State of Iowa v. David Hal Calvin

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 12–0618
Filed November 1, 2013
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
DAVID HAL CALVIN,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B.
Hanson, Judge.
A criminal defendant alleges the district court imposed an illegal
sentence by not granting him credit for time served. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE
VACATED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Teresa M. Baustian, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jaki L.
Livingston, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether a criminal defendant is entitled
to credit against a prison sentence for time spent prior to sentencing at
the Iowa Residential Treatment Center (IRTC) and for time spent in jail as
a result of drug court program violations. The district court denied
credit. The defendant appealed, claiming the refusal to grant credit as
required by law resulted in an illegal sentence. We transferred the case
to the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that while the
defendant was not entitled to credit for time served in jail for violations
while participating in the drug court program, he was entitled to credit
for time served at the IRTC. We granted further review. Upon further
review, we conclude the defendant is entitled to credit for time spent at
the IRTC and for time spent in jail as a result of drug court program
violations.
I. Procedural and Factual Background.
The State charged David Calvin with second-degree theft as a
habitual offender and second-degree harassment. Calvin entered a guilty
plea to the theft charge pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), and agreed to enter the Polk
County drug court program, an intensive supervision program. Under
the plea agreement, Calvin and the State agreed to jointly recommend he
receive a suspended sentence if he successfully completed the program.
If Calvin failed to successfully complete the program, the parties agreed
Calvin would serve a prison sentence. The State also agreed to dismiss
the harassment charge and another case pending in Polk County. The
district court accepted Calvin’s Alford plea on March 24, 2011, ordered
him to remain in custody pending further court order, and ordered him
brought to drug court program registration the following day.
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On March 25, Calvin signed an “Intensive Supervision Court
Release Agreement and Order,” an “Intensive Supervision Court
Contract,” and an “Intensive Supervision Court Plea Agreement.” All
three documents outlined possible sanctions for violations of the drug
court program, including jail time. The release agreement provided that
Calvin could be “placed in jail immediately” for violations “of any term of
[the] agreement.” The contract provided that if Calvin failed to follow “the
directives given [him],” he could be sanctioned with a “period of
incarceration as determined by the judge” and that Calvin could be
incarcerated for a failure to remain drug free. The plea agreement
provided that “[s]erious violations that do not result in Defendant being
removed from the program may result in short term jail stays as a
penalty for breaking the rules.” The plea agreement further provided
that Calvin could be immediately arrested and incarcerated if he “violated
the terms and conditions of Drug Court or [was] not making satisfactory
progress.” Finally, the release agreement contained a provision stating
Calvin may be required to participate in residential treatment prior to
release or to reside at a halfway house.
On the same day Calvin executed these documents, the district
court entered an order requiring Calvin to participate in residential
treatment at the IRTC, which is part of the Mount Pleasant Mental
Health Institute. This order stated Calvin’s substance abuse evaluation
indicated a need for residential treatment. The order required the sheriff
to transport Calvin to the facility. It also provided that if Calvin “leaves
the treatment center at any time without an escort by the Polk County
Sheriff’s Office, the act of leaving shall be deemed an escape and
defendant may be prosecuted on a separate criminal violation for such
escape.” It finally required Calvin to remain in the facility until
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discharge, at which time the order required the sheriff to transport
Calvin back to the Polk County jail to await continuing care
arrangements.
According to his presentence investigation report, Calvin
successfully completed treatment at the IRTC. After his discharge,
however, Calvin’s participation in the drug court program became
problematic. He was arrested on a bench warrant for a violation of the
drug court release agreement. As a result of the violation, Calvin was
incarcerated for one night. The next day, the district court ordered that
Calvin be released from jail and transported to the Harbor of Hope
halfway house. The district court order directed, “Defendant shall
remain in said facility until successful discharge . . . .”
After his transfer to the halfway house, Calvin was found in
contempt for a violation of the program’s rules. As a result, Calvin was
incarcerated in the Polk County jail for five days and released, though
the record does not reveal the circumstances of his release. Shortly
thereafter, the district court issued a warrant for Calvin’s arrest for
another violation of the terms of the drug court program. Allegedly,
Calvin had absconded from the halfway house. Authorities arrested
Calvin almost six months later.
In light of the repeated infractions, on March 16, 2012, the district
court removed Calvin from participation in the drug court program and
imposed a sentence for second-degree theft as a habitual offender,
pursuant to the plea bargain. The district court sentenced Calvin to
serve fifteen years in prison, subject to a mandatory minimum of three
years. The district court denied Calvin credit for time served between
March 25, 2011, and March 16, 2012, because he was a participant in
the drug court program during those dates. Calvin appealed.
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Calvin claimed the district court imposed an unlawful sentence by
failing to give him credit for time served when he was under the
supervision of the drug court program. Specifically, Calvin argued that
he was entitled to credit for time spent in jail, with the exception of time
served pursuant to a contempt order, and that he was entitled to time
spent at the IRTC. The court of appeals found Calvin was entitled to
credit for time served at the IRTC, but not for time served in jail due to
violations of drug court program rules. As a result, the court of appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court and
remanded the case for resentencing.
Calvin sought further review, which we granted. He claims the
court of appeals erred in finding that he was not entitled to credit for
time spent in jail while he was under drug court supervision. Calvin
concedes time spent in jail as a result of a contempt order does not
qualify for credit against the district court’s sentence. Calvin claims,
however, that he is entitled to credit for the time he spent in jail as a
penalty for violating drug court program rules and for time spent at the
IRTC.
II. Standard of Review.
We review “the trial court’s application of pertinent sentencing
statutes for correction of errors at law.” State v. Hawk, 616 N.W.2d 527,
528 (Iowa 2000); see also State v. Mott, 731 N.W.2d 392, 394 (Iowa
2007).
III. Discussion.
A. Overview of Iowa Law Regarding Sentencing Credit. Calvin
seeks credit for jail time served prior to his conviction and sentence for
second-degree theft as a habitual offender. The parties cite two
provisions of Iowa law that relate to credit for time served prior to
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conviction: Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.26(1)(f) and Iowa Code
section 903A.5(1) (2011). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.26(1)(f)
provides:
Days in jail before trial credited. The defendant shall receive
full credit for time spent in custody on account of the offense
for which the defendant is convicted.
Iowa Code section 903A.5(1) provides, in relevant part:
If an inmate was confined to a county jail . . . or mental
facility at any time prior to sentencing, or after sentencing
but prior to the case having been decided on appeal, because
of failure to furnish bail or because of being charged with a
nonbailable offense, the inmate shall be given credit for the
days already served upon the term of the sentence.
Although our caselaw under these provisions is sparse, a handful
of precedents have at least some bearing on the issues raised in this
appeal. In Mott, we considered whether a defendant’s time in jail as a
consequence of a contempt order following his profanity-laden outburst
in court should be considered part of a continuous term of imprisonment
under Iowa Code section 901.8 (2005). 731 N.W.2d at 393–94. We
determined section 901.8, which pertains to consecutive sentences, only
applies when a district court sentences a defendant to multiple sentences
for criminal offenses. Id. at 394. Because the contempt statute
expressly prescribed “ ‘punishment for contempt’ ” and because prior
caselaw indicated contempt proceedings were “quasi-criminal, not
criminal, in nature,” we held that incarceration for contempt did not
equate to incarceration for a criminal offense. Id. (quoting Iowa Code
§ 665.4). Consequently, we held that section 901.8 did not apply and
that the defendant’s sentence for a criminal offense and his punishment
for contempt had to be considered separately, not as “ ‘consecutive
sentences’ constituting ‘one continuous term of imprisonment.’ ” Id.
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(quoting Iowa Code § 901.8). We concluded the defendant had to serve
his one-year sentence for assault causing bodily injury, a criminal
offense, and his punishment for contempt separately in the county jail.
Id. We further distinguished other cases where a defendant received
sentences for multiple criminal offenses as opposed to the one criminal
offense in Mott. Id. at 394–95. Mott, however, did not involve an
interpretation of either Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.26(1)(f) or Iowa
Code section 903A.5(1) (2011), nor did it involve sanctions for violations
of drug court program regulations.
In an unpublished opinion cited by the State, the court of appeals
held jail time resulting from contempt for failure to comply with the
terms of a drug court program and subsequent time spent at the Harbor
of Hope facility did not entitle a defendant to credit against the
underlying criminal sentence. See State v. Greening, No. 10–0935, 2011
WL 768744, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2011). The court of appeals
reasoned that jail time for contempt was not “ ‘on account of the offense
for which the defendant is convicted.’ ” Id. at *1 (quoting under Iowa Rule
of Criminal Procedure 2.226(1)(f)).
We have one case where we considered whether a defendant was
entitled to credit under Iowa Code section 903A.5(1) for time served
during a mental health examination and evaluation. See State v. Capper,
539 N.W.2d 361, 366–67 (Iowa 1995), overruled on other grounds by
Hawk, 616 N.W.2d at 530. In Capper, a defendant charged with sex
crimes was out on bail at the time he informed the district court he
intended to rely on the defenses of insanity and diminished
responsibility. Id. at 363, 366–67. Pursuant to a court order, the sheriff
transported the defendant to the Iowa Medical Classification Center at
Oakdale (IMCC) for psychiatric and physical examination and evaluation
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“to determine his competency at the time of the alleged offenses.” Id. at
366.
We concluded the defendant was entitled to credit under Iowa
Code section 903A.5(1). Id. at 367. Even though the defendant was out
on bail prior to the examination and evaluation at IMCC, we emphasized
that “he was committed to the institution by court order,” that “[h]e was
in the physical custody of the sheriff while being transported to and from
the state institution,” and that he “was in the custody of the institution
and the court while at IMCC.” Id. The situation in Capper was thus
unlike that in State v. Wiese, 342 N.W.2d 858, 860–61 (Iowa 1984),
where we refused to grant credit to a defendant convicted of operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated for time voluntarily spent in an alcohol
treatment center after his arrest but prior to his conviction. See Capper,
539 N.W.2d at 367 (distinguishing Wiese).
B. Positions of the Parties. Calvin concedes that under Mott he
is not entitled to credit for jail time served as a result of contempt. He
argues, however, that he is entitled to credit for the remaining time spent
in jail while under the supervision of the drug court that was not
pursuant to a contempt order. For this jail time, Calvin distinguishes
Mott by noting the defendant in that case was incarcerated for contempt,
which meant the defendant was entitled to a notice to show cause,
unless the contempt occurred in the presence of the court, and an order
stating the facts and circumstances of the incarceration. See Iowa Code
§§ 665.7, .10; Mott, 731 N.W.2d at 393–94. Calvin argues his situation
involves a summary penalty for alleged violations of drug court program
rules without a finding of contempt.
Calvin further claims he is entitled to credit for the time he was at
the IRTC for inpatient treatment. Calvin notes he was ordered to be
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transported to the IRTC for inpatient treatment. According to Calvin, the
IRTC qualifies as a “mental facility” under Iowa Code section 903A.5(1).
The State, citing Greening1 and relying on the language of Iowa
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.26(1)(f), responds that Calvin is not entitled
to credit for time spent in jail for drug court program violations because
the violations were not on account of the offense for which Calvin was
convicted. Moreover, the State argues section 903A.5(1) only authorizes
credit for time served “while awaiting sentencing” and does not expressly
authorize credit for any time served while under the supervision of the
drug court. The State does not directly address Calvin’s contention that
he is entitled to credit for time participating in the inpatient treatment
program at the IRTC.
C. Analysis.
1. Credit for time served in jail for drug court program violations.
We first consider whether Calvin is entitled to credit for jail time he
served for violations of the drug court program rules other than time
served for contempt. There is no question that Calvin was confined in
the county jail prior to sentencing. The only question is whether Calvin’s
jail time was the kind of involuntary confinement for which he was
entitled to credit under Iowa law.
We conclude Calvin is entitled to credit for noncontempt violations
of the drug court program.2 We rely primarily on the language of Iowa
1Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.904(2)(c) provides that “[a]n unpublished
opinion or decision of a court . . . may be cited in a brief if the opinion or decision can
be readily accessed electronically. Unpublished opinions or decisions shall not
constitute controlling legal authority.”
2Because Calvin does not claim credit for time spent in jail for contempt, we do
not address whether the approach in Mott is applicable to contempt arising out of drug
court program violations where the failure to complete the program has an impact on
sentencing for the underlying offense.
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Code section 903A.5(1), which grants credit for time served in a county
jail prior to sentencing. While rule 2.26(l)(f) employs the phrase “on
account of the offense for which the defendant is convicted” that
language is absent from section 903A.5(1). We believe the rule should be
interpreted in tandem with the statutory provision. Our rule was
designed to implement, not to add to or subtract from, the credit the
legislature granted in the statute.
The jail time for which Calvin seeks credit was a penalty that was
part and parcel of an intensive supervision program. While we recognize
Mott stands for the proposition that a jail term for contempt does not
trigger credit under Iowa Code section 903A.5(1), the actions that led to
contempt in Mott had no bearing whatsoever on the guilt or sentencing
phase of the ongoing criminal proceeding. The defendant in Mott was
found in contempt following his profane outburst directed at the court
during trial. 731 N.W.2d at 393–94. In Calvin’s case, however, Calvin’s
success in the program was directly related to the ultimate sentence to
be imposed. The parties had agreed to jointly recommend that he receive
a suspended sentence upon his successful completion of the program
and that he would serve a prison sentence if he failed to complete the
program. Calvin’s participation in the program was intended to provide
an opportunity for him to realize the benefits of a plea bargain that would
lead to a lesser sentence. Thus, while the jail time for contempt in Mott
was entirely unrelated to the guilt or sentencing phases of the
defendant’s trial on the underlying offense, the same cannot be said in
Calvin’s case.
We also believe a closer analogy can be found in cases where a
criminal defendant is released pending trial, but is later arrested and
incarcerated for violations of a pretrial release agreement. Such
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incarceration is not independent punishment, but rather simply part and
parcel of the underlying criminal process. See Commonwealth v. Nicely,
326 S.W.3d 441, 447–48 (Ky. 2010) (granting credit for time served in jail
for drug court program violations as analogous to time spent in jail for
violations of probation not warranting probation revocation).
An examination of section 903A.5(1) supports Calvin’s claim to
credit for time served in jail as a penalty for drug court program
violations. Clearly, Calvin was an inmate confined “to a county jail . . . at
any time prior to sentencing.” The statute does not carve out an
exception for jail time as a result of drug court program sanctions. See
Iowa Code § 903A.5(1); see also State v. Poston, 73 P.3d 1035, 1036–37
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (awarding credit for time spent in jail for violations
of drug court program conditions under a statute that did not
distinguish presentence confinement imposed by a drug court from other
court-ordered presentence confinement). As a result, the initial
requirements for credit under section 903A.5(1) have been met.
The next question is whether the phrase “because of failure to
furnish bail or because of being charged with a nonbailable offense” is a
statutory requirement Calvin failed to meet. Iowa Code § 903A.5(1). We
think it is not. The thrust of the language is that, once a charge has
been brought, a defendant is entitled to credit for presentence jail time
regardless of the defendant’s bail status at the time of the incarceration
for which credit is sought. See State v. Harrison, 468 N.W.2d 215, 217–
18 (Iowa 1991) (denying credit for time served prior to the filing of
charges). In other words, whether Calvin could have bailed out of the
county jail where he was incarcerated as a result of his drug court
program violations is irrelevant to the credit issue as long as he did, in
fact, serve time in the county jail.
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2. Credit time served at the IRTC. The record reflects that Calvin
was sent to the IRTC for residential treatment as part of his participation
in the Polk County drug court program. Under Iowa Code section
903A.5(1), time served in a mental health institution may qualify for
credit. Under our holding in Capper, the fact that a defendant was out
on bail prior to the evaluation does not disqualify the defendant from
receiving credit for the time of examination and evaluation under Iowa
Code section 903A.5(1). 539 N.W.2d at 366–67.
We conclude Calvin is entitled to credit for the time he was in
residential treatment at the IRTC. No one questions that the IRTC
qualifies as a mental facility under section 903A.5(1). There is also no
question that Calvin was confined at the IRTC. The order for treatment
and transport to the facility emphasized that if Calvin left the facility
without a proper escort, the act would be deemed an escape for which
Calvin could be separately prosecuted. Under our interpretation of Iowa
Code section 903A.5(1), bail status is irrelevant to this issue.
Further, Calvin’s confinement at the IRTC was related to his
underlying sentence. Successful completion of the residential treatment
was a required part of his participation in the drug court program. Thus,
unlike the situation in Mott, the time Calvin spent at the IRTC was
related to the ultimate sentence in the underlying criminal proceeding.
As a result, Calvin is entitled to credit for the time he spent confined in
the mental facility pursuant to Iowa Code section 903A.5(1).
D. Remedy. The proper remedy when a district court fails to
grant a defendant credit for court-ordered confinement is to remand the
case for a modification of the sentencing order to grant the defendant
proper credit. See id. at 367; see also Hawk, 616 N.W.2d at 529–30
(rejecting a contention that a district court must calculate the amount of
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credit for time served). Accordingly, we remand the case to the district
court to modify its sentencing order to grant Calvin credit for time served
in residential treatment at the IRTC and in the county jail as punishment
for violations of the drug court program, but not for time served in the
county jail for contempt.
IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of
appeals and vacate in part the sentence of the district court. We remand
the matter to the district court to modify its sentencing order in
accordance with this opinion.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.