Joshua Venckus v. City of Iowa City

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 18–1280
Filed June 28, 2019
JOSHUA VENCKUS,
Appellee,
vs.
CITY OF IOWA CITY; ANDREW RICH; JOHNSON COUNTY, IOWA;
ANNE LAHEY; NAEDA ELLIOTT; and DANA CHRISTIANSEN,
Appellants.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Chad
Kepros, Judge.
Interlocutory appeal from the denial of motions to dismiss claims
arising out of an allegedly wrongful prosecution. AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Robert M. Livingston and Kristopher K. Madsen of Stuart Tinley Law
Firm, LLP, Council Bluffs, and Susan D. Nehring, Assistant County
Attorney, Iowa City, for appellants Johnson County, Anne Lahey, Naeda
Elliott, and Dana Christiansen.
Eric R. Goers and Susan Dulek, Assistant City Attorneys, for
appellants City of Iowa City and Andrew Rich.
Martin A. Diaz, Swisher, and M. Victoria Cole, Cedar Rapids, for
appellee.
2
Alan R. Ostergren, Muscatine, for amici curiae Iowa County
Attorneys Association and Iowa State Association of Counties.
Joel E. Fenton of Law Offices of Joel E. Fenton, PLC, Des Moines,
for amicus curiae Iowa Association for Justice.
3
McDONALD, Justice.
Joshua Venckus was charged with sexual abuse in the second
degree and acquitted. Following acquittal, Venckus filed this civil action
against the police investigator, the prosecutors, and the municipalities
that investigated and prosecuted the criminal case. Venckus asserted
common law claims and state constitutional claims against the
defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss Venckus’s claims on the
grounds the defendants were immune from suit, the claims were time
barred, and the state constitutional claims were disallowed because an
adequate nonconstitutional remedy existed. The district court denied the
defendants’ motions to dismiss, and we granted the defendants’
applications for interlocutory appeal.
I.
This court reviews rulings on motions to dismiss for the correction
of legal error. Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa 2017). To the
extent that we review constitutional claims, the standard of review is
de novo. See McGill v. Fish, 790 N.W.2d 113, 116–17 (Iowa 2010). In
reviewing the ruling, “we accept all well-[pleaded] facts in the petition as
true.” Godfrey, 898 N.W.2d at 847.
II.
In February 2013, Venckus resided in Iowa City, Johnson County,
Iowa. On the weekend of February 15–17, Venckus left Iowa City and
spent the weekend at his parents’ home in Chicago, Illinois. While
Venckus was in Chicago, Venckus’s roommates hosted a party at their
residence. After the party ended, a man broke into the residence and
sexually assaulted an intoxicated and incapacitated woman who had
remained in the home. The woman managed to escape during the assault
and obtain assistance.
4
Iowa City Police Department Investigator Andrew Rich was the
principal investigator assigned to the case. The victim reported a single
assailant. The police found a wallet outside a window well of the residence.
The wallet belonged to Ryan Lee Markley. The police found Markley’s
handprint on the basement window used for entry. The police found a
boot print matching Markley’s boot on a chair underneath the window.
The police recovered a marijuana pipe stolen from the residence in
Markley’s apartment. Markley’s DNA matched DNA found on the victim’s
body. However, DNA of “one single sperm found in the [victim’s] cervix”
matched Venckus’s DNA.
The police interviewed Venckus and his roommates. All interviewees
explained Venckus was in Chicago at the relevant time. To prove his alibi,
Venckus turned over his cell phone and bank card to Rich. Venckus
provided the names of alibi witnesses. Venckus also obtained an expert
witness who accounted for the presence of Venckus’s DNA. The assault
occurred in Venckus’s home. The blanket that covered the victim while
she slept was from Venckus’s bedroom, and the blanket was replete with
Venckus’s DNA. Venckus’s expert witness report showed “the DNA
evidence of one sperm found in the cervix represented evidence of a
transfer from the blanket covering the victim and could not represent the
sole evidence of DNA left by a rapist.”
Rich arrested Venckus on January 24, 2014, on the charge of sexual
abuse in the second degree. The affidavit supporting the arrest warrant
provided as follows:
This Def[endant] stated during an interview that he was not
even in [Iowa City] when the attack occurred. However, DNA
evidence developed in the course of this investigation proves
the Def[endant] was not only present but participate[d] in this
attack and left the victim with multiple injuries requiring
immediate medical attention.
5
The Johnson County Attorney’s Office—specifically defendants Anne
Lahey, Naeda Elliott, and Dana Christiansen—prosecuted the case. From
August 2015 through the criminal trial in September 2016, Venckus’s
defense counsel uploaded exculpatory information onto a web-based file
sharing service, which was made available to the police and prosecutors.
The prosecutors took the case to trial. Venckus was acquitted.
Subsequently, Venckus filed the petition at issue. Venckus asserted
claims against Investigator Rich and the City of Iowa City (collectively
police defendants) for defamation, abuse of process, and malicious
prosecution. Venckus asserted claims against Lahey, Elliott,
Christiansen, and Johnson County (collectively prosecutor defendants) for
abuse of process. Against all defendants, Venckus asserted tort claims
arising under the Iowa Constitution, including violations of the following:
the rights to freedom of movement and association under article I, section
1; the right to liberty arising under article I, section 1; the rights to due
process, a fair trial, and equal protection guaranteed by article I, sections
6 and 9; and the right against unreasonable search and seizure
guaranteed by article I, section 8.1
The defendants moved to dismiss the petition. The prosecutor
defendants contended they were absolutely immune from suit. The police
defendants contended they were absolutely immune from suit, the
1In Godfrey v. State, this court held the State of Iowa and state officials acting in
their official capacities could be sued directly for violations of the equal protection and
due process clauses of the Iowa Constitution but only where state law does not otherwise
provide an adequate damage remedy. 898 N.W.2d at 846–47; id. at 880–81 (Cady, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The parties have not asked us to reconsider
Godfrey, to consider whether a Godfrey-type claim can be asserted for alleged violations
of the Iowa Constitution other than those recognized in Godfrey, or to determine whether
Godfrey-type claims can be asserted against municipalities. In the absence of any
argument on these issues, we assume without deciding Venckus has asserted cognizable
constitutional claims for damages.
6
plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and the state
constitutional claims were disallowed because an adequate
nonconstitutional remedy existed under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims
Act (IMTCA). The district court granted the motions to dismiss. Venckus
filed a motion to reconsider. The district court granted the motion and
denied in entirety the motions to dismiss.
III.
The prosecutor defendants contend they are absolutely immune
from suit pursuant to the judicial process immunity. In resolving the
argument, we first discuss the nature and scope of the judicial process
immunity. We then determine whether the district court erred in denying
the prosecutor defendants’ motion to dismiss.
A.
To advance the practical administration of government, the law
recognizes certain government officials should be absolutely immune from
suit for conduct relating to the discharge of certain government functions.
See Hlubek v. Pelecky, 701 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Iowa 2005) (“Absolute immunity
ordinarily is available to certain government officials such as legislators,
judges, and prosecutors acting in their official capacities . . . .”).
One well-established immunity is the judicial process immunity.
Under the judicial process immunity, government officials are absolutely
immune from suit and damages for conduct “intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d
383, 394 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96
S. Ct. 984, 995 (1976)). The judicial process immunity protects both
government officials and their employing municipalities. See Moser v.
County of Black Hawk, 300 N.W.2d 150, 152, 153 (Iowa 1981) (affirming
dismissal of malicious prosecution claim against county based on county
7
attorney’s entitlement to absolute immunity); Burr v. City of Cedar Rapids,
286 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979) (“The public policy which requires
immunity for the prosecuting attorney, also requires immunity for both
the state and the county for acts of judicial and quasi-judicial officers in
the performance of the duties which rest upon them . . . .” (quoting Gartin
v. Jefferson County, 281 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979))).
It is well established the judicial process immunity applies to
common law torts, but it is a question of first impression whether the
judicial process immunity applies to torts arising under the Iowa
Constitution. In Baldwin v. City of Estherville, decided last term, we
intimated the immunity would apply, noting “[c]onstitutional torts are
torts, not generally strict liability cases.” 915 N.W.2d 259, 281 (Iowa
2018). We further noted traditional immunities “could apply to state
constitutional claims.” Id. We did not decide the issue, however, because
the issue was not directly presented. See id.
Now that the question is directly presented, we make explicit what
was implicit in Baldwin: the judicial process immunity applies to state
constitutional torts. This conclusion necessarily flows from the nature of
the immunity itself. “When faced with a question of whether a government
official has absolute immunity from civil liability . . . , we employ a
‘functional approach’ to determine whether those actions ‘fit within a
common-law tradition of absolute immunity.’ ” Minor, 819 N.W.2d at 394
(quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613
(1993)). “Under this ‘functional approach,’ we do not look to the identity
of the government actor, but instead to ‘the nature of the function
performed.’ ” Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S. Ct.
538, 545 (1988)); see Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201, 106 S. Ct.
496, 501 (1985) (“Absolute immunity flows not from rank or title or
8
‘location within the Government,’ but from the nature of the
responsibilities of the individual official.” (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 511, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2913 (1978))). We grant absolute immunity
for only
those governmental functions that were historically viewed as
so important and vulnerable to interference by means of
litigation that some form of absolute immunity from civil
liability was needed to ensure that they are performed “with
independence and without fear of consequences.”
Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012) (quoting
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1218 (1967)).
The functional approach demonstrates the “[i]mmunity . . . is not for
the protection of the [official] personally, but for the benefit of the public.”
Beck v. Phillips, 685 N.W.2d 637, 643 (Iowa 2004). The immunity benefits
the public by protecting government officials involved in “the judicial
process from the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation.”
Minor, 819 N.W.2d at 394 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 494, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1943 (1991)). The same public-interest
considerations that justify the judicial process immunity apply whether
the legal claims arise under common law or the state constitution. See
Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, 98 S. Ct. at 2913 (“Absolute immunity is thus
necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform
their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.”).
We draw further support for our conclusion the judicial process
immunity applies to state constitutional torts from analogous federal
cases. The federal circuit courts unanimously hold the judicial process
immunity applies to federal constitutional claims brought pursuant to
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971). See Humphries v. Houghton, 442 F. App’x
9
626, 628–29, 629 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (stating absolute
immunity for federal prosecutor applies to Bivens claims); Rodriguez v.
Lewis, 427 F. App’x 352, 353 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Because
Martinez was acting within the scope of his employment as a prosecutor
during the sentencing hearing, he enjoys absolute immunity from Bivens
liability.”); Pangelinan v. Wiseman, 370 F. App’x 818, 819 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims against federal judges
and federal prosecutors); Nogueras-Cartagena v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 75
F. App’x 795, 798 (1st Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“The existence of absolute
prosecutorial immunity is a matter of function . . . . In this instance, the
challenged conduct . . . was intimately associated with the judicial phase
of the criminal process. It was, therefore, essentially prosecutorial in
nature. Hence, immunity attaches.” (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United
States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity
barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford, 13 F. App’x 405, 407 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding in Bivens action that “[p]rosecutors . . . are absolutely
immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the
criminal judicial process”); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir.
2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims);
Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In Bivens-type actions,
as at common law, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for conduct
‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ”
(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S. Ct. at 995)); Thompson v. Walbran,
990 F.2d 403, 404 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity
barred Bivens claim against a prosecutor); Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74, 75
(2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“The prosecutor’s activities in this case were
all ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,’
and he is therefore entitled to absolute immunity.” (quoting Imbler, 424
10
U.S. at 430, 96 S. Ct. at 995)); Tripati v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 784 F.2d 345, 346–47 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (finding a U.S.
attorney was absolutely immune from a Bivens claim).
Venckus appears to recognize the judicial process immunity applies
here. Rather than distinguishing this case from our precedents, he asks
us to do away with absolute immunity regardless of the source of the legal
claim and instead adopt a rule of qualified immunity under the all-due-
care standard set forth in Baldwin. See 915 N.W.2d at 279–81. In support
of his position with respect to his constitutional claims, Venckus argues
absolute immunity is inconsistent with the Iowa Constitution. With
respect to all of his claims, Venckus argues prosecutorial misconduct and
wrongful convictions are rampant and absolute immunity contributes to
this because it gives government officials a wide berth to engage in
misconduct.
We reject Venckus’s request to do away with the judicial process
immunity. First, with respect to his constitutional claims, it appears
Venckus conflates two separate issues. The judicial process immunity is
a common law immunity. It bars suit and damages against government
officials for conduct intimately associated with the judicial process. It
immunizes conduct without regard to the substantive source of the legal
claim. In contrast, the all-due-care immunity set forth in Baldwin is a
constitutional immunity. It bars suit and damages only for constitutional
claims and only when the government official proves “that he or she
exercised all due care to conform with the requirements of the law.” Id. at
260–61. The Baldwin immunity is in addition to any other common law
immunities or defenses available and not a comprehensive substitute
immunity.
11
Second, Venckus offers no compelling justification to overrule our
long-standing precedents holding the judicial process immunity applies to
common law claims. “From the very beginnings of this court, we have
guarded the venerable doctrine of stare decisis and required the highest
possible showing that a precedent should be overruled before taking such
a step.” Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 180 n.1 (Iowa 2004) (Cady, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708
& n.3 (Iowa 2016); see Hildreth v. Tomlinson, 2 Greene 360, 361 (Iowa
1849). Venckus has not established our prior decisions should be
overruled. To the contrary, as discussed above, the judicial process
immunity is of long standing in Iowa and was recently reaffirmed in Minor.
See 819 N.W.2d at 397–99.
Third, with respect to all of his claims, Venckus’s policy concerns
are not new. In crafting the judicial process immunity over the course of
time, our cases have considered the issues of prosecutorial misconduct,
the risk of wrongful conviction, and the need for unencumbered judicial
process. The cases have struck the right policy balance between these
competing concerns. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949) (“As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance
between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has
been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done . . .
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation.”). While the absolute immunity is necessary for the proper
functioning of the judicial process, it does not give government officials
carte blanche to engage in misconduct. The judicial process immunity is
narrowly tailored to immunize only conduct “intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process.” See Minor, 819 N.W.2d at 394–
95 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S. Ct. at 995). Further, there are
12
other mechanisms that restrain official conduct, including vigorous
judicial oversight in the district court, appellate review, postconviction-
relief proceedings, attorney disciplinary proceedings, human resource
management, and elections. As the Supreme Court explained,
[T]he safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce
the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling
unconstitutional conduct. The insulation of the judge from
political influence, the importance of precedent in resolving
controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and the
correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many
checks on malicious action by judges. Advocates are
restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by
the knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their
adversaries in open court. Jurors are carefully screened to
remove all possibility of bias. Witnesses are, of course, subject
to the rigors of cross-examination and the penalty of perjury.
Because these features of the judicial process tend to enhance
the reliability of information and the impartiality of the
decisionmaking process, there is a less pressing need for
individual suits to correct constitutional error.
Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, 98 S. Ct. at 2914 (footnote omitted). Against this
regulatory backdrop, the abandonment of the absolute immunity in favor
of qualified immunity is unnecessary to achieve Venckus’s stated policy
objectives. This is true without regard to the source of the legal claim.
For these reasons, we hold a government official is absolutely
immune from suit and damages with respect to any claim arising out of
the performance of any function intimately related to the judicial phase of
the criminal process whether the claim arises at common law or under the
state constitution.
B.
We next address the application of the judicial process immunity to
the prosecutor defendants. The district court denied the prosecutor
defendants’ motion to dismiss on two grounds. First, with respect to the
state constitutional claims, the district court appeared to hold the
13
prosecutor defendants could assert only a qualified immunity rather than
an absolute immunity. Second, the district court held the claim for abuse
of process was not sufficiently developed and directed “the defendants to
raise their defenses as to immunity again at an appropriate time when the
actual facts underlying these allegations are more fully known.” With one
exception, which will be discussed below, we conclude the district court
erred in denying the prosecutor defendants’ motion to dismiss.
As discussed in the preceding section, the judicial process immunity
applies to common law torts and state constitutional torts, and the district
court erred in holding to the contrary. It is long-established the absolute
immunity applies to the conduct of prosecutors. In Blanton v. Barrick, we
held prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity related to the
prosecution of criminal cases. See 258 N.W.2d 306, 309 (Iowa 1977)
(“Clearly, as previously stated, prosecutors performing their official duties
are quasi-judicial officials, not non-judicial functionaries and should be
able to vigorously proceed with their tasks unhampered by the fear of
unlimited civil litigation.”). In subsequent cases, we adopted and applied
a functional approach to conclude prosecutors are entitled to absolute
immunity for activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process.” Hike v. Hall, 427 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Iowa 1988) (quoting
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S. Ct. at 995).
The district court also erred in concluding the claims against the
prosecutor defendants were not sufficiently clear to resolve the prosecutor
defendants’ assertion of absolute immunity. Venckus’s primary complaint
is the prosecutor defendants continued a “reckless crusade” to convict
Venckus in the face of “overwhelming evidence” of Venckus’s innocence.
Venckus argues the prosecutors refused to drop the charges because they
did not want to admit they had charged an innocent man. However, the
14
decisions to initiate a case and continue prosecution are at the core of the
judicial process immunity. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31, 96 S. Ct. at
995 (1976) (finding “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s
case” were parts of the judicial process and necessitated immunity); Beck,
685 N.W.2d at 643 (“The decision to bring criminal charges is clearly
‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process’ . . . .”
(quoting Hike, 427 N.W.2d at 159; and Burr, 286 N.W.2d at 396)); Hike,
427 N.W.2d at 160 (holding “a prosecutor’s use of his authority to drop or
continue pending criminal charges” was absolutely immune regardless of
whether the charges had a basis); Blanton, 258 N.W.2d at 310 (“A public
prosecutor acting in his official capacity is absolutely privileged to initiate,
institute, or continue criminal proceedings.” (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 656, at 414 (Am. Law Inst. 1977))). This is true without
regard to motive or intent. The “immunity applies even when the [official]
is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly because as a matter of policy
it is in the public best interest that [officials] should exercise their function
without fear of consequences and with independence.” Blanton, 258
N.W.2d at 308; accord Beck, 685 N.W.2d at 642 (“Because we apply a
functional analysis, immunity attaches even when the prosecutor is
alleged to have acted for improper reasons.”).
Much of the remainder of Venckus’s claims relate to the prosecutor
defendants’ strategic and discretionary decisions regarding the
prosecution of the case. Venckus challenges the prosecutors’ decision to
enter into a lenient plea agreement with Markley in exchange for Markley’s
testimony. Venckus challenges the prosecutors’ subsequent decision to
not call Markley as a witness despite the favorable plea agreement.
Venckus challenges the prosecutors’ decision to “shop” around for an
15
expert witness to rebut Venckus’s DNA expert. And Venckus challenges
the prosecutors’ evaluation of the alibi evidence presented.
None of this challenged conduct is actionable. Venckus admits all
of the prosecutor defendants’ challenged conduct occurred after the
development of probable cause to arrest and charge Venckus. See
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5, 113 S. Ct. at 2616 n.5 (“The reason that lack
of probable cause allows us to deny absolute immunity to a state actor for
the former function (fabrication of evidence) is that there is no common-
law tradition of immunity for it, whether performed by a police officer or
prosecutor. The reason that we grant it for the latter function (malicious
prosecution) is that we have found a common-law tradition of immunity
for a prosecutor’s decision to bring an indictment, whether he has
probable cause or not.”). The decision to offer a plea bargain is necessarily
a vital part of the judicial phase of the criminal process. See Hike, 427
N.W.2d at 160 (collecting cases for the proposition that a prosecutor’s
actions in the plea bargain process are absolutely immune). Similarly,
“[t]he decision whether to call or not to call a given witness clearly falls
within the scope of the immunity.” Beck, 685 N.W.2d at 644 n.3; see
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426–27, 96 S. Ct. at 993 (stating absolute immunity
insulates prosecutors from liability for calling witnesses who falsely
testify). Likewise, the prosecutors’ evaluation of the evidence is immune
from legal challenge. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273–75, 274 n.5, 113 S. Ct.
at 2615–17, 2616 n.5 (holding that prosecutor would be entitled to only
qualified immunity for fabrication of evidence during the investigative
phase prior to the development of probable cause and stating prosecutor’s
evaluation of evidence in trial is protected by absolute immunity).
The sole instance of alleged conduct falling outside the judicial
process immunity is Venckus’s allegation the Johnson County Attorney’s
16
Office filed an ethics complaint against Venckus’s attorney for conduct in
a different case solely to bully Venckus’s attorney and distract him from
the defense of the case. The filing of an ethics complaint against an
attorney is not “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process.” Beck, 685 N.W.2d at 645. For example, in Beck we
held a prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity for writing letters
to the police department and the mayor regarding a case. Id. at 644–45.
The prosecutor in Beck was performing an “administrative function” and
not acting in his capacity as an advocate within the judicial process and
thus was not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. Similarly, although the
nature of the ethics complaint is not in the record, the filing of the
complaint was not within the judicial phase of the criminal process.
Claims related to this allegation are not barred by the judicial process
immunity.
C.
In sum, the district court erred in part in denying the prosecutor
defendants’ motion to dismiss. The judicial process immunity applies to
both common law and state constitutional claims. The allegations in the
petition against the prosecutor defendants were sufficiently specific to
apply the judicial process immunity. The immunity bars all claims in the
petition against the individual prosecutors and the county except for any
claim relating to the ethics complaint filed against Venckus’s attorney
because that conduct was administrative in nature and not intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.
IV.
The police defendants also claim the district court erred in denying
their motion to dismiss. The police defendants contend they are absolutely
immune from suit. They also contend all claims against them are barred
17
by the relevant statute of limitations. Finally, they claim Venckus’s state
constitutional claims were disallowed because an adequate
nonconstitutional remedy existed under the IMTCA. We address each
contention in turn.
A.
Like the prosecutor defendants, the police defendants contend the
judicial process immunity bars all claims asserted against them. The
district court denied the police defendants’ motion to dismiss on two
grounds. With respect to the state constitutional claims, the district court
appeared to hold that the judicial process immunity was not available and
the police defendants could only assert the qualified-immunity defense set
forth in Baldwin. With respect to the common law claims for defamation,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, the district court held the
claims were not sufficiently developed. The court directed the police
defendants to raise their judicial-process-immunity defense again when
the facts were more fully known. For the reasons set forth below, we
conclude the district court erred in part in denying the police defendants’
motion to dismiss.
Absolute immunity extends to police officer functions falling within
the scope of the judicial process immunity, e.g., testifying as an ordinary
witness. Cf. Minor, 819 N.W.2d at 397 (stating a social worker functioning
as an ordinary witness is entitled to absolute immunity). As discussed
above, this is true whether the claims arise under common law or under
the state constitution. The district court erred in holding otherwise.
However, we cannot conclude the district court erred in denying the
police defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the judicial process
immunity. Unlike the claims against the prosecutor defendants, the
claims against the police defendants are not well defined. This is
18
evidenced by the fact the parties spend much of their appellate briefing
arguing about the factual bases for the claims against the police
defendants. Moreover, the legal bases for the constitutional claims are not
at all developed. As the police defendants noted in their motion to dismiss,
“it is unclear from Venckus’s petition how Rich allegedly violated his right
to equal protection or right to a fair trial and due process.” At oral
argument, Venckus’s counsel could not articulate the legal bases for some
of the state constitutional claims. While the failure to present a coherent,
cognizable cause of action might be cause to seek a more specific
statement or an independent ground to dismiss Venckus’s claim, those
issues are not raised on appeal. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f) (allowing
for preanswer motion to dismiss for “[f]ailure to state a claim upon which
any relief may be granted”); id. r. 1.433 (“A party may move for a more
specific statement of any matter not pleaded with sufficient definiteness to
enable the party to plead to it . . . .”).
Ultimately, “[a] motion to dismiss a petition should only be granted
if there is no state of facts conceivable under which a plaintiff might show
a right of recovery.” Kingsway Cathedral v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 711
N.W.2d 6, 7 (Iowa 2006). Here, the factual and legal bases for the claims
against the police defendants are so vague as to be indeterminate—the
immunity may or may not apply depending on the factual and legal bases
for the claims. We will not piece through the petition and advance
arguments the parties have not made. “Judges are not like pigs, hunting
for [meritorious] truffles buried in [the record].” United States v. Dunkel,
927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). On the record presented,
we believe an appropriate application of the functional analysis prohibits
us from making a broad decision regarding the application of the judicial
process immunity to the claims against the police defendants.
19
For this reason, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to
dismiss with respect to the police defendants’ argument regarding the
judicial process immunity.
B.
The police defendants contend Venckus’s claims are time-barred by
the IMTCA, Iowa Code chapter 670 (2018). Iowa Code section 670.5
provides,
Except as provided in section 614.8, a person who claims
damages from any municipality or any officer, employee or
agent of a municipality for or on account of any wrongful
death, loss, or injury within the scope of section 670.2 or
section 670.8 or under common law shall commence an action
therefor within two years after the alleged wrongful death,
loss, or injury.
The district court appears to have denied the police defendants’ limitations
defense on the ground that further development of the record is necessary
to meaningfully apply the limitations period. For the reasons expressed
below, we conclude the district court erred in part.
Although frequently referred to as a statute of limitations, section
670.5 is a statute of creation. We explained this distinction in the seminal
case of Montgomery v. Polk County:
Chapter [670 2] created a new right of action—one that was not
available at common law nor available elsewhere by statutory
authority, and therefore, while cases interpreting other
limitation statutes are helpful, they do not control here. Truly
chapter [670], and particularly the section which we are
interpreting here, section [670.5], might be called a statute of
creation, rather than a statute of limitation. The statute
creates a new liability and provides for methods of enforcing
the same, and by its terms fixes the time within which action
for recovery may be commenced. It being a statute of creation,
the commencement of the action within the time the statute fixes
2The IMTCA was moved from Iowa Code chapter 613A to Iowa Code chapter 670
by the Code editor in 1993.
20
is an indispensable condition of the liability and of the action
permitted. The time element is an inherent element of the
right so created, and the limitation of the remedy is likewise a
limitation of the right.
278 N.W.2d 911, 914–15 (Iowa 1979) (en banc) (quoting Sprung ex rel.
Sprung v. Rasmussen, 180 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Iowa 1970)). With that
understanding, we held the time to file the action commenced upon the
date of injury and not the date of accrual. See id. at 916–17.
Since Montgomery was decided in 1979, we have repeatedly held the
IMTCA bars any claim not filed within the requisite time period as
measured from the date of injury rather than date of accrual. See Rucker
v. Humboldt Cmty. Sch. Dist., 737 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa 2007) (“[The
IMTCA’s statute of limitations] requires a plaintiff to file suit within two
years from the date of injury.”); Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 270
(Iowa 1990) (en banc) (holding the limitations period under the Iowa Tort
Claims Act commences from the date of accrual in contrast with the
IMTCA, which commences on the date of injury without regard to when
the claim accrues); Uchtorff v. Dahlin, 363 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Iowa 1985)
(en banc) (refusing to overrule Montgomery because the time period for
commencing an action is governed by statute and the statute provides the
date of injury is the relevant date); Orr v. City of Knoxville, 346 N.W.2d 507,
510 (Iowa 1984) (en banc) (adhering to rejection of the discovery rule);
Farnum ex rel. Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 392, 396 (Iowa
1983) (en banc) (“The trial court in the present case predicted that, upon
reconsideration, a majority of this court would now vote to overrule
Montgomery and adopt the view of the dissenters in that case. This
prediction is incorrect. The court adheres to the holding in Montgomery
. . . .”).
21
Most recently, in Doe v. New London Community School District, we
again held the limitations period in section 670.5 commences on the date
of injury. 848 N.W.2d 347, 353–54 (Iowa 2014). We explained, “[T]he
IMTCA contains no term like ‘accrues’ to give the statute ‘elasticity’ for the
court to consider ‘when a cause of action ‘accrues.’ ” Id. at 352 (quoting
Montgomery, 278 N.W.2d at 914). We further noted the legislature
amended the statute post-Montgomery and retained the date of injury as
the relevant date and there was thus no reason to reconsider Montgomery:
In sum, on several occasions, we have discussed the
pre–2007 version of section 670.5 and said it did not
incorporate a common law discovery rule. We reached this
conclusion based upon the absence of language like “accrue”
or “accrual” in the IMTCA to suggest that something other
than the date of injury might be the starting point for the
statute of limitations. Especially given the further fact that
section 670.5 has now been legislatively rewritten, we see no
reason to disturb our longstanding precedent in this area.
Id. at 353–54 (citations omitted). One of the practical consequences of
Montgomery, as reaffirmed in Doe, is that an action can be barred before
the accrual date if the action was not filed within two years of the date of
injury. See Farnum, 339 N.W.2d at 394, 396 (holding an action was barred
by the limitations period where the time period to commence the action
had passed prior to the accrual date).
Venckus does not contest the timeliness of his common law claims
is governed by section 670.5, but he does dispute whether his state
constitutional claims are governed by section 670.5. With respect to his
constitutional claims, Venckus contends Iowa Code section 614.1(2)
applies. That section provides for a two-year statute of limitations. Iowa
Code § 614.1(2). However, that two-year limitations period commences on
the date of accrual rather than injury and is subject to the discovery rule.
See id. § 614.1. We disagree with Venckus’s contention.
22
Claims arising under the state constitution are subject to the
IMTCA. Iowa Code section 670.2(1) provides a “municipality is subject to
liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees.” Iowa Code
section 670.1(4) defines a “tort” as “every civil wrong,” including the “denial
or impairment of any right under any constitutional provision.” Section
670.4(2) provides the statutory remedies shall be exclusive. Our cases
recognize the exclusivity of the IMTCA. See, e.g., Rucker, 737 N.W.2d at
293 (“Iowa Code chapter 670 is the exclusive remedy for torts against
municipalities and their employees.”). Thus, the limitations period set
forth in section 670.5 applies here.
Venckus contends we should ignore the text of the statute because
application of the limitations period set forth in section 670.5 creates
inconsistency in the law regarding the time to file constitutional claims
against the state and its municipalities. Venckus notes constitutional
claims against the state must be asserted within two years of the date the
claim accrues, see Iowa Code § 669.13(1), whereas, under section 670.5,
a claim must be filed within two years of the date of injury.
We are nonplussed regarding the distinction between the two
limitations periods. We have long recognized and upheld the distinction
between the two limitations periods. The legislature has placed greater
limitations on actions against municipalities compared to actions against
the state because municipalities “operate under greater fiscal constraints
than the state does” and municipalities have special problems with respect
to formulating and implementing budgets. Farnum, 339 N.W.2d at 397.
More than thirty-six years have passed since Farnum, and the legislature
has continued to distinguish between claims against the state and
municipalities. Venckus’s purported inconsistency is actually a legislative
23
policy decision of long standing. We see no reason to disturb the
legislature’s decision.
With that background, we apply the IMTCA to the claims presented.
We first consider whether the IMTCA bars Venckus’s claim for defamation.
“To establish a prima facie case in a[] defamat[ion] action, a plaintiff must
show the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3)
of and concerning the plaintiff.” Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 464
(Iowa 2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting Taggart v. Drake Univ.,
549 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Iowa 1996)). The date of injury for a defamation
claim is the date on which “the defendants performed their last allegedly
. . . defamatory act.” Crouse v. Iowa Orthopaedic Ctr., No. 03-1626, 2005
WL 1224577, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2005). The only statement
attributable to the police defendants is the statement made in conjunction
with Venckus’s arrest. The petition was filed more than four years after
that statement. We thus conclude section 670.5 bars Venckus’s
defamation claim.
With respect to the remainder of Venckus’s claims, we agree with
the district court that the record is not adequate to evaluate the limitations
defense. “A defendant may raise the statute of limitations by a motion to
dismiss if it is obvious from the uncontroverted facts contained in the
petition that the applicable statute of limitations bars the plaintiff’s claim
for relief.” Turner v. Iowa State Bank & Tr. Co. of Fairfield, 743 N.W.2d 1,
5 (Iowa 2007). Where the nature of the claim or the pertinent factual
allegations are unclear, further development of the record may be
necessary. See id. With the exception of the defamation claim discussed
above, the same difficulties precluding resolution of the police defendants’
absolute-immunity argument preclude resolution of their limitations
defense—namely, the factual and legal bases for the claims are
24
underdeveloped. We thus conclude the district court did not err in denying
the motion to dismiss with respect to the remainder of the claims.
C.
The police defendants argue Venckus’s state constitutional claims
are not cognizable because the IMTCA allows for adequate remedies.
Specifically the police defendants contend the IMTCA allows for jury trial,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The district court
concluded the IMTCA did not preempt Venckus’s state constitutional
claims.
We conclude the district court did not err in denying the police
defendants’ motion. The IMTCA “does not expand any existing cause of
action or create any new cause of action against a municipality.” Iowa
Code § 670.4(3). Instead, the Act allows people to assert claims against
municipalities, their officers, and their employees that otherwise would
have been barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Thomas v.
Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 2013) (explaining the IMTCA abolished
sovereign immunity). The substance of any legal claim asserted under the
IMTCA must arise from some source—common law, statute, or
constitution—independent of the IMTCA. The mere existence of the IMTCA
itself does not provide any remedy that would preclude the recognition of
a state constitutional claim. While there might be common law causes of
action or statutory causes of action that would provide a remedy sufficient
to warrant disallowance of the state constitutional claims, those
arguments are not advanced here. Further, as noted above, the record
with respect to Venckus’s claims against the police defendants is not
sufficiently developed to justify dismissal at this point.
For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying the police
defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground.
25
D.
Finally, the police defendants argue a claim for malicious
prosecution will not lie against the police defendants because (1) there was
probable cause to charge Venckus and (2) the prosecutors had exclusive
control of the case. The police defendants did not directly present the
issue to the district court, and the district court did not directly rule on
the issue. It is not preserved for appellate review. See Meier v. Senecaut,
641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of
appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by
the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). Given that the
issue was not directly presented to or decided by the district court,
prudence dictates further development of the record. We need not address
the issue further.
E.
In sum, we conclude the district court erred in part in denying the
police defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district court erred in
concluding Baldwin displaced the judicial process immunity. The district
court erred in denying the police defendants’ motion to dismiss Venckus’s
defamation claim. The district court did not err in denying the police
defendants’ motion to dismiss on the remaining grounds.
V.
The district court erred in part in denying the defendants’ respective
motions to dismiss. We remand this matter for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion. We express no view on the merits or
demerits of the claims, immunities, defenses, or other issues to be litigated
after remand and upon development of the record.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Appel, J., who dissents.
26
#18–1280, Venckus v. City of Iowa City
APPEL, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I. Introduction.
After being acquitted by a jury of a rape charge, Joshua Venckus
alleges that police and prosecutors recklessly ignored evidence proving he
was innocent, improperly engaged in expert shopping after a state
criminologist provided them with an unfavorable opinion, filed an ethics
complaint against Venckus’s attorney over an unrelated matter that state
authorities ultimately dismissed, threatened one of Venckus’s alibi
witnesses if he did not change his testimony, and offered the actual rapist
a lenient plea deal in order to obtain testimony against Venckus. Venckus
claims the defendants’ actions and omissions amounted to numerous
violations of his rights under the Iowa Constitution. He seeks to vindicate
these constitutional rights in an Iowa courtroom.
The various defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
alleging a number of grounds including the claim that they were absolutely
immune from the claims brought by Venckus. The district court granted
the motion. On reconsideration, the district court denied in entirety the
defendants’ motions to dismiss. The defendants appealed.
The question before us is whether Venckus is entitled to his day in
court or whether the doors of the courthouse are closed to his claims. For
the reasons expressed below, I conclude that absolute immunity should
not bar his claims. As a result, I dissent from division III of the majority
opinion.
II. Factual and Procedural Background.
A. Factual Background. The petition filed by Venckus alleged the
following facts. Because we are reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept
27
the facts as true. Albrecht v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa
2002).
In February 2013, Venckus was visiting Chicago. While he was in
Chicago, his roommates in Iowa City had a party. A woman at the party
became intoxicated and slept on the couch. Other partygoers made her
comfortable and covered her with a blanket retrieved from Venckus’s
bedroom.
A man named Ryan Markley was one of the attendees at the party.
After the party, Markley broke into the residence and sexually assaulted
the woman. The victim was able to escape and sought help from a person
in the alley by the back door of the residence.
The person assisting the victim saw one person at the back door of
the residence as the woman escaped. The police were called. Police found
Markley’s wallet outside a window well of the residence, Markley’s
handprint on the north window used to enter the residence, and Markley’s
boot imprint on a chair inside the window where entry was gained to the
basement of the residence.
Police interviewed the victim, Venckus’s roommates, and Venckus
himself. All explained that Venckus was in Chicago at the time of the
crime. No one placed Venckus at the house during the party.
Officer Rich was principally responsible for the investigation. Police
initially focused on Markley as the perpetrator. The results of DNA testing
returned male profiles for two persons, Markley and an unknown male.
The profile of the unknown male consisted of one sperm found in the
victim’s cervix. The police obtained a DNA sample from Venckus and
found his DNA matched the sperm.
Prior to his arrest, Venckus tried to prove his alibi. He gave police
his bank card and cell phone, and offered to provide contact information
28
for people who could attest that he was in Chicago. The defendants
pressed forward despite overwhelming evidence that Venckus was in
Chicago at the time of the assault.
In January 2014, eleven months after the sexual assault, police
charged both Venckus and Markley for the sexual assault. Prior to the
filing of criminal charges, Venckus did not know Markley. Venckus pled
an alibi defense. Johnson County prosecutors Anne Lahey, Naeda Elliott,
and Dana Christiansen were involved in the prosecution.
Officer Rich interviewed Michael Concannon, one of the plaintiff’s
alibi witnesses. In the course of a recorded interview, Rich threatened him
with prosecution if he did not change his testimony to implicate Venckus.
Venckus’s petition alleged that the act would constitute tampering with a
witness.
Beginning on August 20, 2015, and continuing up until trial,
Venckus’s attorney created a Google Drive online file. Venckus’s defense
attorney placed into the Google Drive all of the evidence that Venckus was
relying upon to show that Venckus was not in Iowa at the time of the crime
and that the DNA evidence relied upon was not reliable.
The Google Drive was shared with the defendants upon its creation.
Venckus’s attorney would periodically update the file and notify the
defendants that it had been updated. The Google Drive was updated and
maintained up until the time of trial in September 2016. Venckus alleged
that the defendants either failed to review the information provided on the
Google Drive or recklessly and with malice ignored the information.
Venckus alleged, “Despite the overwhelming evidence that Plaintiff could
not have been the perpetrator and the clear evidence that Ryan Lee
Markley was the sole perpetrator, the Defendants continued their reckless
crusade to convict an innocent man of this awful crime.”
29
Venckus’s attorney also shared expert witness reports on the single
sperm found in the victim’s cervix that matched Venckus’s DNA. The
reports were provided to establish that the DNA evidence of one sperm
found in the cervix represented evidence of a transfer from the blanket
covering the victim and could not represent the sole evidence of DNA left
by a rapist.
Defendants were told by DCI criminologist Michael Halverson, the
DNA technical leader at the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation
(DCI), that it was possible that dry sperm, if rehydrated, could transfer
from the blanket. The defendants then withdrew Halverson as an expert
witness and pressured DCI criminologist Tara Scott, who was supervised
by Halverson, to offer an opinion that a transfer was not possible. Venckus
alleged the defendants’ “expert shopping” was done because Venckus’s
lawyer had provided “a reasonable explanation for why only one sperm
could be found in the body of the victim when the donor was 240 miles
away.”
During the prosecution, Venckus alleges that defendants’ pursuit of
him “was so reckless that they even agreed to offer a more lenient plea to
the actual rapist, Ryan Lee Markley” in return for testimony against
Venckus. But at trial, Markely was not called as a witness because,
according to Venckus, “Markley did not have any evidence that Plaintiff
had been involved in this terrible assault.”
During the pendency of the prosecution of Venckus, the Johnson
County Attorneys’ Office filed an ethics complaint against Venckus’s
criminal defense attorney dealing with events in an unrelated case that
was three months old. Venckus alleged the ethics complaint was filed “in
order to distract his attorney from preparing for trial or to force the
withdrawal of said attorney.” The ethics complaint was eventually
30
dismissed by the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board in July
2017 upon a finding of no convincing proof of ethical misconduct.
According to Venckus, the defendants “knew that their effort to
convict Plaintiff would likely fail but pressed forward because they knew
they had made a mistake in charging the Plaintiff and they did not want
to make such an admission.”
After a criminal trial in September 2016, a jury acquitted Venckus.
Venckus alleged that as a result of the above, he incurred substantial
attorney’s fees, suffered significant emotional distress, was expelled from
college, lost a career, and endures continuous harm to his reputation.
B. Procedural History. Venckus brought suit in March 2018
against Officer Rich and Iowa City (city defendants) and against Johnson
County. He filed an amended petition in April 2018, adding prosecutors
Lahey, Elliott, and Christiansen (together with Johnson County, county
defendants).
Venckus asserted Godfrey claims against all defendants for
violations of his constitutional rights. See Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d
844, 847 (Iowa 2017). The claimed violations involve (1) search and
seizure, Iowa Const. art. I, § 8; (2) due process and a fair trial, id. art. I,
§ 9; (3) equal protection, id. art. I, § 6; and (4) liberty and freedom of
movement and association, id. art. I, § 1. Venckus also asserted that all
defendants committed abuse of process. As to the city defendants,
Venckus additionally alleged defamation and malicious prosecution. The
city defendants and the county defendants moved to dismiss the petition.
In their motion to dismiss, the city defendants raised a number of
defenses. As to all claims, city defendants sought dismissal based on
(1) absolute prosecutorial or witness immunity and (2) statute of
limitations. As to the Godfrey claims, city defendants also asserted failure
31
to state a claim because the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA)
provides an adequate remedy. See Iowa Code ch. 670. They further
contended that the Godfrey claims against Iowa City should be dismissed
because there is no direct cause of action against municipal entities under
the Iowa Constitution.
County defendants filed a more limited motion to dismiss. They
sought dismissal on the basis of the defense of absolute prosecutorial
immunity. The county defendants did not argue that the IMTCA provides
an adequate remedy.
In June, the district court largely granted the motions to dismiss.
The district court dismissed all the claims against the county defendants
based on absolute prosecutorial immunity. On the Godfrey claims against
the city defendants, the district court stated that the punitive damages
available in the IMTCA, see Iowa Code § 670.12, rendered the Godfrey
claims “unnecessary and duplicative.” The district court also dismissed
the claims for defamation and abuse of process against the city defendants
as time-barred under Iowa Code section 670.5. The district court did not
dismiss the malicious prosecution claim against the city defendants but
expressed uncertainty as to whether Venckus would be able to prove the
claim. Still, the court limited city defendants’ exposure to the malicious
prosecution claim. The court held Officer Rich was entitled to qualified
immunity in his capacity as a complaining witness and police officer, and
absolute immunity for his role in testifying at trial or preparing for trial.
These immunities, the court held, also applied to Iowa City.
Venckus asked the district court to reconsider. Venckus
supplemented his reconsideration request after we decided Baldwin v. City
of Estherville (Baldwin II), 915 N.W.2d 259, 281 (Iowa 2018).
32
The district court reversed itself and denied the motions to dismiss.
According to the district court, Officer Rich and the prosecutors were
entitled to qualified immunity under Baldwin II. Further, in light of
Baldwin II, the district court held “the IMTCA does not pre-empt the
constitutional claims provided for in Godfrey.” The district court also held
that the determination of whether Johnson County and Iowa City were
entitled to immunity for abuse of process should be made after discovery.
Likewise, the defamation claim against city defendants was reinstated to
allow Venckus the opportunity to discover facts concerning defamatory
actions that were not time-barred. And the malicious prosecution claim
against city defendants was also reinstated until after discovery.
Defendants applied for interlocutory appeal. We granted the
applications.
III. Standard of Review.
“[W]e review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for
correction of errors at law.” Turner v. Iowa State Bank & Tr. Co. of Fairfield,
743 N.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Iowa 2007). We may grant a motion to dismiss for
“[f]ailure to state a claim upon which any relief may be granted.” Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f).
“In determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss, a court
views the well-pled facts of the petition in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, resolving any doubts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Turner, 743 N.W.2d
at 3. “The purpose of the motion is to test the legal sufficiency of the
petition.” Id.
IV. Immunities and the Iowa Constitution.
Although there is no need to repeat what I have already said in
Baldwin II, we need to be clear-eyed about what is at stake in this case.
As was noted by Chief Justice John Marshall at the founding of our
33
republic, “[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal
right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that
right is invaded.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)
(quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 23
(1765–1769) [hereinafter Blackstone]).
Make no mistake, the right-without-a-remedy issue is the front and
center issue in this case. The stakes are high. On the one hand, we are
dealing with the awesome prosecutorial power of the state. On the other
hand, we are dealing with fundamental rights asserted in the very first
article of the Iowa Constitution.
In my view, we should be resistant and skeptical, maybe even
stubborn, about any assertions of immunity in cases involving a
constitutional tort. As will be shown below, absolute prosecutorial
immunity historically was simply not available. It is a modern innovation
in the law supported by a highly questionable policy rationale. And its
consequence is unnerving: It closes the courthouse door to grievances
related to profound constitutional harms.
Further, the majority of this court in Baldwin II has already
developed a doctrine of qualified immunity for the officers and agents of
the state. I would apply the constitutional brakes in this case and bring
the development of immunities for constitutional torts to a stop.
V. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity from Constitutional Torts.
A. Absolute Judicial Immunity at Common Law. At common
law, absolute judicial immunity protected judges acting in their judicial
functions. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217–18
(1967); Floyd v. Barker (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307; J. Randolph
Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980
Duke L.J. 879, 897–901 [hereinafter Block] (collecting early American
34
authorities). It also extended to “jurors and grand jurors, members of
courts-martial, private arbitrators, and various assessors and
commissioners.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132, 118 S. Ct. 502,
510 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Absolute judicial immunity was a limited doctrine. It “extended only
to individuals who were charged with resolving disputes between other
parties or authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” Id.
Absolute immunity of the judicial function was based on the public
interest in allowing a neutral decision-maker to exercise his function with
independence. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S. Ct. at 1218. The judge
must “decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him,
including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the
litigants.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, “[h]is errors may be corrected
on appeal.” Id. “[T]he doctrine of judicial immunity was developed
primarily to eliminate collateral attacks on judgments and to confine
procedures in error to the hierarchy of the king’s courts . . . .” Block, 1980
Duke L.J. at 880.
B. No Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity at Common Law for
Common Law Torts. In evaluating the status of prosecutorial immunity
at common law, we need to recognize that the prosecutorial function at
common law in early America and also in England involved both public
and private prosecutors. John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the
Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 511, 516–18
(1994); see State v. Peterson, 218 N.W. 367, 369 (Wis. 1928).
In Iowa, public prosecutors have worked alongside private
prosecutors since before the 1857 constitutional convention. At the
constitutional convention, Mr. Harris noted that, oftentimes, private
prosecutors were employed to initially present a case to a magistrate, after
35
which they “let the matter go into court, when the State will take charge of
it. They look to the prosecuting attorney to take charge of it in the courts.”
1 The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Iowa 476 (W.
Blair Lord rep., 1857), www.statelibraryofiowa.org/services/
collections/law-library/iaconst. The framers discussed the ineptitude of
some county attorneys and debated whether district attorneys would be
preferable. Id. at 475–77. Mr. Harris noted that the people of his district
“desired only to see the law faithfully executed,” id. at 476, while Mr.
Gillaspy emphasized that incompetent public prosecutors had cost the
state enough “to build a railroad from one end of the State to the other,”
id. at 477.
Across the country, both public and private prosecutors were
subject to suit for misconduct. Private prosecutors could be sued for
malicious prosecution where, for instance, they caused wrongful
imprisonment or induced the seizure of property. Warfield v. Campbell,
35 Ala. 349, 350 (1859); Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535, 538–39 (1852);
Center v. Spring, 2 Iowa 393, 401, 404 (1856); Wood v. Weir, 44 Ky. 544,
546, 550 (1845); Staley v. Turner, 21 Mo. App. 244, 251–52 (Ct. App.
1886). This court said, for example, that “[t]he prosecution of an innocent
person without using reasonable care to ascertain the facts is certainly not
justifiable.” Walker v. Camp, 63 Iowa 627, 630, 19 N.W. 802, 803 (1884).
Public prosecutors were also subject to suit for malicious
prosecution. In Parker v. Huntington, 68 Mass. 124, 128 (1854), the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a public prosecutor who
elicited and used false testimony could be liable for malicious prosecution.
Additionally, “in 1871, the Reconstruction Congress adopted § 1983 in
part to address the abusive practice in the South of prosecuting Union
officers and officials who were attempting to establish and enforce civil
36
rights for newly freed slaves.” Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and
Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 Fordham L.
Rev. 509, 510, 525 (2011) [hereinafter Johns, Unsupportable and
Unjustified].
The absence of absolute prosecutorial immunity in those cases is
explained by two considerations. First, the courts refused to privilege
finality and prosecutorial freedom over redress for the injuries to a
defendant and safeguards for public trust of the justice system. As one
court explained,
It would be strange . . . if the attorney, by art and contrivance,
the abuse of the confidence reposed, and prostitution of his
profession, should procure from the Justices, from malicious
motives to the defendant, an illegal and oppressive order by
which injury accrues to the defendant, if the attorney could
not be made liable for the wrong. It is contended, that this
rule will expose attorneys to perplexing litigation, to the
manifest injury of the profession. If it should, the law knows
no distinction of persons; a different rule cannot, as to them,
be recognized by this Court, from that which is applicable to
others. Besides, this is a numerous class, powerful for good
or evil, and holding them to a strict accountability, will have
the effect to exalt and dignify the profession, by purging it of
ignorant, meretricious and reckless members.
Wood, 44 Ky. at 547.
Second, the tort of malicious prosecution incorporated elements
akin to a qualified immunity. In general, a person could be sued for
malicious prosecution “only if he acted maliciously and without probable
cause, and the prosecution ultimately terminated in the defendant’s
favor.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132–33, 118 S. Ct. at 511; see Margaret Z.
Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. Rev.
53, 111 (2005) [hereinafter Johns, Reconsidering Absolute]; see also
Center, 2 Iowa at 406–07 (“To sustain this action, . . . plaintiff must show
that the prosecution originated in the malice of the prosecutor, and
37
without probable cause.”). “[T]here was a kind of qualified immunity built
into the elements of the tort.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133, 118 S. Ct. at 511.
C. Emergence of Absolute Immunity for Prosecutorial
Functions.
1. Turn-of-the-century developments. Public prosecutors remained
subject to suit in many states well into the twentieth century. In Arnold
v. Hubble, 38 S.W. 1041, 1041 (Ky. 1897), the court suggested that a
public prosecutor could be liable for malicious prosecution if acting with
malicious or corrupt motives. In Carpenter v. Sibley, 94 P. 879, 879–80
(Cal. 1908), the California Supreme Court held that a public prosecutor
and a sheriff were subject to suit for malicious prosecution for the use of
false testimony. In Buhner v. Reusse, 175 N.W. 1005, 1006 (Minn. 1920),
the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that an action for malicious
prosecution against a public prosecutor required plaintiff to prove both
malice and want of probable cause.
In Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Haw. 362, 368 (1916), the Hawaii court
held that public prosecutors are immune from suits based on actions
“done in good faith though with erroneous judgment, but private
individuals are entitled to the protection of the law against any conduct of
such officers which is at once reckless, malicious and damaging.” The
Leong Yau court specifically rejected the notion that public prosecutors act
in a judicial function, explaining,
Public prosecuting officers are, properly speaking, executive
officers. Though, like all enrolled attorneys, they are officers
of the courts, they are not part of the courts. In discharging
their duties executive officers are at times required to perform
acts of a judicial nature, but even then they act no more than
quasi-judicially.
Id. at 367.
 38
Finally, in Schneider v. Shepherd, 158 N.W. 182, 184 (Mich. 1916),
the Michigan Supreme Court held that a public prosecutor’s instigation of
arrest did not even warrant the immunity of a quasi-judicial officer. The
court noted that the prosecutor prosecuted criminal charges based on
vague investigative reports, without further inquiry, that did not connect
the criminal defendant with the alleged crime. Id.
At the turn of the twentieth century, there were also decisions
holding prosecutors absolutely immune from suit for malicious
prosecution. The first case anywhere was in Indiana. See Griffith v.
Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001, 1002 (Ind. 1896); see Johns, Reconsidering
Absolute, 2005 BYU L. Rev. at 114. The Griffith court held that a public
prosecutor is a judicial officer, not in the sense of a judge but insofar as
he performs judicial duties requiring exercise of judgment, and is therefore
entitled to absolute immunity. 44 N.E. at 1002.
In Smith v. Parman, 165 P. 663, 663 (Kan. 1917), the Kansas
Supreme Court recognized that much of a public prosecutor’s work is
advocacy. However, because “the important matter of determining what
prosecutions shall be instituted is committed in a considerable degree to
his sound judgment,” the court held that “the reason for granting
immunity to judges and grand jurors applies with practically equal force
to a public prosecutor in his relations to actions to punish infractions of
the law.” Id. The court reasoned that absolute immunity would not foster
abuse of power because of “the risk of being called to account criminally
for official misconduct.” Id. at 663–64.
In Kittler v. Kelsch, 216 N.W. 898, 898 (N.D. 1927), a public
prosecutor was sued after he made out a criminal complaint and brought
criminal charges based on false information. The court held that the
prosecutor’s action was state action and constituted a judicial mistake to
39
which absolute immunity applied. Id. at 904. This immunity, the court
said, was “for the protection of the public, and to insure the active and
independent action of the officers charged with the prosecution of crime,
for the protection of life and property.” Id. at 905. In a dissent, Justice
Burr argued that a prosecutor should be immune from “passing upon
complaints” but not from “making the complaint himself.” Id. (Burr, J.,
dissenting).
In Watts v. Gerking, 228 P. 135, 141 (Or. 1924), a majority of the
Oregon Supreme Court sustained a demurrer of a complaint for malicious
prosecution against a public prosecutor. The majority said, “Because of
their tendency to obstruct the administration of justice, it is the policy of
the law to discourage actions for malicious prosecution.” Id. Noting that
a public prosecutor is subject to criminal sanctions, the majority further
stated, “The public policy of the state affords ample protection to the
innocent, and a prosecutor’s endeavors should not be weakened by
backfires in the nature of malicious prosecution.” Id.
Two Justices dissented. Justices Burnett and Rand emphasized
that a prosecutor should not be immune from civil suit when he
prosecuted a person the prosecutor knew to be innocent of the charges.
Id. at 142 (Burnett, J., dissenting); id. at 143–44 (Rand, J., dissenting).
Justice Burnett explained,
In this government of the people, by the people, for the people,
no officer is clothed with arbitrary, autocratic, or irresponsible
power with which he may knowingly oppress an innocent
person. I fully agree with the principle that any judicial officer,
district attorney, or grand juror, while acting within the scope
of his authority, is protected from either civil or criminal
liability, though his actuating motive may be malicious. He
may depend upon testimony of witnesses if he has no
knowledge of nor reason to suspect its want of truth although
the event may demonstrate its falsity. But when, as charged
in the complaint herein, he knows that the charge he
promotes is false, he has no right to seize upon some isolated
40
inconclusive circumstance and institute a prosecution upon
it. It is the scienter that strips from him the immunity of his
official station. A person whom the district attorney knows to
be innocent is not one of those within his jurisdiction to
prosecute. When he has actual knowledge of innocence he
cannot have reasonable cause to believe guilt. Only a person
who is an actual violator of the law or whom the district
attorney has reasonable cause to believe is such violator is
amenable to prosecution by that officer. All others are beyond
the pale of his authority, and as to them when he knows they
are guiltless he acts at his peril, for there can be no wrong
without a remedy.
Id. at 142 (Burnett, J., dissenting). Justice Rand went further, articulating
that public policy dictates a public prosecutor should be entitled to no
more than the type of qualified immunity we found in Baldwin II, 915
N.W.2d at 260–61:
As the defendant was a prosecuting officer, if the act had been
done either ignorantly or rashly, for doing it, the law might
hold him excusable. But as the act was done wickedly, with
full knowledge of its falsity, the doing of the act, in law, was
neither justifiable nor excusable, and the defendant ought to
be compelled to answer for the consequences of his wrongful
act. . . . To contend, under any proper conception of sound
public policy, that any prosecuting officer has the privilege of
bringing a person into court and charging him with and
prosecuting him for a crime which he knows him to be
innocent of, without being answerable for the damages caused
thereby, upon the theory that the public good will be best
subserved thereby, is a proposition too monstrous to be
debated in a court of justice; for it must be obvious to any
reasonable mind that this would place in the hands of an
unscrupulous officer powers which are not consistent with
good government nor the welfare of society.
228 P. at 144 (Rand, J., dissenting).
2. Current status of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Jurisdictions
across our country remain divided on whether prosecutors are entitled to
absolute immunity.
To be sure, the greater weight of modern precedent affords absolute
immunity to prosecutorial functions. See Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d
944, 946 n.8 (La. 1996) (collecting authorities); George A. Weiss,
41
Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson, 60 Drake L. Rev.
199, 231 & n.231 (2011) (same); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 656, at 414 (Am. Law Inst. 1977) (“A public prosecutor acting in his
official capacity is absolutely privileged to initiate, institute, or continue
criminal proceedings.”).
The United States Supreme Court has held prosecutors absolutely
immune to common law torts and § 1983 actions. In Yaselli v. Goff, 275
U.S. 503, 48 S. Ct. 155 (1927) (per curiam), in a one-sentence opinion, the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed a lower court decision holding
public prosecutors absolutely immune from a civil action for malicious
prosecution. The Yaselli Court cited its decisions upholding absolute
immunity of judges. Id.; see Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 111, 34 S. Ct.
27, 29 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871).
The Court’s decisions on absolute prosecutorial immunity in § 1983
actions began in 1976. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96
S. Ct. 984, 995 (1976). In short, the Court has determined that a
prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as an
advocate and qualified immunity when functioning as an administrator or
investigator. Id. at 430–31, 96 S. Ct. at 995; see Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,
555 U.S. 335, 338–39, 129 S. Ct. 855, 858–59 (2009); Kalina, 522 U.S. at
129–31, 118 S. Ct. at 509–10 (majority opinion); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
509 U.S. 259, 261, 275–76, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2609, 2617 (1993); Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494–96, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1943–44 (1991).
In addition, the majority tells us, federal circuit courts of appeal
unanimously hold that the judicial process immunity applies to federal
constitutional claims brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
That result is not surprising. Federal courts generally apply § 1983
42
precedent to Bivens claims. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98
S. Ct. 2894, 2909–10 (1978). In fact, all of the cases cited by the majority
that actually deal with absolute prosecutorial immunity in Bivens actions
rely on Imbler or its § 1983 progeny. See Humphries v. Houghton, 442 F.
App’x 626, 628–29, 629 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Rodriguez v. Lewis,
427 F. App’x 352, 353 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Pangelinan v. Wiseman,
370 F. App’x 818, 819 (9th Cir. 2010); Nogueras-Cartagena v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 75 F. App’x 795, 798 (1st Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Blakely v. United
States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002); Benson v. Safford, 13 F. App’x
405, 407 (7th Cir. 2001); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir.
2000) (per curiam); Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1996);
Thompson v. Walbran, 990 F.2d 403, 404–05 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam);
Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Tripati v. U.S.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 784 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam).
Some states have departed from the majority and limit or deny
absolute prosecutorial immunity. In Cashen v. Spann, 334 A.2d 8, 10, 12
(N.J. 1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court distinguished prosecutorial
immunity from judicial immunity and held the former was not absolute.
The Cashen court reviewed a lower state court decision finding “[n]o
rationalization could possibly shield evil acts of such magnitude” as the
subornation of perjury involved in the reviewed case. Id. at 13 (quoting
DeGroot v. Muccio, 277 A.2d 899, 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971)).
The Cashen court concluded that “there are indeed circumstances in
which a prosecutor will incur civil liability for his official conduct” and
“[t]he public interest is best served by recognizing that prosecutors enjoy
only a limited form of immunity.” Id.
43
The Cashen court did not consider the contours of prosecutorial
immunity because it found the record “d[id] not support any inference that
the prosecutor in this case acted out of personal motive, with malicious
intent, or in excess of his jurisdiction.” Id. at 14. In a subsequent case,
the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that “reasonable grounds for the
belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with
good-faith belief, . . . affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive
officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.” Burke v.
Deiner, 479 A.2d 393, 397 (N.J. 1984) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 247–48, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (1974), abrogated on other grounds
by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 3017 (1984)).
Cashen remains the law in New Jersey. See, e.g., Pitman v. Ottehberg, No.
10-2538, 2015 WL 179392, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2015) (recognizing
continuing vitality of Cashen); Newsome v. City of Newark, No. 13-CV-
06234, 2014 WL 4798783, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2014) (same).
Public prosecutors acting in a prosecutorial function are also
subject to suit in Nebraska. In Koch v. Grimminger, 223 N.W.2d 833, 836
(Neb. 1974), the Nebraska Supreme Court relied on the common law
notion of quasi-judicial immunity. The Koch court said that, in
determining whether to file a complaint, the prosecutor must ascertain the
law, apply the law to the facts, and weigh the reliability of evidence, all of
which constitute quasi-judicial and discretionary functions. Id. at 836–
37. In conclusion, the Koch court said,
We hold that a public prosecutor, acting within the
general scope of his official authority in making a
determination whether to file a criminal prosecution, is
exercising a quasi-judicial and discretionary function and that
where he acts in good faith he is immune from suit for an
erroneous or negligent determination. This rule would not
protect a prosecutor who, knowing that a particular charge is
groundless in law or in fact, nonetheless intentionally files a
44
charge and thus acts through a corrupt motive. In such a
case he would not be acting within the scope of his authority.
Id. at 837. Koch remains the law in Nebraska. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Nebraska, No. 4:17-CV-3073, 2018 WL 4354952, at *8 (D. Neb. Sept. 12,
2018) (recognizing continued vitality of Koch); Gallion v. Woytassek, 504
N.W.2d 76, 83 (Neb. 1993) (same).
Public prosecutors may also be sued in Hawaii. “[A]bsolute
immunity is not a defense under Hawai’i law in an action for malicious
prosecution.” Wong v. Cayetano, 143 P.3d 1, 18 (Haw. 2006). “[T]he
prosecuting attorney is an officer of the executive branch of appellant, and
thus subject to liability for his tortious conduct.” Orso v. City of Honolulu,
534 P.2d 489, 493 (Haw. 1975) (footnote omitted), overruled on other
grounds by Kahale v. City of Honolulu, 90 P.3d 233, 239 (Haw. 2004).
VI. Analysis of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity.
A. Overview of Rationales Offered in Support of Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity. As the rationale for absolute prosecutorial
immunity from constitutional torts, the majority adopts reasoning from
our prior decisions addressing absolute prosecutorial immunity in
common law torts and § 1983 actions. In our first case on prosecutorial
immunity to common law torts, this court said absolute prosecutorial
immunity
is based upon the same considerations that underlie the
common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting
within the scope of their duties. These include concern that
harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection
of the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties, and the
possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of
exercising the independence of judgment required by his
public trust.
Blanton v. Barrick, 258 N.W.2d 306, 309–10 (Iowa 1977) (quoting Imbler,
424 U.S. at 422–23, 96 S. Ct. at 991); see Beck v. Phillips, 685 N.W.2d
45
637, 642 (Iowa 2004). We have also stated that the immunity “is not for
the protection of the prosecutor personally, but for the benefit of the
public” and “[a]lthough genuinely wronged plaintiffs are left without
recourse in a civil suit for damages, the alternative would disserve the
broader public interest.” Beck, 685 N.W.2d at 643. Finally, we have noted
that prosecutors are still checked by the possibility of professional
discipline and criminal punishment. Id. at 643 n.2.
B. Inapplicability of Policy Rationales of Absolute Immunity for
Prosecutors.
1. Distinction between common law torts and constitutional torts. A
state constitutional tort is a claim that may be brought by a person for
harms by government authorities arising from a violation of a rights
creating provision of the Iowa Constitution. Godfrey, 898 N.W.2d at 847.
The claim is implied in the substantive provisions of the Iowa Bill of Rights
contained in article I of the Iowa Constitution. See id. at 868. It is
supported by the basic principle that there is no right without a remedy.
Id. at 867.
Constitutional torts are unlike common law torts. “The injuries
inflicted by officials acting under color of law, while no less compensable
in damages than those inflicted by private parties, are substantially
different in kind . . . .” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409, 91 S. Ct. at 2011 (Harlan,
J., concurring in the judgment). A constitutional claim is designed “to
vindicate social policies which, by virtue of their inclusion in the
Constitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as
an instrument of popular will.” Rosalie Berger Levinson, Recognizing a
Damage Remedy to Enforce Indiana’s Bill of Rights, 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 11
(2005) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404, 91 S. Ct. at 2008). Whereas
common law torts focus on remediation of damages and compensation,
46
constitutional torts also focus on ensuring effective enforcement of
constitutional rights. See Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for
Constitutional Torts, 56 La. L. Rev. 841, 858–62 (1996). The harm to
society is not captured by a judgment that solely compensates a plaintiff
for his injury. See Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983
and the Common Law, 68 Miss. L.J. 157, 189 (1998).
A constitutional violation is different from an ordinary dispute
between two private parties. . . . When a constitutional
violation is involved, more than mere allocation of risks and
compensation is implicated. The emphasis is not simply on
compensating an individual who may have been harmed by
illegal conduct, but also upon deterring unconstitutional
conduct in the future. . . . Vindication of the social interest is
distinct from adequate compensation goals of tort law and
most statutory remedies . . . .
Godfrey, 898 N.W.2d at 876–77 (plurality opinion).
Relatedly, we also emphasized in Godfrey the importance of
providing a cause of action for redress and deterrence of constitutional
violations. Id. at 864–68 (majority opinion). We firmly stated, “If these
individual rights in the very first article of the Iowa Constitution are to be
meaningful, they must be effectively enforced.” Id. at 865. “[T]he
judiciary,” we quoted Justice Harlan as saying, “has a particular
responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional interests.” Id.
(quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407, 91 S. Ct. at 2010). We further explained
the historical pedigree of remedies to enforce violations of constitutional
rights. Id. at 866–68.
The majority ignores these considerations. In a conclusory fashion,
the majority flatly declares, “The same public-interest considerations that
justify the judicial process immunity apply whether the legal claims arise
under common law or the state constitution.” Of course, there was no
such absolute at the time of the adoption of the Iowa Constitution of 1857,
47
but the majority declines to engage in originalist reasoning. In any event,
I strongly disagree with the notion that constitutional torts are simply
garden variety torts.
2. Denial of remedy. Our legal tradition has traditionally ensured
that there is a remedy for the violation of rights. As Chief Justice Marshall
stated in Marbury, “[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there
is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded.” 5 U.S. at 163 (quoting 3 Blackstone at
23). In Bivens, Justice Harlan explained that contemporary modes of
thought at the time of the United States Constitutional Convention
reflected “modes of jurisprudential thought which appeared to link ‘rights’
and ‘remedies’ in a 1:1 correlation.” 403 U.S. at 400 n.3, 91 S. Ct. at 2007
n.3.
Denying a remedy for unconstitutional prosecutorial misconduct is
anathema to that tradition, as it “drives a stake in the heart of a
substantive legal doctrine.” Baldwin II, 915 N.W.2d at 284 (Appel, J.,
dissenting). Karl Llewellyn explained, “Defect of remedy is defect of right.”
Aaron Belzer, Comment, The Audacity of Ignoring Hope: How the Existing
Qualified Immunity Analysis Leads to Unremedied Rights, 90 Denv. U. L.
Rev. 647, 673 (2012) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 88
(Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2008) (1930)). Justice Thomas notes the failure
to find a constitutional violation when prosecutors fabricate evidence
“leaves victims of egregious prosecutorial misconduct without a remedy.”
Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118, 1119, 121 S. Ct. 873, 873–74 (2001)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
3. Distinction between prosecutorial function and judicial function.
Prosecutors are unlike judges. They perform different functions. Judges
are part of the judicial branch. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177–78.
48
Prosecution is an executive power. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691,
108 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1988).
Judges are expected to be neutral decision-makers. See State v.
Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Iowa 2012). Prosecutors are expected to be
vigorous advocates for the state while simultaneously seeing that justice
is done. State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 870 (Iowa 2003).
Judicial decisions are made in public. See Philip M. Pro,
Mis(understanding) Judging, 7 Nev. L.J. 480, 484–85 (2007). Prosecutors
exercise wide discretion behind closed doors. See Schmidt v. State, 909
N.W.2d 778, 788 (Iowa 2018). As two scholars note, prosecutors’ offices
are “black boxes” that “make[] it possible for prosecutors to do their daily
work without explaining their choices to the public.” Marc L. Miller &
Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 125, 129 (2008). “They
decide whether to bring criminal charges, what charges to bring, whether
to engage in plea negotiations and, through these and other powers, they
in a very real sense determine what punishment a criminal defendant will
face.” Bidish Sarma, Using Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial
Accountability, 21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 573, 579 (2017) [hereinafter
Sarma].
Judicial decisions are subject to later judicial review. Iowa Const.
art. V, § 4; Iowa R. App. P. 6.103(1). Many prosecutorial decisions, like an
illegal decision to withhold exculpatory evidence, while technically subject
to judicial control, are difficult to uncover or, even if noticed, will not result
in a reversal or modification. Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines
for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 2089, 2090 (2010)
[hereinafter Barkow, Organizational Guidelines].
Affiliating the prosecutorial function with the judicial function is a
grave error. “To regard prosecution as part of the judicial power in any
49
way, shape, or form, is to nullify one of the Constitution’s central
features—its judicial safeguard against prosecutorial overreach.”
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 521,
569 (2005). “[I]t is critical to maintain separation between judicial and
executive power because the judiciary supplies a critical check on
prosecutions.” Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal
Law, 58 Stanford L. Rev. 989, 1003 n.63 (2006).
As a result, I think the majority draws a false equivalency between
the judicial and prosecutorial functions. It is not enough to equate the
two by the tenuous connection that both are involved in criminal justice.
As Venckus vividly points out, “Football teams and referees may be on the
same field, but they are not on the same side.”
4. Absence of historical support for absolute prosecutorial immunity.
When the Iowa Constitutions were adopted in 1846 and 1857, neither
public nor private prosecutors enjoyed absolute immunity from lawsuits
concerning their litigation misconduct. Indeed, at the time, “there was not
a single decision affording prosecutors any kind of immunity defense from
liability for malicious prosecution.” Johns, Reconsidering Absolute, 2005
BYU L. Rev. at 114 (second emphasis added), accord Imbler, 424 U.S. at
421, 96 S. Ct. at 990–91 (noting the first case to address prosecutorial
immunity was Griffith, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896)).
Absolute judicial immunity at common law was a functional doctrine
that “extended only to individuals who were charged with resolving
disputes between other parties or authoritatively adjudicating private
rights.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132, 118 S. Ct. at 510 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Prosecutors neither “resolv[e] disputes between other parties” nor
“authoritatively adjudicat[e] private rights.” Id.
50
By contrast, prosecutors do undertake “official acts involving policy
discretion but not consisting of adjudication.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 500, 111
S. Ct. at 1947 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). But at common law, officials engaged in such
functions only benefited from quasi-judicial immunity, a qualified
immunity that “requir[ed] good faith” or an absence of malice. Johns,
Reconsidering Absolute, 2005 BYU L. Rev. at 120; see Burns, 500 U.S. at
500, 111 S. Ct. at 1947. As Justice Scalia explained, “I do not doubt that
prosecutorial functions, had they existed in their modern form in 1871,
would have been considered quasi-judicial . . . . But that characterization
does not support absolute immunity.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 500–01, 111
S. Ct. at 1947 (citations omitted).
Likewise, the standard for malicious prosecution incorporated
elements which effectively provided a qualified immunity. Kalina, 522 U.S.
at 132–33, 118 S. Ct. at 511; Center, 2 Iowa at 406–07. No more was
needed or given.
The absence of historical discussion in the majority opinion is
striking. According to the majority, this court grants absolute immunity
for only
those governmental functions that were historically viewed as
so important and vulnerable to interference by means of
litigation that some form of absolute immunity from civil
liability was needed to ensure that they are performed “with
independence and without fear of consequences.”
Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012) (quoting
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S. Ct. at 1218). The majority opinion fails its
own test because, as discussed, the framers of the Iowa Constitution
would have known no such thing as absolute prosecutorial immunity. The
51
majority does not address the absence of historical support for absolute
prosecutorial immunity.
Just last term, a majority of this court highlighted the role of history
in determining the scope of immunity for Godfrey claims under the Iowa
Constitution. In Baldwin II, the majority said, “We believe . . . that
qualified immunity should be shaped by the historical Iowa common law
as appreciated by our framers and the principles discussed in Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 874A.” 915 N.W.2d at 280 (majority opinion).
I do not believe that historical circumstances should control our
interpretation of the Iowa Constitution. But I find the historical
circumstances instructive. The lack of historical support for absolute
prosecutorial immunity is one factor which leads me to dissent from the
majority opinion.
5. Need for effective deterrence. One incident of prosecutorial
misconduct is one too many. One study found that, since 1970,
prosecutorial misconduct led to dismissal of charges, reversal of
conviction, or reduction of sentence in more than 2000 cases. Steve
Weinburg, Harmful Error: Breaking the Rules, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity,
(updated May 19, 2014), https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/
breaking-the-rules/ [https://perma.cc/AX5L-AW7F]. As one jurist put it,
“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land. Only judges
can put a stop to it.” United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir.
2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order denying petition for rehearing
en banc); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional
Torts, 99 Va. L. Rev. 207, 227 & n.68 (2013) [hereinafter Jeffries] (collecting
evidence on “widespread noncompliance” with Brady).
Scholars have identified several causes of prosecutorial misconduct.
52
[P]rosecutorial misconduct is largely the result of three
institutional conditions: vague ethics rules that provide
ambiguous guidance to prosecutors; vast discretionary
authority with little or no transparency; and inadequate
remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, which create perverse
incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain
from, prosecutorial misconduct. These three conditions
converge to create uncertain norms and a general lack of
accountability for how prosecutors view and carry out their
ethical and institutional obligations.
Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis.
L. Rev. 399, 400 (2006).
Prosecutors also face pressures to quickly identify suspects and
increase conviction rates, especially where, as in Iowa, they are elected.
See Ephraim Unell, Note, A Right Not to Be Framed: Preserving Civil
Liability of Prosecutors in the Face of Absolute Immunity, 23 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 955, 959 (2010) [hereinafter Unell]. “Whether they are elected or
appointed, prosecutors often feel pressure to obtain convictions to
demonstrate their effectiveness, as convictions are the lodestar by which
prosecutors tend to be judged.” Barkow, Organizational Guidelines, 31
Cardozo L. Rev. at 2091.
Without civil liability, deterrents to prosecutorial misconduct are
insufficient. As Justice White wrote for himself and two other Justices,
“[O]rdinarily, liability in damages for unconstitutional or otherwise illegal
conduct has the very desirable effect of deterring such conduct. Indeed,
this was precisely the proposition upon which § 1983 was enacted.”
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 442, 96 S. Ct. at 1000 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment). Conversely,
[s]hielded from the feedback mechanism of civil liability,
prosecutors are free to engage in conduct, ethical and
otherwise, devoid of the accountability brought to bear on
officials and counselors in other fields of the law. This creates
an incentive for prosecutors to substitute precautionary
53
functions aimed at avoiding the violation of civil rights with
greater emphasis on attaining convictions.
Daniel Woislaw, Absolute Immunity: Applying New Standards for
Prosecutorial Accountability, 26 C.R. L.J. 349, 350–51 (2016) [hereinafter
Woislaw].
The majority relies on “other mechanisms that restrain official
conduct, including vigorous judicial oversight in the district court,
appellate review, postconviction-relief proceedings, attorney disciplinary
proceedings, human resource management, and elections.” Absent from
the majority’s list is another frequently cited mechanism, namely, the risk
of criminal punishment.
The methods for deterring prosecutorial misconduct relied on by the
majority are generally weak and have proven their ineffectiveness. I begin
my analysis with the strongest control mechanism cited by the majority:
judicial oversight.
A fair case can be made that absolute immunity makes sense for
prosecutorial functions occurring only during trial. In this setting, there
is supervision by a judge and monitoring by opposing counsel. Jeffries,
99 Va. L. Rev. at 221. Thus, certain prosecutorial misconduct, such as
inflammatory statements to the jury, improper comment on the
defendant’s silence, or introduction of hearsay evidence, can, at least in
theory, be corrected in the courtroom. Id.
However, judicial oversight of criminal proceedings cannot control
or deter all or even most prosecutorial misconduct. Some types of
prosecutorial misconduct, like withholding exculpatory evidence or
fabricating inculpatory evidence, are difficult to uncover and never come
to light in court proceedings. See Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified,
80 Fordham L. Rev. at 521. They occur where “prosecutors act ex parte
54
and without judicial supervision, usually without correction from opposing
counsel, and under professional and psychological circumstances that
vitiate the incentives to comply.” Jeffries, 99 Va. L. Rev. at 230. “The
judicial process will by definition be ignorant of the violation when it
occurs; and it is reasonable to suspect that most such violations never
surface.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 443–44, 96 S. Ct. at 1001. Judge Kozinski
wrote,
A robust and rigorously enforced Brady rule is
imperative because all the incentives prosecutors confront
encourage them not to discover or disclose exculpatory
evidence. Due to the nature of a Brady violation, it’s highly
unlikely wrongdoing will ever come to light in the first place.
This creates a serious moral hazard for those prosecutors who
are more interested in winning a conviction than serving
justice. In the rare event that the suppressed evidence does
surface, the consequences usually leave the prosecution no
worse than had it complied with Brady from the outset. . . . If
the violation is found to be material . . . the prosecution gets
a do-over, making it no worse off than if it had disclosed the
evidence in the first place.
Olsen, 737 F.3d at 630. When prosecutorial misconduct during trial is
predicated on pretrial misconduct, absolute immunity should not apply.
See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 443–44, 96 S. Ct. at 1001; Olsen, 737 F.3d
at 630; McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922, 932–33 (8th Cir.
2008); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 344, 349 (2d Cir. 2000).
Further weakening the functional rationale for applying absolute
immunity to a prosecutor’s actions at trial based on judicial oversight is
the relative strength of the adverse parties. “[T]he brunt of prosecutorial
misconduct falls disproportionately on the poor (including minorities) who
cannot afford the aggressive and independent defense which can detect or
deter misconduct.” Unell, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics at 957; accord Johns,
Unsupportable and Unjustifiable, 80 Fordham L. Rev. at 516. “Public
55
defenders[,] in particular, have scarce resources to allocate towards the
discovery of prosecutorial misconduct . . . .” Woislaw, 26 C.R. L.J. at 368.
Moreover, judicial oversight of prosecutorial misconduct is negligible
or nonexistent in the ninety-seven percent of cases that do not go to trial.
Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified, 80 Fordham L. Rev. at 517; Sarma,
21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 576 n.11.
Finally, appellate courts are focused less on holding the state
accountable for prosecutorial misconduct and more on determining
“whether violations of a defendant’s rights resulted in an unfair or
unreliable determination of his guilt or innocence.” Sarma, 21 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. at 583. Thus, “prosecutorial wrongdoing will only result in
accountability-promoting consequences when it implicates the
conviction’s integrity.” Id. at 584. Judge Smith of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit explains that appellate courts are limited
in their control of prosecutorial misconduct by harmless error standards
and by a reluctance to impose sanctions and name errant prosecutors.
See D. Brooks Smith, Policing Prosecutors: What Role Can Appellate Courts
Play?, 38 Hofstra L. Rev. 835, 840–43 (2010). “[T]he distinction between
harmful and harmless [errors] is problematic because it doesn’t illustrate
how serious the misconduct was, merely that the court determined that it
wouldn’t have affected the ultimate outcome of the trial.” Innocence Project
Research Illustrates Lack of Accountability for Prosecutors Who Commit
Misconduct, Innocence Project (Feb. 6, 2012),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/innocence-project-research-illustrates-
lack-of-accountability-for-prosecutors-who-commit-misconduct/ [https:
//perma.cc/BA7Z-945U]. Harmless error findings obviate the deterrence
and remediation of prosecutorial wrongs. Johns, Unsupportable and
Unjustified, 80 Fordham L. Rev. at 517.
56
A second control mechanism identified by the majority are
disciplinary proceedings. As an empirical matter, numerous
commentators have found that prosecutors are rarely disciplined. One
found that, between 1970 and 2003, among 2000 convictions overturned
or reduced as a result of prosecutorial misconduct, none resulted in
criminal prosecution and only forty-four led to professional discipline.
Johns, Reconsidering Absolute, 2005 BYU L. Rev. at 60. Another
concluded that “prosecutors are disciplined rarely, both in the abstract
and relative to private lawyers,” and with respect to provisions that
prosecutors and private attorneys have incentives to violate, “the
discrepancy between discipline of prosecutors and private attorneys is
enormous”). Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors,
79 N.C. L. Rev. 721, 755 (2001) [hereinafter Zacharias]. Two reporters
identified 381 homicide convictions thrown out for Brady violations and
found that none of the prosecutors involved were publicly reprimanded,
barred from practicing law, or convicted of a crime. Ken Armstrong &
Maurice Possley, Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 11, 1999),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/chi-020103trial1-
story.html [https://perma.cc/FR84-WATQ].
The reasons for the paucity of professional discipline against
prosecutors, commentators suggest, are manifold. Some relate to the
nature of professional discipline rules. “Many of the rules of professional
conduct . . . are blunt instruments—altogether inapplicable, or barely
applicable, to full-time prosecutors.” Zacharias, 79 N.C. L. Rev. at 725.
Other reasons relate to the incentives and resources of disciplinary
authorities. General prohibitions against dishonest behavior and conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice are difficult and expensive to
prove without an accompanying direct rule violation. Id. at 736. Areas
57
where prosecutors have discretion or where the law is unsettled are
oftentimes avoided by disciplinary authorities for fear they may “embroil
the disciplinary agency in litigation and aggressive claims by prosecutorial
agencies that professional discipline violates the separation of powers.” Id.
at 737. Disciplinary authorities may believe their resources are better
spent pursuing lawyers whose misconduct reflects self-interested greed.
Id. at 757.
A third set of reasons for the lack of prosecutorial discipline relates
to the incentives and resources of participants in criminal cases.
“Prosecutors have no clients who are likely to complain. Criminal
defendants rarely have incentives or resources to pursue complaints to the
bar. Defense lawyers hesitate to antagonize adversaries with whom they
must deal on a regular basis.” Id. at 749.
Another control mechanism frequently cited to support absolute
prosecutorial immunity is the possibility of criminal punishment. But
criminal proceedings are not a forum in which claims against prosecutors
are likely to be brought. As of 2011, only one prosecutor was criminally
convicted for violating constitutional protections under 18 U.S.C. § 242
even though the statutory provision has been in effect since 1866. Johns,
Unsupportable and Unjustified, 80 Fordham L. Rev. at 520. “Enforcement
of similar state laws is equally sparse.” Sarma, 21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev.
at 585. “[O]nly one prosecutor has ever gone to jail for deliberate
constitutional violation.” Id. at 586. “[T]he bringing of criminal charges
against a prosecutor is very rare, because the intent standard is a high
bar and another prosecutor must be willing to press charges.” Unell, 23
Geo. J. Legal Ethics at 960; accord Woislaw, 26 C.R. L.J. at 367.
Additionally, according to the majority, “human resource
management” renders civil liability unnecessary. At the outset, it is
58
noteworthy that such systems are not generally thought sufficient to
obviate tort liability in other fields. Are prosecutors’ offices somehow
different? The studies suggest not. “[P]rosecutors’ offices appear far less
equipped than other large organizations, including police departments, to
manage and discipline employees.” Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court
Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar:
Three Case Studies that Prove that Assumption Wrong, 80 Fordham L. Rev.
537, 543 (2011). “[M]ost prosecutor’s offices don’t even have internal
systems for dealing with misconduct.” Innocence Project Research
Illustrates Lack of Accountability for Prosecutors Who Commit Misconduct,
Innocence Project (Feb. 6, 2012), https://
www.innocenceproject.org/innocence-project-research-illustrates-lack-of-
accountability-for-prosecutors-who-commit-misconduct/ [https://
perma.cc/ZE74-VKDS].
Observers doubt that discipline internal to prosecutorial offices is
effective. “[O]ther common goals and policies, like obtaining a high
conviction rate and prevailing in high-profile trials,” undercut incentives
to establish rigorous disciplining systems inside prosecutorial offices.
Sarma, 21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 594. Internal office discipline, Judge
Kozinski suggests, is unlikely to prove useful: “Prosecutors need to know
that someone is watching over their shoulders—someone who doesn’t
share their values and eat lunch in the same cafeteria.” Alex Kozinski,
Criminal Law 2.0, Preface, 44 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. iii, xxxii
(2015). And “[c]onsidering the lack of transparency” in such systems, one
author writes, “one would do well to treat claims that these internal
mechanisms suffice with caution.” Sarma, 21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at
593.
59
The final control mechanism cited by the majority is elections. But
here again there is little to no control of misconduct. First, “[p]oor
information flow between prosecutors and the public renders the political
check ineffective.” Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution,
86 Wash. L. Rev. 69, 78 (2011). Added to the low-information problem is
the fact that prosecutorial elections are historically low turnout affairs.
Sarma, 21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 592. And, approximately eighty-five
percent of prosecutor incumbents run unopposed. Ronald F. Wright &
Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1587, 1606 (2010). Finally, “because prosecutorial
elections involve so many issues beyond misconduct, there is no clear line
from misconduct (likely committed in the ranks by line prosecutors and
not the head of the office) to a district attorney being voted out of office.”
Sarma, 21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 592.
In summary, the alternative control mechanisms relied on by the
majority, individually and together, amount to paper tigers. As one author
explains, “The need for prosecutorial accountability is widely
acknowledged. Scholars have established the fact that we do not hold
prosecutors accountable. And, they have widely explored how specific
methods created to hold them accountable have failed to achieve that end.”
Id. at 578. To deter prosecutorial misconduct, civil liability is necessary.
If we are going to accept the premise that potential liability
affects behavior, as advocates of immunities so fervently do,
we need to look at the opposite side of the coin too, namely, if
behavior is fundamentally affected by the imposition of tort
liability, the removal of tort liability will also similarly impact
behavior. If it is true that police [and prosecutorial] conduct
will be chilled by tort rules, then the granting of immunity will
lead police [and prosecutors] to engage in more
unconstitutional activities because they do not have to worry
about potential liabilities. We must consider both halves of
the deterrence walnut.
60
Baldwin II, 915 N.W.2d at 289 (Appel, J., dissenting).
6. Adverse effect on integrity of criminal justice system. Our system
of criminal justice gives prosecutors remarkable power and wide
discretion. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 874,
884 (2009) (characterizing prosecutors as “leviathans” with “unchecked
power”). At the same time, we expect a prosecutor’s interest to be “not
that [he] shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 (1935).
[W]hile he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is
to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id.
Ensuring that prosecutors are accountable to those expectations
improves the integrity of the criminal justice system. “[O]ne would expect
that the judicial process would be protected and indeed its integrity
enhanced by denial of immunity to prosecutors who engage in
unconstitutional conduct.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 442, 96 S. Ct. at 1000–01.
Conversely, failure to hold prosecutors accountable damages the
integrity of our criminal justice system. “When publicized, cases of
prosecutorial misconduct dramatically reduce confidence in the justice
system.” Unell, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics at 957. “When prosecutors infringe
upon individual defendants’ rights without recourse, respect for the
system’s integrity corrodes—and ethical prosecutors suffer the
consequences ushered in by those who fail to abide by the rules.” Sarma,
21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. at 577; see also H. Mitchell Caldwell, The
Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63
Cath. U. L. Rev. 51, 54 (2013) (“[P]rosecutorial misconduct is still unjust
61
when it harms the guilty, who, regardless of their crimes, are entitled to
the full protection of the Constitution.”).
7. Hindering development of constitutional law. Absolute immunity
stalls the development of constitutional law. By dismissing claims at the
initial pleading stage, courts do not interpret substantive constitutional
protections or apply them to factual situations. Moreover, difficult-to-
defeat immunities tend to dissuade lawyers and putative clients from even
bringing suit upon weighing the practicalities of bringing constitutionally
based legal actions. See Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity
Matter?, 8 U. St. Thomas L.J. 477, 494–95 (2011). As a result, absolute
immunity “tends to freeze the law in a state of perpetual uncertainty” and
prevents the judicial opportunity to set a standard that will have positive
implications across the state. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute, 2005 BYU
L. Rev. at 130.
In Baldwin II, the majority justified allowing qualified immunity, and
creating a gap between rights and remedies, out of a desire for “play in the
joints.” 915 N.W.2d at 278–79 (majority opinion). Limitations on damages
remedies, the majority reasoned, would still allow courts to develop the
scope of constitutional rights in certain cases, whereas closing the gap
between rights and remedies, the majority cautioned, could inhibit
development of substantive constitutional law. Id. at 278 n.6.
Here, instead of allowing “play in the joints,” the majority simply
snaps the joint. The sensitivity to continued development of constitutional
rights in Baldwin II is absent.
8. No applicability to Brady violations. In Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196–97 (1963), the United States Supreme
Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
62
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.” But because Brady requires prosecutors to act
in the “unharmonious role” of helping the opposing side by “crediting a
version of the evidence at odds with their understanding,” it has not been
properly implemented by prosecutors. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 697, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3391 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (first
quotation); Jeffries, 99 Va. L. Rev. at 227–29 (second quotation).
Absolute immunity of Brady violations makes no sense. It thwarts,
rather than advances, the fundamental role of the judicial process—to
seek truth. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 441–45, 96 S. Ct. at 1000–02; see Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381, 54 S. Ct. 212, 215 (1933). Justice White
made the point well:
It would stand this immunity rule on its head . . . to apply it
to a suit based on a claim that the prosecutor
unconstitutionally withheld information from the court.
Immunity from a suit based upon a claim that the prosecutor
suppressed or withheld evidence would discourage precisely
the disclosure of evidence sought to be encouraged by the rule
granting prosecutors immunity from defamation suits. Denial
of immunity for unconstitutional withholding of evidence
would encourage such disclosure. A prosecutor seeking to
protect himself from liability for failure to disclose evidence
may be induced to disclose more than is required. But, this
will hardly injure the judicial process. Indeed, it will help it.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 442–43, 96 S. Ct. at 1001. Further, as noted above,
the judicial process lacks sufficient mechanisms to ensure proper
oversight of such malfeasance. See id. at 443–44, 96 S. Ct. at 1001; Olsen,
737 F.3d at 630; Jeffries, 99 Va. L. Rev. at 230; Johns, Unsupportable and
Unjustified, 80 Fordham L. Rev. at 516, 521; Unell, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
at 957; Woislaw, 26 C.R. L.J. at 368.
9. Inefficient doctrine. The prosecutorial immunity doctrine
embraced by the majority is inefficient. This is because it generates
63
needless satellite litigation over whether a prosecutor’s challenged conduct
should be entitled to absolute or qualified immunity. See Buckley, 509
U.S. at 273, 113 S. Ct. at 2615 (noting that prosecutors are not entitled to
absolute immunity for administrative and investigative functions); Beck,
685 N.W.2d at 642 (same); see also Burr v. City of Cedar Rapids, 286
N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1979). “Not only does the litigation of such
questions consume effort, time, and money; it does so without any obvious
payoff for the functional integrity of constitutional tort law.” Jeffries, 99
Va. L. Rev. at 225.
The questions generated by the doctrine are diverse, intricate, and
mostly beside the point. Should absolute immunity apply similarly where
prosecutors obtain a search warrant as to when they obtain an arrest
warrant? See KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2004). Does it
matter if prosecutors are seeking evidence of additional crimes as opposed
to evidence of crimes for which a defendant has already been indicted?
See id. at 1112. Should prosecutors be entitled to a different immunity
when they present false information to a court as compared to when they
put that information in a sworn affidavit? See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 120,
118 S. Ct. at 505 (majority opinion). How about when prosecutors employ
fabricated evidence in plea bargaining as compared to employing the
evidence during trial?
Some of the results in the cases are examined are striking. For
instance, one court held that a prosecutor is entitled to qualified immunity
for manufacturing tainted evidence but absolute immunity for presenting
that same tainted evidence in court. Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d
118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). But cf. McGhee, 547 F.3d at 932–33 (holding that
prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for fabricating evidence
before filing criminal charges and then later presenting that evidence in
64
court); Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (same);
Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 344, 349 (same).
Rather than focus judicial attention on the extent of a prosecutor’s
immunity, we should devote those resources to vindicating society’s
interest in enforcement of the constitution. “A simplified approach—
applying qualified immunity in all cases—would serve public policy,
respect historical understanding, and simplify and streamline civil rights
litigation.” Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified, 80 Fordham L. Rev. at
511.
C. Issue of First Impression. The majority says, “Venckus has not
established our prior decisions should be overruled.” “To the contrary,”
the majority continues, “the judicial process immunity is of long standing
in Iowa and was recently reaffirmed in Minor [v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383,
397–99 (Iowa 2012)].”
There is no stare decisis issue here. We have never decided whether,
and to what extent, prosecutors should enjoy absolute immunity from
constitutional torts. Venckus is, at least with respect to his constitutional
torts, not asking that we overrule precedent. Stare decisis “is a Latin term
meaning ‘to stand by things decided.’ ” State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583,
586 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Stare decisis, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009)). If something is not decided, there is nothing by which stare decisis
calls on us to stand.
For instance, the majority says the judicial process immunity was
recently reaffirmed in Minor. But Minor does not control this case. Minor
involved a § 1983 claim, not an Iowa constitutional claim. 819 N.W.2d at
389.
There is another reason why stare decisis is of limited import here.
Even if one were to assume prosecutors’ absolute immunity to common
65
law torts is a constraining precedent with respect to constitutional torts,
that immunity is a judge-made doctrine. We have a “responsibility to
reconsider court-made rules when their continued validity is
questionable.” Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787 (Iowa 1981). “When
a rule is of judicial origin, it is subject to judicial change.” Id.; see Bd. of
Water Works Trs. v. SAC Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 890 N.W.2d 50, 61 (Iowa
2017) (recognizing that the principles supporting stare decisis are of lower
force when a rule is of judicial origin).
There is one aspect of the majority’s discussion in which I agree.
The majority recognizes that continued adherence to our precedents
depends on their persuasive power. In Iowa, “[i]f precedent is to have any
value it must be based on a convincing rationale.” State v. Cline, 617
N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
James, 393 N.W.2d 465, 472 (Iowa 1986) (Lavorato, J., dissenting)),
abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606
& n.2 (Iowa 2001). “The degree to which we follow United States Supreme
Court precedent, or any other precedent, depends solely upon its ability to
persuade us with the reasoning of the decision.” State v. Ochoa, 792
N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010). If the common law precedents were
persuasive, analogical reasoning would suggest we follow that rationale.
However, as discussed above, our precedents on absolute
prosecutorial immunity in common law torts do not provide a convincing
rationale for absolutely immunizing prosecutors from constitutional torts.
Common law and constitutional torts are dissimilar, the prosecutorial
function is unlike the judicial function, and the other policy rationales in
the common law cases are dubious.
There has been, unfortunately, an emerging trend in this court to
misapply the doctrine of stare decisis, usually to shore up favored policy
66
arguments not based upon constitutional analysis. See, e.g., State v.
Brown, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2019) (Appel, J., dissenting) (noting
majority’s citing of cases as precedent where issue was not contested by
parties); Westra v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2019)
(Appel, J., dissenting) (noting majority’s citing of case deciding federal
constitutional law as precedent under Iowa Constitution). See generally
Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553, 614–15 (Iowa
2017) (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
stare decisis requires that the issue be actually litigated by the parties).
As I have previously noted,
We should be particularly alert to avoid masking
preferred policy choices in a stare decisis costume. And, an
overburdened court may be tempted to over read precedent in
the name of efficiency and quick results, but such an
approach runs the risk of uncritical dispositions.
Bd. of Water Works Trs., 890 N.W.2d at 86 (Appel, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
D. Proper Scope of Prosecutorial Immunity. In Baldwin II, a
majority of this court recently held that government officials are entitled
to a form of qualified immunity when they are sued under article I, sections
1 and 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 915 N.W.2d at 281. Specifically, the
majority said,
[W]ith respect to a damage claim under article I, sections 1
and 8, a government official whose conduct is being
challenged will not be subject to damages liability if she or he
pleads and proves as an affirmative defense that she or he
exercised all due care to conform to the requirements of the
law.
Id. I, of course, dissented in Baldwin II. Id. (Appel, J., dissenting). In any
event, the qualified immunity developed by a majority of the court in
Baldwin II is more than enough protection for most prosecutorial
67
functions. Affording any more protection to prosecutors severs the
connection between rights and remedies, removes a necessary deterrent,
is historically unjustified, hinders development of constitutional law,
damages the integrity of the criminal justice system, and inefficiently
creates needless satellite litigation to characterize the prosecutorial
function involved. Greater protection also has absolutely no role where
prosecutors impair the truth-seeking role of the judicial process by
withholding exculpatory evidence or fabricating inculpatory evidence.
There is one area, however, where I believe the case for absolute
prosecutorial immunity is strongest, namely, for actions taken pursuant
to the judicial process in open court. At least the judicial supervision of
such functions, in tandem with the check provided by opposing counsel,
provides some degree of protection and renders a civil damages remedy
unnecessarily costly as compared to its benefits. Still, to the extent such
an exception is recognized, it cannot swallow the general rule that
prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity on matters involving
functions predicated on pretrial misconduct, such as Brady violations, or
presenting evidence at trial that was previously fabricated, because the
judicial and advocatory checks are ineffective in such circumstances.
E. Proper Resolution of Claims Against Prosecutors. Venckus
complains about the prosecutors’ pretrial conduct. Therefore, absolute
prosecutorial immunity should not apply. 3 Accordingly, we should affirm
the district court judgment on these claims.
3The majority says a “government official” is entitled to absolute immunity for “any
function intimately related to the judicial phase of the criminal process.” But this case
does not call upon this court to decide the immunity of “any government official.” We are
only concerned with the immunity of prosecutors and police. Accordingly, the majority’s
overbroad statement is mere dicta.
68
VII. Even if Prosecutors Are Entitled to Absolute Immunity for
Some Functions, Such Limited Absolute Immunity Should Be Strictly
Tied to Judicial Functions and Does Not Provide a Basis for Dismissal
of Venckus’s Petition.
A. Introduction. In this section, I assume, for purposes of
argument, that absolute immunity is available to prosecutors in some
settings. But even if one embraces some form of absolute immunity for
prosecutors, such a doctrine does not provide the basis for dismissing the
petition in this case.
Venckus argues that the prosecutors acted illegally and
unconstitutionally in four ways. First, he asserts that prosecutors
recklessly ignored exculpatory evidence he provided to prosecutors,
including expert reports and alibi testimony. Second, he asserts that
prosecutors went shopping for a favorable expert after receiving an
unfavorable report on DNA transfer from their first expert, a state DNA
expert. In the course of their shopping, Venckus asserts, prosecutors
pressured a state criminalist to offer an opinion contrary to the DNA
expert. The criminalist, Venckus notes, lacked training in DNA transfer.
Third, he asserts that prosecutors filed an ethics complaint against his
attorney on an unrelated matter that was later dismissed. Fourth, he
asserts that prosecutors offered Markley, the actual rapist, a lenient plea
deal in exchange for testimony against him.
If there is a prosecutorial absolute immunity doctrine, the State has
the strongest argument with respect to the fourth assertion. There is
authority for the proposition that offering a plea deal in exchange for
testimony is a function entitled to absolute immunity. See Beck, 685
N.W.2d at 643 (stating that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for decision
to bring charges and for decision not to bring charges); Hike v. Hall, 427
N.W.2d 158, 160–61 (Iowa 1988) (holding that prosecutorial decisions to
69
defer prosecution and reduce charges are entitled to absolute immunity).
Filing an ethics complaint against a defense attorney on an unrelated
matter is not entitled to absolute immunity.
However, even if we were to embrace some form of prosecutorial
immunity, the majority errs in concluding that the functions associated
with the first and second assertions—recklessly ignoring exculpatory
evidence and expert shopping—are entitled to absolute immunity. As the
United States Supreme Court has cautioned,
Almost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct
participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to
be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to
prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute
immunity is that expansive.
Burns, 500 U.S. at 495, 111 S. Ct. at 1944 (majority opinion). Similarly,
we have said, “We will be sparing in our recognition of absolute immunity
and will not extend it further than its justification warrants.” Beck, 685
N.W.2d at 643. A prosecutor’s investigatory and administrative functions
are not protected by absolute immunity. Id. at 642; see also Burr, 286
N.W.2d at 395.
B. Expert Shopping and Pressuring Witnesses. In Buckley, 509
U.S. at 272, 113 S. Ct. at 2615, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity in
shopping for experts until they found one that would provide the opinion
they sought. The expert shopping related to a boot print found at the scene
of the crime. Id. at 262, 113 S. Ct. at 2610. After three studies performed
by state and municipal criminologists could not make a reliable connection
between the boot print and a pair of boots supplied by the target of the
prosecutorial investigation, prosecutors found an expert willing to testify
to a positive identification. Id. The expert they found was an
70
anthropologist with a reputation “for her willingness to fabricate unreliable
expert testimony.” Id. At the time of the witness shopping, probable cause
had not yet been established and prosecutors were working “hand in hand”
with police. Id. at 272, 113 S. Ct. at 2615. The witness shopping, the
arrestee charged, amounted to a conspiracy to manufacture false evidence.
Id.
No absolute immunity, the Buckley Court held, applied to the
prosecutors’ actions. Id. at 276, 113 S. Ct. at 2617. The Buckley Court
reasoned that “[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions
normally performed by a detective or police officer,” absolute immunity is
inapplicable. Id. at 273, 113 S. Ct. at 2616. The prosecutors’ mission in
expert shopping, the Buckley Court said, “was entirely investigative in
character.” Id. at 274, 113 S. Ct. at 2616.
The Buckley Court also addressed the issue of timing vis-à-vis
probable cause. The Buckley Court explained that “[a] prosecutor neither
is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable
cause to have anyone arrested.” Id. But “[o]f course,” the Buckley Court
emphasized, “a determination of probable cause does not guarantee a
prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for all actions taken
afterwards.” Id. at 274 n.5, 113 S. Ct. at 2616 n.5. “Even after that
determination, . . . a prosecutor may engage in ‘police investigative work’
that is entitled to only qualified immunity.” Id. Further, the Buckley Court
continued, it is improper to conclude “a prosecutor’s actions in ‘obtaining,
reviewing, and evaluating’ evidence are always protected by absolute
immunity” because “some of these actions may fall on the administrative,
rather than the judicial, end of the prosecutor’s activities, and therefore be
entitled only to qualified immunity.” Id. at 276 n.7, 113 S. Ct. at 2617 n.7
(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33, 96 S. Ct. at 995 n.33).
71
Finally, the Buckley Court stressed that fabrication of evidence is
not a function entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 272, 276, 113 S. Ct.
at 2615, 2617. No common law tradition, the Buckley Court explained,
granted absolute immunity for fabrication of evidence. Id. at 275, 113
S. Ct. at 2616–17.
The alleged facts in Buckley are largely parallel to the facts before
us. As in Buckley, prosecutors here allegedly shopped for an expert willing
to testify favorably after receiving unfavorable reports from a state expert.
In Buckley, the prosecutors found an anthropologist with a reputation for
fabricating testimony; here, the prosecutors found a criminalist without
training in the subject matter about which she was asked to testify.
Indeed, the alleged circumstances here are arguably worse and more
attenuated from any prosecutorial function entitled to absolute immunity.
Unlike in Buckley, prosecutors here allegedly pressured the witness to
testify against Venckus. In my view, the alleged actions of the prosecution
in witness shopping and pressuring a witness to testify are not entitled to
absolute immunity protection.
Of course, there is one difference between Buckley and this case. In
Buckley, the prosecutorial conduct occurred before probable cause was
found. By contrast, Venckus suggests that probable cause may have
existed at one point, and even though that probable cause disappeared
shortly thereafter, the prosecutorial misconduct of which Venckus
complains occurred after probable cause had existed.
Does the temporary existence of probable cause matter? As noted
above, the Buckley Court clarified that prosecutors can still be liable after
a probable cause finding. This clarification was based on the same
rationale we utilize in defining immunities, namely, functional analysis.
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But perhaps the fact that probable cause preceded prosecutors’
expert shopping, attempts to manufacture evidence, and witness pressure
is relevant as one factor to consider. Neither this court nor the Supreme
Court have addressed how to determine whether a prosecutor is engaged
in investigatory or administrative functions after a probable cause finding.
The lower federal courts have adopted two different approaches to post-
probable cause immunity where prosecutors allegedly coerce witnesses or
fabricate evidence.
The D.C. Circuit takes a categorical approach, holding that coercing
a witness to testify falsely is an investigative function meriting qualified
immunity. Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194, (D.C. Cir. 1995). The Moore
court explained,
Intimidating and coercing witnesses into changing their
testimony is not advocatory. It is rather a misuse of
investigative techniques legitimately directed at exploring
whether witness testimony is truthful and complete and
whether the government has acquired all incriminating
evidence. It therefore relates to a typical police function, the
collection of information to be used in a prosecution.
Id.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit tries to ascertain a prosecutor’s state
of mind to determine if—when fabricating evidence, coercing witnesses,
withholding exculpatory evidence, or failing to interview exculpatory
evidence—the prosecutor was acting in an advocatory or investigative role.
Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 638–39 (9th Cir. 2005). In Genzler,
the Ninth Circuit held that a prosecutorial meeting with a potential witness
was “a process of manufacturing evidence while performing police-type
investigative work—not [prosecutors] acting as advocates by actively
preparing [the witness] for her testimony in court.” Id. at 643.
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Under either Buckley, Moore, or Genzler, the prosecutors’ expert
shopping and pressuring of the state criminalist are not entitled to
absolute immunity. As the Genzler court said, the prosecutors in
Venckus’s case were engaged in “a process of manufacturing evidence
while performing police-type investigative work—not [prosecutors] acting
as advocates by actively preparing [the witness] for her testimony in court.”
Id. at 643.
C. Recklessly Ignoring Exculpatory Material. Recklessly
ignoring exculpatory material is not an evaluation of evidence in
preparation for trial or otherwise an advocatory function. See Broam v.
Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). Our “sparing” recognition of
absolute immunity and refusal to “extend it further than its justification
warrants,” Beck, 685 N.W.2d at 643, provide no basis for labeling an
investigatory omission as an advocatory function. The prosecutors’ alleged
failure is therefore not entitled to absolute immunity.
The foregoing conclusion is supported by caselaw addressing claims
that police officers ignored exculpatory evidence. Courts have held that
knowingly and willfully ignoring exculpatory evidence is a failure of a police
officer’s investigative function exposing the officer to liability for a
constitutional tort. Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 957 (8th Cir.
2001); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992), abrogation
on other grounds as recognized by Pulliam v. City of Horn Lake, No. 92–
7696, 1994 WL 442316, at *1 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The Wilson
court denied qualified immunity to police officers because “[t]here is no
countervailing equally important governmental interest that would excuse
the [officers] from fulfilling their responsibility to investigate these
[exculpatory] leads when faced with an involuntary confession and no
reliable corroborating evidence.” 260 F.3d at 957.
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VIII. Police Officer Absolute Immunity.
A. Introduction. With respect to the application of absolute
immunity to police officers, the majority declares, “Absolute immunity
extends to police officer functions falling within the scope of the judicial
process immunity, e.g., testimony as an ordinary witness.” “[T]his is true,”
the majority continues, “whether the claims arise under common law or
under the state constitution.” Because the majority does not decide the
issue of absolute immunity for police officers, the discussion is dicta. I am
not willing to let it go at that, however, because the majority’s suggested
approach is contrary to Iowa law, federal precedent, and common law.
B. No Absolute Immunity Under Iowa Caselaw for Police
Officers. The majority’s statements are overbroad and flatly contrary to
Iowa caselaw. In Vander Linden v. Crews, 205 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Iowa
1977), Paul Crews was secretary of the Iowa Board of Pharmacy Examiners
and the director of Drug Law Enforcement. Crews arrested Vander Linden
without a warrant and filed a preliminary information against him. Id.
The Vander Linden court held Crews was a public officer amenable
to a suit for malicious prosecution. Id. at 688, 691. The court also said it
would make no difference if Crews were considered a peace officer. Id. at
687. The Vander Linden court further held, “We have not . . . extended the
doctrine of judicial or governmental immunity to other offices of a
nonjudicial character, and decline to do so now.” Id. at 689. After
discussing the policy rationale for extending absolute immunity to law
enforcement officials articulated in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949), the Vander Linden court said,
We are unimpressed by the fears expressed by Judge
Hand in Gregoire set out above. We believe it possible to
determine whether claims for damages for malicious
prosecution are well founded, and agree . . . that to deny a
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person claimed to be injured by the malicious action of an
officer not occupying a judicial position, to be “monstrous.”
205 N.W.2d at 690. The Vander Linden court also quoted at length from
a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which itself relied on a
dissenting opinion from California. Id. at 691. In the California opinion,
the dissent wrote,
The majority opinion states that public officers should be
protected from “vindictive and retaliatory damage suits.” The
reverse situation is presented here: Any employee, clerk,
assistant, investigator, inspector or deputy is, by this holding,
protected when he has instigated the commencement and
prosecution of a vindictive and malicious suit. This is true
because the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint must be taken
as true, and he has alleged that the action was brought with
malice and without probable cause.
White v. Towers, 235 P.2d 209, 216 (Cal. 1951) (en banc) (Carter, J.,
dissenting). The Michigan Supreme Court agreed, stating,
With that reasoning, we agree. Extension of immunity to
virtually any peace officer or law enforcement officer would
result in a practical nullification of the tort of malicious
prosecution. We conclude that assurance of full
compensatory justice to the damaged individual should be
paramount, and that the interest of the individual in
protection from Mala fide prosecutions is best assured by
making the putative tortfeasor civilly liable for malicious
prosecution.
Belt v. Ritter, 189 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Mich. 1971). Applying this reasoning,
the Vander Linden court concluded, “[T]he doctrine of judicial immunity
shall not be further extended to protect and shield nonjudicial officers from
civil suits where actual malice is alleged.” 205 N.W.2d at 691.
In Moser v. Black Hawk County, 300 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Iowa 1981),
we reiterated that police officers are not entitled to absolute immunity.
Pointing to Paige v. City of Chariton, 252 N.W.2d 433, 438 (Iowa 1977), and
Sarvold v. Dodson, 237 N.W.2d 447, 448 (Iowa 1976), the Moser court
highlighted “our cases that recognize peace officers who instigate or
76
procure a prosecution may be held liable for malicious prosecution, other
elements, including actual malice, being present.” 300 N.W.2d at 153.
The Moser court emphasized, “The general rule that law enforcement
officers are absolutely privileged to institute criminal proceedings and
therefore have an indefeasible immunity against an action for malicious
prosecution is not applied in this jurisdiction.” Id. at 153 n.1 (citation
omitted); see also Rogers v. Hill, 576 P.2d 328, 333 (Or. 1978) (en banc)
(holding that a police officer may be liable for “[a]n active part in continuing
an unfounded criminal proceeding”).
Other decisions of this court are to the same effect. “Iowa courts . . .
have traditionally declined to extend judicial immunity to nonjudicial
officers where malice was alleged.” Muzingo v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 518
N.W.2d 776, 777 (Iowa 1994). “[W]e have described other public officers
or peace officers charged with investigative duties as ‘nonjudicial officers’
to whom the protection should not extend.” Webster Cty. Bd. of
Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 877 (Iowa 1978).
The majority’s statements are contrary to that well-settled precedent
because the majority would protect “police officer functions falling within
the scope of the judicial process immunity,” which it defines in turn as
“conduct ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.’ ” But immunizing an officer’s conduct associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process is clearly contrary Vander Linden,
where the public officer was amenable to suit for arresting and filing an
information against Vander Linden. 205 N.W.2d at 687, 691. The
majority’s approach cannot be squared with the rule in this jurisdiction
that law enforcement officers are not “absolutely privileged to institute
criminal proceedings.” Moser, 300 N.W.2d at 153 n.1.
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Given the apparent contradiction with our precedent and the
absence of any indication from the majority that it is intending to overrule
that precedent, I think the majority opinion must be read as only
recognizing absolute immunity from defamation actions for a police
officer’s testimony in court. If the majority is overruling our precedent, it
should say so.
C. No Absolute Immunity Under Federal Precedent for Police
Officers. The majority’s statements regarding the applicability of absolute
immunity to peace officers are also inconsistent with federal law. Under
federal law, police officers generally get qualified immunity. See Scheuer,
416 U.S. at 245, 94 S. Ct. at 1691; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557, 87 S. Ct. at
1219.
For example, police officers are not entitled to absolute immunity
under federal law when they act as complaining witnesses. Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097 (1986) (holding that an
officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to
qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity); see Eugene
Scalia, Comment, Police Witness Immunity Under § 1983, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1433, 1454–59 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia] (explaining that the Supreme
Court held police officers were entitled to absolute immunity when
functioning as an ordinary witness testifying at trial and were not entitled
to absolute immunity when functioning as a complaining witness).
Where . . . the constitutional tort is the action of a police
officer in initiating a baseless prosecution, his role as a
“complaining witness” renders him liable to the victim under
section 1983, just as it did at common law, and the fact that
his testimony at a judicial proceeding may have been the
means by which he initiated the prosecution does not permit
him to transpose the immunity available for defamation as a
defense to malicious prosecution.
78
White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1988). See generally Piper M.
Willhite, Comment, Defamation Law: Privileges from Liability:
Distinguishing Quasi-Judicial Proceedings from Proceedings Which Are
Preliminary to Judicial Hearings, 47 Okla. L. Rev. 541, 548 n.61 (1994)
(collecting cases that do not extend absolute immunity to a witness’s
statements leading up to a judicial proceeding).
Judge Posner elaborated on the rationale for withholding absolute
immunity from police officers:
It is true that so far as potential exposure to suit by members
of the public is concerned, a policeman is in much the same
position as a judge or prosecutor yet enjoys no absolute
immunity from civil damage actions. There are reasons for
the difference in treatment. One, which is merely realistic, is
that a policeman rarely has sufficient assets to be worth suing
(of course this is also true of many assistant district
attorneys), unless he is indemnified by his employer—in
which event the suit is unlikely to have much impact on his
performance of his duties. The threat of suit is less likely to
affect the performance of his duties for another reason as well:
he has less discretion than a judge or prosecutor. He is also
more amenable to discipline and control by his superiors if he
seems to be flagging. Finally, unless policemen can be sued
for using excessive force or for false arrest, many victims of
these excesses will be without any remedy.
Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 662 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
D. Absolute Immunity for Police Officers Is Contrary to
Common Law. The majority’s views on the application of absolute
immunity to police officers is also contrary to the law at the time of Iowa’s
founding. The majority would protect police officers under its expansive
“judicial process immunity.” But, as discussed, judicial immunity at
common law was “extended only to individuals who were charged with
resolving disputes between other parties or authoritatively adjudicating
private rights.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132, 118 S. Ct. at 510 (Scalia, J.,
79
concurring). Police officers do no such thing. Police officers are not “jury,
judge, and executioner.” Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106, 65
S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (1945) (plurality opinion). “The common law has never
granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity . . . .”
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555, 87 S. Ct. at 1218.
Common law might have protected certain police officers from
defamation actions. Absolute immunity at common law protected—from
defamation actions—all “statements made in the course of a judicial
proceeding and relevant to the matter being tried.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at
133, 118 S. Ct. at 511; see Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193, 197 (1841). It did
not matter if the statements were false or borne of malicious intent.
Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133, 118 S. Ct. at 511; Hoar, 44 Mass. at 197. The
immunity applied to lawyers and witnesses. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133, 118
S. Ct. at 511. The policy rationale for the immunity was that “full freedom
of speech” would be “best calculated to subserve the purposes of justice.”
Hoar, 44 Mass. at 197–98. Importantly, as noted, this immunity only
applied to defamation actions, i.e., libel and slander, and not to other types
of actions. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133, 118 S. Ct. at 511.
The majority notes that one example where a police officer could be
protected by absolute immunity is for “testifying as an ordinary witness.”
Such testimony at trial would be protected at common law from
defamation actions. But police officers would be liable to other suits. For
instance, police officers who initiated a criminal prosecution could be
liable to a malicious prosecution claim. White, 855 F.2d at 961; Scalia, 56
U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1453–54.
E. Resolution of Police Officer Immunity in this Case. The
majority does not decide whether the police officer’s actions in this case
would be entitled to absolute immunity. But there are important reasons
80
discussed above to believe the dicta is off the mark. We have already
declined in a series of cases to extend absolute judicial immunity to police
officers. Muzingo, 518 N.W.2d at 777; Moser, 300 N.W.2d at 153; Webster
Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 268 N.W.2d at 877; Vander Linden, 205 N.W.2d at
687. Further, Officer Rich acted as the complaining witness. Malley, 475
U.S. at 343, 106 S. Ct. at 1097; White, 855 F.2d at 961; Scalia, 56 U. Chi.
L. Rev. at 1453–54.
IX. Municipal Immunity.
As discussed in Baldwin v. City of Estherville, (Baldwin IV), ___
N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2019) (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), even if individual officers and agents of the government are
entitled to immunity, it should not extend to claims against a municipal
entity under respondeat superior. The same rationale applies here.
Municipal entities were not immunized at common law. Id. at ___.
Further, damages remedies are necessary to enforce constitutional rights,
and “the municipal entity itself is likely to be in the best position to
implement corrective measures to vindicate constitutional rights.” Id. at
___. Indeed, municipal liability can target those “above the fray of
prosecutorial decisions” and thus altogether avoid the dubious policy
rationales asserted in favor of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Woislaw,
26 C.R. L.J. at 374.
X. Conclusion.
I would hold that prosecutors are not absolutely immune from a suit
for damages except to the extent they are functioning in open court and
are not acting based on misconduct occurring outside the trial setting.
Because Venckus does not claim any prosecutorial misconduct during
trial, I would affirm the district court judgment with respect to the
prosecutors.
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Were I to apply the common law absolute prosecutorial immunity to
Venckus’ common law and constitutional torts against the prosecutors, I
would affirm in part and reverse in part. Under that standard, I do not
think the prosecutors are liable for the plea deal offered to Markley.
Otherwise, I think the district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss.
With respect to the police officer, I would affirm the district court’s
denial of the motion to dismiss. Police officers are not entitled to absolute
immunity except, as with all witnesses, when testifying during trial.
Venckus’s claims do not relate to any testimony at trial by Officer Rich.
I therefore dissent from division III of the majority opinion. I concur
in the result of division IV of the majority opinion.