State of Iowa v. Jesse John Pearson

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 09–1798
Filed September 30, 2011
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JESSE JOHN PEARSON,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Bruce B. Zager (motion to suppress) and James C. Bauch (trial), Judges.
Appellant seeks further review of his convictions, sentences, and
judgment for first-degree robbery, willful injury causing serious bodily
injury, and going armed with intent. DECISION OF COURT OF
APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN
PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, David Arthur Adams,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, and Jordan T. Smith, Student Legal
Intern, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and
Kimberly A. Griffith, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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WATERMAN, Justice.
This case presents our first opportunity to address the impact of a
defendant’s underage status on the Miranda custody analysis in light of
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310(2011) (remanding to reconsider custody issue in light of thirteen-year-
old suspect’s age). Our analysis turns on the specific circumstances of
this interview: a confession received by a familiar social worker
conducting the juvenile’s status assessment at his youth home—without
the coercive pressure of an unfamiliar police officer interrogating him at
the station to solve a crime.
Defendant, Jesse Pearson, a seventeen-year-old runaway from the
Bremwood Residential Treatment Center in Waverly, robbed an elderly,
mentally disabled man in the victim’s Waterloo home and beat him
bloody with a cast iron frying pan. When apprehended later that day by
the Waterloo police, Pearson refused to waive his Miranda rights and said
he would not talk before he returned to Bremwood and spoke with his
lawyer. The next morning, however, he promptly confessed to his social
worker, Marie Mahler, without his attorney present. The district court
ruled Mahler’s interview was not a custodial interrogation implicating
Miranda safeguards and denied Pearson’s motion to suppress this
confession. A Black Hawk County jury convicted him of first-degree
robbery, willful injury, and going armed with intent. The court of
appeals affirmed the evidentiary ruling allowing the jury to hear his
confession, rejected an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and
affirmed his convictions for robbery and willful injury, but reversed his
conviction on the “going armed” charge based on an instructional error.
We granted further review to decide whether Pearson’s confession to
Mahler was admissible.
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We conclude Mahler’s interview of Pearson was not a custodial
interrogation for Miranda purposes and that his confession to her was
voluntary and admissible. Accordingly, we affirm his judgment and
sentence for robbery and willful injury. The court of appeals decision
shall stand rejecting the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and
granting a new trial on the “going armed” charge.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Pearson had known Mahler for nearly eight years, since she was
assigned his caseworker when he was age eleven after he was
adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA). Mahler is a social
worker employed by the Department of Human Services (DHS) in
Buchanan County. As Pearson’s caseworker, Mahler oversaw his
juvenile proceedings and monitored his education, peer interactions,
health, and general welfare. In July 2009, Pearson, seven months shy of
his eighteenth birthday, resided at Bremwood by court order. Bremwood
is a youth home, not a prison, jail, or juvenile detention facility.
Bremwood provides a “home like” atmosphere to juveniles needing an
intensive rehabilitative environment. At Bremwood, Pearson lived in a
cottage with a kitchen, bathroom, living area, and bedroom. Despite
these amenities, Pearson and D.S., another Bremwood resident, ran
away.
They turned up the morning of July 14 at the door of the Waterloo
home of Peter Weiss, a sixty-nine-year-old, mentally challenged man who
lived alone. Weiss recognized D.S. from the neighborhood and let them
enter when they asked to use his phone and bathroom. Once inside,
Pearson began going through Weiss’s drawers, over the protests of the
elderly resident. Matters escalated when Pearson took a cast iron frying
pan from the stove and hit Weiss over the head with it repeatedly.
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Pearson’s blows left a clump of Weiss’s hair on the kitchen floor and
broke the iron handle off the pan. Weiss was knocked down with a
fractured skull and multiple scalp lacerations that bled profusely. The
teenagers ran out the door.
Weiss was able to call 9-1-1, and the operator kept him on the line
as an ambulance and police were dispatched. Neighbors who spotted the
teens hiding in bushes placed another call to police. Pearson was
apprehended with Weiss’s blood on his shirt and taken to the Waterloo
police station. Officer Robert Michael reached Pearson’s mother by
phone, and she gave permission for the police to interview her son.
Pearson was already a juvenile delinquent experienced in police
procedures. Officer Michael read Pearson his Miranda rights, including
that he had the right to remain silent, that if he chose to talk, anything
he said would or could be used against him, and that he had a right to
an attorney. Pearson responded by refusing to sign a form waiving his
Miranda rights and by stating that he was not going to talk until he
returned to Bremwood and spoke with his attorney. Pearson already had
a public defender assigned to represent him on pending juvenile charges
in Buchanan County. Later that afternoon, Bremwood staff picked
Pearson up at the Waterloo police station and drove with him back to the
youth home. His victim spent the night in the hospital with fifteen
staples in his scalp to close his head wounds.
Bremwood staff moved Pearson to a different room called Trinity
Cottage, but he was not locked in it. Trinity is windowless and
positioned where staff can observe the doorway. Staff relocated Pearson
there because he had run away and faced new charges. On July 15,
Mahler arrived at 8 a.m. to meet with Pearson. She had already been
told by Pearson’s mother and Bremwood staff that Pearson had run away
5
and been involved in an assault on an older man. Mahler also had
spoken with a public defender assigned to Pearson’s juvenile case who
told her he would tell Pearson “not to talk to the officers or anybody
about the incident.” This defense counsel, however, did not tell Mahler
to refrain from talking with Pearson. Mahler did not speak with the
Waterloo police at this time.
As Pearson’s CINA caseworker, Mahler needed to interview him to
reassess his status after he had run away from Bremwood and been
arrested. She was concerned Bremwood would evict him. She did not
interview Pearson at the request of the Waterloo police, but rather, as his
social worker. When questioned about the purpose of her interview at
the suppression hearing, Mahler testified as follows:
Q. Okay. So what’s your protocol; what’s the policy
after a child is picked up after being on the run, what are
you supposed to do after you’re advised that he’s back?
A. Usually I go and meet with the child to see where they
were, what they were doing, what they were thinking, why
they ran, what happened while they were on the run, and
just in general how he was doing; and then talk with
Bremwood staff about what they were going to do afterwards,
were they going to give me a ten-day notice, which means
they want me to remove him from their program within ten
days and find another placement for him, whether I was
going to approach the juvenile judge about what was
happening.
Q. What’s the purpose of talking to the defendant
about what you’ve just said in talking to Bremwood staff
about placement? A. A lot of times, depending on behaviors
and incidents within the facility, a program will only tolerate
so much. And they have the right to give the Department of
Human Services, and it has to be in writing, a ten-day notice
that says you have ten days to remove him and place him in
another — at that time his juvenile court order said group
care, so it would have been another group care facility that I
would have had to look for.
Q. So is the purpose for talking to him for — to assist
law enforcement, or is it to — or act with law enforcement, or
is it to talk to him for your placement issues and where
you’re going to be putting him and planning for the juvenile
court case? A. It is to plan for the [Buchanan County]
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juvenile court case, but it is also to plan based on what
Jesse’s feeling, which his needs are, and trying to find out
where his mind-set was, what caused him to want to run in
the [first] place.
Pearson was sleeping when Mahler arrived the morning after he
assaulted Weiss, and staff awakened him. She met with him in Trinity
Cottage and kept the door open so the staff could intervene if he became
aggressive. Mahler first asked Pearson how he was doing, and he said,
“I’m okay.” Then she asked him, “Did you actually do what everybody’s
saying you did?” He said, “What did I do?” Mahler responded, “Did you
actually hit an old man?” Without any further prompting, Pearson
confessed: “Yeah. So? I hit him over the head with a frying pan.” After
making this admission, Pearson told Mahler his lawyer “told him to shut
up” and that he had not answered questions from the police. Mahler
asked no further questions about the assault at that time and spent the
next hour talking with Pearson about why he had run away from
Bremwood and where matters would go from there.
Mahler filed a report on her caseworker interview with the
Buchanan County authorities handling Pearson’s previously pending
CINA and juvenile proceedings. Her report noted Pearson’s “cocky”
attitude and lack of remorse. She did not submit a report to the
Black Hawk County Attorney or Waterloo police investigating the Weiss
assault and robbery. Mahler was surprised to learn that the Waterloo
police arrested Pearson the afternoon of July 15 and took him to jail.
Days later, Officer Michael asked Mahler to provide a statement. She
assumed information from her report to Buchanan County authorities
had reached Michael’s attention. Mahler refused to give the police a
statement until her superiors at DHS in Des Moines authorized her to do
so. Mahler also spoke with Pearson on August 7 when she asked him
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what the victim’s injuries had been. Pearson told her the victim had
fourteen to fifteen staples in his head and a fractured skull. Mahler
again noted Pearson showed no remorse. On September 4, Pearson told
Mahler that D.S. told him to hit the victim, so he did. Pearson admitted
they were trying to get clothes from Weiss’s home.
Pearson was charged in Black Hawk County with robbery in the
first degree, willful injury, and going armed with intent. Pearson moved
to transfer the case to juvenile court. The district court noted his
“extended history of involvement with the juvenile court, primarily in
Buchanan County,” and “that the predominant delinquent history of the
Defendant involves assault.” Pearson had repeatedly assaulted his
mother beginning at age eight and had assaulted police officers. The
district court found “no evidence of any reasonable prospects for
rehabilitation” and that Pearson “is a significant threat to the
community.” Accordingly, his motion to transfer was denied and the
case proceeded in district court.
Pearson’s trial counsel filed a motion to suppress his July 15
confession to Mahler. The district court denied the motion, concluding
“the Miranda warning was not required because there was neither
custody nor interrogation of the defendant.” The district court found “the
record is devoid of any threats, deceit, or other improper promises which
were made to Pearson prior to his making admissions.” The district
court concluded Pearson’s statements “were made willingly and
voluntarily and satisfy due process rights.”
The motion to suppress did not address the admissions Pearson
made to Mahler on August 7 and September 4. Mahler testified at the
jury trial regarding Pearson’s confession and subsequent admissions.
Weiss and D.S. both testified at trial that Pearson beat Weiss with the
8
frying pan. Other witnesses established that DNA testing confirmed
Weiss’s blood was on the shirt worn by Pearson when he was arrested
the day of the assault. Weiss’s blood was not found on the clothing worn
by D.S.
The jury convicted Pearson on all three counts. The district court
merged the conviction for willful injury into the first-degree robbery
conviction for sentencing purposes and imposed a twenty-five-year
prison sentence and a concurrent five-year sentence for going armed with
intent. Pearson appealed on multiple grounds, including that the district
court erred in allowing Mahler to testify about his July 15 confession,
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for going
armed because he arrived at Weiss’s home unarmed, that the uniform
jury instruction on that charge omitted the element of “movement,” and
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress
Mahler’s testimony about his subsequent admissions on August 7 and
September 4.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court on all but one
ground. The court of appeals held Mahler’s July 15 interview was not a
custodial interrogation requiring a Miranda warning and affirmed the
order denying the motion to suppress this confession to her that day.
The court of appeals rejected Pearson’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim by concluding he failed to show prejudice because his admissions
on August 7 and September 4 were cumulative to properly admitted
evidence. The court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for going armed, concluding the frying pan was a weapon and
Pearson moved across the kitchen armed with it. Finally, the court of
appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on that charge based on
9
the omission of the “movement” element in the marshaling instruction.
We granted Pearson’s application for further review.
II. Issues.
We exercise our discretion on further review in this case to decide
a single issue: whether the district court erred by denying Pearson’s
motion to suppress his July 15 confession to Mahler. The court of
appeals decision shall stand as the final decision in this appeal on the
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and the going armed charge. 1 See
State v. Marin, 788 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Iowa 2010) (electing to review only
one of three issues raised on appeal and leaving the court of appeals
decision as final on the remaining issues).
III. Scope of Review.
We review de novo a district court’s refusal to suppress statements
allegedly made in violation of constitutional safeguards. State v. Palmer,
791 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2010). We independently evaluate the
totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. Id. “ ‘We
give deference to the district court’s fact-findings due to its opportunity
to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those
findings.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa
2001)).
1We agree with the court of appeals that the Iowa State Bar Association Jury
Instruction Committee’s Criminal Jury Instruction 800.15, which marshals the
elements of going armed with intent, omits “proof of movement”—an element of the
offense. See Iowa Code § 708.8 (2009); State v. Taylor, 596 N.W.2d 55, 57 (Iowa 1999)
(“[G]oing armed with intent involves movement.”); State v. Ray, 516 N.W.2d 863, 865
(Iowa 1994) (“[W]e believe the term [‘going’ armed] necessarily implicates proof of
movement.”). Evidence Pearson moved across the kitchen is sufficient to submit the
issue to the jury. See Ray, 516 N.W.2d at 865 (movement from house to front yard
sufficient). But, omission in the jury instruction of the movement element requires a
new trial on the going-armed charge.
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Pearson relies on the Federal Constitution without raising the
admissibility of his statements under the Iowa Constitution.
Consequently, we will limit our analysis regarding the admissibility of the
statements to the Federal Constitution. Id.
IV. The Miranda Custody Analysis.
“Voluntary confessions are not merely ‘a proper element in law
enforcement,’ they are an ‘unmitigated good,’ ‘ “essential to society’s
compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who
violate the law.” ’ ” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct.
1213, 1222, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045, 1055 (2010) (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 726
(1966); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2210,
115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 170 (1991)).
The dispositive issue in this case is whether Mahler’s July 15
interview of Pearson at Bremwood without his lawyer present was a
custodial interrogation under Miranda. The day before, Pearson
unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel
and expressly declined Officer Michael’s invitation to waive his Miranda
rights, ending his interrogation at the Waterloo police station before it
began. See Palmer, 791 N.W.2d at 845–48 (reviewing procedural
safeguards upon invocation of the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel). Pearson relies on Edwards v. Arizona, which prohibits the
police from initiating another custodial interrogation without counsel
present. 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884–85, 68 L. Ed. 2d
378, 386 (1981). Under Shatzer, confessions are presumed to be
involuntary if made without defense counsel present during a custodial
interrogation initiated by police within fourteen days after counsel is first
requested. 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1223, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1057.
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The Shatzer Court, however, reiterated “Miranda is to be enforced ‘only in
those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision
are implicated.’ ” Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1224, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1058
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3148–
49, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 333 (1984)). Specifically, the protection of Miranda
and its progeny extend only to custodial interrogations. See id. at __,
130 S. Ct. at 1223, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1057 (“In every case involving
Edwards, the courts must determine whether the suspect was in custody
when he requested counsel and when he later made the statements he
seeks to suppress.”); United States v. Cook, 599 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th
Cir. 2010) (“But in order to implicate Miranda and Edwards, there must
be a custodial interrogation.”); see also State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d
553, 557 (Iowa 1997) (“Miranda warnings are not required unless there is
both custody and interrogation.”).
We begin with an overview of Miranda to guide our determination
whether Mahler’s interview falls within the “types of situations” that
implicate its requirements.
A. The Miranda Rationale. The Fifth Amendment states “[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself,” U.S. Const. amend. V, and the Amendment’s
protections apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653,
658 (1964). In Miranda, the Supreme Court adopted a set of
prophylactic warnings to be given before custodial interrogations to
protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the
“inherently compelling pressures” of questioning by the police. 384 U.S.
at 467, 86 S. Ct. at 1624, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 719. The Shatzer Court echoed
the concerns raised in Miranda: “ ‘incommunicado interrogation’ in an
12
‘unfamiliar,’ ‘police-dominated atmosphere,’ involves psychological
pressures ‘which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.’ ” 559
U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1219, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1052 (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 456–57, 467, 86 S. Ct. at 1618, 1624, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 713–
14, 719). Miranda thus required police officers to warn a suspect prior to
a custodial interrogation that he has a right to remain silent and the
right to the presence of an attorney. 384 U.S. at 444–45, 86 S. Ct. at
1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706–07. The interrogation must halt if the suspect
invokes his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. Shatzer, 559
U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1219, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1052.
The Supreme Court in J.D.B. v. North Carolina recently reviewed
the concerns that motivated adoption of the Miranda safeguards and
emphasized one of the evils to be avoided is coerced, false confessions
from an innocent juvenile:
Indeed, the pressure of custodial interrogation is so immense
that it “can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people
to confess to crimes they never committed.” That risk is all
the more troubling—and recent studies suggest, all the more
acute—when the subject of custodial interrogation is a
juvenile. See Brief for Center on Wrongful Convictions of
Youth et al. as Amici Curiae 21–22 (collecting empirical
studies that “illustrate the heightened risk of false
confessions from youth”).
564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2401, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 321 (citation
omitted) (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, ___, 129 S. Ct.
1558, 1570, 173 L. Ed. 2d 443, 458 (2009)). 2 Importantly, the J.D.B.
2See David L. Strauss, Barbarous Souls (2010), for a chilling example of a life
ruined by a pre-Miranda interrogation. The book chronicles the story of Darrel Parker,
who came home from work on December 14, 1955, to find his wife, Nancy, strangled in
their bed. Police had reason to suspect an ex-convict, Wesley Peery, who had installed
a fence at the Parker home the preceding week. Id. at 34–35, 98. Nevertheless, police
investigator, John Reid, was brought in from Chicago and interrogated the grieving
Mr. Parker for hours, using manipulative psychological techniques until he confessed.
13
Court reiterated that, because the Miranda safeguards “protect the
individual against the coercive nature of custodial interrogation, they are
required ‘only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s
freedom as to render him in custody.’ ” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2402,
180 L. Ed. 2d at 322 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322,
114 S. Ct. 1526, 1528, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 298 (1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Against this backdrop, we apply the factors for determining
whether Mahler’s July 15 interview of Pearson was a “custodial
interrogation” under Miranda. We conclude the circumstances of this
confession lack the coercive pressure of a custodial interrogation.
Accordingly, his July 15 confession is admissible.
B. Factors for Determining Miranda Custody. The J.D.B. Court
emphasized whether a juvenile is in custody for Miranda purposes is an
objective inquiry:
“Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination:
first, what were the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would
a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set
and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the
court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate
inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.”
________________________
See Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459, 465–66 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding confession
involuntary), overruled on procedural grounds by Sigler v. Parker, 396 U.S. 482, 90
S. Ct. 667, 24 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1970). Parker was released in 1970 after serving thirteen
years in prison. Barbarous Souls, at 216. Peery ultimately confessed to the Nancy
Parker murder. Id. at 224. Parker is now an eighty-year-old resident of Moline, Illinois.
Id. at 245. The Reid interrogation techniques that prompted his false confession in
1955 are described in the Eighth Circuit decision holding Parker’s confession to be
involuntary, see Parker, 413 F.2d at 465, and discussed at length by the Miranda
Court. 384 U.S. at 449–58, 86 S. Ct. at 1614–19, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 709–14. Jesse
Pearson is no Darrel Parker, and Marie Mahler is no John Reid.
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Id. (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465,
133 L. Ed. 2d 383, 394 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Relevant factors for determining custody include: “the language used to
summon the individual[;] the purpose, place and manner of the
interrogation[;] the extent to which [he] is confronted with evidence of his
guilt[;] and whether [he] is free to leave the place of questioning.” State v.
Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1994). Our analysis begins with the
scene of the confession—Trinity Cottage at Bremwood—and the players,
the underage suspect and his social worker employed by the state. We
will next review the players’ lines and actions to see if this interview had
the characteristics of a formal arrest to constitute a custodial
interrogation for purposes of Miranda.
1. The scene. The Waterloo police had released Pearson from their
custody, and Bremwood staff drove him from the police station back to
the Bremwood campus in Waverly the afternoon of July 14. Bremwood
was Pearson’s place of residence. It is not a detention or lockdown
facility. Rather, it provides a “home like” environment. Because he had
run away and had charges pending, Pearson was moved into Trinity
Cottage, an unlocked, windowless room where he could be closely
observed by staff. Pearson argues he was not “free to leave,” but
“[i]ncarceration does not automatically render an inmate in custody for
purposes of Miranda.” Id.; see also Shatzer, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at
1224, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1058 (“[T]he freedom-of-movement test identifies
only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.”).
When an inmate is questioned, we look for “some added restriction on
the inmate’s freedom of movement stemming from the interrogation
itself.” Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 789. For example, in that case, an inmate
who assaulted a guard was handcuffed and taken from his cell for
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questioning in another area of the prison. Id. We found those facts
showed “a restriction of Deases’ freedom over and above that of his
normal prison setting” sufficient to establish custody. Id. at 790. By
contrast, Trinity Cottage was Pearson’s new room at Bremwood where he
slept the night of July 14. He was not handcuffed or summoned by
Mahler for questioning in another room. Rather, she interviewed him in
his room with the door open. The scene of their interview is not a factor
tending to establish custody.
2. The players. Pearson was nearly seventeen and one-half years
old by mid-July. Because he was a minor, we will begin with the age
analysis mandated by J.D.B. The concern is that underage suspects may
be more vulnerable than adults to the coercive pressure of a police
interrogation. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2403, 180 L. Ed. 2d
at 323 (“[A] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will
sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel
free to go.”). Our court anticipated J.D.B. by holding the age of juvenile
defendants is to be considered in the custody status in State v. Smith,
546 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Iowa 1996) (police interviews of fifteen-year-olds
voluntarily brought by mothers to juvenile center were not in custody for
Miranda purposes). Subsequent cases, however, called into question
whether age is a factor to consider. See State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676,
681 n.1 (Iowa 2009).
J.D.B. involved a thirteen-year-old seventh grader suspected of
residential burglaries. 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2399, 180 L. Ed. 2d
at 319. A uniformed police officer removed the boy from his social
studies class and took him to a conference room at his middle school.
Id. He was questioned for thirty to forty-five minutes behind closed
doors with two uniformed officers, the school principal, and another
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administrator present. Id. No Miranda warnings were given before the
boy confessed to several thefts. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2399–2400, 180
L. Ed. 2d at 319–20. The boy’s resulting adjudication of delinquency was
affirmed by a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals and
by the North Carolina Supreme Court, with two dissents. Id. at ___, 131
S. Ct. at 2400, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 320–21. The state appellate courts
declined “ ‘to extend the test for custody to include consideration of the
age . . . of an individual subjected to questioning by police.’ ” Id. (quoting
In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 140 (N.C. 2009)). The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a suspect’s age informs the
Miranda custody analysis. The J.D.B. Court requires consideration of the
suspect’s age when it is known or objectively apparent to a reasonable
officer at the time of questioning. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2404, 180
L. Ed. 2d at 324–25.
The J.D.B. Court itself recognized age is an insignificant factor
when the defendant is a teenager close to the age of majority. Id. at ___,
131 S. Ct. at 2406, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 326–27. Pearson was just seven
months shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time of his confession.
Every parent and adult who works with teenagers can appreciate the
difference between a thirteen-year-old and a seventeen-year-old. We are
not dealing with a frightened seventh grader accused of furtive thefts.
Pearson brazenly beat an elderly man in the victim’s own kitchen. He
had a prior history of assaulting adults, including his mother and police.
He had no difficulty invoking his Miranda rights at the Waterloo police
station after his apprehension in this case. It is relevant, although not
determinative, to the age/custody analysis that the district court denied
Pearson’s motion to transfer this case to juvenile court based in part on
the court’s determination that there were no “reasonable prospects for
17
rehabilitating the child if the juvenile court retain[ed] jurisdiction.” Iowa
Code § 232.45(6)(c). Sadly, we are dealing with a hardened seventeen-
year-old. In Smith, we considered the fifteen-year-old juvenile
defendant’s “extensive prior experience with the system of law
enforcement” when concluding their confessions were voluntary. 546
N.W.2d at 927 (“Although these defendants may lack the calculated
judgment of an adult, they are not young minors, either mentally or
legally.”). The same is true with Pearson. His age does not support a
finding of custody.
We next consider Mahler’s status as a social worker. Pearson
relies on Deases, where we recognized “the mere fact that the state
official conducting the interrogation” is not a law enforcement officer
“should not insulate the State from the requirements of Miranda where
these safeguards would otherwise apply.” Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 790
(holding Miranda applied to interrogation of inmate by prison guard). In
Deases, we approvingly cited State v. Helewa, 537 A.2d 1328 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), which we summarized as follows:
In Helewa, a social services caseworker conducted a
custodial interview of the defendant who was charged with
sexually assaulting his daughters. The New Jersey Superior
Court found that the caseworker was a “law enforcement
officer” for the purposes of Miranda. The court focused its
inquiry on the likelihood that the information elicited from
questioning would be used against the defendant in criminal
prosecutions.
Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 790 (citing Helewa, 537 A.2d at 1330–33).
Deases and Helewa, however, both focused on the custodial nature of
the interrogation, not the job status of the interrogator. The correctional
officer interrogated Deases in prison after he was taken to a different cell
in handcuffs. Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 789. The caseworker in Hellewa
interrogated the defendant at the adult correction center—a jail—after he
18
was arrested by police. Hellewa, 537 A.2d at 1329. The New Jersey
Supreme Court subsequently held that Miranda safeguards were
inapplicable to a caseworker’s at-home interview of a father suspected of
child abuse in State v. P.Z., 703 A.2d 901, 910 (N.J. 1997). The P.Z.
court noted “the issue turns on [the defendant’s] non-custodial status”
and distinguished Hellawa on grounds that the defendant in that case
was interviewed while incarcerated. Id.
Pearson’s case is more like State v. Trigon, Inc., in which we held
that Miranda did not apply to an IOSHA inspector’s office-interview of a
corporation’s president regarding a workplace fatality. 657 N.W.2d 441,
444 (Iowa 2003). We noted the IOSHA inspector was investigating
“whether the fatality resulted from a lapse in safety procedures and
devices that would put other employees at risk of injury unless abated.”
Id. The inspector “had no weapon, no badge, and no authority to arrest”
and “was [not] mounting a criminal investigation.” Id. The same is true
for Mahler. She was not a law enforcement officer, parole officer, or
probation officer.
Mahler’s nearly eight-year history as Pearson’s caseworker cuts
against a finding of custody. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,
433, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1145, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409, 423 (1984). In Murphy,
the United States Supreme Court concluded the circumstances of a
probation interview by a familiar caseworker lacked the coercive
pressures of a custodial interrogation by an unfamiliar police officer:
[C]ustodial arrest thrusts an individual into “an unfamiliar
atmosphere” or “an interrogation environment . . . created for
no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will
of his examiner.” Many of the psychological ploys discussed
in Miranda capitalize on the suspect’s unfamiliarity with the
officers and the environment. Murphy’s regular meetings
with his probation officer should have served to familiarize
him with her and her office and to insulate him from
19
psychological intimidation that might overbear his desire to
claim the privilege.
Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456–57, 86 S. Ct. at 1618–19, 16 L. Ed.
2d at 713–14) (footnote omitted).
Mahler and Officer Michael had different roles that did not
intersect until days after Pearson’s confession. Michael was the Waterloo
police officer investigating criminal charges against Pearson in the Weiss
incident. Mahler’s purpose for interviewing Pearson was to perform a
status assessment for his pending CINA and juvenile proceedings in
Buchanan County. There is nothing in the record indicating Mahler was
an agent for law enforcement. Michael did not ask Mahler to interview
Pearson; they spoke for the first time days after Pearson’s July 15
confession. She refused to give Michael her statement until authorized
to do so by her DHS supervisor. Compare State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d
296, 299–300 (Iowa 2007) (child protection center counselor’s “forensic
interview” conducted with police officer observing and listening through
“observation window” and collaborating with interviewer on follow-up
questions to prove crime).
We therefore conclude Mahler was not an agent or stalking horse
for the Waterloo police; she had her own reasons, as Pearson’s
caseworker, to interview him. “When a state-agency employee is working
on a path parallel to, yet separate from, the police, Miranda warnings are
not required.” Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 529 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005) (holding defendant’s confession to caseworker admissible despite
lack of Miranda warnings when she was not acting in tandem with police
officers). Mahler’s status as a DHS caseworker operating independently
from the Waterloo police reinforces our conclusion that her interview of
Pearson was not a custodial interrogation.
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3. The players’ lines and actions. Mahler immediately confronted
Pearson with evidence of his guilt. This factor supports a finding of a
custodial interrogation. Her first words to him after he was awakened
asked how he was doing, and when he said, “I’m okay,” she said, “Did
you actually do what everybody’s saying you did?” He responded, “What
did I do?” Mahler then asked, “Did you actually hit an old man?”
Pearson’s next line was his confession, “Yeah. So? I hit him over the
head with a frying pan.” Mahler’s approach with Pearson is akin to the
probation officer’s interview in Murphy in which she directly confronted
the defendant with evidence of his guilt and consciously sought
incriminating statements. The United States Supreme Court concluded
the interview was noncustodial, stating:
Since Murphy was not physically restrained and could
have left the office, any compulsion he might have felt from
the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led
to revocation of probation was not comparable to the
pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally
cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433, 104 S. Ct. at 1145, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 423.
Similarly, we conclude that Mahler did not convert her status
assessment into a custodial interrogation by asking Pearson at the outset
what he had done. Mahler did not wear him down through a lengthy
interrogation; Pearson freely admitted what he did to the victim at the
very outset of their discussions. Pearson knew the day before he could
refuse to answer the questions of the Waterloo police; we see no reason
he did not feel equally at liberty to decline to answer Mahler’s questions. 3
3Pearson does not claim any sort of patient-therapist privilege. Our law does not
require social workers to withhold testimony regarding information revealing “the
contemplation or commission of a crime.” Iowa Code § 154C.5(1).
21
The district court correctly found that “[t]he record is devoid of any
threats, deceit, or other improper promises which were made to Pearson
prior to his making admissions” and that Pearson’s statements “were
made willingly and voluntarily.” The court of appeals on its de novo
review reached the same conclusion:
Pearson was not summoned to speak to Mahler; she
went to the cottage at Bremwood where he was staying to
speak to him. The purpose, place, and manner of
questioning were based on Mahler’s position as the
caseworker in Pearson’s CINA case. Mahler testified she was
worried Pearson might be asked to leave Bremwood and she
would need to look for another placement for him. She was
not acting as a representative of law enforcement officials.
Pearson was not confronted with evidence of his guilt to any
substantial degree—Mahler asked him whether he had done
what people were saying he did, and then asked, “Did you
actually hit an old man?” Finally, the evidence shows
Pearson was free to leave the place of questioning. Mahler
testified that as a CINA, Pearson could not be placed in a
locked facility. The door to the room where Mahler
questioned Pearson was open. Pearson could walk out of the
room, although he had been placed in a room where staff
would be sure to see him if he left the cottage.
On our de novo review, we agree with the district
court’s conclusion Pearson was not in custody at the time he
was questioned by Mahler. Pearson had not been formally
arrested at that time, and his freedom of movement was not
notably restricted. A reasonable person in Pearson’s position
would not believe he or she was in custody. Because
Pearson was not in custody at the time he was questioned by
Mahler, there was no need for a Miranda warning.
This case is lacking the “essential ingredients of a ‘police-
dominated atmosphere’ and compulsion” that implicate the concerns
underlying Miranda. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S. Ct.
2394, 2397, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 251 (1990) (holding confession to
undercover agent posing as cellmate did not implicate Miranda). Pearson
was not handcuffed or physically restrained; the door to his room was
left open. He confessed without any lengthy or aggressive or hostile
questioning from Mahler, and the brevity of Mahler’s interview preceding
22
his confession belies a finding of compulsion. See Smith, 546 N.W.2d at
924–25 (noting a “relaxed” style of questioning and that “[t]he interviews
themselves were rather brief in duration, lasting only from twenty to forty
minutes”). Mahler noted Pearson was “cocky” and remorseless, not
intimidated or frightened.
Based on our own de novo review of the totality of the
circumstances, we reach the same conclusion as the district court and
court of appeals: Pearson objectively would not have felt he was under
arrest or restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest when he
confessed. Accordingly, we hold Mahler’s July 15 interview was not a
custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes and that Pearson’s
confession was voluntary and admissible.
V. Disposition.
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and affirm Pearson’s
district court convictions and sentence for first-degree robbery and willful
injury. We reverse the district court’s conviction of Pearson for going
armed and remand for a new trial on that charge using a corrected
marshaling instruction that includes the element of “movement.”
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
All justices concur except Mansfield and Zager, JJ., who take no
part.