City of Cedar Rapids v. Marla Marie Leaf

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 16–0435
Filed August 31, 2018
CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS,
Appellee,
vs.
MARLA MARIE LEAF,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R.
Grady, Judge.
Plaintiff requests further review after magistrate in small claims
court action found a violation of a municipal ordinance. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT
AFFIRMED.
James C. Larew of Larew Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
James H. Flitz, City Attorney, and Patricia G. Kropf, Assistant City
Attorney, for appellee.
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APPEL, Justice.
This case involves the enforcement of an automated traffic
enforcement (ATE) system, but unlike its companion case, Behm v. City
of Cedar Rapids, ___ N.W.2d ____ (Iowa 2018), where the district court
granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, this case proceeded to
trial, with a judgment adverse to the defendant.
In this appeal, Marla Leaf, a registered vehicle owner, makes a
series of challenges to an adverse judgment arising out of the operation
of an ATE system established by the City of Cedar Rapids (Cedar Rapids)
through a municipal ordinance. Leaf received a notice of violation from
Cedar Rapids asserting that she was speeding while traveling
southbound at the J Avenue exit on Interstate 380 (I-380) where the ATE
system was operating. She contested the citation by following the
directions on the notice. After a telephonic hearing, an administrative
hearing officer ruled against her challenge to the citation. Leaf then
requested Cedar Rapids file a municipal infraction against her in small
claims court pursuant to the ordinance.
As a result of Leaf’s request, Cedar Rapids filed the municipal
infraction naming Leaf as a defendant in the district court. A magistrate
sitting as a small claims court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
The magistrate found clear and convincing evidence that Leaf violated
the ATE ordinance, rejected Leaf’s legal challenges to enforcement, and
assessed a civil penalty of $75, plus court costs. Leaf appealed the small
claims decision to the district court. The district court affirmed.
Leaf appealed the ruling of the district court. On appeal, Leaf
claims that Cedar Rapids failed to show a violation of the ordinance by
clear and convincing evidence. She further asserts that the ordinance
establishing the ATE system unlawfully granted jurisdiction over
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enforcement to an unauthorized administrative tribunal. Finally, Leaf
challenges the enforcement of Cedar Rapids’ ATE ordinance on several
constitutional theories. Specifically, Leaf claims the ordinance violates
the Iowa Constitution by unlawfully delegating police power to a private
entity, the ATE contractor Gatso USA, Inc. (Gatso). She further claims
that the ordinance, on its face and as applied, violates procedural and
substantive due process of law and offends the equal protection and
privileges and immunities clauses under the Iowa Constitution.
We transferred the appeal to the court of appeals. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court judgment. For the reasons expressed
below, given the posture of this case, we affirm the judgment of the
district court and the decision of the court of appeals concluding that
Leaf violated the ATE ordinance.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
A. Structure of Cedar Rapids ATM System.
1. The ordinance. In 2009, Cedar Rapids enacted an ordinance
establishing an ATE system. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Mun. Code § 61.138
(2016). 1 The ordinance authorizes Cedar Rapids to “deploy, erect or
cause to have erected an automated traffic enforcement system for
making video images of vehicles that . . . fail to obey speed regulations
. . . in the city.” Id. § 61.138(a). The ordinance authorizes the hiring of a
contractor “with which the City of Cedar Rapids contracts to provide
equipment and/or services in connection with the Automated Traffic
Enforcement System.” Id. § 61.138(b)(2).
The ordinance provides that when the ATE system generates an
image of a speeding vehicle, a notice of violation is mailed to the vehicle
1The ordinance is available online at https://www.municode.com/library/
ia/cedar-rapids/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeld=CH6ATRRE_61.138AUTREN.
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owner within thirty days of obtaining the owner’s identifying information.
Id. § 61.138(d)(1). The ordinance further provides that a vehicle owner
may contest the citation by requesting an administrative hearing “held at
the Cedar Rapids Police Department before an administrative appeals
board . . . consisting of one or more impartial fact finders.” Id.
§ 61.138(e)(1). Upon receiving the decision of the board, the ordinance
provides a vehicle owner with the option of either paying the fine or
submitting a request that Cedar Rapids file a municipal infraction in the
small claims division of district court. Id. § 61.138(e)(2).
In any small claims court proceeding, Cedar Rapids is required to
show “by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence” that the vehicle
was travelling in excess of the posted speed limit. Iowa Code
§ 364.22(6)(b) (2015). The ordinance authorizes a fine of between $25
and $750. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Mun. Code § 61.138(c)–(d). The
ordinance also notes that state-mandated court costs are added to the
amount of the fine if the vehicle owner is found guilty after a small
claims court proceeding. Id. § 61.138(e); see also Iowa Code § 364.22(8).
2. Gatso’s contract with Cedar Rapids. Pursuant to the ordinance,
Cedar Rapids entered into a contract with Gatso in 2009. Under the
contract, Gatso installed ATE cameras at selected locations. Gatso
owned the ATE equipment and was responsible for annual calibrations
and preventative maintenance.
Gatso was also responsible for developing images and obtaining
data, including speed calculations, from the ATE equipment. If an event
met the criteria for a violation, Gatso sent the license plate data to a
database for name, address, and vehicle information. Gatso then
presented the prescreened information that supported potential
violations to the Cedar Rapids Police Department. The police department
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reviewed the information and either approved or rejected each violation.
If Cdar Rapids approved a violation, Gatso sent a notice of violation by
mail to the registered owner of the vehicle.
B. Gatso’s Notices to Alleged Violators.
1. Content of notice of violation. Vehicle owners who were alleged
to have violated the ATE ordinance received a “Notice of Violation.” The
notice of violation displayed the City of Cedar Rapids logo and had the
signature of the Cedar Rapids law enforcement officer who approved
issuing the citation.
The front page of the notice of violation provided information about
the time and place of the alleged violation along with two photos of the
vehicle recorded by the ATE system. The front page of the notice of
violation provided the following admonition:
Failure to pay the civil fine or to contest liability within (30)
calendar days is an admission of liability in the full amount
of the civil fine assessed and will result in the loss of your
right to a hearing. In addition, you may be subject to formal
collection procedures including, but not limited to, being
reported to a credit reporting agency, and a civil lawsuit.
The backside of the notice of violation provided information about
how to pay the civil penalty. It also stated that a person receiving the
notice of violation had a right to contest the violation in person at an
administrative hearing. The notice of violation suggested that recipients
wishing to contest the violation “review the city ordinance, the images,
and the actual recorded video (if applicable) of the infraction” and
provided a limited list of “valid defenses.” The list of valid defenses did
not include a defense that the driver was a person other than the
vehicle’s registered owner. The backside of the notice of violation
cautioned that the failure to appear at an administrative hearing “will
result in a final determination of liability.” The notice of violation made
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no mention of the recipient’s option of requesting Cedar Rapids initiate a
small claims action in district court where Cedar Rapids would bear the
burden of proof of showing a violation “by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence.” Iowa Code § 364.22(6)(b).
2. Content of “notice of determination of liability.” If the first notice
of violation did not result in payment or the scheduling of an
administrative hearing, Gatso sent out another document to the vehicle
owner entitled “Notice of Determination 2nd Notice.” As with the notice
of violation, the notice of determination carried the City of Cedar Rapids
logo and had the signature of a law enforcement officer.
The notice of determination of liability provided the same
information about the time and place of the alleged offense as the notice
of violation. It contained, however, a slightly different admonition than
the original notice of violation:
Failure to pay the civil fine or to appeal this determination
within (30) calendar days may result in the possible
imposition of a late fee. In addition, you may be subject to
formal collection procedures including, but not limited to,
being reported to a credit reporting agency, and a civil
lawsuit.
The backside of the notice of determination also differed from the
notice of violation. Unlike the notice of violation, the notice of
determination declared that citizens may resolve the notice of
determination by paying the fine or “request[ing] a trial before a judge or
magistrate” within thirty days of the date listed on the front of the notice.
C. Appeal Before Administrative Appeals Board. Although the
ATE ordinance refers to an administrative appeals board, the ordinance
states that the board consisted of “one or more impartial fact finders.”
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Mun. Code § 61.138(3)(1). In the administrative
hearing in this case, the board consisted of a single person. The
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ordinance does not establish procedures or criteria for appointment, nor
does the ordinance describe a burden of proof or the procedures to be
applied in the administrative proceedings.
D. IDOT Rulemaking and Enforcement Actions.
1. IDOT rules related to ATE systems. As in Behm, Leaf relies on
IDOT rulemaking and enforcement actions in support of her appeal.
Several years after the Cedar Rapids ATE system commenced operation,
in February of 2014, the IDOT promulgated administrative rules relating
to ATE systems. See Iowa Admin. Code ch. 761—144. The rules
declared that their purpose was “to establish requirements, procedures,
and responsibilities in the use of automated traffic enforcement systems
on the primary road system” and to “ensure[] consistency statewide” in
their use. Id. r. 761—144.1.
The IDOT rules sharply restricted the implementation of ATE
systems on primary roadways. The rules directed that ATE systems were
to be considered only “after other engineering and enforcement solutions
have been explored and implemented” and were not to be used as a long-
term solution to speeding or red-light running. Id. r. 761—144.4(1)(a)–
(b). The rules provided that ATE systems were to be used only “in
extremely limited situations on interstate roads because [such roads] are
the safest class of any roadway in the state and typically . . . carry a
significant amount of non-familiar motorists.” Id. r. 761—144.4(1)(c).
The rules further stated that ATE systems should only be considered “in
areas with a documented high-crash or high-risk location” in “[a]n area
or intersection with a significant history of crashes which can be
attributed to red-light running or speeding,” or “[a] school zone.” Id.
r. 761—144.4(1)(d).
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The IDOT rules contained minimum requirements for the operation
of ATE systems. Id. r. 761—144.6. Among other requirements, the rules
provided that ATE systems could not “be placed within the first 1,000
feet of a lower speed limit.” Id. r. 761—144.6(b)(10). The rules required
that ATE “fixed systems” be calibrated at least quarterly “by a local law
enforcement officer trained in the use and calibration of the system.” Id.
r. 761—144.6(4).
The IDOT rules required that each jurisdiction with an active ATE
system on primary highways prepare an annual report on the operation
of the system and submit the report to the IDOT. Id. r. 761—144.7(1)–
(2). The local evaluation was to include (1) an analysis of the impact of
the ATE system in reducing speeds or red-light running; (2) the number
and type of collisions at the sites, including before-and-after
implementation comparisons; (3) an evaluation of the ATE system’s
impact on critical safety issues; (4) the total number of citations issued
during each calendar year; and (5) certification that the calibration
requirements of the rule had been met. Id. r. 761—144.7(1)(a)(1)–(5).
Upon receipt of the annual report, the IDOT used the information
from the report to reevaluate the continued use of the ATE system. Id.
r. 761—144.8(1). The rules provided that continued use of the ATE
system was contingent upon the effectiveness of the system, appropriate
administration by the local jurisdiction, continued compliance with ATE
rules, changes in traffic patterns, infrastructure improvements, and
implementation of other identified safety measures. Id. r. 761—144.8(1)–
(2). The IDOT “reserve[d] the right to require removal or modification of a
system in a particular location, as deemed appropriate.” Id. r. 761—
144.8(2).
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2. IDOT evaluation of the Cedar Rapids ATE sites on I-380. On
March 17, 2015, the IDOT issued an evaluation of Cedar Rapids’ ATE
program. In terms of the general findings related to the ATE system on
I-380, the IDOT noted there were eighty-two crashes in 2008 and 2009
prior to ATE implementation and fifty-nine crashes in 2012 and 2013,
two years after the implementation in 2010. The IDOT report noted that
the greatest area of safety concern was an “S” curve in downtown Cedar
Rapids. The IDOT stressed that the dangers associated with the “S”
curve, however, were in entering the “S” curve, not leaving the “S” curve.
The IDOT noted, echoing its rules, that ATE systems should only be
considered in “extremely limited situations on interstate roads because
they are the safest class of any roadway in the state and they typically
carry a significant amount of non-familiar motorists.” The IDOT reported
that many safety countermeasures had been added to this section of the
roadway since a safety audit conducted in 2008 and published in 2009.
The IDOT report proceeded to evaluate each of the four ATE sites
on I-380. With respect to the site on I-380 northbound near Diagonal
Drive, the IDOT concluded that because the current equipment was
located 859 feet beyond a reduction in speed limit from sixty to fifty-five
miles per hour, the equipment should be moved to the next truss to the
north to ensure that the equipment complied with the 1000-foot
requirement of rule 761—144.6(1)(b)(10). The IDOT evaluation came to a
similar conclusion with respect to the ATE site on I-380 southbound
near J Avenue. There, the ATE cameras were located 896 feet beyond a
change of speed instead of the 1000 feet required by the IDOT rule.
Two other Cedar Rapids ATE sites, however, received different
treatment. The IDOT evaluation concluded that the ATE site at I-380
northbound near J Avenue and the site at I-380 southbound near the lst
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Avenue ramp should be removed or disabled. According to the IDOT,
these two ATE systems were located either well beyond or mostly beyond
the area of concern presented by the “S” curve. Further, with respect to
the site at I-380 northbound near J Avenue, the IDOT found that the
issuance of speeding citations in excess of 30,000 per year was
“extremely high.”
Cedar Rapids appealed the IDOT evaluation to the director. Cedar
Rapids raised issues concerning the IDOT’s legal authority to implement
its ATE rules, Cedar Rapids’ home rule authority, and the procedure the
IDOT followed regarding its ATE rules. Cedar Rapids also appears to
have asserted that the IDOT rules did not apply retroactively to ATE
systems in place prior to the rules promulgation.
3. Cedar Rapids appeals IDOT evaluation. On May 11, 2015, the
director denied the appeal. Cedar Rapids appealed the IDOT action to
the district court. The district court affirmed the IDOT action, and Cedar
Rapids appealed. We concluded the IDOT lacked the necessary statutory
authority to promulgate its ATE rules. See City of Des Moines v. Iowa
Dep’t of Transp., 911 N.W.2d 431 (Iowa 2018).
E. Notices of Violations and Administrative Proceedings
Involving Leaf. Leaf received a notice of violation arising from the ATE
system. The notice of violation claimed that Leaf traveled at a speed of
sixty-eight miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone on
February 5, 2015, at 1:59 p.m. The notice of violation stated that the
location of the event was “I380 SB @ J Avenue, Lane 2.”
The backside of the notice of violation provided detailed
information on how to contest the alleged violation. The notice of
violation gave the recipient the option of paying the civil penalty and
waiving the right to a hearing or contesting the violation. According to
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the notice of violation, the recipient had “the right to contest this
violation in person at an administrative hearing or by mail if [the
recipient] resides outside the state of Iowa.” The notice of violation
further stated that “[i]n order to state a valid defense supporting
dismissal of this citation, it is recommended that [the recipient] reviews
the city ordinance, the images and the actual recorded video . . . of the
infraction” available online before contesting the violation. The notice of
violation further stated that if after such review, the recipient believed he
or she had a valid defense, the vehicle owner could contest the cited
violation at an administrative hearing.
The notice of violation also provided a list of “valid defenses” to a
violation. The notice of violation made no mention of the possibility of
foregoing the administrative appeal process and requesting Cedar Rapids
issue a municipal infraction and file it in small claims court.
F. Administrative Hearing on Leaf Citation. Leaf requested an
administrative hearing, which was held on March 4, 2015. Leaf
participated by telephone. The subsequent administrative order stated
that the citation was sustained, declared payment due by April 4, and
concluded that the judgment total was $75. The administrative order
noted that failure to timely pay the amount “will result in possible
imposition of further fees, collection efforts and legal action.”
The administrative order also noted, however, that the vehicle
owner had the option of requesting that in lieu of the citation Cedar
Rapids issue a municipal infraction and file it in the small claims court.
The administrative order provided a website where the vehicle owner
could find a request form and a copy of the ATE ordinance.
The applicable form was entitled “Request for Municipal Infraction
in Lieu of Citation by Administrative Proceeding.” The form provided that
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the vehicle owner requested to be named as a defendant in a small
claims action. The form noted that if the owner was found “guilty” of the
municipal infraction, state-mandated court costs would be added to the
amount of the fine. The form noted that Cedar Rapids reserved the right
to exercise “any and all remedies,” including any lawful means of
enforcing judgment obtained as a result of the municipal infraction being
filed. Leaf filled out the form and returned it as instructed.
G. Proceedings in Small Claims Court on Leaf Infraction.
Cedar Rapids filed a municipal infraction in small claims court against
Leaf. The magistrate assigned to the matter set a May 26 evidentiary
hearing date.
1. Motion to dismiss. Leaf filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding
just prior to the hearing date. In her motion to dismiss, Leaf asserted
that the IDOT had determined that the ATE system that led to her
infraction was in violation of IDOT administrative rules. According to
Leaf, to enforce Cedar Rapids’ infraction when the equipment did not
comply with administrative rules violated due process of law under the
United States and Iowa Constitutions. Leaf also claimed that the effort
to enforce the ordinance contrary to IDOT’s express orders to remove the
equipment violated due process under both constitutions.
Leaf also asserted in her motion to dismiss that the rear license
plate identification process utilized by Cedar Rapids and Gatso did not
allow for the identification of millions of semi-trailer trucks whose rear
plate numbers are not included in the applicable database utilized to
identify infractions. Further, Leaf asserted that government-owned
vehicles are also excluded because their special license plates are not
included in the database utilized by Cedar Rapids and Gatso. According
to Leaf, enforcement against her under these circumstances violated the
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Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the
privileges and immunities clause of the Iowa Constitution.
Finally, Leaf asserted in her motion to dismiss that the
administrative process created by the ATE ordinance “is without a lawful
basis.” Leaf asserted the administrative hearing process subverted “the
express provisions of the Iowa Code governing prosecution of civil
infractions.” The hearing officers, according to Leaf, were selected by and
at the pleasure of the police department and as such “provided no
objective, independent judgment using any ascertainable standards to
determine liability or non-liability.” In a statement before the magistrate,
Leaf expanded her argument to assert that the administrative appeal
violated due process of law and amounted to an unlawful delegation of
power to a hearing officer.
The magistrate court reserved ruling on any legal issues raised in
the motion to dismiss and allowed Cedar Rapids to respond in seven
days. Cedar Rapids ultimately asserted that the IDOT order did not
apply retroactively, that the IDOT’s administrative rules did not give rise
to any private right of action, that the ordinance was rationally related to
its safety purpose and therefore did not violate due process, that the
ordinance was rational and that incremental problem solving or
underinclusiveness did not violate equal protection or privileges and
immunities, and that the creation of an administrative hearing structure
was well within Cedar Rapids’ home rule authority.
2. Evidence at trial. At the small claims trial, Cedar Rapids called
Leaf as its first witness. Leaf testified that she owned a Fort Mustang
vehicle with the license plate captured by the ATE system. She further
admitted to driving her vehicle on February 5, 2015, at 1:59 p.m., the
date and time cited on the notice. Leaf stated she was sixty-five years old
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and had been driving for fifty-one years. In all that time, prior to the
automated notice, she had never received a speeding ticket. She further
testified that road conditions were icy, that she had texted her son that
day warning of icy conditions, that vehicles passed her at a greater
speed, and that she believed she was driving below the speed limit.
Leaf also testified about the administrative hearing process. When
she called the number to appeal the citation, Leaf was told that the only
available time was March 4, at 7:30 p.m. Leaf had caregiving
responsibilities at that time and sought a different time but was told that
no other time was available. At the appointed time, Leaf received a
phone call from the hearing officer who, after hearing her deny speeding,
found her guilty and told her to pay the fine. He also told her, she
testified, that it would cost her hundreds of dollars if she did not pay the
fine. Leaf testified that she received a formal written notice of the
March 4 hearing on March 9, four days after the hearing. Further, Leaf
testified that on March 15 she filed a request that Cedar Rapids file a
municipal infraction in small claims court. Thereafter, on April 6, she
received a notice of determination, second notice.
Cedar Rapids next called Officer Harvey Caldwell of the Cedar
Rapids Police Department. He testified about the administration of
Cedar Rapids’ ATE system. Caldwell explained that before a notice of
violation is sent to the vehicle owner, Gatso sends the notice (violation
package) to the police department. The department reviews the notice
and makes the decision as to whether to have Gatso send the notice of
violation to the vehicle owner. He said that no one other than the Cedar
Rapids Police Department approves the issuance of notices. He testified
that he was responsible for reviewing the information supplied by Gatso
related to Leaf’s citation and approved sending the notice of violation. He
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further testified that the police department does not compute the speed
of the vehicle—that is done by the Gatso radar equipment and then
Gatso provides this information to the police department. He also stated
he had never calibrated the radar equipment on the truss-mounted
cameras.
Cedar Rapids also called Officer Robert Asplund of the Cedar
Rapids Police Department to testify about the administration of the ATE
system. Asplund testified about equipment calibration. He said that a
Gatso technician performed a yearly calibration on the equipment. The
calibration process checks to see if the equipment is calculating speed
accurately. The most recent calibration of the radar equipment that
recorded Leaf as speeding occurred on June 25, 2014, a record of which
was entered into evidence. Officer Asplund testified the calibration
record showed that the equipment was functioning correctly.
Officer Asplund also testified that the police department itself
checks the functioning of the equipment four times a year by running a
squad car by the radar and camera equipment at a set speed and
confirming that the radar accurately measures the speed. However,
Cedar Rapids did not offer documentation regarding the tests performed
by the police department into evidence. Finally, Officer Asplund stated
the volunteer hearing officer in this case, Chris Mayfield, did not work for
the police department, but he knew some police officers because his
father had been a police officer.
Billy Lawrence Heeren, Leaf’s domestic partner and passenger in
the car when the ATE system recorded her vehicle speeding, also
testified. Heeren said that on the day in question, the roads were icy and
slippery and he and Leaf saw accidents on the streets, which he believed
had been caused by the slippery roads. In Heeren’s opinion, Leaf had
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been driving somewhere between fifty to fifty-five miles per hour around
the J Avenue exit.
3. Ruling from small claims court. The magistrate issued an order,
finding against Leaf and ordering payment of the $75 fine, plus court
costs. The magistrate found that Cedar Rapids had proven by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that the violation occurred. The
magistrate found that, based on the evidence, the ATE system was
functioning properly when it recorded Leaf’s vehicle as speeding.
The magistrate rejected Leaf’s due process challenges. With
respect to the due process challenge related to the IDOT order to
dismantle the cameras at the location involved in Leaf’s citation, the
magistrate noted that Leaf’s citation predated the IDOT determination.
The magistrate also rejected the procedural due process and unlawful
delegation claim related to the administrative hearing, noting that Leaf
received a de novo review of her claim in the small claims court. The
magistrate rejected Leaf’s substantive due process claim based upon a
right to travel, noting that “no person has a fundamental right to speed
or to avoid being seen by a camera on a public roadway.” Further,
according to the magistrate, the ordinance survived due process rational
basis scrutiny because Cedar Rapids has a legitimate interest in
“deterring speeding to ensure public safety,” lessening the risk of police
officers being struck while enforcing traffic laws, and “free[ing] up officers
to monitor other areas of the city to further combat crime.”
The magistrate also found that Leaf failed to show a violation of her
equal protection rights. According to the magistrate, the mere fact that
the ATE system does not have access to a database that includes all
license plate numbers does not give rise to an equal protection violation.
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H. Appeal of Small Claims Judgment to District Court.
1. Issues presented on appeal. Leaf appealed the magistrate’s
order to the district court. In her appeal to the district court, Leaf
argued that Cedar Rapids failed to prove that she violated the ordinance
by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.
Additionally, Leaf argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional
on an array of theories. Specifically, she claimed that the ordinance
violated her procedural and substantive due process rights. Leaf also
asserted the ordinance amounted to a violation of the equal protection
and privileges and immunities clause of the Iowa Constitution.
Leaf also asserted several additional nonconstitutional theories.
She claimed that the ordinance was an unlawful attempt to grant
jurisdiction to an administrative hearing officer and that Iowa law
preempted the ordinance. Leaf further claimed that Cedar Rapids
unlawfully delegated its police powers to Gatso and to an administrative
hearing officer. Finally, she argued that Cedar Rapids was unjustly
enriched by the fines collected. Cedar Rapids opposed Leaf’s arguments.
2. Ruling of the district court. The district court found the record
made before the magistrate adequate to render a judgment in the case
and proceeded to decide the issues presented by Leaf. The district court
found that Cedar Rapids had proven by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence that Leaf violated the ordinance. The district court
relied on admissions by Leaf that she was driving the vehicle at the time
and place cited in the notice of violation and the testimony of Officer
Asplund that the equipment was properly calibrated. The district court
also explained that Cedar Rapids was not required to submit a video of
Leaf speeding or present evidence that someone actually witnessed Leaf
speeding.
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The district court next held that the ordinance was not an
unlawful grant of jurisdiction to an administrative board or hearing
officer. Citing Cedar Rapids’ constitutional home rule authority and
implementing statutes, the district court found that Cedar Rapids had
authority to create an impartial and detached administrative board to
hear contests between the City and vehicle owners regarding the
issuance of an ATE citation. Further, the district court noted the
ordinance provided for judicial review of ATE citations at the option of
the owner.
The district court also held the ordinance did not violate
procedural due process on its face or as applied to Leaf because of the
unfairness of the administrative tribunal. The district court explained
that ordinary judicial process, which was available and utilized by Leaf,
satisfied procedural due process. See Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.,
532 U.S. 189, 197, 121 S. Ct. 1446, 1451 (2001).
The district court also rejected Leaf’s due process argument that
her citation was invalid because of the IDOT’s administrative decision
related to the placement of ATE equipment. The district court rejected
the due process challenge because (1) the IDOT’s administrative decision
was made after the date of Leaf’s infraction and (2) the regulations
related to the proper placement of traffic cameras do not afford Leaf a
private remedy.
The district court further held that the ordinance did not violate
Leaf’s substantive due process right to intrastate travel or deprive her of
property without due process. The district court rejected Leaf’s
argument that the ordinance violated her fundamental right to intrastate
travel. While the district court recognized she had a property interest in
avoiding irrational or arbitrary fines, the district court found a
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reasonable fit between the ATE ordinance and the legitimate
governmental interests furthered by it. The district court noted that the
sites where the ATE devices are located are places where traditional
traffic stops are dangerous to conduct. The district court further
reasoned that the photo-radar devices encourage vehicles on I-380 to
obey traffic regulations.
The district court rejected Leaf’s privileges and immunities and
equal protection claims. With respect to privileges and immunities, the
district court noted that Leaf failed to articulate how Cedar Rapids’ ATE
ordinance treats citizens differently. With respect to equal protection,
the court noted that because there was no suspect class or fundamental
right at stake, the ordinance needed only to survive a rational basis test.
The court held because the ordinance passed rational basis, Leaf’s equal
protection argument failed.
Finally, the district court held that Cedar Rapids did not delegate
police power to a private company. The district court stated that Gatso
“significantly participates” in the ordinance, but that under Cedar
Rapids, Iowa, Municipal Code section 61.138(a), the decision to issue a
notice of violation remains with the police department.
II. Proceedings on Appeal.
Leaf requested discretionary review of the district court’s ruling.
We granted discretionary review and transferred the case to the court of
appeals.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court. The court of
appeals outlined the evidence against Leaf, noting that “[a]lthough we do
not doubt the sincerity of Leaf’s belief she was not speeding, upon our
review, we find no error on the part of the district court” in finding clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Leaf violated the ordinance.
20
With respect to procedural due process, the court of appeals
explained that the ordinance specified two different methods of
contesting the fine: (1) the administrative hearing and (2) a small claims
action at Iowa district court. See Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Mun. Code
§ 64.138(e). The court of appeals stressed that the administrative
hearing was optional and that the results of the hearing could be
appealed to small claims court.
The court of appeals thus disagreed with Leaf’s contention that
Iowa Code section 364.22(6) requiring municipal infractions to be tried in
small claims was violated by the ordinance’s procedures. In a footnote,
the court noted it was “somewhat troubling” that the notice of violation
was misleading in that it did not inform of the alternative method of
contesting the violation. The court concluded, however, that Leaf had
adequate process because she had access to judicial process, either
directly or after the administrative hearing. Additionally, the court
noted, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa
rejected such a due process argument in Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids,
112 F. Supp. 3d 817, 847–48 (N.D. Iowa 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
840 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2016).
The court of appeals summarily rejected Leaf’s substantive due
process and equal protections arguments as having been raised and
rejected in Hughes, 840 F.3d at 995–97. The court also summarily
rejected the privileges and immunities argument for “the same reasons
[it] rejected her other constitutional arguments.”
With respect to Leaf’s unlawful grant of jurisdiction to an
administrative board or hearing officer and preemption argument, the
court of appeals initially addressed a preservation problem. The district
court did not address the preemption aspect of Leaf’s unlawful grant of
21
jurisdiction argument. “[I]t apparently got lost in the shuffle,” the court
of appeals speculated. But, the court noted, while it would ordinarily
only address issues raised and decided by the district court, Leaf could
not have filed a rule 1.904(2) motion to amend or enlarge the district
court’s review of a small claims appeal. Because Leaf was without a
remedy for the district court overlooking this part of the argument, the
court of appeals decided it would elect to address the argument. The
court then rejected the argument as Leaf made it at the district court
level, noting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit and the Iowa Supreme Court had rejected similar arguments.
See Brooks v. City of Des Moines, 844 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 2016);
Hughes, 840 F.3d at 998; Hughes, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 849; Davenport v.
Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 542 (Iowa 2008).
With respect to Leaf’s additional preemption argument before the
court of appeals—that the ordinance was preempted by Iowa
Administrative Code rule 761—144.6(1) and the March 2015 IDOT
order—the court held this argument was raised for the first time on
appeal and thus was not preserved. Even if the argument were preserved
and was ripe for review, the court explained, the argument would fail
because the doctrine of preemption is not concerned with the
enforcement of an enactment that is not preempted on its face by a
superior body’s enactment.
Finally, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that
Cedar Rapids had not delegated police powers to Gatso because the
police department makes the determination of which vehicle owners
receive a notice of violation. The court also cited an Eighth Circuit
opinion holding that the ordinance was not an unlawful delegation of
police powers. See Hughes, 840 F.3d at 998.
22
Leaf applied for further review, which we granted.
III. Standard of Review.
The parties agree that our review is for errors at law. We are
bound by the trial court’s findings of fact so long as they are supported
by substantial evidence. Smith v. State, 845 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Iowa 2014).
When constitutional issues are raised, however, these are reviewed de
novo. Midwest Check Cashing, Inc. v. Richey, 728 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Iowa
2007); Simonson v. Iowa State Univ., 603 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Iowa 1999).
IV. Challenge Based on Lack of Substantial Evidence.
The first question in this case is whether substantial evidence
supports that Cedar Rapids established that Leaf was speeding in
violation of the ordinance by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence
as required by Iowa Code section 364.22(6)(b). In making our
determination, we give weight to the trial court’s findings of fact,
particularly when it comes to the credibility of witnesses. Jack Moritz Co.
Mgmt. v. Walker, 429 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Iowa 1988).
Leaf argues that the only eyewitnesses to the event, Leaf and
Heeren, both testified that weather conditions were poor on the day of
the alleged event and that Leaf was not speeding. Leaf argues that Cedar
Rapids’ proof was based on hearsay evidence, particularly what Leaf
labels “the calibration document,” a document generated by Gatso that
indicated the ATE system was calibrated several months prior to the
events in question. The thrust of Leaf’s argument is that the
eyewitnesses testified that Leaf was not speeding, while Cedar Rapids
could only present hearsay and conjecture regarding whether the Gatso
equipment was operating properly.
Cedar Rapids challenges Leaf’s gloss of the evidence. Cedar Rapids
emphasizes that Officer Asplund testified extensively without objection
23
about Gatso’s and the police department’s routine calibrations of the
system. With respect to hearsay evidence, Cedar Rapids asserts that
such evidence is fully admissible in a small claims court proceeding and
that, in any event, the evidence submitted without objection was
sufficient to establish the violation by clear and convincing evidence.
Our review of the trial record reveals that Leaf candidly admitted
she was driving her vehicle at the time and place recorded by the ATE
system. Although she denied speeding, Cedar Rapids’ ATE equipment
recorded a violation. Cedar Rapids’ witnesses testified that the
equipment was properly calibrated and tested. As a result, it is not
necessary for us to determine whether the district court erred in rejecting
Leaf’s hearsay objection to the admission of documents related to the
calibration of the equipment. Based on our review of the record
developed at trial, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support
the small claims court’s determination that Cedar Rapids proved by
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Leaf violated the
ordinance.
V. Substantive Constitutional Challenges: Equal Protection,
Privileges and Immunities, and Substantive Due Process.
The arguments raised in this case with respect to equal protection,
privileges and immunities, and substantive due process are generally the
same as the arguments raised in Behm, ___ N.W.2d ___. We held in
Behm that the ordinance did not infringe on the fundamental right to
travel. Id. at ___. The appropriate standard of review is therefore
rational basis. Unlike in Behm, however, Leaf’s claims were not resolved
on a motion for summary judgement, but after a trial on the merits.
In this case, the record is not more favorable to Leaf with respect to
her constitutional challenges than the record was in Behm. For the
24
reasons cited in Behm, we reject the constitutional claims under the Iowa
Constitution.
In addition, although it is questionable error was preserved, the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution do not provide Leaf with greater protection than the Iowa
Constitution in this case. As a result, we reject Leaf’s state and federal
constitutional claims based upon equal protection, privileges and
immunities, and substantive due process.
VI. Procedural Challenges Based on Preemption and Due
Process.
A. Challenges Based on Preemption of Iowa Code Section
364.22 and Iowa Code Section 602.6101. Leaf asserts that the
ordinance improperly creates an administrative appeal board that
deprives the small claims court of jurisdiction in cases involving
“municipal infractions” arising from the ATE ordinance. Leaf claims Iowa
Code sections 364.22 and 602.6101 preempt the administrative
procedures established in the ordinance.
In this case, Leaf eventually was afforded the full panoply of
procedural rights provided in Iowa Code sections 364.22 and 602.6101.
As a result, she has not been prejudiced by any unlawful provisions of
the ordinance in resolving the merits of her case. See Markadonatos v.
Village of Woodridge, 760 F.3d 545, 561 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing
parties who participated in procedures must show injury from defective
procedures in order to show prejudice from a defective notice); Rector v.
City of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 945 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding payment of
fine not fairly traceable to defects in notice); Roberson v. City of Rialto,
173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66, 74 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding plaintiff failed to show
evidence of prejudice from defective notice). Further, in this case, Leaf
25
only seeks to appeal an adverse judgment in her small claims action.
She does not seek declaratory or injunctive relief. Cf. Colo. Manufactured
Hous. Ass’n v. Pueblo County, 857 P.2d 507, 510 (Colo. App. 1993)
(noting a party seeking declaratory or injunctive relief may demonstrate
injury by showing that they will be threatened with future injury).
Leaf claims Cedar Rapids’ action is preempted by a provision of the
Iowa Administrative Code which provides that ATE systems not be
located less than 1000 feet from a change in speed. Iowa Admin. Code
r. 761—144.6. In March 2015, the IDOT entered an order that the
equipment be removed by April 2015. Leaf did not raise this claim before
the district court and, as a result, it is not preserved. Meier v. Senecaut,
641 N.W.2d 532, 540 (Iowa 2002). Even if this claim was preserved, our
decision in City of Des Moines, 911 N.W.2d at 434, holding that IDOT did
not have authority to promulgate ATE rules, resolves her claim in favor of
Cedar Rapids. See Behm, ___ N.W.2d at ___.
B. Procedural Due Process.
1. Positions of the parties. Leaf raises claims similar to those in
Behm. Leaf, however, presents some additional facts beyond that
presented in Cedar Rapids’ motion for summary judgment in Behm.
Leaf presented evidence regarding Cedar Rapids’ implementation of
the administrative procedures in her case. When she called to appeal the
notice of violation but could not appear in person at Cedar Rapids’
preferred time, she asserts Cedar Rapids employees told her to “just pay
it.” Leaf claims Cedar Rapids ignored her certified-mail request that the
administrative hearing be rescheduled. Leaf claims that when she was
called at home on the evening that Cedar Rapids scheduled the hearing,
she spoke with a hearing officer—the son of a police officer with no legal
experience or training—who found her liable based upon a
26
preponderance of evidence. Leaf cites the order she received after the
administrative hearing, which warned her that she would have to pay up
to $150 above the $75 fee if she appealed to district court and was
unsuccessful.
Leaf assets that Cedar Rapids’ handling of these matters does not
comport with procedural due process. She notes that under our caselaw,
a person has a protected property interest in “not being subject to
irrational monetary fines.” City of Sioux City v. Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d
335, 345 (Iowa 2015). Leaf argues that the risk of an erroneous
deprivation is simply too great in the flawed administrative structure that
is designed to obtain acquiescence in simply paying the fine.
Cedar Rapids properly concedes that Leaf has a property interest
in the $75 fine it seeks to impose. Regardless of potential flaws in the
administrative process, Cedar Rapids points out that the administrative
process was optional and that Leaf, in fact, received a full-blown trial on
the merits in small claims court that fully satisfied due process. When
ordinary judicial process is available, according to Cedar Rapids, “that
process is due process.” Lujan, 532 U.S. at 197, 121 S. Ct. at 1451.
Cedar Rapids also defends the administrative process itself. It
stresses that only $75 was at stake. Although the hearing officer in this
case was the son of a police officer, Cedar Rapids asserts that fact alone
does not establish bias sufficient to give rise to a due process violation.
Cedar Rapids asserts that it would be unreasonable to require it to file
municipal infraction cases in small claims court for ATE violations. Such
a requirement, according to Cedar Rapids, would stretch its resources
and impose an undue burden when many vehicle owners simply just
want to pay the fine and be done with it. According to Cedar Rapids, a
27
free, optional administrative hearing is of benefit to itself and to vehicle
owners.
2. Discussion. Leaf’s case is in a significantly different posture
than in Behm, ___ N.W.2d ___. Here, Leaf ultimately received a small
claims hearing in district court. For a traffic ticket, the small claims
process plainly satisfies due process. See Lujan, 532 U.S. at 197, 121
S. Ct. at 1451. As a result, she was not prejudiced by any procedural
due process problem in the resolution of her case. See Rector, 348 F.3d
at 942–43 (misleading instructions do not establish a procedural due
process claim if they did not cause payment of fine); Fields v. Durham,
909 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding courts must consider entire
panoply of rights afforded in evaluating procedural due process claim).
The district court properly ruled in favor of Cedar Rapids on this claim.
VII. Unlawful Delegation Claims.
Leaf alleges that pursuant to the ordinance and the underlying
contract, Cedar Rapids has unlawfully delegated its police powers to
Gatso, a private entity, in three ways. First, she claims that Cedar
Rapids unlawfully delegated power to Gatso employees who made the
initial screening determination that a vehicle violated the ATE ordinance.
Second, she argues Gatso’s mailing of notices of violation to vehicle
owners on Cedar Rapids letterhead is an unlawful delegation. Third,
Leaf argues that the appointment of persons as hearing officers, who are
not a judges or magistrates, to hear administrative challenges amounted
to an unlawful delegation of authority. 2
Unlike in Behm—where Cedar Rapids had the burden of showing a
lack of genuine issue of material fact in support of its motion for
2Leaf did not raise the question of unlawful delegation in connection with the
calibration of the ATE system.
28
summary judgment—the burden at trial here was on Leaf to show that
the ATE system unlawfully delegated governmental power to third
parties.
Leaf failed to meet her burden at her small claims trial on the
unlawful delegation issue related to the initial screening of violations.
The evidence at trial did not show that Cedar Rapids unlawfully
delegated to Gatso discretionary decision-making regarding determining
which vehicles would be cited for violations of the ATE system. As Officer
Caldwell testified, Cedar Rapids made the decision on whether to send
Leaf a notice of violation and no one other than a police officer was able
to approve the issuance of a notice. Further, Leaf did not offer any
evidence to show that Gatso’s actions in prescreening potential violations
for the police department are anything other than ministerial in nature.
As a result, Leaf is not entitled to prevail on her unlawful delegation
theory.
Second, we find no evidence in the record to suggest that the
sending of notices by Gatso after a law enforcement officer approved the
violation was anything other than ministerial. Causing notices to be
mailed after the city approves a violation involves no judgment. See
Behm, ___ N.W.2d at ___.
Additionally, there was no evidence in the record to suggest that
the volunteers who acted as hearing officers were serving in a private
capacity. Leaf did not present any evidence to rebut that the hearing
officers were acting as anything other than agents of Cedar Rapids
seeking to informally resolve Leaf’s objection to her citation. Under the
ordinance, the volunteers exercised no judicial functions. For the
reasons expressed in Behm, ___ N.W.2d at ___, we do not find an
unlawful delegation here.
29
VIII. Conclusion.
For all of the above reasons, the judgment of the district court and
the decision of the court of appeals in this matter is affirmed.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF
DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.