Karen McQuistion v. City of Clinton, Iowa Mark Regenwether Jeffrey Farwell And Jeffrey Horne

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 14–0413
Filed December 24, 2015
KAREN McQUISTION,
Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF CLINTON, IOWA; MARK REGENWETHER;
JEFFREY FARWELL; and JEFFREY HORNE,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Henry W.
Latham II, Judge.
Claimant appeals from summary judgment dismissing claims of
pregnancy discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act and equal
protection and due process violations under the Iowa Constitution.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Roxanne Barton Conlin of Roxanne Conlin & Associates, P.C.,
Des Moines, for appellant.
Cynthia Sueppel of Scheldrup Blades Schrock Smith P.C.,
Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
2
Thomas J. Duff of Duff Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, Kodi A.
Brotherson of Becker & Brotherson Law Firm, Sac City, Katie A.
Ervin Carlson of Babich Goldman P.C., Des Moines, and Emily E.
McCarty of Fiedler & Timmer, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for amicus curiae
Iowa Association for Justice.
3
CADY, Chief Justice.
In this case, we are presented with the question whether a city
discriminates under the Iowa Civil Rights Act and the Iowa Constitution
by refusing to accommodate a pregnant employee with light duties when
requested due to her pregnancy. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants, City of Clinton and three of its employees,
finding as a matter of law no discrimination had occurred. On our
review, we adapt our test for the evaluation of pregnancy discrimination
claims and remand the case to the district court to consider the statutory
civil rights claim under this new standard. We conclude the undisputed
material facts of this case do not support equal protection and due
process claims under the Iowa Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Karen McQuistion is employed as an engineer and paramedic for
the City of Clinton fire department. She was a ten-year veteran of the
department during the events in question. She began as a firefighter in
2001 and was promoted to her current position in 2008.
In May 2011, McQuistion informed Fire Chief Mark Regenwether
she was pregnant. McQuistion was in the early stages of pregnancy at
the time. She requested light-duty assignments for the duration of her
pregnancy. The requested accommodation was based solely on her
pregnancy and the nature of her job and not on any underlying
pregnancy-related medical condition amounting to disability.
The City of Clinton maintained an administrative policy governing
light-duty assignments. The policy described the circumstances when
light duty was available to employees, generally authorizing light duty for
4
employees who had been injured on the job and were eligible for workers’
compensation benefits. This policy controlled light-duty assignments
unless it conflicted with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Under a collective bargaining agreement between police officers and the
City, a police officer who becomes pregnant is entitled to light-duty
assignments. The fire department’s collective bargaining agreement did
not contain a clause expanding light-duty assignments beyond the policy
either to pregnant employees or any other employees suffering temporary
disabilities resulting from off-the-job events.
The light-duty policy of the City defined light duty as “modified
work for employees injured on the job unable to temporarily return to
their regular classification.” It is work for an employee “who can return
to work but is not yet physically capable of fulfilling the work normally
assigned.” 1 The policy articulates four benefits of light duty:
a. Getting an employee back to the workplace as soon as
possible after an on-the-job injury when there is not a
risk to him/her and others;
b. Minimizing financial hardship and emotional stress to an
employee injured on the job;
c. Retaining qualified and experienced workers;
d. Minimizing cost of workers’ compensation and other
related programs.
Light duty generally involves the modification of the worker’s
normal job duties. For a firefighter, this means conducting inspections,
fire prevention duties, training assignments, and other duties that do not
include the emergency response requirements of the job. These duties
can be performed independent of the normal physical requirements for
1The policy provides that any employee refusing a light-duty assignment
consistent with their medical restrictions may lose eligibility for workers’ compensation
benefits during the time of refusal.
5
fire department employees. The normal job duties for an engineer and
paramedic in the fire department include:
1. Responding to emergency fire incidents.
2. Responding to emergency rescue incidents.
3. Responding to hazardous materials incidents.
4. Responding to emergency medical incidents.
5. Responding to emergency airport incidents.
6. Performing required training tasks.
7. Performing required maintenance tasks.
8. Performing Fire Prevention and Public Education
Assignments.
Fire Chief Regenwether denied McQuistion’s request for a light-
duty assignment. He determined she was not entitled to light duty under
the city administrative policy because she did not have a disabling injury
that occurred on the job.
McQuistion continued to perform her regular job duties as an
engineer and paramedic for the fire department after her request for light
duty was denied. In June, Fire Chief Regenwether met with city officials
in an effort to provide an accommodation for McQuistion, without
success. The city officials who participated in this meeting and the
decision to deny the request included Jeffrey Farwell, the city attorney,
and Jeffrey Horne, the city administrator.
By the end of September, McQuistion’s pregnancy had advanced to
the point that she was no longer able to perform her required emergency-
response duties safely and her protective uniform no longer fit her. Her
doctor recommended she stop performing her regular duties. As a result,
McQuistion took a leave of absence from work by using accrued vacation
and sick leave time. She was paid during this time period. Once she
exhausted the vacation and sick leave, however, her leave of absence was
6
unpaid. McQuistion gave birth in January 2012. She returned to her
job as an engineer and paramedic for the fire department in March.
McQuistion brought a lawsuit against the City of Clinton and the
individuals who participated in the decision to deny her light duty
(collectively referred to as the City). She alleged pregnancy
discrimination under Iowa Code section 216.6(2), a violation of her equal
protection rights under article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution, and a
violation of her due process rights under article I, section 9 of the Iowa
Constitution. The City moved for summary judgment. It asserted
McQuistion was not entitled to an accommodation as a matter of law. It
claimed the action of the City in denying light-work accommodations was
not discriminatory under the Iowa Civil Rights Act and the Iowa
Constitution because all fire department employees with nonwork-related
disabilities were denied light-duty work. It also claimed the actions of
the City did not violate the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution.
The district court found McQuistion was unable to show an
inference of discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act because the
City policy denies light work to both pregnant employees and
nonpregnant disabled employees who are not injured on the job. It
found the undisputed facts of the case failed to establish pregnancy
discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act or the Iowa Constitution.
It found the policy of the City treated all employees who were not granted
separate rights under a collective bargaining agreement the same. It also
found the policy did not impinge upon McQuistion’s fundamental right to
procreate. McQuistion appealed.
II. Standard of Review.
We review district court summary judgment rulings for corrections
of errors at law. Goodpaster v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 849 N.W.2d 1,
7
6 (Iowa 2014). Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. We construe the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. However, to survive a motion
for summary judgment, sufficient facts must be in the record to support
the claim that a reasonable fact finder could find in the nonmoving
party’s favor. See Smidt v. Porter, 695 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Iowa 2005).
Statutory interpretation is reviewed for errors at law. State v.
Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2013). “If the statute is capable of
being construed in more than one way, one of which is constitutional, we
must adopt the constitutional construction.” Hensler v. City of
Davenport, 790 N.W.2d 569, 578 (Iowa 2010). Our review of
constitutional claims is de novo. State v. Groves, 742 N.W.2d 90, 92
(Iowa 2007).
III. Statutory Analysis.
The Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 makes it an unfair or
discriminatory practice for any person to discriminate in employment
against an employee based on various classifications, including the “sex
. . . or disability of such . . . employee.” Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (2011). 2
In the early years following the enactment, claims involving
discrimination based on pregnancy emerged in several cases, even
though pregnancy was not specifically mentioned in the Act as a
protected classification. In 1975, we held that pregnancy constituted a
2The Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 did not originally prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sex or disability. See Iowa Code § 105A.7 (1966). The Act was amended in
1970 to add discrimination on the basis of sex to the statute’s list of prohibited
discrimination. 1970 Iowa Acts ch. 1058 (codified at Iowa Code ch. 105A (1971)).
Disability discrimination was added to the list in 1972. 1972 Iowa Acts ch. 1031
(codified at Iowa Code ch. 601A (1973)).
8
temporary disability and concluded an employment policy that failed to
treat pregnant employees in the same manner as disabled employees
regarding the imposition and use of leave constituted sex discrimination
under the Act. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Parr, 227 N.W.2d 486,
493, 495–96 (Iowa 1975) (finding the employment policy discriminated
under the Act because it imposed special restrictions on pregnant
employees that did not apply to employees with other conditions). We
subsequently reiterated this position on two occasions in 1978, rejecting
as discriminatory in both cases employment policies that excluded
pregnancy from benefits provided for employees disabled from nonwork
injuries. See Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 270 N.W.2d
829, 834 (Iowa 1978) (rejecting a group insurance plan that did not cover
pregnancy because it was not an illness or injury); Quaker Oats Co. v.
Cedar Rapids Human Rights Comm’n, 268 N.W.2d 862, 864, 867 (Iowa
1978) (rejecting a plan that specifically excluded pregnancy from
coverage), superseded on other grounds by statute, 1978 Iowa Acts
ch. 1179, § 21 (codified at Iowa Code § 601A.19 (1979)). These two
decisions rejected the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, which held that a company
plan that excluded pregnancy from “nonoccupational sickness and
accident benefits to all employees” did not constitute sex discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it did not provide
benefits to one gender that did not accrue to the other, and the failure to
cover pregnancy-related risks did not destroy the presumed parity of the
benefits and render it discriminatory. 429 U.S. 125, 128, 138–39, 97
S. Ct. 401, 404, 409–10, 50 L. Ed. 2d 343, 349, 355–56 (1976),
superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)). The
9
Court took the view that the plan did not discriminate based on sex
because, in the final analysis, the same protection provided for men was
provided for women. Id. at 138–39, 97 S. Ct. at 409–10, 50 L. Ed. 2d at
355–56. Both Franklin Manufacturing and Quaker Oats made it clear
that the Iowa Civil Rights Act would be construed differently than the
Federal Civil Rights Act was in Gilbert by instead treating pregnancy
discrimination as sex discrimination. Franklin Mfg. Co., 270 N.W.2d at
831; Quaker Oats Co., 268 N.W.2d at 866–67. Therefore, under the Iowa
Civil Rights Act, terms and conditions under an employment disability
policy must apply to pregnant employees the same as they apply to all
other employees. See Parr, 227 N.W.2d at 494 (finding no viability in a
differentiation between pregnancy and “other disabling conditions which
qualify an employee for sick (disability) pay”).
In response to Gilbert, Congress enacted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) to extend Title VII protections to
pregnant women as a subset of sex discrimination. See Deborah L.
Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act at 35, 21 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 67, 74–75 (2013).
Congress rejected the approach taken in Gilbert and set a course more in
line with the approach taken under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Congress
did this by adding new language to the definitions section of Title VII. Id.
at 75–76; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). First, the amended Act declared the
“ter[m] ‘because of sex’ . . . include[s] . . . because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k). Second, it added a clause providing that “women affected by
pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work.” Id. Thus, Congress added pregnancy to the
10
definition of sex discrimination and gave further structure to the process
of identifying discrimination in the context of pregnancy. See Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691, 93
L. Ed. 2d 613, 626 (1987) (indicating the second clause was intended to
“illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied”).
The Supreme Court recently discussed the scope of the rights
provided to pregnant employees under the PDA in Young v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 191 L. Ed. 2d 279 (2015). In
Young, the Court found the discrimination analysis under the PDA
consists of two key components. First, it found the Act only requires
pregnant employees to be treated the “same” as “other persons” in
similarly situated jobs with a similar ability (or inability) to work. Id. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1350, 1353, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 294, 297–98; see also id.
at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1357–59, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 302–04 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (discussing how to determine a comparator group for the
disparate treatment analysis). The Court observed that the clause did
not broadly declare that pregnant employees needed to be treated “the
‘same’ as ‘any other persons.’ ” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1350, 191
L. Ed. 2d at 294 (majority opinion). As a result, the Court rejected the
notion that the PDA gave pregnant employees “an unconditional most-
favored-nation status” that required employers who provided a disability
accommodation to any disabled worker or a specific group of disabled
workers to unconditionally provide the same accommodation to all
pregnant workers with comparable limitations. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at
1349–50, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 293–94. Importantly, the Court found nothing
from the history and background of the Act to suggest Congress intended
for the PDA to alter the approach of the law or to impose a “new
legislative mandate” to require more favorable treatment for pregnant
11
employees. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1350, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 294 (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 95–948, at 3–4 (1978)). Rather, the Court required each
claimant make a prima facie case that they were treated differently from
those similar in ability or inability to work using the framework
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93
S. Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677–78 (1973):
Thus, a plaintiff alleging that the denial of an
accommodation constituted disparate treatment under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s second clause may make out
a prima facie case by showing, as in McDonnell Douglas, that
she belongs to the protected class, that she sought
accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate
her, and that the employer did accommodate others “similar
in their ability or inability to work.”
Young, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1354, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 298 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
After establishing the criteria for a claimant to show a prima facie
case, the Young Court turned to the question of what the employer was
required to show. Id. The Court observed that the body of law built by
the courts over the years governing disparate treatment claims generally
permits an employer to maintain employment policies that may harm
members of a protected class as long as the policies are not intended to
harm the class and “the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory,
nonpretextual reason” for the different treatment. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct.
at 1350, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 294. Once the employer has proffered a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the claimant has the chance to
show that the reason offered is mere pretext to disguise discriminatory
intent. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1354, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 299. The Court
placed limits on what could constitute the reason, noting it “normally
cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less
convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (‘similar in
12
their ability or inability to work’) whom the employer accommodates.” Id.
at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1354, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 298 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k)). The Court further explained that a claimant could reach the
jury “by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose
a significant burden on pregnant workers” when the reason is “not
sufficiently strong to justify the burden.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1354,
191 L. Ed. 2d at 299. This was illustrated with the example that a
claimant can raise a genuine issue of material fact showing a significant
burden “by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large
percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large
percentage of pregnant workers.” Id.
Accordingly, the PDA does not mandate employers provide
pregnant employees with benefits such as light-duty assignments, but
rather requires an examination of the facts and circumstances in each
individual case whether the employer was treating the pregnant
employee the same as others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”
See id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1353–54, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 298 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) (requiring each “plaintiff to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination”).
The path to legal recognition and prohibition of pregnancy
discrimination in Iowa began in 1972 when the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission (ICRC), established under the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965,
promulgated a rule that classified pregnancy-related disabilities as
temporary disabilities for job-related purposes. Davenport Cmty. Sch.
Dist. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 277 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Iowa 1979)
(discussing the promulgation of administrative rule 4.10 on pregnancy
discrimination in 1972). As with the approach later taken by Congress
under the PDA in 1978, and following the lead of federal regulations
13
promulgated earlier in 1972 by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the ICRC first declared, “Disabilities caused or contributed
to by pregnancy . . . are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities . . . .” Iowa Departmental Rule 4.10(2) (1973); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973). Second, the ICRC declared that the
“employment policies and practices involving . . . the availability of . . .
benefits and privileges . . . shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy
. . . on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other
temporary disabilities.” Iowa Departmental Rule 4.10(2).
In 1987, our legislature amended the Iowa Civil Rights Act to add a
section governing employment policies relating to pregnancy,
substantively tracking with the 1980 version of the administrative rule
promulgated by ICRC. Compare Iowa Code § 601A.6(2) (1989), with Iowa
Admin. Code r. 240—3.10 (1980). Specifically, the first section declares
that an employment policy that excludes employees from employment
because of the employee’s pregnancy constitutes prima facie
discrimination. See Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(a) (2011); Iowa Admin. Code
r. 161—8.55(1) (2011). The second provision contains two clauses. See
Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(b); Iowa Admin. Code r. 161—8.55(2). It first
declares that “[d]isabilities caused . . . by the employee’s pregnancy . . .
are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and shall be
treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or
sick leave plan available in connection with employment.” Iowa Code
§ 216.6(2)(b). Second, it declares that
employment policies and practices involving matters such as
the commencement and duration of leave . . . and other
benefits and privileges . . . shall be applied to a disability due
to the employee’s pregnancy . . . on the same terms and
conditions as they are applied to other temporary
disabilities.
14
Id. A 1980 amendment adding a third provision to the rule was
subsequently adapted into the statute by the legislature in 1987, making
a disability caused by a legal abortion a temporary disability under a
health, temporary disability, or sick leave plan. Id. § 216.6(2)(c); see
Iowa Admin. Code r. 161—8.55(3).
The statute then goes beyond the administrative rule to add two
additional provisions governing employment policies relating to
pregnancy. It makes it illegal for an employer to “terminate the
employment of a person disabled by pregnancy because of the employee’s
pregnancy.” Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(d). Finally, the statute requires
employers to grant employees who are disabled by pregnancy a leave of
absence for up to eight weeks if adequate leave is not otherwise available
under an available health, temporary disability, or sick leave plan. Id.
§ 216.6(2)(e). The question for us is whether our legislature intended
this statute to grant all pregnant employees greater rights than those
guaranteed under the PDA.
The two clauses within section 216.6(2)(b) form the heart of this
litigation. McQuistion contends these clauses grant broader protection
for pregnant employees than available under the PDA. She specifically
asserts that section 216.6(2)(b) expresses a legislative mandate that any
employment policy maintained by an employer in Iowa that allows light
duty for any disabled employees must also unconditionally apply to
pregnant employees. Consequently, she claims an employer
discriminates against pregnant employees by failing to include them
unconditionally in a disability policy applicable to any disabled
employees. McQuistion primarily uses the language of section
216.6(2)(b) and the timing of the enactment of the section to support her
15
claim. We first address the argument dealing with the timing of the
enactment of section 216.6(2).
The amendment to the Iowa Civil Rights Act that added the
provisions governing pregnancy as section 216.6(2) was enacted shortly
after the United States Supreme Court decided California Federal Savings
& Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 107 S. Ct. 683, 93 L. Ed. 2d 613
(1987). McQuistion claims section 216.6(2) was enacted as a response to
Guerra to implement broader protections and rights for pregnant
employees in Iowa than provided under the Federal Civil Rights Act. In
Guerra, the Court held that the PDA did not preempt state laws, but only
established “a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not
drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise.” 479 U.S. at 285, 107
S. Ct. at 691, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 626 (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985)). Thus, McQuistion argues
that our legislature could have only believed the floor established by the
PDA was too low and enacted its own version of a pregnancy
discrimination law to raise the bar to give pregnant employees in Iowa
greater protections.
The five provisions of Iowa Code section 216.6(2) enacted by our
legislature did provide some greater rights to pregnant employees than
declared under the PDA. See Iowa Code § 216.6(2). Thus, we agree with
McQuistion that the timing of the 1987 enactment supports the
proposition that our legislature intended to provide guidance that is more
definite to Iowa employers than found under the PDA. The language
used by the legislature supports this intent. For instance, section
216.6(2)(e) mandates employers grant up to eight weeks leave of absence
for employees disabled due to pregnancy, a specific mandate benefiting
pregnant employees not provided under the PDA. Id. It gives pregnant
16
employees a special status in Iowa relating to a leave of absence. Yet, the
question is whether the legislature extended this special status to
benefits such as light-duty assignments. Thus, we turn to consider the
argument by McQuistion that the first clause of section 216.6(2)(b) gives
pregnant employees a special status that requires a light-duty
accommodation.
No provision in section 216.6(2) specifically requires employers
provide all pregnant employees light-duty assignments or other
accommodations. Instead, section 216.6(2)(b) declares, “Disabilities
caused . . . by . . . pregnancy . . . are, for all job-related purposes,
temporary disabilities and shall be treated as such under any health or
temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection
with employment.” Id. § 216.6(2)(b). McQuistion claims this provision
means any sick-leave policy provided by an employer that allows light
duty for any group of disabled employees must apply to all pregnant
employees. Since the City in this case did maintain a policy that
permitted light-duty assignments for employees who were injured on the
job and for pregnant police officers, McQuistion asserts that the statute
mandates the same accommodation be available to all other pregnant
employees.
The language of section 216.6(2)(b) does not support a broad
mandate according all pregnant employees special benefits. McQuistion
simply reads too much into the statutory language. The first sentence
makes two declarations. First, it declares a disability caused by
pregnancy or related condition to be a temporary disability. Id.
Pregnancy alone does not trigger the protections of section 216.6(2)(b);
the statute requires a disability that is “caused or contributed to” by the
pregnancy or related condition for the protections to apply. Id. Second,
17
it declares a pregnancy-related disability must be treated as a temporary
disability under an employment plan or policy governing temporary
disabilities, not that an employer must treat the pregnancy-related
disability as all other disabilities under the statute. 3 Id. However, the
sentence does not address how the policy or plan must treat pregnant
employees not experiencing pregnancy-related disabilities. Instead, that
issue was addressed by the second sentence of section 216.6(2)(b). This
clause provides:
[E]mployment policies and practices involving matters such
as the commencement and duration of leave . . . and other
benefits and privileges . . . under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan . . . shall be applied to
a disability due to . . . pregnancy . . . on the same terms and
conditions as they are applied to other temporary
disabilities.
Id.
Yet, this language does not readily answer the more difficult
question at the center of this case: whether an employment plan for
benefits complies with the statutory requirement to be applicable to
disabilities due to pregnancy on the same terms and conditions as other
temporary disabilities when a gender-neutral term or condition
applicable to all disabilities under the plan excludes a class of temporary
disabilities that includes disabilities caused by pregnancy. See id.; see
also Young, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1351, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 295.
This was the same situation faced by the Court in Young under the
3This differs from the PDA, which requires all pregnant women “affected by
pregnancy” or related conditions “be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The Iowa statute is drawn more narrowly, requiring
“[d]isabilities caused or contributed to by the employee’s pregnancy, miscarriage,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom” and limiting the benefits to those provided for other
temporary disabilities. Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(b).
18
language of the PDA. See Young, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1347–48,
191 L. Ed. 2d at 291–92. The Iowa statute only demands that a light-
duty policy be applied to pregnancy-related disabilities “on the same
terms and conditions” as the policy is applied to other temporary
disabilities. Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(b). This clause does not specifically
cover the situation in this case in which the terms and conditions for
light duty applicable to all temporarily disabled employees result in the
exclusion of all disabled employees who did not become disabled through
a work-related injury, including employees disabled because of
pregnancy or related conditions. Instead, it is clear our legislature
intended for the question whether a particular term or condition
applicable to all disabilities serves to discriminate against disabilities due
to pregnancy to be decided under a different analysis.
Our legislature has impliedly indicated approval of the use of the
McDonnell Douglas test to address employment policies that potentially
discriminate against pregnant employees by mirroring language used in
the analytical approach applied in that case. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 677–78
(requiring a claimant establish a prima facie case of discrimination).4
4The McDonnell Douglas analysis is not the only one used in discrimination
cases, but has long been used in cases in which a facially neutral policy is being
challenged as pretext for discrimination. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Mem’l Hosp., 726
F.2d 1543, 1547–48 (11th Cir. 1984) (discussing when a pretext theory applies). We
have also used a test from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42, 109
S. Ct. 1775, 1786, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268, 282 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075, when the plaintiff can “present
credible evidence of conduct or statements of supervisors which may be seen as
discrimination sufficient to support an inference that the discriminatory attitude was a
motivating factor.” Vaughan v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 538–39 (Iowa 1996)
(describing the McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse methods of analysis in an age-
discrimination case). Following that inference, the employer has a chance to prove the
same decision would have been made without the discriminatory motive. Boelman v.
Manson State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 73, 78 (Iowa 1994). A third theory of discrimination
19
Using this analytical framework, a claimant who seeks to show disparate
treatment under an employment policy that does not facially exclude the
protected group must first establish a “prima facie” case of
discrimination based on employer actions that infer discrimination
because of the protected characteristic. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575–76, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957,
966 (1978). Section 216.6(2)(a) provides that an “employment policy or
practice which excludes from employment applicants or employees
because of the employee’s pregnancy is a prima facie violation of this
chapter.” Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(a). The burden-shifting analysis based
on “prima facie” discrimination was entrenched in the law by the time
the statute was enacted. See Woodbury County v. Iowa Civil Rights
Comm’n, 335 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 1983) (using McDonnell Douglas
analysis in a racial discrimination case under the Iowa Civil Rights Act);
King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 334 N.W.2d 598, 601–02 (Iowa 1983)
(applying McDonnell Douglas analysis in religious discrimination case
under the Iowa Civil Rights Act); see also State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d
492, 503 (Iowa 2007) (“We . . . assume our legislature was familiar with
the existing state of the law when it enacted [the statute] . . . .”).
Furthermore, we have also adopted the framework when indirect
evidence is used to infer discrimination and have specifically applied it to
pregnancy discrimination. See Smidt, 695 N.W.2d at 14–15. Finally, the
Supreme Court explicitly adopted the framework for pregnancy
discrimination cases alleging disparate treatment under the PDA in
Young, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1353–54, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 298.
___________________
analysis was used in Pippen v. State, 854 N.W.2d 1, 22–27 (Iowa 2014), in which we
analyzed racial discrimination claims under the disparate impact theory.
20
Thus, we reject the argument by McQuistion that the legislature
established as facially discriminatory any exclusion of a pregnant
employee from any policy or plan that provides benefits for any other
temporary disability. Instead, our legislature only established that the
exclusion of pregnant employees and applicants by an employment policy
or practice because of their pregnancies constituted prima facie evidence
of discrimination. Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(a). Even under section
216.6(2)(a), the employer may then come forward with a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the exclusion that the claimant can rebut
with evidence that the proffered reasons are pretextual. Smidt, 695
N.W.2d at 15. Employment policies and practices that do not expressly
target pregnant employees or applicants may still result in disparate
treatment, and employees affected in such a way may show a prima facie
case using indirect evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
See Young, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1345, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 288–89.
Overall, our legislature intended to provide institutional protection
by placing pregnant employees who become unable to complete their job
duties due to a pregnancy-related disability on equal footing with other
employees who become unable to perform their regular job duties
because of any other temporarily disabling bodily condition. See Iowa
Code § 216.6(2)(b). This equal footing was established by declaring any
disability arising out of pregnancy and related conditions to be a
temporary disability and requiring that all disability policies be applied to
pregnancy-related and nonpregnancy-related disabilities “on the same
terms and conditions.” Id. Second, if this structural protection still
results in the exclusion of pregnant employees from employment because
of their pregnancies, our legislature declared the exclusion to be prima
facie evidence of discrimination. Id. § 216.6(2)(a). By identifying a prima
21
facie case of discrimination in section 216.6(2)(a) when actions are taken
“because of the employee’s pregnancy,” id., our legislature necessarily
signaled its intent for disparate treatment claims by pregnant employees
to be resolved through an analytical framework that requires the
employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to exclude
pregnant employees. Thus, we find the legislature intended that same
analytical framework to apply in cases in which the evidence tending to
prove discrimination based on pregnancy is indirect. The declared
prima facie approach necessarily revealed an intent by the legislature to
permit the employer to overcome a prima facie pregnancy discrimination
claim, either established under the statute or shown through the
McDonnell Douglas framework, based on legitimate reasons for excluding
pregnant employees and to permit the employee to show the proffered
reasons were pretextual. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03, 93
S. Ct. at 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 677–78. This approach ultimately reveals
our legislature sought to balance the competing rights and interests of
employers and employees at stake in light of the weight of the burden
imposed on pregnant employees by exclusion from the policy and the
strength of the neutral reason for the employer to justify the exclusion of
pregnant employees. 5
5Discrimination against the disabled is different from most other forms of
discrimination because the disability itself can impact the ability of the person to
perform the duties of the job. Goodpaster, 849 N.W.2d at 16–17. If a person is not
qualified for the job, a prima facie case of discrimination cannot be established. Id. at
14. As a result, in order to eliminate discrimination against the disabled, the law
generally requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodations that permit the
person to perform the essential duties of the job. Id.; see also Iowa Admin. Code
r. 161—8.27(6). We have not extended that requirement to temporary disability cases.
See Vincent v. Four M Paper Corp., 589 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Iowa 1999) (including a
permanency analysis as an important factor in a disability discrimination claim under
the statute). The extension of a duty to reasonably accommodate to include temporary
disabilities, including pregnancy, is laden with policy considerations normally reserved
22
This approach is not only consistent with the language of the
statute, as well as the approach we have taken to analyzing
discrimination claims in this state, it is also consistent with the
approach taken under federal law. See Young, 575 U.S. at ___, 135
S. Ct. at 1353–54, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 298–99. The language of the PDA
differs from the language of section 216.6(2), but the concepts at play
parallel each other and support similar outcomes.
This outcome largely disposes of the arguments by the City. The
City’s statutory argument tracked those made by UPS before the
Supreme Court in Young—that the employer need not accommodate
disability caused by pregnancy unless it falls within specifically defined
categories singled out for accommodation. See id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at
1344, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 288. The City argued McQuistion’s treatment
under the policy should only be compared with how the City treats those
suffering from a disability arising outside of employment. The district
court, without the benefit of the Young decision at the time, agreed the
narrow classification was the proper comparison group. Yet, as with
Young, the statutory remedy provided in section 216.6(2) would be
rendered moot and defeat the purpose and intent of the legislature if we
permitted such an easy way for employers to evade the
antidiscrimination statute. See id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1353, 191
L. Ed. 2d at 298–99. We therefore remand to the district court to
evaluate McQuistion’s claim under the standard articulated in Young,
___________________
for the legislative branch of government. Indeed, our legislature has considered
precisely this issue in the past two general assemblies, with bills introduced that would
amend section 216.6(2) to require employers to provide reasonable accommodations to
pregnant employees. See S.F. 313, 86th G.A., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2015); S.F. 308, 85th
G.A., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2013).
23
comparing her with all those temporarily disabled, not just those injured
off the job.
IV. Equal Protection Claim.
McQuistion’s first constitutional claim, intertwined with her
discrimination claim, is an equal protection challenge under article I,
section 6 of the Iowa Constitution. 6 “[E]qual protection demands that
laws treat alike all people who are ‘similarly situated with respect to the
legitimate purposes of the law.’ ” Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882
(Iowa 2009) (quoting Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d
1, 7 (Iowa 2004) [hereinafter RACI]). To prove an equal protection claim,
the claimant must first establish disparate treatment and then the policy
reasons for the classification are scrutinized. Id. at 879–80. Equal
protection claims “require[] an allegation of disparate treatment, not
merely disparate impact.” King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 24 (Iowa 2012).
The district court found that McQuistion failed to offer sufficient
evidence that the City treated her less favorably than it treated other
similarly situated City employees. It found the equal protection claim
failed because McQuistion failed to show she suffered disparate
treatment as a matter of law. In addressing this issue, we observe the
City did not raise any argument that a constitutional claim was not
available as a companion remedy or that the Civil Rights Act provides the
exclusive remedy under state law. Instead, the City argued that
McQuistion did not make a prima facie case of discrimination nor did she
show the classification unrelated to the reasons behind the policy. Thus,
6We take this opportunity to note that under the Iowa Constitution, our equal
protection law arises out of the confluence of article I, section 1 and article I, section 6.
Article I, section 1 protects individuals’ rights, while article I, section 6 prevents the
government granting any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities not granted
to all citizens on the same terms. Iowa Const. art I, §§ 1, 6.
24
we proceed to consider the equal protection claim in light of the
arguments raised.
The equal protection analysis used by the district court failed to
properly consider the critical aspect of the right to equal protection that
the law itself be equal. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882–83. The district
court essentially held McQuistion failed to show any disparate treatment
because she was not similarly situated to the employees covered under
the City policy. It found the primary purpose of the policy was to get
employees receiving workers’ compensation, who were unable to perform
their normal work duties because of a work injury but capable of
performing light-duty work, back to work earlier. Consequently, the
district court reasoned that McQuistion was not similarly situated to
those employees covered by the policy, and she failed as a matter of law
to show she was subjected to any disparate treatment.
The problem with this analysis is that it excludes any examination
of whether the purpose of the law is legitimate. See id. The district court
only considered the purpose of the policy when defining the classification
imposed by the policy. This approach caused the classification to be
defined too narrowly and foreclosed any real analysis to determine if the
purpose of the policy at least satisfied rational-basis scrutiny.
McQuistion did identify groups of temporarily disabled
employees—pregnant police officers and City employees injured on the
job—that were provided light-duty accommodations. She also offered
evidence that she was similarly situated to those groups with respect to
the purpose of the employment policy. This evidence showed she was
not just similarly situated to City employees who became temporarily
disabled off the job, but was similarly situated to all City workers with
temporary disabilities that prevent them performing their regular duties.
25
In this respect, we recognize McQuistion does not need to show she was
similarly situated in all respects to those injured on the job. Thus,
construing the record in the light most favorable to McQuistion under
the summary judgment standard, sufficient evidence of disparate
treatment has been put forth to raise a question for the jury on the
threshold issue, and McQuistion’s claim needs to be evaluated based on
the reasons for the disparate treatment.
Once disparate treatment has been proven, the claimant must
show the reasons for the classification in the policy were not sufficiently
important or related to the government’s interest. RACI, 675 N.W.2d at
7. First, we note the policy’s classification is based on whether the
disabling condition arises out of the employment, not on the gender of
the claimant—except in this as-applied challenge—making the proper
level of scrutiny rational basis. This analysis involves three questions.
First, the court must determine whether there was a valid, “realistically
conceivable” reason for the classification. Id. (quoting Miller v. Boone Cty.
Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Iowa 1986)). Next, the court must evaluate
whether the “reason has a basis in fact.” Id. at 7–8. Finally, it must
determine if the relationship between the classification and the purpose
for it “is so weak that the classification must be viewed as arbitrary.” Id.
at 8. The burden is not on the government to justify its action, but for
the plaintiff to rebut a presumption of constitutionality. King, 818
N.W.2d at 28; RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 8.
The purpose, scope, and provisions of the City’s light-duty policy
all classify eligibility and the purpose of the policy as helping those
injured on the job. Reasons why the policy exists include getting
employees back to work after an on-the-job injury, minimizing financial
hardship, retaining workers, minimizing workers’ compensation costs,
26
and making the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits contingent on
performing those duties of their jobs consistent with medical restrictions.
Limiting light duty to those harmed through a work injury and thereby
minimizing workers’ compensation costs is a realistically conceivable
reason for the classification in the policy. As long as an employer must
pay an employee under workers’ compensation law, it is reasonable to
require the employee to work to the extent the employee is capable of it.
Next, we consider whether the reason has a basis in fact. The City
has provided examples of several other firefighters denied light duty
when disabled from nonjob-related events, including cancer. The City
has also provided an example of McQuistion being required to work light
duty when she suffered an on-the-job injury. McQuistion has not
challenged either the workers’ compensation reason for the classification
in the policy, nor its basis in fact, but argues the reason is not good
enough to support the classification.
Therefore, we must determine if the relationship between the
classification and the purpose for it is so weak as to be arbitrary. While
some of the policy’s articulated benefits, such as minimizing the
employee’s financial hardship and retaining workers, would apply to all
temporarily disabled employees no matter the source of the injury, other
benefits articulated like minimizing costs of worker’s compensation
programs and the provision changing eligibility for workers’
compensation benefits upon refusal of light duty are clearly related only
to workers’ compensation situations. Providing benefits to those harmed
during the course of their employment and minimizing extra costs
associated with workers’ compensation are legitimate purposes for the
City. McQuistion has not demonstrated the classification of on- versus
off-the-job injury or disability to be so tenuously related to its purpose as
27
to render the classification arbitrary. The classification of on- or off-the-
job injuries is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of minimizing
workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, we find the classification
does not violate the equal protection clause.
V. Substantive Due Process Claim.
We now turn to consider the second constitutional claim asserted
by McQuistion. She asserts that the absence of a light-duty
accommodation by the City infringes on her fundamental right to
procreate in violation of the due process clause under article I, section 9
of the Iowa Constitution. It is very important to frame the claim properly
because the due process clause of our constitution exists to prevent
unwarranted governmental interferences with personal decisions in life.
Hensler, 790 N.W.2d at 583 (evaluating whether the governmental
interference was warranted); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
317–18, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2688, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784, 805 (1980).
We have adopted a two-step analysis when presented with a
substantive due process claim. The first step involves a determination of
the nature of the right at stake. State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 662
(Iowa 2005). The second step turns to an analysis of the appropriate
level of scrutiny. Id. at 662–63. Under this step, if a fundamental right
is involved, we apply a strict-scrutiny analysis. This analysis requires us
to determine “whether the government action infringing the fundamental
right is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Id.
at 662 (quoting State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 238 (Iowa
2002)). If a fundamental right is not infringed, the statute or
governmental action “need only survive a rational basis analysis.” Id.
This analysis requires us to determine whether there is “a reasonable fit
between the government interest and the means utilized to advance that
28
interest.” Id. (quoting Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 238). We begin
with the first step of the analysis.
The claim articulated by McQuistion identifies the individual
liberty alleged to be at stake as the right to procreate. McQuistion
asserts that women have a fundamental right to procreate and that this
right has been implicated by the absence of a light-duty accommodation
by the City for those women who work at a job that would require a light-
duty accommodation during pregnancy, such as firefighters. Her claim
is built on the assertion that the absence of a light-duty policy interferes
with the right to procreate by interfering with her ability to work.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the “freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40,
94 S. Ct. 791, 796, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52, 60 (1974). We, too, have recognized
familial rights to be fundamental liberties under our Iowa Constitution.
In re Guardianship of Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707, 714 (Iowa 2014) (finding
a guardian sterilizing a ward without court involvement raises “serious
due process concerns”); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 663. The right to
procreate is implied in the concept of ordered liberty and qualifies for due
process protection as a fundamental right. See Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d at
714–15.
Consequently, McQuistion has asserted a substantial due process
claim built on a fundamental right. Yet, she must additionally establish
that the fundamental right asserted—her right to procreate—has been
implicated by the particular governmental action at issue. See Seering,
701 N.W.2d at 663 (requiring accuracy and specificity in the claim to
allow the court to proceed on appropriate grounds). Not every
29
government action that relates in any way to a fundamental liberty must
be subjected to strict-scrutiny analysis. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 386–87, 98 S. Ct. 673, 681, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 631 (1978). Instead,
the alleged infringement is unconstitutional only when it “has a direct
and substantial impact” on the fundamental right. Seering, 701 N.W.2d
at 663. Reasonable regulations that do not directly and substantially
interfere with the right may be imposed. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386,
98 S. Ct. at 681, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 631.
In Seering, we identified numerous cases in which the statute or
government action at issue did substantially and directly impact the
fundamental interest at stake. 701 N.W.2d at 663–64. We cited three
U.S. Supreme Court cases examining familial rights as fundamental
rights. In Zablocki, the Court found a state statute that prohibited a
noncustodial parent ordered to pay child support from marrying without
a court order substantially interfered with the right to marry. 434 U.S.
at 388–90, 98 S. Ct. at 682–83, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 632. The Court in Moore
v. City of East Cleveland found a city ordinance that excluded a
grandchild from living in a single-family household substantially
interfered with the freedom of personal choices in matters of family life.
431 U.S. 494, 499–500, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1935–36, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 537–
38 (1977). Finally, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court found a state
miscegenation statute that prohibited interracial marriage substantially
interfered with the freedom to marry. 388 U.S. 1, 11–12, 87 S. Ct. 1817,
1823–24, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 1017–18 (1967). We also cited one of our
own cases discussing the requirement of a direct and substantial impact.
Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 664. In Santi v. Santi, we found a grandparent
visitation statute impermissibly interfered with the fundamental liberty
interest in parental caretaking. 633 N.W.2d 312, 317–18 (Iowa 2001).
30
The statute permitted court-ordered grandparent visitation over the
objection of the parents in an intact nuclear family. Unlike statutes
requiring car seats or vaccinations for children that only minimally
intrude on a parent’s protected caretaking interest, we found that the
nature of the grandparent visitation statute was more invasive and had a
substantial impact on the liberty interest at stake. Id. at 318.
Following Seering, we again confronted and applied the
requirement of a substantive due process claim to consider whether the
governmental action infringed on a fundamental right in Hensler v. City
of Davenport, 790 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 2010). There, we faced a challenge
to a city ordinance that imposed a duty on parents to control their
children and prevent them from committing unlawful acts. Id. at 575.
The ordinance included graduated sanctions against parents for
breaching this duty. Id. at 576. The first violation resulted in a warning
letter. Id. The second violation required the parents to complete a
parenting class. Id. The third or subsequent violation resulted in a civil
penalty between $100 and $750. Id. We held the ordinance did not have
a direct and substantial impact on the fundamental right to parent and
exercise care and control over a child. Id. at 583. The force of the
penalties under the ordinance did impact the right to parent, but not
enough to violate the constitutionally protected right. Id.
McQuistion supports her claim that the City substantially
interfered with her right by relying on the holding in Rodgers v. Berger,
438 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1977). In that case, the court considered the
constitutionality of a mandatory pregnancy leave provision in a school
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 721. The provision required a
pregnant teacher to be on leave for a year after the end of the pregnancy.
Id. at 715. In finding the policy violated substantive due process, the
31
court relied on LaFleur, which found that “overly restrictive” maternity
leave regulations create a heavy burden on the exercise of the right to
procreate. Id. at 722 (quoting LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640, 94 S. Ct. 796, 39
L. Ed. 2d at 60). 7
Unlike the claim of governmental interference in each of these
cases, this case does not allow us to consider the extent of the
interference. Instead, it requires us to consider a more fundamental
question of whether the interference alleged by McQuistion was created
by government action. We have expressed doubt in the past about the
viability of a substantive due process claim based on the failure of
government to act. King, 818 N.W.2d at 31. The substantive due
process protections under our constitution have traditionally been
applied when government has engaged in actual conduct that interferes
with a right. Id. Yet, we do not apply the affirmative and negative act
distinction as a legal principle to deny relief when based on the failure of
government to act, but recognize it as a general observation. We must,
in every case, look behind the distinction to see if the government
interference at issue—affirmative or negative—constitutes a direct and
substantial infringement of a fundamental right.
McQuistion claims the City interfered with the exercise of her right
to have children when it acted to deny her request to alter her job duties
to enable her to work during her entire pregnancy. This claim identifies
a governmental act, but it fails to further identify how McQuistion’s
inability to work throughout pregnancy interfered with the exercise of her
7As explained earlier, we decided this issue on statutory grounds under the Iowa
Civil Rights Act and have not needed to find a constitutional basis to overturn the
mandatory-leave provisions under the Iowa Constitution. See Parr, 227 N.W.2d at 496–
97.
32
right. McQuistion answered by pointing to the financial burdens and
resulting difficult decisions imposed on women and families by the loss
of income associated with the inability to work throughout pregnancy.
However, the City’s decision to deny McQuistion’s request for light duty
did not change any of the viable choices available to her, and she has
failed to identify any specific effect of the City’s action on her decision to
procreate. Thus, the financial obstacle she offered to support her claim
of infringement on her right to procreate was not created by the City’s
decision to deny relief. McQuistion has not identified any facts to
establish any other form of governmental interference and, so, has failed
to frame a claim of infringement on a fundamental right.
Without the infringement of a fundamental right, we turn to our
rational-basis analysis. When applying the rational-basis test to
evaluate the policy under the due process clause of the Iowa
Constitution, the claim fails. The rational-basis analysis under the equal
protection clause would be equally applicable to the due process claim,
with the same result—that the policy is not unconstitutional. See RACI,
675 N.W.2d at 7.
The outcome we reach in this case does not in any way overlook or
minimize the existence of an obstacle in society faced by many women in
the workplace in the exercise of their right to procreate. Due to the range
of financial circumstances of all people, the financial burdens resulting
from the inability to continue in employment during pregnancy could
substantially interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right. The
obstacle is pervasive and affects both women and men in the exercise of
their right to have children when an inability to work throughout
pregnancy because of the pregnancy adversely impacts the overall family
finances.
33
Yet, this case reveals that our constitution only declares a certain
level of protection for people and that the constitutional powers of courts
are limited. One of the limitations revealed is the preliminary
requirement for a due process claim that government action create the
interference. Government action allows for the elective branches of
government to debate and balance the competing interests and policies
behind the government action and for laws and policies to be made or
rejected based on that process. The arm of the court, however, only
protects the constitutional floor of the rights of people and ensures
government provides nothing less. It is up to the other branches of
government to provide more. Over the years, the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission and the Iowa General Assembly have engaged in this
process. The resulting laws passed over the years have differed in some
respects from the earlier regulations from the agency and reflect the
changing ideas and attitudes of society toward pregnant workers. These
laws and rules can continue to evolve as time continues to pass to reflect
the will of the people. The role of courts in the process is limited to
interpreting those laws when challenged as ambiguous and make certain
those laws and other forms of government action, when challenged as
unconstitutional, conform to the supreme law identified in the
constitution. That is the role engaged in by the court today. It is not our
role to do more.
VI. Conclusion.
We reverse the district court decision granting the City summary
judgment on the pregnancy discrimination claim. We remand to the
district court for further consideration in light of our opinion today. We
affirm the district court and dismiss the equal protection and due
34
process claims. We tax the costs of this action equally between the
parties.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.