sections 232.45(7)(a) and
907.3A—when applied to an offender age thirteen at the time of the
crime—violate article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibiting
“cruel and unusual punishment.” Under our de novo review of
constitutional challenges to legislative enactments,
we must remember that statutes are cloaked with a
presumption of constitutionality. The challenger bears a
heavy burden, because it must prove the unconstitutionality
beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, “the challenger must
refute every reasonable basis upon which the statute could
be found to be constitutional.” Furthermore, if the statute is
capable of being construed in more than one manner, one of
which is constitutional, we must adopt that construction.
Thompson, 836 N.W.2d at 483 (quoting State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655,
661 (Iowa 2005)).
We first address Crooks’s claim that the waiver of a child to district
court for prosecution as a youthful offender under section 232.45(7)
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Then we address his
challenge to his fifty-year indeterminate sentence imposed under section
907.3A.
1. Whether the waiver process of section 232.45(7) constitutes
punishment. Crooks claims the waiver process constitutes punishment
because the decision to waive jurisdiction transfers a child from the
juvenile system, which focuses on rehabilitation, to the adult system,
which emphasizes incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence. See In re
14
M.M.C., 564 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 1997) (“[T]he primary goal of juvenile
justice in Iowa is rehabilitation, not punishment.”); see also State v.
Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 646 (Iowa 2012) (identifying “four legitimate
penological justifications: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation” (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2028 (2010))). The statutory waiver changes the forum from
juvenile court to district court, but with built-in protections for youthful
offenders.
In order to waive jurisdiction for the child to be tried as a youthful
offender, the juvenile court must make an individualized finding that
“there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child, prior to
the child’s eighteenth birthday, if the juvenile court retains jurisdiction
over the child.” Iowa Code § 232.45(7)(a)(3) (2011). After jurisdiction is
transferred from the juvenile court, the district court “shall, upon a plea
of guilty or a verdict of guilty, defer sentence of a youthful offender . . .
[and] transfer supervision of the youthful offender to the juvenile court
for disposition in accordance with section 232.52.” Id. § 907.3A(1)
(emphasis added). 4 A youthful offender is treated the same as a child
retained in the juvenile system until the child approaches age eighteen.
At that point,
4The legislature amended section 907.3A in 2013. See 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 42,
§ 15 (adding language directing court to consider a presentence investigation report, if
ordered, and renumbering the sentencing options for clarity). At the May 6, 2016
sentencing hearing, the court indicated the 2011 Code applied, and the parties agreed.
With regard to the sentencing options, the State noted, “The 2013 Code is clearly
written better than the 2011 Code section, and it’s the State’s opinion that that was the
purpose of amending the statute. We don’t believe that the 2013 [amendment] added
anything different[;] it just is easier to read.” The court agreed that the amendments
“merely clarified the 2011 statute” and concluded that both statutes provided “the same
options to the court.” We rely on the 2011 Code applied by the district court and the
parties but would reach the same conclusions under the 2013 amendment.
15
[t]he court shall hold a hearing prior to a youthful offender’s
eighteenth birthday to determine whether the youthful
offender shall continue on youthful offender status after the
youthful offender’s eighteenth birthday under the
supervision of the court or be discharged. . . . The court
shall make its decision after considering the services
available to the youthful offender, the evidence presented,
the juvenile court’s report, the interests of the youthful
offender, and interests of the community.
Id. § 907.3A(2). Adult punishment is discretionary with the district
court, which has the options of discharging the youthful offender,
“continu[ing] the youthful offender deferred sentence[,] or enter[ing] a
sentence, which may be a suspended sentence.” 5 Id. § 907.3A(2)–(3). As
a result, the decision to waive jurisdiction over a child for prosecution as
a youthful offender does not automatically subject the child to adult
criminal sanctions. Instead, the youthful offender provisions allow the
courts to wait until the child is nearly eighteen—and to see whether the
rehabilitative services provided in the juvenile system have been
effective—before determining how to proceed.
Waiver of a child for prosecution as a youthful offender is not a
decision to abandon efforts to rehabilitate the child. To the contrary, the
statutory scheme allows the state to focus on rehabilitating the child
while at the same time giving the state the option to retain supervision of
the child after the child’s eighteenth birthday if the court finds the child
cannot be rehabilitated within that time. The court is required to make
5Section 907.3A(3) limits the term of probation.
[I]f the district court either continues the youthful offender deferred
sentence or enters a sentence, suspends the sentence, and places the
youthful offender on probation, the term of formal supervision shall
commence upon entry of the order by the district court and may
continue for a period not to exceed five years.
Id. § 907.3A(3). The court could decide to impose a sentence of incarceration for a term
of years but does not have to do so. See id.
16
specific findings at each step of the process and has discretion with
regard to the disposition, including when the child reaches age eighteen.
We hold that the waiver process does not constitute punishment for
purposes of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.
Other courts have held waiver statutes allowing prosecution of
juveniles in adult court are not “punishment” for constitutional
purposes. See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 385 P.3d 5, 9 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016)
(“Being waived into adult court, whether mandatory or discretionary, is
not a punishment.”); People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 550–51 (Ill.
2014) (concluding that the automatic transfer statute does not impose
punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment or the analogous
state constitutional provision); State v. Mays, 18 N.E.3d 850, 861 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that provisions governing “whether a juvenile
case must be transferred to adult court for adjudication” do not impose
punishment); cf. State v. Rodriguez, 71 P.3d 919, 928 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003) (concluding that the transfer statute “does not subject th[e]
juvenile to enhanced punished [but instead] subjects the juvenile to the
adult criminal justice system”).
Crooks cites no case holding that a waiver statute transferring a
juvenile to adult court constitutes punishment under an Eighth
Amendment or comparable state constitutional analysis. He relies on
language in three cases that tangentially support his claim. In R.H. v.
State, the Alaska Court of Appeals explained,
Nor can juvenile waiver proceedings realistically be
said to affect “only the forum where the issue of guilt will be
adjudicated.” A juvenile waiver proceeding is the only
available avenue by which the state may seek to prosecute a
child as an adult.
17
777 P.2d 204, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). R.H. involved a claim that
“court-ordered evaluations infringed [R.H.’s] right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination”—not a claim that being tried as an adult
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 208. The Alaska
court was distinguishing juvenile waiver hearings from competency
proceedings in order to determine whether the court erred in requiring
“R.H. to submit to a psychiatric evaluation for the purpose of
determining his amenability to treatment as a child.” Id. at 210–11.
Crooks also cites Ramona R. v. Superior Court, in which the
California Supreme Court held that under the California Constitution,
“testimony a minor gives at a fitness hearing . . . may not be used against
him at a subsequent trial of the offense.” 693 P.2d 789, 795 (Cal. 1985)
(en banc). In support of this holding, the court stated that “the
certification of a juvenile offender to an adult court has been accurately
characterized as ‘the worst punishment the juvenile system is
empowered to inflict.’ ” Id. (quoting Note, Separating the Criminal from
the Delinquent: Due Process in Certification Procedure, 40 S. Cal. L. Rev.
158, 162 (1967)). The Ramona R. court was not addressing a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment but was instead considering whether “the
[trial] court erred in refusing to grant [the minor defendant] immunity
from use at trial of any statements she made in the fitness hearing or to
her probation officer.” Id. at 790. Finally, Crooks cites the dissent in
People v. Hana, stating “[t]here can . . . be no question regarding the
punitive nature of the decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction over [Hana].”
504 N.W.2d 166, 181 (Mich. 1993) (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). The
Michigan Supreme Court majority concluded that Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections do not apply to juvenile waiver hearings to
18
determine whether the defendant should be prosecuted as a juvenile or
as an adult. Id. at 169, 174 (majority opinion). The dissent concluded,
I would remand this case to the juvenile court for a hearing
to determine whether the statements and confessions
introduced and considered at phase II of [Hana]’s juvenile
waiver hearing were obtained in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent or his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
Id. at 183 (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). The Hana court was not
addressing a claim that the waiver constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.
Moreover, in all three cases, the child would be tried as an adult
and faced either life imprisonment or a prison sentence with a lengthy
mandatory minimum. See R.H., 777 P.2d at 210 (ninety-nine year
sentence with a mandatory minimum of twenty years); Ramona R., 693
P.2d at 795 (life imprisonment); Hana, 504 N.W.2d at 181 (mandatory life
sentence without parole). By contrast, Crooks was tried as a youthful
offender rather than as an adult and received a prison sentence with
immediate parole eligibility and no mandatory minimum. None of these
decisions persuade us that Iowa’s waiver provision for youthful offenders
constitutes punishment within the meaning of article I, section 17 of the
Iowa Constitution, much less cruel and unusual punishment.
2. Crooks’s categorical challenge to the sentence imposed under
section 907.3A. Crooks claims that sentencing a thirteen-year-old as a
youthful offender under section 907.3A violates article I, section 17 of the
Iowa Constitution. He urges us to adopt a categorical bar on imposing
punishment upon a child under the age of fourteen in adult court. We
begin our analysis with a brief overview of federal and state
jurisprudence on the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as it
relates to juvenile sentencing.
19
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as it relates to
juvenile sentencing in a trilogy of cases, expanding the categorical
challenges available to juvenile offenders challenging the death penalty
or mandatory sentences of life without parole. See generally Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham, 560 U.S. 48,
130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183
(2005). In Roper, the Supreme Court addressed the differences between
juveniles and adults, including that juveniles lack maturity and “are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures.” 543 U.S. at 569–70, 125 S. Ct. at 1195. The Court held that
“[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death
penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes
were committed.” Id. at 578, 125 S. Ct. at 1200. In Graham, the Court
held a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender for a
nonhomicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment. 560 U.S. at 82,
130 S. Ct. at 2034. In Miller, the Court held that a mandatory life
sentence for homicide without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth
Amendment. 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
We have applied the Roper–Graham–Miller reasoning under the
Iowa Constitution and “built upon it and extended its principles.” State
v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 832 (Iowa 2016). We held that the Iowa
Constitution requires an individualized sentencing hearing before
sentencing a juvenile offender to a lengthy mandatory minimum sentence
of imprisonment. See State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013)
(reversing thirty-five year mandatory minimum without the possibility of
parole); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013) (reversing 52.5-year
mandatory minimum prison term). Then, in State v. Lyle, we held that
20
any automatic mandatory minimum prison sentences for juvenile
offenders is unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of article I, section 17. 854 N.W.2d 378, 402–04 (Iowa 2014)
(holding an individualized sentencing hearing applying the Miller factors
is required for the imposition of a minimum sentence before parole
eligibility). In Sweet, we adopted “a categorical rule that juvenile
offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.”
879 N.W.2d at 839. 6
Crooks asks us to “take the next logical step and define at what
age a child may be subject to adult prosecution and punishment” by
adopting a categorical bar on sentencing an eighteen-year old in adult
court for a crime committed at age thirteen. In considering whether to
adopt a categorical approach to a class of offenders under the cruel and
6In response to Miller and related Iowa caselaw, the Iowa General Assembly in
2015 amended the statutory provisions relating to the sentencing of juveniles who
commit class “A” felonies. See Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 840 (Cady, C.J., concurring
specially) (explaining that the 2015 amendment, which provided for a hearing and
identified circumstances the court must consider, “addressed the constitutional
deficiency identified in Miller and in our cases that followed”). The previous version of
the statute required a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years for a juvenile
convicted of a class “A” felony that was not first-degree murder and prohibited parole
for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder. Iowa Code § 902.1(2) (2015). Under the
amended statute, a juvenile who commits first-degree murder shall be sentenced to
(1) life without parole unless the governor commutes the sentence to a term of years,
(2) life with the possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of confinement, or
(3) life with the possibility of parole (with no minimum term of confinement). 2015 Iowa
Acts ch. 65, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(a) (2016)). A juvenile who commits a
class “A” felony that is not first-degree murder shall be sentenced to either (1) life with
the possibility of parole after serving a minimum term of confinement or (2) life with the
possibility of parole (with no minimum term of confinement). 2015 Iowa Acts ch. 65,
§ 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 902.1(3)(a) (2016)). Sweet’s categorical prohibition on life-
without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders eliminated that sentencing option in the
2015 enactment. See Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 840 (“[T]he new statutory scheme adopted
by our legislature for sentencing juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder to
life without the possibility of parole violates the cruel and unusual punishment
clause.”). State v. Zarate rejected a facial challenge to the remaining provisions of
section 902.1(2). ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2018).
21
unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17, we apply the two-step
approach used by the United States Supreme Court under the Eighth
Amendment. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 835 (majority opinion). We first
consider whether there is a consensus—or at least an emerging
consensus—to guide our consideration of the question. Id. We then
“exercise our independent judgment to determine whether to follow a
categorical approach.” Id. In exercising our independent judgment, we
are “guided by ‘the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and
by [our] own understanding and interpretation of the [Iowa
Constitution’s] text, history, meaning, and purpose.’ ” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d
at 386 (alterations in original) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 130
S. Ct. at 2022). We also “consider ‘the culpability of the offenders at
issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity
of the punishment in question.’ ” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 67,
130 S. Ct. at 2026).
“Substantial deference is afforded the legislature in setting the
penalty for crimes.” State v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa 2000)
(rejecting constitutional challenges to fifty-year indeterminate sentence
for second-degree murder). 7 In Lyle, we discussed in the context of
7The United States Supreme Court has observed that “the ‘clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country’s legislatures.’ ” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247
(2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989),
abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 2252); see also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174–76, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925–26 (1976) (basing Eighth
Amendment analysis on state legislative judgments as reflecting the moral values of the
American people). Chief Justice Roberts recently noted,
This Court’s precedents have emphasized the importance of state
legislative judgments in giving content to the Eighth Amendment ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. . . . The “clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values” comes from state legislative
judgments. Such legislative judgments are critical because in “a
democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to
22
juvenile sentencing the deference owed to the elected branches under our
separation of powers and reiterated that “[l]egislative judgments can be
‘the most reliable objective indicators of community standards for
purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.’ ”
854 N.W.2d at 388 (quoting State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 873
(Iowa 2009)). We added, “Just as we typically ‘owe substantial deference
to the penalties the legislature has established for various crimes,’ we
owe equal deference to the legislature when it expands the discretion of
the court in juvenile sentencing.” Id. (quoting Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 650).
We elaborated on the importance of the discretion afforded our courts
when adjudicating juvenile offenders:
Here, the legislative decision to back away from mandatory
sentencing for most crimes committed by juveniles weakens
the notion of a consensus in favor of the practice of blindly
sentencing juveniles based on the crime committed. In fact,
it helps illustrate a building consensus in this state to treat
juveniles in our courts differently than adults.
Actually, the statutory recognition of the need for some
discretion when sentencing juveniles is consistent with our
overall approach in the past in dealing with juveniles.
Primarily, the juvenile justice chapter of our Code gives
courts considerable discretion to take action in the best
interests of the child.
Id. Iowa’s youthful offender statutes require appropriate factual findings
for discretionary, individualized waiver, and sentencing determinations.
_______________________
the will and consequently the moral values of the people.” And we have
focused on state enactments in this realm because of the “deference we
owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system
. . . where the specification of punishments is concerned.” For these
reasons, we have described state legislative judgments as providing
“essential instruction” in conducting the Eighth Amendment inquiry.
Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1056–57 (2017) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (first quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312, 122 S. Ct. at 2247; then quoting
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175, 96 S. Ct. at 2926; then quoting id. at 176, 96 S. Ct. at 2926;
then quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 564, 125 S. Ct. at 1192).
23
See Iowa Code § 232.45(7)(a); id. § 907.3A(2). For that reason, we
uphold the legislature’s enactment permitting prosecution of thirteen-
year-old defendants as youthful offenders in district court upon the
requisite judicial findings.
Crooks acknowledges that twenty-one states authorize children
under the age of fourteen to be prosecuted and punished as adults. 8 He
8See Alaska Stat. Ann. § 47.12.100 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.
& 4th Spec. Sess. of the 30th Leg.) (no lower age limit); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-
518(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 85 of the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 71st Gen. Assemb.
(2018)) (age twelve or older for discretionary waiver for specified offenses); Ga. Code
Ann. §§ 15-11-560 to -561 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Sess. of Gen. Assemb.) (age
thirteen or older for exclusive adult jurisdiction for specified offenses and for
discretionary transfer for specified offenses); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 20-508 to -509 (West,
Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 64th Idaho Leg.) (under age fourteen for
discretionary waiver for specified offenses); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/5-805(3), -
810 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-582 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (age thirteen or older
for discretionary wavier and for extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (Westlaw through ch. 351 of the 2017 2d Reg. Sess.) (no
lower age limit); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-151, -157 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
Sess.) (age thirteen or older for exclusive adult jurisdiction for specified offenses; age
thirteen and older for discretionary waiver); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.071 (West, Westlaw
through 2d Extraordinary Sess. of the 99th Gen. Assemb.) (age twelve or older for
discretionary transfer); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206 (West, Westlaw through 2017
Sess.) (age twelve or older for discretionary transfer for specified offenses); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 62B.390 (West, Westlaw through 79th Reg. Sess. (2017)) (age thirteen or
older for discretionary transfer for murder or attempted murder); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 628:1(II) (Westlaw through ch. 7 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (age thirteen or older for
discretionary waiver for specified offenses); N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00(2) (McKinney,
Westlaw through L.2018, ch. 1 to 3) (age thirteen or older to be criminally responsible
for specified offenses); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7B-2200 (West, Westlaw through 2017
Reg. Sess.) (age thirteen or older for transfer for felonies); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A, § 2-
5-101 (West, Westlaw through ch. 6 & 7 of 2d Extraordinary Sess. of the 56th Leg.)
(child age thirteen or older charged with first-degree murder shall be considered an
adult); 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Ann. § 6302 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Act
10) (excluding murder from the definition of “delinquent act”); 14 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §
14-1-7 to -7.1 (West, Westlaw through ch. 480 of the Jan. 2017 Sess.) (no lower age
limit for discretionary waiver for offense punishable by life imprisonment if committed
by an adult); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1210 (Westlaw through 2018 Act No. 133) (no
lower age limit for discretionary transfer for murder or criminal sexual conduct); S.D.
Codified Laws § 26-8C-2 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. effective Mar. 23, 2018 &
Supreme Court Rule 17-12) (age ten or older to be “delinquent child”); id. § 26-11-4
(delinquent child charged with felony may be tried in circuit court); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 37-1-134 (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess., effective through Mar. 22,
2018) (no lower age limit for discretionary waiver for specified offenses); Vt. Stat. Ann.
24
also concedes that there appears to be no consensus on the minimum
age to hold children criminally responsible. But he notes that
“consensus is not dispositive.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 387 (alteration
omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421, 128 S. Ct.
2641, 2650 (2008)).
Crooks relies on a recent study authored by Jeree Thomas, Policy
Director at the Campaign for Youth Justice (CFYJ), entitled Raising the
Bar: State Trends in Keeping Youth Out of Adult Courts (2015-2017),
http://cfyj.org/images/A-StateTrends_Report-Web.pdf. The focus of that
report is on legislative reform efforts. See id. at 38. The report cites no
judicial decisions invalidating enactments allowing or requiring transfer
of youthful offenders to adult court. Rather, the report urges state
legislatures to raise the minimum age for prosecution as adults. See id.
at 7–8 (noting “[f]our states have passed laws to raise the age of juvenile
court jurisdiction so that 16- and/or 17-year-olds are not automatically
prosecuted as adults”). The report also advocates restoring judicial
discretion on waiver and transfer decisions lacking in many states. See
id. at 35. The Iowa youthful offender laws already provide for such
judicial discretion. We agree with the CFYJ that policy-based arguments
for juvenile sentencing reform should be directed to the legislature.
We next exercise our independent judgment. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d
at 386. In doing so, we decline to adopt the categorical bar Crooks
requests because the individualized protections available to youthful
offenders do not offend Lyle or its progeny. The juvenile court must
_______________________
tit. 33, § 5204 (West, Westlaw through Adjourned Sess. of the 2017–2018 Vt. Gen.
Assemb.) (age twelve to fourteen for discretionary transfer for specified offenses); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 938.183 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 142) (age ten or older for
exclusive adult court jurisdiction for specified offenses).
25
conduct an individualized hearing and consider specified factors before
deciding to waive jurisdiction to permit the defendant to be tried as a
youthful offender. After the youthful offender is found guilty, the district
court must transfer supervision back to the juvenile court for disposition
under section 232.52, which requires the juvenile court to “enter the
least restrictive dispositional order appropriate” in view of additional
factors. Then, the district court, after conducting another individualized
hearing prior to the youthful offender’s eighteenth birthday, has the
discretion to select one of four sentencing options: (1) discharge the
youthful offender from the court’s jurisdiction, (2) continue the deferred
sentence for a term not to exceed five years, (3) impose a suspended
sentence and place the youthful offender on probation for a period not to
exceed five years, or (4) impose an indeterminate sentence with or
without a mandatory minimum. See Iowa Code § 907.3A. These
statutorily mandated individualized hearings are consistent with the
constitutional protections we required in Lyle.
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court explained that “the
discretion available to a judge at the transfer stage cannot substitute for
discretion at post-trial sentencing in adult court—and so cannot satisfy
the Eighth Amendment.” 567 U.S. at 489, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. The Court
elaborated,
Even when States give transfer-stage discretion to
judges, it has limited utility. First, the decisionmaker
typically will have only partial information at this early,
pretrial stage about either the child or the circumstances of
his offense. . . . The key moment for the exercise of
discretion is the transfer—and as Miller’s case shows, the
judge often does not know then what she will learn, about
the offender or the offense, over the course of the
proceedings.
Second and still more important, the question at
transfer hearings may differ dramatically from the issue at a
26
post-trial sentencing. Because many juvenile systems
require that the offender be released at a particular age or
after a certain number of years, transfer decisions often
present a choice between extremes: light punishment as a
child or standard sentencing as an adult (here, life without
parole). In many States, for example, a child convicted in
juvenile court must be released from custody by the age of
21. Discretionary sentencing in adult court would provide
different options: There, a judge or jury could choose, rather
than a life-without-parole sentence, a lifetime prison term
with the possibility of parole or a lengthy term of years. [I]t
is easy to imagine a judge deciding that a minor deserves a
(much) harsher sentence than he would receive in juvenile
court, while still not thinking life-without-parole appropriate.
Id. at 488–89, 132 S. Ct. at 2474–75 (citations omitted).
We conclude the Iowa youthful offender statutes provide the
discretionary, individualized posttrial sentencing that Miller requires.
Indeed, the Iowa statutes go beyond what Miller requires: instead of the
district court imposing a sentence immediately after the initial
determination of guilt, the district court is required to transfer
supervision of the youthful offender back to the juvenile court until he or
she reaches age eighteen. Only upon the offender’s eighteenth birthday
does the district court select among the sentencing options in section
907.3A. This provides additional time (nearly five years from age thirteen
for Crooks) to track the juvenile offender’s progress towards
rehabilitation before imposing any prison sentence. We reject Crooks’s
challenge to section 907.3A under article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution.
D. The District Court’s Discretion to Impose the Prison
Sentence. Crooks also claims the district court abused its discretion in
imposing a sentence of an indeterminate term of incarceration not to
exceed fifty years. As quoted above, the court explained in great detail
the reasons for its sentence. Crooks argues the district court abused its
discretion in three ways: (1) by overlooking other available options
27
besides incarceration or street probation, (2) by failing to apply the
Miller/Lyle factors, and (3) by imposing incarceration. We address each
of these claims in turn.
1. Considering the available options. Crooks claims the district
court failed to recognize the sentencing options available and therefore
failed to properly exercise its discretion. Cf. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 272
(“When a sentence is not mandatory, the district court must exercise its
discretion . . . .” (quoting State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 433 (Iowa
2005))). He specifically points to the judge’s statements, “I’ve got
probation on the one hand or I’ve got an indeterminate term not to
exceed 50 years on the other hand,” and “[s]o, simply stated, I have two
options at this point in time. One is some type of street probation and
the other would be a term of incarceration.”
Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong
presumption in their favor. State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa
2015). “A defendant therefore has the burden to provide a record
showing that the court abused its discretion.” State v. Ayers, 590
N.W.2d 25, 29 (Iowa 1999). Crooks has failed to meet this burden. The
record shows that the district court was aware of the options available to
it. The court knew that discharge was an option and explicitly rejected
that option: “I don’t believe that a straight discharge at this time is
appropriate.” The court also acknowledged the five-year limit on
probation and stated, “I’m also concerned, when we talk about the
appropriateness of street probation, that you have made the comment
that you really don’t think you have any need for future services.” This
shows the court understood that it could impose conditions on
probation.
28
Additionally, “a sentencing court need only explain its reasons for
selecting the sentence imposed and need not explain its reasons for
rejecting a particular sentencing option.” Id. at 28. The court explained
why it was imposing incarceration:
I am hopeful, but I’m not yet convinced, that it is safe
for you to be free despite your young age. The lack of an
appropriate emotional response, the lack of empathy, the
lack of something that even approaches an adequate
explanation for why this happened could be an indication
that you just don’t care. We just don’t know yet. That’s the
point, we don’t know. And I don’t believe it’s appropriate to
release you on probation until we can be confident that that
isn’t the situation, but rather that you do care and that we
don’t have to worry about something like this happening
down the road. And, in short, we need more time so that we
can be confident in that determination.
So I do believe that the imposition of a sentence with
incarceration is appropriate, and to that end it is necessary
that I enter conviction.
The court did not fail to consider the available options and explained why
it selected the sentence it imposed. The court therefore did not abuse its
discretion.
2. Failing to consider the Miller/Lyle factors. Crooks also claims
that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the
Miller factors. He cites Null for the proposition that, in sentencing a
juvenile as an adult when a mandatory minimum sentence is an option,
the district court must also “undertake an analysis of ‘[e]verything . . .
said in Roper and Graham’ about youth.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74
(alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 476, 132 S. Ct. at
2467). Under Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life sentences without the
possibility of parole for offenders under eighteen at the time of their
crimes. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. These factors are
29
(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful
behavior, such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the particular
“family and home environment” that surround the youth; (3)
the circumstances of the particular crime and all
circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role
in the commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for
youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal
process; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the
capacity for change.
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132
S. Ct. at 2468). In Lyle, we extended the holding of Miller to require the
district court to expressly consider the Miller/Lyle factors before
imposing any mandatory minimum sentence on a juvenile offender. Id.
(“[T]he portion of the statutory schema requiring a juvenile to serve
seventy percent of the period of incarceration before parole eligibility may
not be imposed without a prior determination by the district court that
the minimum period of incarceration without parole is warranted under
the factors identified in Miller and further explained in Null.”). In State v.
Roby, we required the district court to consider “the relevant mitigating
factors of youth” before imposing a minimum term of incarceration before
the juvenile offender is eligible for parole. 897 N.W.2d 127, 148 (Iowa
2017). In State v. White, we emphasized the importance of expert
testimony to support a minimum period of incarceration. 903 N.W.2d
331, 333 (Iowa 2017).
Crooks argues on appeal that, because a minimum period of
incarceration before parole eligibility was an available option, the district
court was required to consider the Miller/Lyle factors “on the record.”
The State responds that the court is only required to consider the
Miller/Lyle factors if it contemplates imposing a mandatory minimum
sentence. In State v. Propps, we expressly “decline[d] to extend the
requirement of a Miller individualized sentencing hearing to juvenile
30
defendants who are not subject to a mandatory minimum period of
incarceration.” 897 N.W.2d 91, 104 (Iowa 2017). We explained,
Because an indeterminate sentence allows for immediate
eligibility for parole, a juvenile is able to demonstrate to the
parole board whether he or she appreciated the harm done
and utilized the options available for reform. If rehabilitation
has not yet occurred, the parole board may make the
decision to continue incarceration until the juvenile has
demonstrated through his or her own actions the ability to
appreciate the severity of the crime. This is consistent with
the approach of our prior holdings in the area of juvenile
sentencing, because it allows for a realistic and meaningful
opportunity for parole upon the juvenile’s demonstration of
maturity and rehabilitation.
Id. at 102. We therefore held that “a meaningful, reasonable, and
immediate opportunity for parole . . . is all that is required under our
decision in Lyle and the United States and Iowa Constitutions.” Id. at
104. As the concurring opinion observed, “[t]he constitutional
protections we have recognized do not target mandatory incarceration of
juvenile offenders, but [their] mandatory incarceration . . . with no
opportunity during the period of incarceration to show the greater
likelihood of rehabilitation and reform has occurred.” Id. at 105 (Cady,
C.J., specially concurring); cf. State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 622,
626 (Iowa 2017) (declining to require consideration of Miller/Lyle factors
before imposing $150,000 restitution award on a juvenile homicide
offender).
When sentencing Crooks, the district court expressly declined to
consider imposing a mandatory minimum.
[I]f incarceration is ordered there’s no mandatory minimum.
The State is not seeking that. . . . And so when I sentence
someone to incarceration I don’t say, “I sentence you to 50
years,” I say, “I sentence you to an indeterminate term not to
exceed 50 years,” and at that point in time the Board of
Parole takes over and makes a determination as to when a
person should be released from prison. And so it’s important
31
to keep in mind that even though people throw around 50
years, it doesn’t mean 50 years, at least not necessarily.
Under Propps, no hearing on the Miller/Lyle factors was required to
sentence Crooks to prison with immediate eligibility for parole. 897
N.W.2d at 102, 104.
Nevertheless, we reiterate that “[a] sentencing court is to consider
any mitigating circumstances relating to a defendant.” State v. Witham,
583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998). These include the circumstances of
youth and, specifically, any applicable Miller/Lyle factors. See State v.
Zarate, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2018) (“We also hold that the district
court’s consideration of any potential aggravating factors . . . shall align
with our juvenile sentencing jurisprudence so as not to overwhelm the
mitigating factors associated with youth, especially the five factors of
youth set forth in Lyle.”). Once the sentencing court declines to impose a
minimum period of incarceration without parole, the Miller/Lyle factors
remain relevant in considering the remaining sentencing options, along
with all other mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Yet the court is
not required to specifically examine and apply each factor on the record
at this point but considers all relevant factors in exercising its discretion
to select the proper sentencing option. We may find an abuse of
discretion “[i]f a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that
should have received significant weight.” Zarate, ___ N.W.2d at ___
(alteration in original) (quoting Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 138).
The record reveals the sentencing court addressed a variety of
factors in response to the evidence and argument presented by Crooks,
including those Miller/Lyle factors identified by Crooks. We find no
abuse of discretion. As a result, we turn to address the final argument
32
by Crooks that the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing
incarceration.
3. Imposing sentence of incarceration. Crooks additionally claims
the district court abused its discretion by imposing incarceration. He
asserts that the court imposed incarceration based on “the belief that
Crooks is not rehabilitated and poses a potential danger to society” and
that the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing does not support
this conclusion. We disagree.
The court was required to “make its decision after considering the
services available to the youthful offender, the evidence presented, the
juvenile court’s report, the interests of the youthful offender, and
interests of the community.” Iowa Code § 907.3A(2). “[O]ur task on
appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but
to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.”
State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002)). A district court has not
abused its discretion if the evidence supports the sentence. Id.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing a sentence of incarceration. Dr. Michael Taylor, who evaluated
Crooks in 2012, emphasized in his August 12, 2012 report,
With a strong degree of medical certainty, I can state
that the prospects for rehabilitating Noah Crooks prior to his
eighteenth birthday are nil. He has no psychiatric illness
(which had any impact on his actions) which might be
treated—absent a brain transplant. He appears to not be
capable of experiencing guilt and/or remorse. He is not
capable of considering the impact that his actions might
have on others—except himself. His actions vis-à-vis the
murder of his mother were part and parcel of deeply-
ingrained personality traits which have been present for
years, despite his relative youth, and will continue to be
present for the foreseeable future. There is no treatment
known to man that can change these personality traits as
Noah grows older. It is highly probable, however, that Noah
33
will become more skilled at “saying the right things” to cover
up his severe psychopathology until he is no longer in a
secure facility.
Dr. Augspurger, a psychiatrist who evaluated Crooks both in 2013 and
in 2016, concluded after the 2016 evaluation that Crooks does not have
a diagnosable mental disorder. Dr. Augspurger stated that “it cannot
still be said that [Crooks] is developing an Antisocial Personality Disorder
since he has not outwardly displayed evidence for the behavior required
to substantiate such a diagnostic development since admission [at the
State Training School].” But Dr. Augspurger concluded,
This could all be illusion, but it could just as well be reality
and I would certainly rather have him being productive and
behaving in a prosocial manner compared with the opposite.
If one believes in the purpose of having a separate juvenile
judicial system, that it is possible and desirable to educate
and train young people in the hopes of changing them, then
one must be hopeful that he is a successful product of that
system. However, I have no ability to predict the future and
cannot offer assurances one way or the other.
Dr. Augspurger’s equivocal opinions did not compel the district court to
discharge Crooks or release him on probation. The district court acted
within its discretion by imposing an indeterminate sentence of
incarceration not to exceed fifty years, with immediate eligibility for
parole and no mandatory minimum term.
IV. Disposition.
For these reasons, we affirm Crooks’s judgment of conviction and
sentence.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Appel, Wiggins, and Hecht, JJ., who
concur in part and dissent in part.
34
#16–0851, State v. Crooks
APPEL, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority’s disposition with respect to some
aspects of this case, but would vacate the decision of the district court
and remand the case for consideration of the Lyle factors before
convicting and sentencing Crooks. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378,
404 n.10 (Iowa 2014); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).
I. Statutory Interpretation Regarding Age Floor.
On the question of statutory interpretation, I agree with the
majority that the legislature did not establish a floor for the age of a child
who might be treated as a youthful offender. Iowa Code section 232.45
(2011) sets out two paths for waiving children into district court. Under
section 232.45(6), a child who is fourteen years of age or older may be
tried as an adult. Under section 232.45(7)(a), a child who is fifteen years
of age or younger may be tried as a youthful offender. The notion that a
juvenile transfer statute has no lower limit is not a stranger to the law.
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 486 & n.14, 132 S. Ct. at 2473 & n.14 (citing
statutes). We should be hesitant to read language into a statute absent a
compelling reason to do so. See State v. Nicoletto, 862 N.W.2d 621, 625
(Iowa 2015); State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 177–78 & n.6 (Iowa 2013);
see also State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 150 (Iowa 2018) (Appel, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
II. Categorical Constitutional Attack on Trying Thirteen-Year-
Olds as Youthful Offenders.
The notion that juvenile offenders should be subject to transfer
with adult criminal sanction regimes has been subject to attack in the
literature. One prominent authority has argued that juvenile offenders
35
should never be integrated with adult offenders and should not be
incarcerated beyond the age of twenty-five. See Christopher Slobogin,
Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and Expanded
Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 103, 104–05, 131 (2013).
Other attacks on transfer of children to adult court focus on automatic
transfers, transfers arising out of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
and the imposition of mandatory sentencing schemes applicable to
adults upon transfer. See Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children Are Different:
Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4
Cal. L. Rev. Cir. 92, 102–03 (2013).
The lack of an age floor in a statute that may lead to transfer is
potentially problematic as certainly at some point very young children
simply cannot be held criminally culpable consistent with the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution. The Iowa statute, however, allows district courts to make
the question of whether a thirteen-year-old child is potentially exposed to
criminal sanctions on a case-by-case basis. See Iowa Code § 232.45(9). 9
Sometimes, however, case-by-case evaluations under multifactor
tests are so arbitrary that a categorical rule is preferable and even
constitutionally required. This is particularly true when we attempt to
predict future behavior. In State v. Sweet, for instance, we announced a
categorical rule that life without the possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders would not be permitted in large part because it was simply
impossible to determine with any accuracy which juvenile offender is so
9The common law set a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit any
felony at the age of fourteen. Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can
Malice Supply the Want of Years?, 86 Tulane L. Rev. 309, 317 (2011). The common law
allowed the presumption to be rebutted by strong and clear evidence that the juvenile
possessed the necessary understanding and judgment to form criminal intent. Id.
36
incorrigible that no “second look” should be permitted. 879 N.W.2d 811,
838–39 (Iowa 2016). Given the very high stakes, we declined to allow life
without the possibility of parole to be imposed by a trial court through
what would necessarily be a highly inaccurate and unreliable case-by-
case assessment. Id. at 839.
The question in this case for the purpose of the relatively narrow
constitutional question presented is whether a district court can, with
any degree of reliability, determine which offending children who are
thirteen years of age are not likely to be rehabilitated by age eighteen.
While Sweet teaches us to exercise great caution before making broad
declarations about future behavior, the issue in this case is different
from Sweet in three critical respects.
First, the nature of the prediction required under the statute,
though difficult, is less problematic than in Sweet. The question of
determining which child will need rehabilitative services after five years
of juvenile rehabilitation is at least arguably less troublesome than
predicting who will ultimately be found to be incorrigible or irredeemably
corrupt after full character development and maturity. While there is a
professional consensus among psychiatrists that accurate, long-term
assessment of juveniles is impossible, there is no such consensus on the
inability to assess those who need relatively short-term rehabilitative
services. See id. at 838–39 (noting that professional psychologists
disclaim the ability to accurately predict which juveniles will be
incapable of rehabilitation).
Second, the statute contains a look-back provision. Iowa Code
§ 907.3A(2). As a result, the consequences of an initial determination
that a child will be treated as a youthful offender does not eliminate a
timely second look but, in fact, embraces it. Prior to the second look, the
37
child will be in the hands of juvenile authorities charged with providing
appropriate services and not in the hands of adult correctional officials
meting out punishment. Id. § 907.3A(1). The second-look feature of the
statute thus provides a critical check on the potential of arbitrary and
irrational imposition of incarceration on a child. The statute thus does
not provide for automatic transfer into adult court, an approach that
would be constitutionally suspect because of the absence of an
individualized determination under Miller and Lyle principles.
Third, the consequence of the determination that a child is a
youthful offender is less consequential than in Sweet. In Sweet, the
consequence was incarceration for life with no meaningful opportunity to
show rehabilitation and maturity. 879 N.W.2d at 840 (Cady, C.J.,
concurring specially). Here, a youthful offender, even if ultimately
subject to a criminal sentence, is not exposed to a mandatory minimum
adult sentence because of our ruling in Lyle barring the mandatory
imposition of minimum sentences for children. As a result, the
consequence of being found to be a youthful offender and ultimately
subject to a criminal penalty does not lead to an arbitrary and irrational
imposition of an adult mandatory minimum sentence on a child.
Yet, it must be recognized that transfer statutes may ultimately
pose certain risks. For instance, a youth who is ultimately incarcerated
may lack access to resources sufficient to provide a reasonable means to
achieve maturity and rehabilitation. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (“The absence of an affirmative program of
training and rehabilitation may have constitutional significance where in
the absence of such a program conditions and practices exist which
actually militate against reform and rehabilitation.”), aff’d 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971); Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for
38
Release: Graham, Miller and California’s Youth Offender Parole Hearings,
40 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 245, 286 (2016) (emphasizing that
access to rehabilitative programs are essential to providing juvenile
offenders a meaningful opportunity for release); Sally Terry Green,
Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the States
Must Provide Meaningful Opportunities for Release, 16 Berkeley J. Crim.
L. 1, 26 (2011) (providing education and treatment programs “comply
with Graham’s mandate for meaningful opportunity for release”);
Elizabeth Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional
Framework, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 675, 712 (2016) [hereinafter Scott] (“[A]
meaningful opportunity to reform requires a correctional setting that
promotes healthy psychological development.”). That, however, is not so
much a categorical challenge to the Iowa transfer statute as it is a fact-
based challenge to conditions of incarceration.
Although the statute approaches the border of constitutionality, in
light of its limiting features, I am not prepared to say, at least at this
time, that the statute is categorically infirm in this case under article I,
section 17 of the Iowa Constitution at least as applied to thirteen-year-
old children. The lower the age of the child, of course, the greater the
risk of crossing the constitutional line, and it may well be that at age
thirteen we are very close to it. Nonetheless, at present, I am inclined
not to strike it down on the grounds that the implementation of the
statute with respect to thirteen-year-olds is so irrational as to
categorically amount to cruel and unusual punishment under article I,
section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Instead of categorically striking
down the statute, I think the better course is to permit challenges on an
as-applied basis. No as-applied challenge is raised in this case. I would
revisit the issue, however, if in practice, application of Miller and Lyle
39
principles on discretionary decisions under the statute prove arbitrary,
inconsistent, or unworkable.
III. Challenges to District Court Sentencing.
A. Awareness of Sentencing Options. The first issue is whether
the district court recognized the breadth of its discretion under the
applicable statute. If the district court did not recognize the scope of its
discretion, a remand for resentencing is required. State v. Thomas, 547
N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1996) (per curiam); State v. Sandifer, 570 N.W.2d
256, 257 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). The defendant bears the burden of
showing that the district court was unaware of its discretion to impose a
particular sentence. State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Iowa 1999).
Under the statute, the district court has several options for
disposition of a youthful offender—
[T]he court may continue the youthful offender deferred
sentence or enter a sentence, which may be a suspended
sentence. . . . [I]f the district court either continues the
youthful offender deferred sentence or enters a sentence,
suspends the sentence, and places the youthful offender on
probation, the term of formal supervision shall commence
upon entry of the order by the district court and may
continue for a period not to exceed five years. If the district
court enters a sentence of confinement, and the youthful
offender was previously placed in secure confinement by the
juvenile court under the terms of the initial disposition order
or any modification to the initial disposition order, the
person shall receive credit for any time spent in secure
confinement.
Iowa Code § 907.3A(3).
At the hearing on sentencing, the district court made extensive
comments. The commentary twice affirmatively stated that the court
believed the choice was between incarceration and some type of street
probation. The district court said,
40
So, simply stated, I have two options at this point in time.
One is some type of street probation and the other would be
a term of incarceration . . . .
Then, after observing the statute was “not particularly well drafted,” the
district court declared, “I’ve got probation on the one hand or I’ve got an
indeterminate term not to exceed 50 years on the other hand.” There is
nothing in the record to show that these affirmative statements regarding
limited options were based on anything other than the district court’s
view of the statute.
The statute, however, authorized the district court to defer or
suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation, with the
level of supervision to be determined under section 901B.1 by the district
department of corrections. Id. § 907.3A(3); id. § 901B.1. Section 901B.1
provides for a corrections continuum of varying levels of restrictiveness,
including community-based and residential treatment facilities. Id.
§ 901B.1(1)(c)(1). Similarly, section 907.3A(3) provides that the district
court could have deferred or suspended the sentence and placed Crooks
on probation with such terms and conditions that it chose, including
commitment to an alternate jail facility or a community-based correction
residential treatment facility. Id. § 907.3A(3).
The district court, twice, stated on the record that the choices were
“street probation” or incarceration. Nothing in the transcript of the
sentencing or dispositional hearing indicates that the district court
understood it had the possibility of confining Crooks under the
corrections continuum of Iowa Code section 901B.1 and that such
confinement could include a residential treatment facility or community-
based correction facility. Indeed, the entire discussion of the district
court on sentencing suggests that it considered only two options, street
probation or incarceration. For instance, the district court stated, “I
41
don’t believe it’s appropriate to release you on probation” as driving the
court into a sentencing option without considering other dispositions.
It may be, of course, that the district court was, in fact,
subjectively aware of the other options, but we can only proceed by
analyzing the affirmative statements made on the record in this case.
The record suggests the district court believed it had two stark choices
and not a continuum of choices. I would thus remand for resentencing.
See Thomas, 547 N.W.2d at 225 (noting it would be an abuse of
discretion in sentencing if the district court was unaware of its discretion
in imposing sentencing options); Sandifer, 570 N.W.2d at 257 (explaining
the record must reveal the sentencing court in fact exercised discretion
in regard to the range of sentencing options).
B. Consideration of Lyle Factors. The next question is whether
the court abused its discretion in sentencing Crooks. Under our
caselaw, the district court must consider any mitigating factors. See,
e.g., State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 102 (Iowa 2017); State v. Witham,
583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam); State v. Draper, 457
N.W.2d 600, 605 (Iowa 1990).
We have repeatedly said “children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 395
(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S. Ct. at 2464); see also Propps, 897
N.W.2d at 99; State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 119 (Iowa 2013). The
differences include “distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and
environmental vulnerabilities,” Miller, 567 U.S. at 473, 132 S. Ct. at
2465, including a “lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, vulnerability to peer pressure, and the less fixed nature of
the juvenile’s character,” State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 74 (Iowa 2013);
see also Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 832–33; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115 n.6.
42
We have emphasized that the constitutionally significant distinction
between adults and children is applicable to all crimes, not just some
crimes. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 831; Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 399; Null, 836
N.W.2d at 71. 10
As noted by the leading recognized authorities in the field, the
developmental principle that children are constitutionally different has
broad application. See Scott, 88 Temp. L. Rev. at 707–12 (urging broad
application of developmental principle that children are different and
citing Lyle as example). The principle is applicable to other sanctions
and not just the severe sanctions discussed in the cases of the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 707. Indeed, the principle that children
are different should inform “policies regulating the sentencing of
juveniles whenever they are dealt with in the adult system.” Id. It makes
no sense at all to say, for instance, that the mitigating characteristics of
youth apply only for minimum sentencing and not, for instance, for
discretionary sentencing for a term of years. See Barry C. Feld, The
Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the Time, 11
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 107, 147 (2013). The majority correctly finds that
the features of children described in Lyle and our other juvenile cases are
mitigating factors that must be considered in any and all contexts
involving discretionary sentencing of defendants who committed crimes
10We have repeatedly applied the principle that children are constitutionally
different in factual settings beyond Roper, Graham, and Miller. In Null, we applied the
children-are-different principle in the context of aggregate sentencing. 836 N.W.2d at
73. In Lyle, we applied the children-are-different principle to categorically strike down
mandatory minimums. 854 N.W.2d at 400. In Sweet, we applied the children-are-
different principle to categorically strike down life-without-the-possibility-of-parole
sentences. 879 N.W.2d at 839.
43
as children. This makes sense in a criminal justice system where
culpability is a cornerstone of proportional punishment. 11
The remaining question is whether we should require a district
court to make specific findings regarding consideration of the mitigating
factors of youth when sentencing children in adult court. We have
required such specific findings in the context of the case-by-case
determination of whether a sentencing court should impose an adult
minimum sentence on a child offender. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545,
557 (Iowa 2015); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71, 74. We have stated that Miller
requires “more than a generalized notion of taking age into consideration
as a factor in sentencing.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402 n.8 (quoting Null,
836 N.W.2d at 74). We require consideration of
(1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of
youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and
home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent
of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way
familial and peer pressures may have affected [the youth]”;
(4) the “incompetencies associated with youth—for example,
[the youth’s] inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or [the youth’s]
incapacity to assist [the youth’s] own attorneys”; and (5) “the
possibility of rehabilitation.”
11At the district court, Crooks argued that the imposition of a fifty-year prison
term went against the common law tradition that young children could not form intent
and that the sentence “would run counter to the recent scholarly literature on the
subject of juvenile punishment, and which literature the Iowa Supreme Court relied
upon in its recent cruel and unusual punishment cases dealing with juvenile
offenders.” Crooks further cited Graham v. Florida as outlining the features of youth to
be considered in sentencing, namely their lack of maturity, social development, and risk
analysis ability, as well as their susceptibility to familial and peer pressure. 560 U.S.
48, 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
44
Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 570 (alterations in original) (quoting Ragland, 836
N.W.2d at 115 n.6); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132 S. Ct. at
2468.
The requirement of specific findings on mitigating factors in the
minimum-sentencing context serves three purposes. It ensures that the
mitigating Lyle and Miller factors of youth have been considered, that the
Lyle and Miller factors are treated as mitigating and not aggravating
factors, and that the heinous character of the crimes has not, as the
United States Supreme Court has cautioned, overwhelmed the Lyle and
Miller factors. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183,
1197 (2005).
It is true that the context of this case is not identical to that faced
by courts considering minimum sentences. A minimum sentence is an
all-or-nothing proposition—either the adult minimum sentence applies or
it does not. Further, when an adult minimum sentence is imposed on a
child offender, there is no possibility of revisiting the issue if the
predictions of future character development prove wrong.
Yet, in this case, the district court faced a wide range of options
with dramatically different consequences on the child offender. As the
district court correctly pointed out at the sentencing hearing, the child
offender in this case will have the possibility of parole. In that sense, the
sentence in this case does not have the highly inflexible character of an
adult minimum sentence. But the differences between the available
options in this case are truly dramatic and are not less consequential
than the imposition of an adult minimum sentence on a child.
Although the context is different, I think the three purposes of
requiring specific findings apply here. I do not think it is too much to
ask that in these invariably difficult cases, district courts provide a
45
specific explanation of how the plastic characteristics of youth played
into the sentencing in this case. We will thus not be required, on appeal,
to peer into an empty box in evaluating how the district court
approached this key sentencing consideration. Although it is true that
we have said in a pre-Lyle case that a sentencing court generally is not
required to give reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options, see
State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713–14 (Iowa 1995), we have announced
an exception to that rule in our juvenile cases to ensure that sentencing
of child offenders occurs within constitutional guardrails, see Seats, 865
N.W.2d at 557; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71, 74. I would apply that concept
here as well.
IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, I would vacate the sentence of the district
court and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., join this concurrence in part and dissent
in part.