Amended May 24, 2017 Gary Pettit v. Iowa Department of Corrections

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 16–0582
Filed February 24, 2017
Amended May 24, 2017
GARY PETTIT,
Appellee,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Mary Pat
Gunderson (motion to dismiss) and Scott Rosenberg (judicial review
petition), Judges.
The Iowa Department of Corrections appeals a decision of the
district court requiring the department to provide an inmate counsel in a
sex offender treatment program classification hearing. REVERSED AND
CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John McCormally,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Gary Dickey of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for
appellee.
2
WIGGINS, Justice.
An inmate filed a judicial review petition under Iowa Code chapter
17A (2015) 1 seeking court review of a sex offender treatment program
(SOTP) classification hearing. The Iowa Department of Corrections
(IDOC) moved to dismiss the petition claiming judicial review was
unavailable under chapter 17A. The district court overruled the motion
to dismiss, and on the merits, the court determined the inmate was
entitled to counsel. IDOC appeals.
On appeal, we find the district court did not have the authority to
review the classification hearing under chapter 17A. Accordingly, we
vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case back to
the district court to enter an order dismissing the inmate’s petition for
judicial review.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On June 8, 2004, Gary Pettit pled guilty to third-degree sexual
abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(1) (2003) and third-degree
kidnapping. The Madison County district court sentenced him to two
consecutive fifteen-year terms of imprisonment with a mandatory three-
year habitual offender enhancement. The court placed Pettit in the
custody of the IDOC, which incarcerated him at the Anamosa State
Penitentiary. In 2005, Pettit completed Sexual Offender Counseling
(SOC). Since his incarceration, Pettit has received three discipline
reports primarily regarding unauthorized possession of items.
On January 5, 2015, the IDOC provided Pettit with a “Sex Offender
Treatment Program Classification Hearing Notice” informing him of the
decision that “he would be required to complete sex offender treatment.”
1All references are to the 2015 Code of Iowa unless otherwise noted.
3
The notice informed him that “[t]his classification decision may affect your
future accrual of earned time and tentative discharge date pursuant to
Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)(a).” The notice also stated Pettit is a “convicted
sex offender” currently serving time for third-degree sex abuse among
other charges and “[b]ecause he has never completed any type of sex
offender treatment [program], the [IDOC] will require he do so. Should
offender Pettit refuse to participate in mandatory treatment,
appropriately his earned time will be suspended.” Finally, the notice
provided “that an in-person or telephonic hearing on your appeal of the
sex offender treatment program requirements will be held on Wednesday,
January 21,” before an administrative law judge (ALJ), and “[a]ll
documents or other exhibits that you want considered at the hearing
[must be received] . . . no later than two business days [before] the
hearing.”
Prior to the hearing, Pettit sought to have subpoenas issued for
witnesses and documents. The ALJ denied his requests. The ALJ
explained his requests for subpoenas were properly denied because
“[t]his matter was not being conducted under Iowa Code Chapter 17A,”
and drawing upon the precedent of prison disciplinary hearings, such
hearings do not use subpoenas. Pettit also requested his attorney be
present with him at the classification hearing, and the ALJ denied that
request. Citing the IDOC’s policy for the denial, the ALJ provided,
This due process (ALJ) hearing of a classification committee
decision is an administrative remedy and the offender shall
not have the right to use outside counsel during the hearing
or appeal process.
See Policy IS-CL-03, at IV.A.3.d.II (page 9). Thus, while
[Pettit] may consult with his attorney, he does not have the
right to have the attorney participate in the hearing process
itself.
4
At the start of the classification hearing, Pettit requested the ALJ
record the hearing. The ALJ denied his request, reasoning that
recordings are not required for prison disciplinary hearings and thus, are
not required for classification hearings. Pettit also indicated he was
making his objections to the hearing procedures under the Iowa due
process clause, and the ALJ found the procedures comported with
relevant Iowa law and the IDOC’s policies.
At the hearing, Pettit objected to the classification, contending the
SOC program he completed at the Anamosa State Penitentiary satisfied
the requirement that he complete sex offender treatment. During the
hearing, Pettit had the opportunity to present evidence and make
statements. Pettit submitted fifteen exhibits and five notarized
statements from other offenders. He also asked the ALJ to take judicial
notice of his prison record. The ALJ accepted all of Pettit’s documents
into evidence and took administrative notice of all relevant documents in
the prison records.
Following the hearing, the ALJ rendered a decision. After
considering the evidence and Pettit’s argument, the ALJ affirmed the
classification decision, concluding Pettit is required to complete the SOTP
at the Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility. Pettit appealed the ALJ’s
decision to the warden by completing the SOTP appeal form. See Iowa
Code § 903A.3(2) (“The orders of the administrative law judge are subject
to appeal to the superintendent or warden of the institution, . . . who
may either affirm, modify, remand for correction of procedural errors, or
reverse an order.”). The warden affirmed the decision of the ALJ,
agreeing with the classification committee’s and the ALJ’s decisions to
require Pettit to complete SOTP.
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Pettit filed a petition for judicial review naming the IDOC as the
respondent under Iowa Code chapter 17A. Pettit claimed the IDOC
violated his substantive and procedural due process rights under the
Iowa Constitution and chapter 17A because the IDOC refused to allow
him access to counsel during the classification hearing, refused to
provide him with subpoenas, refused to provide him with requested
identifiable agency records, and refused to provide him with prehearing
discovery. See Iowa Code §§ 17A.13(1)–(2), .19(10)(a), (d). Pettit also
asserted under chapter 17A that his substantial rights were prejudiced
by the IDOC’s requirement that he “participate in the SOTP a second
time after having previously completed sex offender treatment.” See id.
§ 17A.19(10)(b), (c), (f), (g), (h), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n).
The IDOC filed a preanswer motion to dismiss Pettit’s petition,
arguing chapter 17A was not applicable to the classification decision and
that filing a postconviction-relief action under Iowa Code chapter 822
was the proper way to review the actions taken by the IDOC. The district
court denied the motion.
The case proceeded on the merits. The district court, relying on
State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 2015), found,
[s]ince an inmate’s ability to accrue earned time has been
recognized . . . to be a liberty interest, the facts and
circumstances of this case required [Pettit] be allowed to
retain counsel or, if he could not afford counsel, to have
counsel appointed at state expense.
The IDOC appealed.
II. Issue.
The IDOC raises numerous issues on appeal. The issue of whether
the district court erred in overruling IDOC’s motion to dismiss is
6
dispositive of this appeal. Therefore, we will not address any other issues
presented.
III. Scope of Review.
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for
correction of errors at law. Alliant Energy-Interstate Power & Light Co. v.
Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Iowa 2007). “Ultimately, ‘our decision to
overrule or sustain a motion to dismiss must rest on legal grounds.’ ”
Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Haupt v.
Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa 1994)).
IV. Analysis.
Before reaching the merits of this claim, it is important to note the
difference between subject matter jurisdiction and the court’s lack of
authority to hear a particular case. In the past, we have explained these
concepts as follows:
[W]e distinguished subject matter jurisdiction from the
court’s “lack of authority to hear a particular case,” also
referred to as “lack of jurisdiction of the case.” “Subject
matter jurisdiction” refers to the power of a court to deal
with a class of cases to which a particular case belongs. A
constitution or a legislative enactment confers subject matter
jurisdiction on the courts. Although a court may have
subject matter jurisdiction, it may lack the authority to hear
a particular case for one reason or another.
In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 789–90 (Iowa 2003) (citation
omitted) (quoting Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa
1989)).
Ordinarily, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over
judicial review petitions. Here, the IDOC is claiming a judicial review
petition is not the proper vehicle to challenge the IDOC’s actions, but
that a postconviction-relief action is the proper method of review. Thus,
7
the IDOC is claiming the district court had no authority to review this
matter under chapter 17A. We agree with the IDOC.
The legislature has passed certain statutes concerning a prisoner’s
right to accrue earned time. Section 903A.2 of the Code provides,
An inmate of an institution under the control of the
department of corrections . . . is eligible for a reduction of
sentence equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the
inmate demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily
participates in any program or placement status identified by
the director to earn the reduction. The programs include but
are not limited to the following:
....
(4) A treatment program established by the director.
Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)(a)(4). In 2005, the legislature added the following
language to specifically address sex offender treatment: “However, an
inmate required to participate in a sex offender treatment program shall
not be eligible for a reduction of sentence unless the inmate participates
in and completes a sex offender treatment program established by the
director.” Id. § 903A.2(1)(a). 2 Thus, “[a]n inmate who fails to participate
in sex offender treatment required by the IDOC risks losing his or her
ability to obtain an earlier release from prison by accumulating earned
time.” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 888 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Iowa 2016).
2We have previously stated,
This court held in Holm v. Iowa District Court, 767 N.W.2d 409, 416 (Iowa
2009), that application of the 2005 amendment to inmates whose crimes
occurred after enactment of the 2001 amendment but before enactment
of the 2005 amendment does not violate the ex post facto clause because
the 2005 amendment was a clarification of the 2001 amendment.
Reilly v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 2010). Thus, although Pettit’s
offense occurred in 2004, section 903.2(1)(a) applies to him.
8
The Code outlines the authority of the IDOC to implement such
treatment programs:
The director of the Iowa department of corrections
shall develop policy and procedural rules to implement
sections 903A.1 through 903A.3. The rules may specify
disciplinary offenses which may result in the loss of earned
time, and the amount of earned time which may be lost as a
result of each disciplinary offense. The director shall
establish rules as to what constitutes “satisfactory
participation” for purposes of a reduction of sentence under
section 903A.2, for programs that are available or
unavailable.
Iowa Code § 903A.4. Finally, the Code provides, “The inmate disciplinary
procedure, including but not limited to the method of awarding or
forfeiting time pursuant to this chapter, is not a contested case subject
to chapter 17A.” Id. § 903A.3(4).
The result of an inmate not participating in SOTP is a loss of the
accrual of earned time. This result will happen no matter the inmate’s
reason for not participating in SOTP. As section 903A.3(4) states, the
disciplinary procedure is not limited to only the “method of awarding or
forfeiting time.” Id. It follows that the initial step of classification is part
of the entire procedure. We find there is little to distinguish the
challenge of the initial SOTP classification decision from a challenge to
the SOTP classification decision after the accrual of the inmate’s earned
time is affected. Thus, we conclude the SOTP classification decision is
part of the disciplinary procedure. Therefore, section 903A.3(4)
precludes review under chapter 17A.
We find the proper method to review a SOTP classification is by a
postconviction-relief action. This conclusion is consistent with our prior
caselaw. In Davis v. State, 345 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Iowa 1984), “[t]he
disciplinary committee determined that [a prisoner] should be penalized
9
by thirty-six months in administrative segregation plus loss of television,
radio, and tape player privileges for the same period of time.” In
discussing the issue, we cited Iowa Code sections 663A.2(5) and (6)
(1983). Id. at 98–99. Section 663A.2(5) of the 1983 Code has the exact
same language of section 822.2(1)(e) of the 2015 Code. Compare Iowa
Code § 663A.2(5) (1983), with Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(e) (2015). Section
663A.2(6) of the 1983 Code contains the same language as section
822.2(1)(f) of the 2015 Code with two minor differences. Compare Iowa
Code § 663A.2(6) (1983), with Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(f) (2015). Section
822.2(1)(f) of the 2015 Code cites the accrual of earned time provisions
contained in chapter 903A and requires a party to exhaust the appeal
procedure of section 903A.7. Id. § 822.2(1)(f).
Without stating which provision specifically applies, we held a
postconviction-relief action was the proper means to contest the
prisoner’s claims. Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 99. In reaching this conclusion
we said,
In many of the prison disciplinary proceedings in
which judicial review will be sought, forfeiture of good and
honor time will be involved but will be coupled with other
means of discipline which can be characterized as a
substantial deprivation of liberty or property but which are
not expressly mentioned as a subject for review under
chapter 663A. We therefore approve litigating all such
claims involving substantial deprivation of liberty or property
interests pursuant to the procedures of chapter 663A in the
county in which the applicant is being confined.
Id. This reasoning is just as applicable today. Pettit’s objection to SOTP
classification is part of the disciplinary procedure because it would lead
to a loss of the accrual of earned time. Section 822.2(1)(f) 3 addresses the
3Section 822.2(1)(f) allows a postconviction-relief action when “[t]he person’s
reduction of sentence pursuant to sections 903A.1 through 903A.7 has been unlawfully
10
loss of earned time and is the statutory basis for a postconviction-relief
action under this set of facts. 4
Pettit relies on the footnote in Maghee v. State, 773 N.W.2d 228,
238 n.3 (Iowa 2009), to support his argument on appeal the IDOC’s
classification decision constituted other agency action. Pettit’s reliance is
misplaced.
In Maghee, an inmate challenged the revocation of his work release
status in a postconviction-relief action. Id. at 230. There, we held
chapter 822 was the proper vehicle to challenge an IDOC decision,
explaining, “[e]ven though the department’s decision may also fall within
chapter 17A, we think the more specific statute—chapter 822—should
control the procedure for judicial review.” Id. at 240. In the footnote, we
also observed,
it is difficult to understand the basis for holding that a
disciplinary decision made by a committee of the department
of corrections is not agency action falling within chapter 17A.
The fact that disciplinary proceedings are not “contested
cases,” see Langley [v. Scurr, 305 N.W.2d 418, 419 (Iowa
1981)], does not preclude their review under chapter 17A.19
as “other agency action.”
Id. at 238 n.3.
Iowa Code chapter 17A recognizes three distinct categories of
agency action: rulemaking, adjudication or contested case, and other
agency action. Greenwood Manor v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 641
N.W.2d 823, 833 (Iowa 2002). In his petition for judicial review, Pettit
______________________
forfeited and the person has exhausted the appeal procedure of section 903A.3,
subsection 2.”
4Section 822.2(1)(e) may also apply because Pettit had undergone a specific
program at Newton that he objected to and was also claiming he was “unlawfully held in
. . . other restraint.” Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(e).
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originally claimed the IDOC’s action was a contested case. At the
hearing for motion to dismiss in the district court, Pettit argued the
SOTP classification decision was a contested case or alternatively, other
agency action. In light of our conclusion that the SOTP classification
decision is part of the “inmate disciplinary procedure . . . , [i]t is not a
contested case subject to chapter 17A.” Iowa Code § 903A.3(4). Thus,
we only need to consider whether the classification decision constitutes
other agency action.
Other agency action is a residual category that does not amount to
rulemaking or a contested case. Greenwood Manor, 641 N.W.2d at 834.
“[I]f the statute or constitution does not require a hearing, or if the
required hearing does not rise to the level of an evidentiary hearing, the
agency action is considered ‘other agency action.’ ” Id. An evidentiary
hearing is considered “an oral proceeding whose purpose is to determine
disputed facts of particular applicability known as adjudicative facts—the
who, what, when, where, and why of particular individuals in specified
circumstances.” Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267,
277 (Iowa 1983) (quoting Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Definition of Formal
Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63
Iowa L. Rev. 285, 294 (1977)). Other agency action entitles parties to, at
most, an informal hearing. Greenwood Manor, 641 N.W.2d at 834.
In Langley, we opined there was no constitutional requirement for
an “evidentiary hearing,” and an “extensive or formal hearing” was not
required in disciplinary proceedings. 305 N.W.2d at 419–20. In Dykstra
v. Iowa District Court, while not overruling Langley, we contemplated the
due process required for disciplinary proceedings under the Iowa and
United States Constitutions more closely. 783 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Iowa
2010). We adopted and summarized the procedural protections set forth
12
in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–71, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978–82, 41
L. Ed. 2d 935, 955–59 (1974), as follows:
(1) advance written notice of the claimed violation, (2) a
written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken, (3) a
hearing, at which the inmate must be allowed to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence, as long as it
would not be unduly hazardous, and (4) a sufficiently
impartial decisionmaker.
Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 482. Subsequently, the Supreme Court
explained that these procedures are necessary in proceedings “designed
to elicit specific facts.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 14, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2107, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 679
(1979), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480–84, 115
S. Ct. at 2298–2300, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 427–30.
The due process requirements under the Iowa Constitution require
a hearing, at which the inmate must be allowed to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence to elicit specific adjudicative facts for
SOTP classification. This rises to the definition of an evidentiary hearing.
Thus, the SOTP classification cannot constitute other agency action.
V. Summary and Disposition.
We find that SOTP classification is part of the disciplinary
procedure because it would lead to a loss of the accrual of earned time if
the inmate does not comply. In light of our conclusion that the SOTP
classification is part of the disciplinary procedure, it is not a contested
case subject to chapter 17A. We further find a SOTP classification
hearing is not other agency action. Accordingly, an inmate must file a
postconviction-relief action under section 822.2(1)(f) to obtain review by
the courts of a SOTP classification.
13
Therefore, the court had no authority to hear the judicial review
petition filed by Pettit and the district court erred in overruling IDOC’s
motion to dismiss. Consequently, we vacate the judgment of the district
court and remand the case back to the district court to enter an order
dismissing Pettit’s petition for judicial review.
REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.