Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Edward M. Conrad

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 113 / 06-1145
Filed November 17, 2006
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
EDWARD M. CONRAD,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission.
On review of findings and recommendations of Grievance
Commission. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Laura M. Roan, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Edward M. Conrad, Sigourney, pro se.
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LARSON, Justice.
Edward Conrad, an attorney from Sigourney, was cited by the Iowa
Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board with violations of several
disciplinary rules. Our Grievance Commission found, based largely on
stipulated facts, that Conrad had failed to render an accounting to a client
as requested and failed to respond to the board’s notices of his client’s
ethical complaint. The commission recommended a public reprimand, but
we conclude he should be suspended for one month.
I. Review.
In attorney disciplinary matters, our scope of review is well
established:
Where “no appeal is taken or application for permission
to appeal is filed . . . [we] proceed to review de novo the record
made before the commission and determine the matter without
oral argument or further notice to the parties.” “We give
respectful consideration to the Grievance Commission’s
findings and recommendations, but are not bound by them.”
The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a
convincing preponderance of the evidence. This burden is less
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the
preponderance standard required in the usual civil case. Once
misconduct is proven, we “may impose a lesser or greater
sanction than the discipline recommended by the grievance
commission.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Letts, 674 N.W.2d 139,
142 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted).
II. Facts.
The parties’ stipulation of facts shows the following: Conrad has been
a licensed lawyer in Iowa since 1989. On April 1, 2004, he was employed
by Shane Williams to petition for modification of a dissolution decree.
Conrad received an advance fee of $1000, which he deposited in his trust
account. When Williams became dissatisfied with the respondent’s services,
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he requested an accounting on two occasions. Conrad failed to provide the
accounting until after this complaint was filed on December 7, 2004.
On December 17, 2004, the board sent a notice of William’s complaint
and asked for the respondent’s reply. The respondent received the notice on
December 22, 2004, but did not respond. On January 13, 2005, the board
sent a second notice to Conrad. This notice advised him that, pursuant to
court rules, the respondent must respond within ten days or the board
could file a complaint with the Grievance Commission. The respondent
acknowledged receipt of this letter on January 31, 2005, but still did not
respond.
III. The Violations Charged.
The parties stipulated that the respondent violated the following
disciplinary rules: DR 1—102(A)(1) (a lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary
rule); DR 1—102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice); DR 1—102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall
not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s
fitness to practice law); DR 9—102(B)(3) (a lawyer shall render an
accounting to his client).
IV. Sanction.
The parties did not stipulate as to the sanction to be imposed. The
board argues that a thirty-day suspension is warranted, based on the
respondent’s failure to render an accounting to his client and his failure to
cooperate in the board’s investigation, together with a public reprimand in
2005 (based on a similar pattern of conduct—neglect of a probate matter
and failure to cooperate with the disciplinary process).
The respondent, on the other hand, points out that his client was not
damaged by his ethical lapses, and he enjoys substantial respect among the
local bench and bar. He noted that one judge observed that the respondent
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had “learned his lesson.” The respondent argues that another public
reprimand is the appropriate sanction. In similar cases involving neglect of
legal matters combined with failure to respond to board notices, we have
imposed sanctions ranging from a public reprimand to fairly lengthy
suspensions. For example, in Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional
Ethics & Conduct v. Daggett, 653 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 2002), the lawyer failed
to comply with appellate deadlines, misstated facts to a trial court, failed to
respond to a trial court’s order, and failed to respond to inquiries by the
board. He was sanctioned with a sixty-day suspension. In Iowa Supreme
Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Scieszinski, 599 N.W.2d 472
(Iowa 1999), the attorney was found to have failed to file annual reports in
probate proceedings, failed to respond to district court notices of
delinquency, and failed to respond to the board’s notices. We ordered a
public reprimand. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics &
Conduct v. Lemanski, 606 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 2000), we held that an attorney’s
neglect of his client’s case, failing to disburse an account for client funds,
and failing to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation warranted a one-
month suspension. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics &
Conduct v. Sprole, 596 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 1999), we held that an attorney’s
neglect of clients’ matters warranted a suspension for two months. In Iowa
Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Scheetz, 568
N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1997), an attorney’s neglect of a client’s interests and
failure to cooperate with the board’s investigation warranted a public
reprimand. In the recent case of Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional
Ethics & Conduct v. Ireland, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2006), the respondent had
neglected two legal matters, resulting in financial loss to a client, and had
previously received a private admonition and a public reprimand, both
based on neglect of clients’ cases. However, unlike the present case, the
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respondent had not ignored notices from the board. We imposed a
minimum suspension of three months. Ireland, ___ N.W.2d at ___.
Upon consideration of the range of sanctions imposed in our prior
cases, we conclude that this respondent’s license should be suspended for a
minimum of one month. We reach that conclusion because of Conrad’s
pattern of client neglect and failure to cooperate with the board as
evidenced by this case and the case leading to his prior reprimand.
We order that this respondent’s license to practice law be suspended
for a period of thirty days. We will reinstate the respondent’s license to
practice law upon the expiration of the thirty-day suspension, subject to the
limitations of Iowa Court Rule 35.12(2). The costs of this action are
assessed against the respondent in accordance with Iowa Court Rule 35.25.
Automatic reinstatement shall not be ordered until all costs have been paid.
LICENSE SUSPENDED.