State Of Iowa Vs. Ronnie James Isaac

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 42 / 06–2030
Filed September 5, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
RONNIE JAMES ISAAC,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A.
Price, District Associate Judge.
Defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction of indecent exposure. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
VACATED. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Susan C. Cox,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
2
TERNUS, Chief Justice.
The district court convicted the appellant, Ronnie Isaac, of
indecent exposure after a police officer caught him masturbating outside
a woman’s bedroom window. On appeal, Isaac claims there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction because he exposed his
genitals only to the officer and that exposure was inadvertent. The court
of appeals rejected this argument, and we granted Isaac’s application for
further review. Upon our consideration of the governing statute, we hold
the State must prove that, at the time Isaac exposed himself to the
officer, he did so for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual
desires of himself or the officer. Because there is insufficient evidence
that Isaac’s exposure of his genitals to the officer was for this purpose,
the State has failed to prove Isaac committed the crime of indecent
exposure. We therefore vacate the court of appeals’ decision, reverse the
district court’s judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
dismissal of the indecent exposure charge.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
On June 29, 2006, Micaela went to bed at 1 a.m. at her
condominium in Ankeny. About twenty minutes later, Micaela heard
knocking on her bedroom window. She heard a man moaning in a
sexual manner and repeating sexually explicit exclamations. She did not
open the window or look through the blinds. Micaela woke up her
roommate who heard a male voice say “oh baby.” The women called the
police.
Ankeny police officers Robert Kovacs and Brian Huggins responded
to the women’s call. After the officers failed to find anyone outside the
residence, they went inside to speak with the women.
3
Meanwhile, Jennifer, who lived in another condominium nearby,
had just gotten into bed. She heard heavy breathing outside her
bedroom window and what sounded like something rubbing against the
window screen. She did not attempt to look outside her window.
Officer Kovacs left Officer Huggins with Micaela and went back
outside to further search the area. As he walked around one of the
buildings in the complex, Officer Kovacs saw a man standing in front of
Jennifer’s window. The man was looking into the window with his left
hand on the wall and his right hand on his crotch. Officer Kovacs
testified it appeared the man was masturbating or fondling himself.
Officer Kovacs shined a flashlight on the man, identified himself as
a police officer, and asked the man what he was doing. The man, Ronnie
Isaac, turned toward the officer. Officer Kovacs noticed the zipper of
Isaac’s blue jeans was down and his penis was outside his pants by his
hand. Officer Kovacs could not tell whether Isaac’s penis was erect.
Isaac took off running. Officer Kovacs chased after him while
repeatedly yelling “stop, police.” Officer Kovacs caught up with Isaac and
tackled him as Officer Huggins came outside to assist. Officer Kovacs
placed Isaac in handcuffs and noticed Isaac’s hands were oily. A bottle
of baby oil was found in Isaac’s back pocket. The officers turned Isaac
over and saw his flaccid penis outside his pants. Officer Kovacs put
Isaac’s penis back into his jeans and zipped up his pants.
The State charged Isaac with indecent exposure, interference with
official acts, and two counts of harassment in the third degree. Isaac
waived his right to a jury. After a trial, the district court found him
guilty on all counts. Isaac appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence with respect to the indecent exposure conviction. He did not
4
appeal the convictions on the other counts. The court of appeals
affirmed. We granted further review.
II. Scope of Review.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for
correction of errors at law. State v. Quinn, 691 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Iowa
2005). The district court’s findings of the required elements of an offense
are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. State v.
Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Evidence is substantial if it
would convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2001).
III. Merits.
The issue before us is whether there was sufficient evidence to
convict Isaac of indecent exposure. Iowa Code section 709.9 (2005)
defines this crime. It states in relevant part:
A person who exposes the person’s genitals or pubes
to another not the person’s spouse . . . commits a serious
misdemeanor, if:
1. The person does so to arouse or satisfy the sexual
desires of either party; and
2. The person knows or reasonably should know that
the act is offensive to the viewer.
Iowa Code § 709.9.
Because indecent exposure is “ ‘essentially a visual assault
crime,’ ” State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1983) (quoting
Kermit L. Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code: Part II, 29 Drake L.
Rev. 491, 541 (1979–80)), the State needed to produce a victim who saw
Isaac’s exposed genitals. See Iowa Code § 709.9 (prohibiting the
exposure of a person’s genitals “to another” when the person knows or
reasonably should know the act is offensive “to the viewer”). Neither
Micaela nor Jennifer saw Isaac or his penis. Thus, the State relies on
5
Isaac’s exposure of his genitals to Officer Kovacs to support Isaac’s
conviction of indecent exposure. On appeal, Isaac claims there was
insufficient evidence to prove he exposed himself to Officer Kovacs for the
purpose of arousing his sexual desires or the sexual desires of the officer.
We agree.
Previously, we have broken down the crime of indecent exposure
into four elements:
1. The exposure of genitals or pubes to someone other
than a spouse . . .;
2. That the act is done to arouse the sexual desires of
either party;
3. The viewer was offended by the conduct; and
4. The actor knew, or under the circumstances should
have known, the victim would be offended.
State v. Adams, 436 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Iowa 1989) (citing Bauer, 337
N.W.2d at 212).1 “ ‘It is only exposure with a sexual motivation, inflicted
upon an unwilling viewer, which will constitute the offense.’ ” Bauer,
337 N.W.2d at 211 (quoting 4 John J. Yeager & Ronald L. Carlson, Iowa
Practice: Criminal Law and Procedure § 217, at 63 (1979)) (emphasis
omitted). Thus, even deliberate exposure done without a sexual motive,
such as streaking, nude protesting or urinating in public, is outside the
proscription of section 709.9. Id. at 211–12.
In the present case, the State satisfied the first element of the
offense by proving Isaac exposed his penis to Officer Kovacs. The
problematic element is the second one: Was this exposure to Officer
Kovacs done for the purpose of arousing Isaac’s or the officer’s sexual
1The necessity that the victim actually be offended has been questioned. See
State v. Newell, No. 06-0528, 2007 WL 1062943, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2007)
(Vogel, J., specially concurring). Isaac does not challenge this element on appeal, so we
do not reconsider whether proof that the viewer was offended is required.
6
desires?2 It is not sufficient that prior to this exposure Isaac sought to
satisfy his sexual desires. Our statute requires such a purpose at the
time of exposure to the viewer. See Iowa Code § 709.9 (requiring that
“[t]he person [expose his genitals or pubes to someone other than a
spouse] to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either party”); see also
State v. Plenty Horse, 741 N.W.2d 763, 765 (S.D. 2007) (holding “the
prosecution must link the exhibition of one’s genitals to the intent to
seek sexual gratification”). Whether a defendant’s exposure of his
genitals to another person was done for the purpose of arousing the
sexual desires of himself or the viewer can be inferred from the
defendant’s conduct, his remarks, and the surrounding circumstances.
After examining the record in the present case, we find no conduct,
remarks, or circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that
the required purpose existed at the time Isaac exposed his genitals to
Officer Kovacs. Officer Kovacs testified that Isaac had his back to the
officer when the officer first spotted Isaac outside Jennifer’s window. The
officer stated he could not see Isaac’s penis at that point, but he believed
Isaac’s right hand was in the area of Isaac’s crotch. The officer testified
that he then shone a flashlight on Isaac and yelled “police” at which
point Isaac “turned his body towards [Officer Kovacs], looked at [Officer
Kovacs], and then immediately took off running around the side of the
building.” The officer further testified that, when Isaac “turned and faced
[Officer Kovacs], he still had his hand down, and when he saw [Officer
Kovacs], his hand came off.” The officer could not tell whether Isaac’s
penis was erect.
2The State argues the issue in this case is whether the statute requires exposure
to a specific person or simply to another person. We disagree. The determinative issue
here is whether the exposure to another person must be for the purpose of satisfying
the sexual desires of that person or the defendant.
7
These facts do not support an inference that Isaac exposed himself
to Officer Kovacs to satisfy his or the officer’s sexual desires. First of all,
there are no facts indicating Isaac’s exposure of his penis to the officer
was anything other than inadvertent, occurring as a result of Isaac
turning in response to the officer’s call. Secondly, Isaac immediately
removed his hand from his crotch and fled. These actions suggest his
sexual desires evaporated, rather than continued, when he was
discovered by the officer. Finally, there was no evidence that Isaac
became sexually aroused when he turned to face the officer or that he
masturbated while exposing himself to the officer, circumstances and
conduct that could support an inference that his exposure to the officer
was sexually motivated.
The State would have us combine Isaac’s intent when he was
masturbating out of sight with his subsequent exposure to Officer
Kovacs. To interpret section 709.9 as the State suggests would ignore
the statutory requirement that the exposure be to another for the
purpose of sexual gratification. This point is illustrated by a comparison
of the Iowa statute with the indecent exposure statute drafted by the
American Law Institute. The model provision states:
A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying sexual desire of himself or of any
person other than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under
circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely to
cause affront or alarm.
See Model Penal Code § 213.5, at 405 (1980). Notably, the model
provision does not require exposure “to another” as the Iowa statute
does. See Iowa Code § 709.9 (“A person who exposes the person’s
genitals or pubes to another not the person’s spouse . . . commits a
serious misdemeanor . . . .” (Emphasis added.)). Thus, under the
8
narrower Iowa statute, mere public exposure is not sufficient. See 4
John J. Yeager & Ronald L. Carlson, Iowa Practice: Criminal Law and
Procedure § 217, at 63 (1979) (“Exposure per se is not prohibited by
§ 709.9.” (quoted in Bauer, 337 N.W.2d at 212)). Our statute requires
exposure to another person; it also requires that this exposure be for the
purpose of sexual gratification. The required concurrence of the
exposure to Officer Kovacs and the defendant’s sexual purpose is missing
in the record before us.
IV. Conclusion.
We find insufficient evidence to support Isaac’s conviction for
indecent exposure. Because there are no facts to support a finding that
Isaac exposed his penis to Officer Kovacs for the purpose of arousing or
satisfying the sexual desires of himself or the officer, Isaac’s conviction
must be reversed. We therefore vacate the contrary decision of the court
of appeals and reverse the district court’s judgment of conviction.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED.
All justices concur except Cady and Streit, JJ., who dissent, and
Baker, J., who takes no part.
9
#42/06-2030, State v. Isaac
STREIT, Justice. (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. Isaac’s conduct is the type of behavior
the legislature intended to outlaw with section 709.9. His actions
indicate he wanted to be observed sexually gratifying himself.
The facts of this case are straightforward. A man was
masturbating outside various bedroom windows of a condominium
complex. He was making sexual noises and saying sexually explicit
things while rubbing or tapping the windows with one hand and
masturbating with the other. The woman inside heard Isaac repeatedly
say “show me your tits” and “oh, f___, I’m going to come.” Clearly, he
was attempting to awaken the occupants so they might come to the
window to see him. Instead, Isaac was seen by a police officer, grasping
his penis with his oily hands. From these simple facts, it is fair to infer
he did it for sexual purposes, even though the majority cannot imagine
such a happening and rules as a matter of law Isaac would not want to
show himself to the police officer.
The majority analyzes the facts through the lens of a reasonable
person unaffected by the prurient thoughts and desires of a sexually
deviant person. In doing so, it forecloses any possibility that someone
who would engage in such behavior could also derive sexual gratification
from exposing himself to a police officer and running from a pursuing
officer with his penis protruding from his pants. Yet, the actions by
Isaac in this case were not those of a reasonable person, but a person
with a sexually perverted mind. The majority simply fails to consider
that nonsexual activity in the eyes of a normal person may be sexual
activity to a sexually perverted person. The approach taken by the
majority places an unfair burden on the State in prosecuting the crime of
10
indecent exposure and means the most bizarre cases of indecent
exposure will likely escape prosecution, as in this case.
Isaac cannot avoid conviction by claiming the particular person
who saw his penis while he was masturbating was not the intended
victim.3 Cf. United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 665 (8th Cir. 2007)
(finding probable cause to arrest defendant for violating Iowa Code
section 709.9 where an off-duty police officer came upon defendant
masturbating while walking along a trail in a park); State v. Bauer, 337
N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1983) (holding Iowa Code section 709.9 is not
unconstitutionally vague on its face where a woman observed defendant
kneeling on the floor in a library facing book shelves while masturbating).
As it was obvious Isaac was attempting to get the attention of the people
inside, he knew or should have known his actions would cause someone
to investigate by either opening the window covers or going outside.
Isaac should be held responsible for the natural and foreseeable
consequences of his actions.
Moreover, it is irrelevant Isaac stopped masturbating after turning
toward the officer. There is evidence to suggest Isaac could view the
moment the police officer saw him as an opportunity to achieve sexual
gratification. Isaac was not forced to turn around and expose himself to
the officer. Nothing prevented Isaac from using the same hand he was
using to masturbate to place his penis back into his pants before turning
around to face the officer. The trial court was completely free to
conclude his failure to do so was circumstantial evidence of a perverted
sexual desire to expose himself at that moment to anyone in sight. See
State v. Talbert, 622 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Iowa 2001) (recognizing the
3There is no evidence to suggest Isaac knew who lived in the apartments. The
women both testified they had never seen him before.
11
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the
findings of the trial court are construed liberally to uphold the result
reached, and the district court’s findings of fact are binding on appeal
unless not supported by substantial evidence). Similarly, it is equally
understandable that a reasonable mind would conclude that a person
would not engage a police officer in a pursuit to arouse or satisfy his
sexual desires.
It is a fundamental tenet of law enforcement investigation that it is
sometimes necessary to think like a criminal to catch a criminal. The
majority not only overlooks this commonsense adage, but fails to give
deference to the role of the district court as fact finder in this case. I
would affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the judgment of the
district court.
Cady, J., joins this dissent.