City of Des Moines v. Iowa DOT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 17–0686
Filed April 27, 2018
CITY OF DES MOINES, IOWA,
CITY OF MUSCATINE, IOWA,
and
CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA,
Appellants,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
and IOWA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D.
Rosenberg, Judge.
Three cities appeal a district court order upholding administrative
rules issued by the Iowa Department of Transportation. REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Michelle R. Mackel-Wiederanders and Carol J. Moser, Des Moines,
Douglas A. Fulton, Matthew S. Brick, and Erin M. Clanton of Brick Gentry,
P.C., West Des Moines, Elizabeth D. Jacobi and James H. Flitz, Cedar
Rapids, for appellants.
2
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David S. Gorham, Special
Assistant Attorney General, and Richard E. Mull, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellees.
3
MANSFIELD, Justice.
We must determine whether the Iowa Department of Transportation
(IDOT) had the statutory authority to promulgate administrative rules
regulating automated traffic enforcement (ATE) systems located along
primary roads. See Iowa Admin. Code ch. 761—144 (2014). The
enforcement of these rules resulted in three cities being ordered to relocate
or remove several of their ATE cameras.
The issue presented is the reach of the administrative state: Before
the executive branch can adopt a rule with the force and effect of law, how
much groundwork must be laid by the legislative branch? After all, article
III, section 1 states that “[t]he legislative authority of this state shall be
vested in a general assembly . . .”—not the executive branch. Iowa Const.
art. III, § 1. Article III, section 1 also states that “no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall
exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, except in cases
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.” Id.
On our review, we find that the IDOT did not have authority from
the legislature to issue rules regulating ATE systems. The IDOT’s specific
grants of authority are in other areas and do not support the rules.
Moreover, any general authority over “regulation and improvement of
transportation” is too broad to sustain the rules—particularly in light of
the specific grants of authority in other areas. See Iowa Code § 307.2
(2013). Accordingly, we conclude the rules are invalid and cannot be
enforced against the cities. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural Background.
This dispute is between the IDOT and three cities—Cedar Rapids,
Des Moines, and Muscatine (the Cities). The Cities have installed ATE
4
systems on primary roads within their boundaries. 1 The IDOT has sought
to regulate and limit those ATE systems through administrative rules.
A. The Installation of the Cities’ ATE Systems. Until 2014, the
IDOT had no formal rules governing ATE systems but instead relied on
informal guidelines. In 2010, working within these guidelines, Cedar
Rapids obtained the IDOT’s written agreement that the city could install
ATE equipment. Cedar Rapids placed these systems in various locations
within its city limits. These places included Interstate 380 and 1st Avenue
East at the intersection of 10th Street. Both I-380 and 1st Avenue East
are considered primary roads.
Early in 2011, Muscatine also obtained the IDOT’s written
agreement to install ATE equipment within its limits, following a study of
accident data and speeding and red-light surveys. The locations included
two intersections along Highway 61, a primary road.
Later that year, Des Moines also received IDOT’s agreement that it
could install ATE cameras to monitor red-light running and speeding.
These included an ATE system to detect speeding vehicles traveling
eastbound on Interstate 235, between 42nd Street and Polk Boulevard. I-
235 is also a primary road. The specific location on I-235 was chosen
because of traffic flow, highway grade, and layout, which the city
maintained made it more difficult for officers to monitor speed safely from
their patrol cars.
1ATE systems use automated cameras to record motorists who commit traffic
violations, such as speeding or running a red light. After the vehicle and its license
number have been photographed, a citation is sent to the registered owner of the vehicle.
See, e.g., Des Moines, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 114-243 (2018). Typically, only a fine
is charged. See, e.g., id. There is no effect on the motorist’s driving or insurance record,
and it is only a civil infraction. Also, the ATE systems generally result in a speeding
citation only when the motorist is driving a certain threshold amount above the speed
limit—such as more than ten miles per hour above the limit. See, e.g., Muscatine, Iowa,
City Code § 7-5-5 (2018).
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IDOT’s standard agreements—which each of the Cities executed—
stated that the agency reserved the right to “[r]equire the removal of such
traffic control device upon thirty days’ written notice. Either lack of
supervision, inadequate enforcement, unapproved operation, or
intolerable congestion shall be considered sufficient reason to require
removal.”
B. The IDOT’s Rulemaking. On October 2, 2013, the IDOT
commenced a rulemaking proceeding to regulate and restrict ATE
placement and usage on primary roadways. See Iowa Code § 17A.4. In
accordance with requirements of the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act,
the IDOT published proposed rules and accepted written comments on
them. See id. § 17A.4(1)(a)–(b).
Among other things, the proposed rules provided that ATE systems
“shall only be considered after other engineering and enforcement
solutions have been explored and implemented,” “should not be used as a
long-term solution for speeding or red-light running,” and “should only be
considered in extremely limited situations on interstate roads because
they are the safest class of any roadway in the state and they typically
carry a significant amount of non-familiar motorists.” Notice of Intended
Action, Admin. Rules Review Comm. 1037C (IDOT Oct. 2, 2013),
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/aco/arc/1037C.pdf. The proposed
rules also required advance approval by the IDOT and a detailed
“justification report” for any ATE system. Thereafter, localities would be
required to submit detailed annual evaluations to assist the IDOT in
reevaluating each ATE system and deciding whether to allow its continued
use.
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Many comments were submitted expressing sharply divergent
viewpoints. 2 Most commenters did not discuss the actual rules but
addressed the pros and cons of ATE systems generally. For example:
“I strongly support the use of traffic cameras in Cedar
Rapids—specifically on I380. They are working!”
“In general, I am against the indiscriminate use of ‘spy
cameras’ as a means to collect massive fines from drivers.”
“I like the idea of traffic cameras for speeding and red
lights. I believe they do help to sa[v]e lives.”
“I am in total agreement of getting rid of photo enforced
speed cameras in Iowa. It is an invasion of privacy. Thank
you for using common sense on this issue.”
“I welcome fewer restrictions on the installation of
speed and red-light cameras. It’s the easiest way to keep
drivers honest and legal. And that’s good for everyone.”
“I am totally against traffic cameras and think they
should be outlawed.”
“Anything to get people to obey traffic laws is a good
thing, even if it is unpopular. Calling the cameras distracting
to drivers just to get rid of them is a cheap shot. KEEP THE
CAMERAS.”
“I see ABSOLUTELY NO value in traffic cameras placed
on the highway.”
Some commenters offered more specific suggestions. One
commenter urged that
[s]peed cameras should not be placed where there is a sudden
reduction in the speed limit. It is dangerous to have a speed
sign reducing speed a short distance from the camera. The
locals know to reduce their speed and start slamming on [their
brakes], which is not safe for traffic.
Along the same lines, another commenter recommended “that the
Department additionally restrict ATEs’ placement in locations where a
higher speed zone is transitioning to a lower speed zone.” Yet another
2The IDOT received a total of 164 written comments.
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commenter proposed that ATE systems “[n]ot be placed within 1,000 feet
of either side of a posted speed limit sign.”
On October 30, the IDOT held a public hearing to afford interested
persons an opportunity to speak out on the proposed rules. At the
hearing, representatives of the Cities, in addition to other officials and
members of the public, made oral presentations. A total of thirteen
persons spoke.
Again, the subject of limiting the use of speed cameras within a
certain distance of new speed limits came up. For example, one speaker
expressed concerns about municipalities installing ATE systems “in areas
where the speed is going from a faster speed zone to a slower speed zone .
. . because those are areas where more people are likely to slam on their
brakes, and it would be . . . more dangerous.”
The IDOT held a subsequent meeting on December 10 to present the
final rules and detail the feedback it had received throughout the process.
At this time, the IDOT unveiled modifications to the rules. These included
a “1000-foot rule”—i.e., that ATE equipment could not be stationed within
1000 feet of a speed limit change. The IDOT explained that this
modification was in response to prior comments.
In most other respects, the final rules mirrored the initial rules the
IDOT had proposed in October. Thus, all ATE locations on the primary
road system had to be approved by the IDOT. Iowa Admin. Code r. 761—
144.4(3). The final rules contained a requirement that any “local
jurisdiction requesting to use an automated traffic enforcement system on
the primary road shall provide the department a justification report.” Id.
r. 761—144.5(1). Such report needed to include documentation as to “why
the area is a high-crash or high-risk location.” Id. r. 761—144.5(1)(a).
According to the rules, ATE systems “should only be considered in
8
extremely limited situations on interstate roads because they are the safest
class of any roadway in the state and they typically carry a significant
amount of non-familiar motorists.” Id. r. 761—144.4(1)(c). After the ATE
equipment was installed, the rules required “each local jurisdiction with
active automated enforcement on Iowa’s primary highway system [to]
evaluate the effectiveness of its use” on an ongoing basis. Id. r. 761—
144.7(1). The annual evaluation must
(1) Address the impact of automated enforcement
technology on reducing speeds or the number of red-light
running violations for those sites being monitored.
(2) Identify the number and type of collisions at the sites
being monitored, listing comparison data for before-and-after
years. If the system includes intersection enforcement, only
the monitored approaches should be included in the
evaluation.
(3) Evaluate and document the automated traffic
enforcement system’s impact on addressing the critical traffic
safety issue(s) listed in the justification report if a justification
report was part of the system’s initial approval process.
(4) Provide the total number of citations issued for each
calendar year the system has been in operation.
(5) Certify that the calibration requirements of subrule
144.6(4) have been met.
Id. r. 761—144.7(1)(a).
The IDOT would determine whether use of the ATE system would
continue. Id. r. 761—144.8. “Continued use [would] be contingent on the
effectiveness of the system, appropriate administration of it by the local
jurisdiction, the continued compliance with these rules, changes in traffic
patterns, infrastructure improvements, and implementation of other
identified safety countermeasures.” Id. r. 761—144.8(1). Additionally, the
department explicitly “reserve[d] the right to require removal or
9
modification of a system in a particular location, as deemed appropriate.”
Id. r. 761—144.8(2). The rules became effective February 12, 2014.
C. The IDOT’s Subsequent Directives to Remove Certain ATE
Systems. Once the ATE rules became effective, each city submitted an
evaluation to the IDOT in an effort to justify the continued presence of the
cameras. Cedar Rapids provided crash data showing that crashes at 1st
Avenue and 10th Street had remained roughly constant since the
installation of the ATE systems. However, on I-380 there had been
declines both in overall crashes and, especially, personal injury crashes.
Whereas one fatal crash had occurred in 2008 and two in 2009, no fatal
crashes had occurred in the relevant area of I-380 since the ATE cameras
were installed.
Muscatine reported that totaling the five intersections where ATE
equipment had been installed, crashes had declined significantly overall.
In 2010, there had been thirty-four motor vehicle crashes including nine
injury crashes; by contrast, during the year 2013, there had been nineteen
crashes, of which four were injury crashes.
Des Moines’s report also argued that its ATE systems had had a
positive safety impact. Regarding the I-235 location, the report concluded
that “the total number of accidents on I-235 in this area (4700 block to
4200 block) have decreased since the implementation of our camera
program.”
Nonetheless, the IDOT ordered all of the Cities to disable or move
some of their ATE equipment. Cedar Rapids was told to disable its ATE
speed detection system at the intersection of 1st Avenue and 10th Street
because it violated the 1000-foot rule. The IDOT also told Cedar Rapids
to move, remove, or disable its ATE cameras on I-380 either because of the
1000-foot rule or because “[t]he location of the camera is well beyond the
10
‘S’ curve [on I-380] and therefore beyond the area of concern.” The IDOT
further cited Iowa Administrative Code rule 761—144.4(1)(c) regarding the
limited use of ATE systems on interstate roadways.
Muscatine was ordered to remove its ATE camera from Highway 61
at University because it violated the 1000-foot rule, because there were a
high number of citations, and because crashes had increased at this
particular location since the camera was installed.
The IDOT directed Des Moines to remove its ATE camera from I-235
as well. Although it acknowledged a reduction in crashes since the camera
was activated, it pointed to its own rule that ATE should only be considered
in extremely limited situations on interstate highways and observed that
“[t]his location experiences a low crash rate.” It also noted the high
number of citations.
Each city appealed, and the department director upheld each
decision.
D. The Consolidated Petition for Judicial Review. On June 9,
10, and 11, 2015, Des Moines, Muscatine, and Cedar Rapids respectively
filed separate petitions for judicial review under Iowa Code chapter 17A.
These actions challenged the IDOT’s actions on various grounds, including
(1) infringement of the Cities’ home rule authority; (2) lack of statutory
authority for the IDOT to promulgate the rules; (3) a claim that the IDOT
did not follow proper procedure in promulgating the rules, especially
because the original, proposed rules had not contained a 1000-foot rule;
and (4) a claim that the IDOT’s directives under the rules to remove or
disable specific ATE equipment were arbitrary and capricious. The actions
were later consolidated into a single proceeding in the Iowa District Court
for Polk County.
11
On March 27, 2017, the district court held a hearing, and the court
subsequently issued an order on April 25.
The district court’s order upheld both the IDOT’s rules and its
decisions based on those rules. In dismissing the Cities’ home rule
argument, the court noted, “Pursuant to Section 306.4(1), the IDOT
implemented rules governing the minimum requirements for ATEs, their
evaluation, and their subsequent removal if necessary. Iowa Admin. Code
r. 761—144. Therefore, state law, through the IDOT administrative rules,
controls.”
The court also found that the IDOT had sufficient authority under
the Iowa Code to promulgate the subject ATE rules. It stated,
The “jurisdiction and control over the primary roads
shall be vested in the [IDOT].” [Iowa Code] § 306.4(1). To carry
out these statutory provisions, the IDOT adopted rules
regulating ATEs emphasizing safety. See Iowa Admin. Code r.
761—144.6(1). This is consistent with regulating
obstructions in highway right-of-ways; the construction,
improvement, operation or maintenance of any highway; and
limiting cities’ obstruction of a street or highway which is used
as an extension of a primary road. See Iowa Code Chapter
318; Iowa Code §§ 306.4, 321.348.
(First alteration in original.)
The district court further concluded that the rules had been
promulgated in accord with a proper procedure, noting,
At the meetings and during the public hearing, comments
specifically citing the 1,000ft rule were submitted. Therefore,
the 1,000ft rule is a direct result of public comments made
and is, at the very least, a logical outgrowth of overall public
comments. Since final administrative rules may differ from
proposed rules, an additional notice and comment period is
not required and the IDOT decisions and orders pursuant to
the rule are valid.
Finally, the district court concluded that the application of the rules
to the Cities’ ATE systems complied with chapter 17A because the IDOT’s
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review of the statistics and data was comprehensive, reviewing more than
simply speed data or crash data. The court concluded that the IDOT’s
actions were reasonable and logical and thus did not violate chapter 17A.
The Cities appealed the district court’s rulings on all of these issues,
and we retained the appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
“Judicial review of agency decisions is governed by Iowa Code
section 17A.19.” Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 897 N.W.2d 522, 530
(Iowa 2017) (quoting Kay-Decker v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 857
N.W.2d 216, 222 (Iowa 2014)). We use the standards set forth in section
17A.19(10) “to determine if we reach the same results as the district court.”
Id. (quoting Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 784 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa
2010)).
To resolve whether the IDOT had authority to promulgate the ATE
rules, we must determine whether its action was “[b]eyond the authority
delegated to the agency by any provision of law or in violation of any
provision of law.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(b).
Historically, we have said that an agency rule is “presumed valid
unless the party challenging the rule proves ‘a “rational agency” could not
conclude the rule was within its delegated authority.’ ” Meredith Outdoor
Advert., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 648 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Iowa 2002)
(quoting Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1982) (en banc));
see also Brakke, 897 N.W.2d at 533.
However, “[t]he power of the agency is limited to the power granted
by statute.” Brakke, 897 N.W.2d at 533. In Brakke, we emphasized that
“ultimately the interpretation and construction of a statute is an issue for
the court to decide.” Id. We do not defer to the agency’s interpretation of
its own statutory authority to issue a rule unless “the legislature has
13
clearly vested that interpretation in the agency.” Id. This is consistent
with our Renda line of cases. See 784 N.W.2d at 13.
For example, in Kopecky v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Commission, we
declined to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own authority to issue
a rule allowing it consider the economic effect of a new gaming operation
on existing facilities because “we [were] not firmly convinced the legislature
vested the Commission with the authority to interpret our statutes when
it enacts its rules.” 891 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Iowa 2017).
Similarly, we are not persuaded here that the legislature clearly
vested the IDOT with interpretive authority to determine its own authority.
None of the relevant statutes expressly give the IDOT interpretive
authority. Cf. Iowa Med. Soc’y v. Iowa Bd. of Nursing, 831 N.W.2d 826,
827, 829–30, 841 (Iowa 2013) (noting that Iowa Code section 147.76
expressly grants the nursing board interpretive authority and applying a
deferential standard in determining that the board had authority to issue
certain rules).
As justification for the rules, the IDOT relies in part on general
provisions. See Iowa Code § 306.4(1) (providing that “[j]urisdiction and
control over the primary roads shall be vested in the department”); id.
§ 307.12(1)(j) (granting authority to “[a]dopt rules . . . as the director deems
necessary for the administration of the department and the exercise of the
director’s and department’s powers and duties”). These provisions,
however, contain generic terms like “jurisdiction” and “deems necessary.”
Such terms are widely used in “other areas of law” besides transportation
and are not “specialized terms within the expertise of the agency.” Renda,
784 N.W.2d at 14.
The IDOT also relies on its authority to eliminate “obstructions” from
highway rights-of-way as found in Iowa Code chapter 318. But the
14
legislature has provided its own definition of “obstruction.” Iowa Code
§§ 318.1(4), .3. This typically presents an “insurmountable obstacle” to
the conclusion that the IDOT has been vested with interpretive authority
over the term. See Iowa Dental Ass’n v. Iowa Ins. Div., 831 N.W.2d 138,
145 (Iowa 2013). On the contrary, “it indicates we ought to apply the
legislative definition ourselves.” Id. Accordingly, we must determine
ourselves whether the ATE rules are “[b]eyond the authority delegated to
the agency by any provision of law or in violation of any provision of law.”
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(b).
In considering whether the agency followed proper rulemaking
procedure under Iowa Code section 17A.4, we apply the relevant standards
of section 17A.19(10). See Iowa Fed’n of Labor, AFL–CIO v. Iowa Dep’t of
Job Serv., 427 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 1988) (en banc) (applying section
17A.19(8), now section 17A.19(10)); see also Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa State
Commerce Comm’n, 404 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1987) (same). The test is
one of substantial compliance with section 17A.4. Iowa Fed’n of Labor,
427 N.W.2d at 450; see Iowa Code § 17A.4(5).
When the question is whether the agency erred in applying its rules,
“then the challenge is to the agency’s application of the law to the facts,
and the question on review is whether the agency abused its discretion by,
for example, employing wholly irrational reasoning or ignoring important
and relevant evidence.” Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 219 (Iowa
2006); see also Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(l); Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814
N.W.2d 512, 518 (Iowa 2012).
III. IDOT’s Authority to Promulgate the ATE Rules.
The Cities first contend that the IDOT exceeded its statutory
authority in promulgating the ATE administrative rules. Although this is
framed as both a home rule argument and an argument that the IDOT
15
went beyond its own statutory authority in issuing the rules, the
arguments are really one and the same.
Within Iowa’s constitutional and statutory framework, the Cities
have retained certain rights, “except as expressly limited by the
Constitution of the State of Iowa, and if not inconsistent with the laws of
the general assembly.” See Iowa Code § 364.1 (emphasis added); see also
Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A (“Municipal home rule”). Therefore, despite
home rule, state law, implemented through valid administrative rule, will
displace an otherwise valid municipal ordinance. See Iowa Code § 364.1;
see also Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A. However, invalid state administrative
rules cannot be enforced against a municipality. Cf. City of Coralville v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 750 N.W.2d 523, 529 (Iowa 2008). The issue thus is
whether the IDOT had the authority to promulgate the rules to begin with.
Since we conclude they do not have the authority to do so, such rules are
unenforceable against the Cities and there is no conflict between the rules
and the Cities’ ordinances.
In City of Davenport v. Seymour, we addressed whether municipal
ordinances regarding ATE systems were preempted by state law (not state
administrative rules). 755 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Iowa 2008). We held that the
legislature had not preempted a Davenport ATE ordinance. Id. at 535–36.
That case did not involve a conflict with the IDOT, nor did it involve agency
action at all; the question was whether the ordinance conflicted with the
statutory provisions. Id. The statutes at issue in that case were the “traffic
regulation and enforcement provisions of Iowa Code chapter 321 (laws of
the road) and sections 364.22(5)(b) (municipal infractions), 805.6 (form of
citation in criminal cases), and 805.8A (schedule of criminal fines).” Id. at
537. This case presents a different question: a conflict between municipal
action and state administrative rules.
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Ordinarily, state agency rules are given the “the force and effect of
law.” Stone Container Corp. v. Castle, 657 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Iowa 2003)
(quoting Greenwood Manor v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 641 N.W.2d 823,
835 (Iowa 2002)). However, “agencies have ‘no inherent power and [have]
only such authority as [they are] conferred by statute or is necessarily
inferred from the power expressly given.’ ” Wallace v. Iowa State Bd. of
Educ., 770 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Iowa 2009) (alterations in original) (quoting
Zomer v. W. River Farms, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa 2003)). For a
rule to be validly adopted, it “must be within the scope of the powers
delegated to [the agency] by statute.” Id. (quoting Iowa Power & Light Co.
v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 410 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Iowa 1987)). Thus,
if the rules adopted by the agency “exceed the agency’s statutory authority,
the rules are void and invalid.” Id. “An agency cannot by rule . . . expand
or limit authority granted by statute.” Smith–Porter v. Iowa Dep’t of Human
Servs., 590 N.W.2d 541, 545 (Iowa 1999).
In deciding whether the ATE administrative rules promulgated by
the IDOT were validly adopted, we must determine whether their adoption
was within the scope of authority delegated to the IDOT by the legislature.
“We have declined to find legislative authorization for agency rulemaking
in the absence of a specific grant of authority.” Wallace, 770 N.W.2d at
348. When the legislature has given an agency general rulemaking
authority but has also granted specific authority in particular areas, the
agency cannot then extend the specific grants beyond their scope.
Our cases reflect this principle. In Brakke, we found that the
specific legislative grant of authority to promulgate rules “for the
quarantine of diseased preserve whitetail” could not be used by the
department of natural resources (DNR) to promulgate rules allowing the
quarantine of (1) nondiseased deer that had also been exposed to the
17
disease or (2) the land where the diseased deer had been. 897 N.W.2d at
531, 541–42 (quoting Iowa Code § 484C.12(1)).
We therefore conclude that Iowa Code section 484C.12
should be read according to its ordinary meaning. The
consequence of this interpretation is that the agency lacked
the statutory authority to promulgate the administrative rule
expanding the scope of quarantines to include fencing of lands
for a five-year period when all diseased preserve wildlife have
been eradicated. As a result, the agency was without
authority to issue the emergency order in this case. If the
legislature wishes to expand quarantine powers as suggested
by the DNR rule, it is, of course, free to do so.
Id. (footnote omitted). We reached this conclusion even though “Iowa Code
chapter 484C generally grants DNR the authority to regulate preserve
whitetail.” Id. at 531; see Iowa Code § 484C.2(2) (“This chapter authorizes
the department of natural resources to regulate preserve whitetail.”).
We applied similar reasoning in Wallace. There, the plaintiffs
challenged a school district’s decision to close five elementary schools on
the ground the school district had failed to comply with rules promulgated
by the state board of education regarding school closure decisions. 770
N.W.2d at 346. The school district responded that the board of education
did not have the authority to promulgate those rules, rendering them
invalid. Id. The board had been authorized by statute to “[a]dopt rules
under chapter 17A for carrying out the responsibilities of the department.”
Id. at 348 (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 256.7(5) (2003)).
However, we found that this language did not grant the board “unlimited
power to regulate matters within the agency’s expertise.” Id. The
legislature had expressly authorized the board to adopt rules regarding
many other areas, but not school closures. Id. at 348–49. We concluded
that “the notable absence of a legislative grant to the [state board] of
authority to adopt rules regulating school closure decisions” meant that
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such power was not within the scope of its authority. Id. at 349. Therefore,
the rules were void. Id.
Likewise, in Litterer v. Judge, we rejected an effort to force the
secretary of agriculture to adopt rules mandating ten percent ethanol
content in all motor vehicle fuel sold in Iowa. 644 N.W.2d 357, 359–60
(Iowa 2002). The secretary had refused to promulgate such a rule on the
basis that she lacked the legislative authority to do so. Id. at 360. The
statute at issue provided,
The secretary shall adopt rules pursuant to chapter 17A for
carrying out this chapter. The rules may include, but are not
limited to, specifications relating to motor fuel or oxygenate
octane enhancers. In the interest of uniformity, the secretary
shall adopt by reference or otherwise specifications relating to
tests and standards for motor fuel or oxygenate octane
enhancers, established by the American society for testing
and materials (A.S.T.M.), unless the secretary determines
those specifications are inconsistent with this chapter or are
not appropriate to the conditions which exist in this state.
Id. at 363 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Iowa Code § 214A.2(1) (1999)).
In other words, Iowa law gave the secretary of agriculture authority
to adopt rules to carry out the motor vehicle fuel statutes, including the
express authority to promulgate rules relating to specifications for motor
fuel. Id. Nonetheless, we rejected the plaintiffs’ appeal because there was
“no specific grant of authority by the legislature in section 214A.2
permitting the secretary to regulate the content level of ethanol in motor
fuel.” Id. In our examination of the legislative history and the meaning of
other terms in the statute, we did not find evidence of legislative intent to
bestow this authority. See id. at 363–65. Therefore, despite the existence
of a closely related grant of authority, we decided the statute did not confer
authority to promulgate rules mandating ethanol content. See id. at 365.
 19
In another case, we found that the DNR lacked statutory authority
to issue an administrative order pertaining to the cleanup of solid waste.
First Iowa State Bank v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 502 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Iowa
1993). The DNR had determined that a bank foreclosing on property was
responsible for the cost of cleanup of illegally dumped solid waste on the
site. Id. at 165. We acknowledged that “[s]pecific statutory authority for
adopting administrative rules relating to solid waste is provided in section
455B.304.” Id. at 168. However, we also noted that “no reference is made
to adoption of rules relating to cleanup of open dumps.” Id. Additionally,
Iowa law imposed liability “for cleanup of a hazardous condition . . . upon
a person having control over the hazardous substance.” Id.
Given these statutory provisions, we reasoned that the DNR lacked
the necessary authority. Id. Interpreting the statute to provide the agency
with authority to issue the administrative order would have imposed
broader liability for cleanup of solid waste than for cleanup of hazardous
waste—contrary to the underlying statutory scheme. See id. We agreed
with the district court that “the action of the DNR is in excess of the
statutory authority granted to it.” Id.
Barker v. Iowa Department of Transportation also found that the
department of transportation had exceeded its rulemaking authority. 431
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1988). There, the department revoked a driver’s license
on the basis of a breath test that had indicated a blood alcohol content of
.108%. Id. at 348–49. The legal challenge concerned department rules
that had established the margin of error for a blood test at plus or minus
five percent. Id. at 349. The underlying statute referenced an “established
margin of error” but neither designated that margin nor expressly
authorized the department to make the designation. Id. (quoting Iowa
Code § 321J.12 (1987)). Because the administrative rules review
20
committee challenged the rule, the burden was on the agency to establish
its authority to promulgate the rule. Id. The department pointed to its
general statutory authority to promulgate administrative rules to carry out
any laws whose enforcement was vested in the department. Id. at 350.
However, we found that the department lacked the authority to establish
a standard for what would constitute a violation, as such a power must be
expressly given. Id. (“Authority for such a power cannot be implied . . . .”).
The authority to approve devices could not be broadly interpreted as
including authority to promulgate a rule “establishing a margin of error for
the devices it has approved.” Id.
In another case, several public utility companies challenged the
state commerce commission’s authority to promulgate a rule requiring
utility financing of energy conservation measures. Iowa–Ill. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 334 N.W.2d 748, 749 (Iowa 1983).
There, we found that even the express statutory mandate that “[t]he
commission shall promulgate rules concerning the use of energy
conservation strategies by rate or service regulated gas and electric
utilities” was not sufficient to confer authority to promulgate rules
requiring utility financing of conservation measures. Id. at 752 (quoting
Iowa Code § 476.2 (1981)). “Such commission authority, if it exists, must
be implied from the statutory language the commission relies on.” Id.
Using the ordinary meaning of the statutes, we concluded that the phrases
“programs designed to promote” and “rules concerning the use of” meant
the commission had the authority “to encourage, influence, and provide
incentives relating to energy conservation.” Id. However, that still was not
enough to give the authority to require utility financing of energy
conservation, undeniably a method of achieving energy conservation. Id.
We found that the Code provisions “relied on by the commission do not
21
mention financing at all, let alone permit it.” Id. at 753. Therefore, the
commission did not have the authority to promulgate rules requiring
utility financing. Id. Because the authority to require financing was a
“departure from traditional utilities regulation,” we concluded “that it must
be clearly manifested by legislative enactment.” Id. at 754.
In Marquart v. Maucker, an employee of a state university
successfully contested an administrative rule that had resulted in
withholding from her final paycheck. 215 N.W.2d 278, 279 (Iowa 1974).
The university had established various rules and regulations for the use
of its parking lots, enforceable by fines that could be deducted from an
employee’s paycheck. Id. The university put forth several statutes that it
claimed as the basis of its authority, including the authority to set speed
limits, but we found that these statutes could not imply the authority to
adopt the parking regulations in question. See id. at 282.
The foregoing cases follow a pattern. In Brakke, Wallace, Litterer,
First Iowa State Bank, Barker, Iowa–Illinois Gas & Electric, and Marquart,
the legislature gave the agency authority to issue rules in a specific area,
but not the specific area at issue. Accordingly, we found that an
overarching general grant of authority was an insufficient basis for
rulemaking in that area.
Even when we have upheld the agency’s authority to promulgate
rules, we first determined that the legislature had expressly granted
statutory authority to promulgate rules related to the subject area. For
example, in Meredith Outdoor Advertising, Inc., we found that the IDOT
could promulgate rules requiring the revocation of permits when billboard
sign owners reconstructed or modified nonconforming signs more than
660 feet from an interstate without seeking a new permit. 648 N.W.2d at
116–17. There, the plaintiff appealed a decision by the IDOT revoking two
22
permits for outdoor advertising signs after the signs were reconstructed or
modified without the plaintiff having obtained new permits. Id. at 112.
This was in violation of the IDOT’s administrative rule. Id. The plaintiff
contended that the rule exceeded the IDOT’s rulemaking authority,
pointing to the fact that a different chapter, 306B, specifically granted
authority to the department to “promulgate and enforce rules . . .
governing the erection, maintenance, and frequency of advertising devices
within six hundred sixty feet of the edge of the right of way.” Id. at 116
(omission in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 306B.3 (1999)). Nevertheless,
we found that “several other statutory sections inherently provide the
department with sufficient authority to enact regulations controlling the
maintenance of nonconforming signs.” Id. at 117. We concluded that “the
legislature intended to provide the department with the power to fill in any
gaps within chapter 306C by enacting administrative rules.” Id.
We noted in Meredith Outdoor Advertising that Iowa Code section
306C.12 generally prohibited the signs in question. Id. at 115.
Additionally, “[s]ections 306C.18(3) and 306C.19 require sign owners such
as [the plaintiff] to follow department rules or be subject to removal.” Id.
at 117. Furthermore, “[a]dditional sections provide general authority to
the department to adopt such rules deemed necessary to carry out its
duties.” Id. Based on this combination of authority, we found the rule
was within the IDOT’s delegated authority. See id.
In Overton v. State, a prison inmate challenged the authority of the
Iowa Department of Corrections to make rules requiring him to reimburse
a staff member for eyeglasses broken during an altercation. 493 N.W.2d
857, 858 (Iowa 1992). The contested rule permitted the sanction of
“assessed costs” when an inmate violated a disciplinary rule. Id. at 859.
Iowa law provided, “Inmates who disobey the disciplinary rules of the
23
institutions to which they are committed shall be punished by the
imposition of the penalties prescribed in the disciplinary rules. . . .” Id.
(omission in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 246.505(1)). We found that the
department had the necessary authority because the assessed costs
constituted a penalty. Id.
In Frank v. Iowa Department of Transportation, we were charged with
deciding “whether the department was within its statutory authority to
conclude under its rules that a moving traffic-law violation includes failing
to have a valid chauffeur’s license.” 386 N.W.2d 86, 88 (Iowa 1986). We
determined that it was, particularly noting the statutory basis for the
authority to promulgate such rules:
Section 321.210 authorizes the department to establish
rules for license suspension if the operator is found to be a
habitual violator, and provides only three exclusions for
violations of statutory or municipal ordinances in determining
whether or not to suspend a license. Pursuant to this section,
the department defines a “habitual violator” as one who has
convictions for more than two moving traffic-law violations
within twelve months. It then defines “moving traffic law
violation” as “any traffic law violation except” ones regarding
equipment, parking, registration laws, expired licenses or
permits, failures to appear, weights and measures, and
disturbing the peace. There are no exceptions for failing to
have a valid chauffeur’s license.
Id. (citations omitted). We pointed out that “the legislature itself did not
see fit to include . . . the failure to have a valid chauffeur’s license in its
exemptions in section 321.210.” Id. We concluded that the department
“may properly consider the failure to have a valid chauffeur’s license to be
a moving traffic-law violation under its rules.” See id.
In Milholin, we “decide[d] the validity and effect of a rule of the Iowa
Real Estate Commission requiring all real estate listing agreements to be
in a writing containing all essential terms.” 320 N.W.2d at 553. The
district court had found the rule to be invalid. Id. We reversed, deciding
24
that the rule was a valid exercise of the commission’s authority. Id. The
relevant chapter vested the commission “with far-reaching authority to
license, regulate and discipline brokers and salespersons.” Id. at 554. The
commission also had express, general rulemaking authority. Id. Although
the statute did not grant the specific authority to promulgate rules on this
subject, the rule was nevertheless a regulatory measure over brokers and
salespersons, thus allowing the commission to reasonably conclude that
promulgating this rule fell within its statutory authority. See id.
In Temple v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co., we concluded that a rule
promulgated by the industrial commissioner was within its specific
statutory authority. 285 N.W.2d 157, 159–60 (Iowa 1979). The rule at
issue there required the commissioner “to decide an appeal on the record
established before the deputy commissioner unless the commissioner is
satisfied that additional evidence is material and that there was good
reason for failure to present the additional evidence to the deputy
commissioner.” Id. at 159. We concluded that the rule was “well within
the legislative authorization.” Id. There, the statute provided, “In addition
to the provisions of section 17A.15, the industrial commissioner, on
appeal, may limit the presentation of evidence as provided by rule.” Id.
(quoting Iowa Code § 86.24 (1979)). We noted that section 86.24 was a
“particular statutory basis for the rule,” and thus the rule was within the
commissioner’s authority. Id. at 160.
Meredith Outdoor Advertising, Overton, Frank, and Temple fall into
the pattern we have already noted. In those cases, legislation gave the
agency specific authority to decide when billboards could be permitted that
were visible from an interstate highway (although more than 660 feet away
from the highway), impose penalties, define a moving violation, and limit
evidence. Thus, in each of those cases, the agency rule was upheld. As
25
noted, the trend of the above cases is that when the statute has granted
general rulemaking authority and followed it up with specific authority
over particular areas, the agency is not free to interpret the general
rulemaking authority as granting unlimited rulemaking authority. Neither
may the agency interpret the specific grants of authority broadly so as to
encompass areas not clearly included within those grants.
Milholin is, perhaps, more difficult to reconcile with the rest of the
caselaw. The real estate commission had been given authority over the
licensing, regulation, and disciplining of brokers and salespersons. 320
N.W.2d at 554. We concluded that a rule requiring listing agreements to
be in writing was a rational way to “regulat[e] broker conduct to protect
the public.” Id. Milholin was decided thirty-six years ago and should be
read along with more recent decisions. 3
We turn now to the IDOT’s asserted basis for authority here. The
IDOT points to its specific statutory authority to remove “obstructions”
from the highway right-of-way of the primary highway system. See Iowa
Code §§ 318.4, .7 (2013). However, an “obstruction”
means an obstacle in the highway right-of-way or an
impediment or hindrance which impedes, opposes, or
interferes with free passage along the highway right-of-way,
not including utility structures installed in accordance with
an approved permit.
Id. § 318.1(4). The legislation continues,
3Notably, a dissenting opinion urged,
The subject of the form or contents of contracts between realtors
and listers does not come within the scope of the chapter. We are already
inundated by a proliferation of agency rules. I do not think we should
enlarge agencies’ rule-making powers additionally by construing statutes
beyond what appears to be legislative intent in those statutes.
Milholin, 320 N.W.2d at 556 (Uhlenhopp, J., dissenting).
26
A person shall not place, or cause to be placed, an
obstruction within any highway right-of-way. This prohibition
includes, but is not limited to, the following actions:
1. The excavation, filling, or making of any physical
changes to any part of the highway right-of-way, except as
provided under section 318.8.
2. The cultivation or growing of crops within the
highway right-of-way.
3. The destruction of plants placed within the highway
right-of-way.
4. The placing of fences or ditches within the highway
right-of-way.
5. The alteration of ditches, water breaks, or drainage
tiles within the highway right-of-way.
6. The placement of trash, litter, debris, waste material,
manure, rocks, crops or crop residue, brush, vehicles,
machinery, or other items within the highway right-of-way.
7. The placement of billboards, signs, or advertising
devices within the highway right-of-way.
8. The placement of any red reflector, or any object or
other device which shall cause the effect of a red reflector on
the highway right-of-way which is visible to passing motorists.
Id. § 318.3.
The list of potential obstructions in Iowa Code section 318.3 does
not include ATE equipment, nor does it include anything comparable to
ATE equipment. Id. § 318.3. The first seven items consist of physical
obstacles within the right-of-way. Id. § 318.3(1)–(7). The last item, a “red
reflector,” is presumably included because a red reflector is a recognized
warning device for motorists. See id. § 321.389 (requiring a red reflector
on the rear of all vehicles). Therefore, a red reflector that wasn’t warning
27
about a vehicle or other hazard could throw motorists off the track and
itself pose a danger. 4
Significantly, Iowa Code chapter 318 requires every “obstruction” to
be removed and provides that any person who places an “obstruction” in
a highway right-of-way is deemed to have created a public nuisance. See
id. §§ 318.5(1)–(2), .6(1) (2013). So if the IDOT’s interpretation were
correct, the Cities would be creating a public nuisance. Also, the
prohibition only applies to obstructions “within any highway right-of-way.”
Id. § 318.3. Notably, all the interstate ATE systems at issue in this case
were mounted on existing overhead truss signs. 5
Reading chapter 318 as a whole, it is not plausible to use the term
“obstruction” for a traffic camera that takes a photograph for law
enforcement purposes of a vehicle going more than ten miles over the
speed limit. 6
The IDOT also relies on two broadly worded statutes: Iowa Code
sections 307.2 and 307.12(1)(j). The former states that the IDOT “shall be
responsible for the planning, development, regulation and improvement of
4Chapter 318 was enacted in 2006. 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1097. Its predecessor,
chapter 319, contained a provision that served a similar purpose:
Except for official traffic-control devices as defined by section
321.1, subsection 46, no person shall place, erect, or attach any red
reflector, or any object or other device which shall cause a red reflectorized
effect, within the boundary lines of the public highways so as to be visible
to passing motorists.
Iowa Code § 319.12 (2005).
5Inseveral instances, the IDOT gave the Cities the option of disabling, rather than
removing, the ATE equipment. If the equipment were really an “obstruction” within the
meaning of chapter 318, disabling would not be a remedy.
6Similarly, we do not believe that the IDOT had authority to promulgate the rules
under Iowa Code section 321.348, which makes it “unlawful for any city to close or
obstruct any street or highway which is used as the extension of a primary road within
such city . . . .” Iowa Code § 321.348. Whatever their merits or demerits, the ATE systems
are not an “obstruction.”
28
transportation in the state as provided by law.” Id. § 307.2. Section
307.12(1)(j) authorizes the director of the department to “[a]dopt rules in
accordance with chapter 17A as the director deems necessary for the
administration of the department and the exercise of the director’s and
department’s powers and duties.” Id. § 307.12(1)(j).
The IDOT argues that these general provisions sustain the ATE
rules. However, neither of these two provisions broadens the reach of the
IDOT; rather, each incorporates and relies upon other legal sources. Iowa
Code section 307.2 states that the IDOT is responsible for the regulation
of transportation “as provided by law.” Section 307.12 empowers the IDOT
to adopt rules to exercise its “powers and duties.” In other words, the
IDOT can adopt rules, but they have to be in furtherance of legal authority
that the agency otherwise possesses.
The IDOT’s argument runs contrary to our prior holdings in Wallace,
Litterer, Iowa–Illinois Gas & Electric, Barker, Brakke, and First Iowa State
Bank. For example, in Wallace we said, “[G]eneral authorization of this
type does not grant to an administrative agency unlimited power to
regulate matters within the agency’s expertise.” 770 N.W.2d at 348.
Furthermore, the delegation of authority to the IDOT over other specific
areas prevents the IDOT from claiming specific authority here. 7
The other statutes cited by the IDOT as authority for promulgating
the ATE rules are similarly generic and not specific to ATE systems. Iowa
Code section 306.4(1) states that “[j]urisdiction and control over the
7Our decision in Lenning v. Iowa Department of Transportation provides a useful
contrast to the present case. 368 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1985). There we upheld an IDOT rule
that made persons with prior license revocations based upon OWI convictions ineligible
for work permits during the period of a subsequent revocation. Id. at 100. Although we
quoted the IDOT’s general rulemaking authority in a footnote, we sustained the rule
because the underlying statute specifically gave the IDOT discretion on whether to issue
temporary restricted licenses in these circumstances. Id. at 101–02 & n.1.
29
primary roads shall be vested in the department.” Iowa Code § 306.4(1).
Section 306.4(4)(a) provides,
Jurisdiction and control over the municipal street system
shall be vested in the governing bodies of each municipality;
except that the department and the municipal governing body
shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the municipal
extensions of primary roads in all municipalities. When
concurrent jurisdiction is exercised, the department shall
consult with the municipal governing body as to the kind and
type of construction, reconstruction, repair, and maintenance
and the two parties shall enter into agreements with each
other as to the division of costs thereof.
Id. § 306.4(4)(a). The IDOT argues that “[s]ections 306.4(1) and 306.4(4)(a)
should be read together and harmonized with the DOT having final
authority to adopt the subject ATE rules.”
We are not persuaded. We think that the ordinary meaning of
“jurisdiction and control over the primary roads” in this context means
that the department has authority over the establishment, alteration, and
vacation of such roads. Those are the subjects covered by Iowa Code
chapter 306. See City of Cedar Rapids v. State, 478 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa
1991) (“We believe that the intent and purpose of [section 306.4(3) (now
306.4(4))] is to establish the jurisdiction and control of municipalities in
the establishment, alteration, and vacation of roadways within the
municipal limits.”).
The IDOT’s argument proves too much. Suppose the Cities decided
to station numerous patrol cars on Interstates 380 and 235 and Highway
61 to catch and ticket speeders. Could the IDOT issue a rule banning the
practice on the ground that it has “jurisdiction and control” over these
roads? Clearly not.
Furthermore, Iowa Code section 321.285(5) gives the IDOT authority
to establish speed limits under circumstances on “fully controlled-access
30
. . . highways.” See Iowa Code § 321.285(5). But missing from this specific
grant is any authority over methods of enforcing speed limits. See Litterer,
644 N.W.2d at 365.
Brakke is instructive here, because it is in many ways analogous to
the present case. 897 N.W.2d 522. Like the IDOT, the DNR possesses
broad authority over its domain. Section 455A.2 states, “A department of
natural resources is created, which has the primary responsibility for state
parks and forests, protecting the environment, and managing fish, wildlife,
and land and water resources in the state.” Iowa Code § 455A.2.
Furthermore, Iowa Code section 484C.2(2) “authorizes the department of
natural resources to regulate preserve whitetail,” and the DNR is imbued
with a statutory authority to “adopt rules pursuant to chapter 17A as
necessary to administer” the chapter regarding whitetail deer. Id.
§ 484C.3.
Nonetheless, in Brakke, we found that the DNR could not
promulgate quarantine rules outside the particular scope of section
484C.12, even though those rules might appear otherwise consistent with
the broad rulemaking authority and legislative intent to protect whitetail
deer. 897 N.W.2d at 533–34. We noted the department’s argument that
the clear legislative intent was to eradicate the particular disease at issue,
since it was mentioned by name by the legislature. Id. at 532 (“According
to the DNR, it would make no sense for a legislature so concerned with
[this disease] to deny the state regulatory authorities the ability to protect
the whitetail population from a primary pathway for transmission of the
disease, namely exposure to prion-contaminated land.”). The expanded
quarantine was certainly consistent with that goal. See id. Still, the
rulemaking authority given to the department did not extend beyond the
type of quarantine referred to in Iowa Code section 484C.12(1). Id. at 541.
 31
Likewise, here, the IDOT’s general mission to preserve motorist
safety is not enough to allow it to deviate from its specific statutory
authority, by treating an ATE system as a right-of-way obstruction. As we
said in Brakke, if the legislature wants to expand the IDOT’s powers to
include regulation of ATE systems, “it is, of course, free to do so.” Id. at
541–42.
Other state legislatures have expressly vested state agencies with
authority over ATE systems. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28–641
(Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. 2018) (giving the department of
transportation the authority to “adopt a manual and specifications for a
uniform system of control devices,” including photo enforcement systems);
625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 7/10 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100–585 of
2018 Reg. Sess.) (granting the department of state police the authority to
establish ATE systems); Md. Code. Ann., Transp. § 25-104 (West, Westlaw
through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“The State Highway Administration shall adopt
a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic control
devices,” including automatic speed monitoring systems). To date, our
general assembly has not pursued this course of action. 8
The IDOT contends that by not enacting legislation to overturn the
ATE rules, the legislature has impliedly endorsed them. The IDOT cites
State v. Miner, where we said,
The Iowa Administrative [P]rocedure Act affords the legislature
an opportunity to object to agency rules and to override them
by statute. These steps were not taken by the legislature;
therefore, we assume that the legislature approved of the
8As noted, the legislature has specifically empowered the IDOT to act in other
areas, but not with respect to ATE systems. We have long recognized the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., the expression of one is the exclusion of the
other, as an aid to statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Staff Mgmt. v. Jiminez, 839 N.W.2d
640, 649 (Iowa 2013); Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa 2013); Kucera v.
Baldazo, 745 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Iowa 2008).
32
requirement that brokers be licensed as dealers and of the
resulting application of the title requirements to all who
initiate the retail sale of motor vehicles.
331 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Iowa 1983) (citation omitted). However, Miner is
distinguishable. Miner involved a specific grant of legislative authority to
adopt the rule at issue. Id. at 686. We found that the administrative rule
“was only verbalizing what section 322.3(2) had already directed.” Id. The
administrative rule, in other words, “was following what the legislature had
already directed in section 322.3(2).” Id. at 687. Here, the rule lacks such
support. We are unwilling to adopt a principle that whenever the
legislature declines to pass legislation overturning a rule, it has statutorily
authorized that rule. This flips article III and article IV of the Iowa
Constitution.
In 2014, the general assembly enacted a statutory ban on the use of
drones for traffic law enforcement. See 2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1111, § 1
(codified at Iowa Code § 321.492B) (2015). This shows that the legislature
has the ability to enact laws regulating newer methods of traffic law
enforcement.
Therefore, we conclude that the IDOT did not have statutory
authority to promulgate the administrative rules dictating placement and
continued use of ATE equipment by the Cities. As a result, the agency was
without authority to rely on those rules to order the Cities to move, remove,
or disable their ATE systems.
Because of our determination that the IDOT lacked authority to
issue the ATE rules, we need not reach the Cities’ additional arguments
that the IDOT failed to comply with proper rulemaking procedure in
adopting the 1000-foot rule, or that the ATE rules and their application to
the Cities were illogical and wholly irrational, failed to address relevant
and important information that a rational decision-maker would consider,
33
and were otherwise arbitrary and capricious. See Iowa Code § 17A.4(1)(a);
id. § 17A.19(10)(i), (j), (n).
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude that the IDOT was without statutory authority to
promulgate its administrative rules regarding the municipalities’ ATE
systems. We reverse the district court’s order and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.