Kris Kolzow v. State of Iowa

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–0293
Filed May 4, 2012
KRIS KOLZOW,
Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County, Cynthia H.
Danielson, Judge.
Offender serving a special sentence under Iowa Code section
903B.2 (2009) seeks further review of court of appeals decision denying
him earned-time and jail-time credits. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant.
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellee.
2
WATERMAN, Justice.
This case presents questions of first impression relating to sex
offenders serving prison time on a “revocation of release” from a “special
sentence” under Iowa Code section 903B.2 (2009):1 whether the
maximum time incarcerated—two years for the first revocation—is
reduced by (1) “earned-time credit” for good behavior under section
903A.2 or (2) by “jail-time credit” under section 903A.5. Kris Kolzow
began serving his ten-year special sentence released on parole. A parole
violation prompted his detention for five and one-half months in a county
jail and work-release facility awaiting a hearing on whether to revoke his
release. The administrative parole judge ordered Kolzow to prison “to
serve a period not greater than two years as required by Code section
903B.2.” The Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) refused to shorten
Kolzow’s prison time with earned-time credit or jail-time credit. The
district court ruled both credits applied to reduce the maximum two-year
period served in prison on the revocation of release. The court of appeals
reversed, holding neither credit applied.
On further review, we interpret section 903B.2 by holding:
(1) earned-time credit for good behavior under section 903A.2 accelerates
completion of the ten-year special sentence, but IDOC is not otherwise
required to apply the earned-time credit to reduce time incarcerated for a
revocation of release; and (2) the two-year maximum for the first
revocation of release includes time spent in detention awaiting the
revocation of release hearing. The district court erred in applying
earned-time credit, but correctly awarded jail-time credit against the two-
year period Kolzow was incarcerated for his revocation of release. This
1All references are to the 2009 Code unless otherwise indicated.
3
interpretation preserves IDOC’s statutory discretion to incarcerate parole
violators to protect the public, without exceeding section 903B.2’s
maximum periods for their revocation of release.
Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and
reverse in part and affirm in part the district court’s ruling on credits.2
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The parties stipulated to the facts relevant to this postconviction
proceeding. In October 2007, Kolzow was convicted of multiple offenses.
The district court sentenced Kolzow to a seven-year prison term,
suspended the sentence, and placed Kolzow on probation. Three of
Kolzow’s convictions were sexual in nature,3 triggering his ten-year
special sentence under section 903B.2, entitled “Special sentence—class
‘D’ felonies or misdemeanors.” The district court imposed three special
sentences to run concurrently after he completed his term of probation.
On May 21, 2009, IDOC discharged Kolzow from probation. After
entering into a parole agreement, Kolzow began his special sentence on
May 29. On July 28, Kolzow was arrested for a parole violation. He was
committed to the Wapello County Jail without bond. See Iowa Code
§ 908.2(2) (“Admittance to bail [in a parole revocation hearing] is
discretionary . . . not a matter of right.”). For the next five and one-half
2The parties stipulate Kolzow’s two-year revocation period ended on January 12,
2012. Accordingly, this case is moot. We nevertheless reach the merits because the
underlying question is one of importance that is likely to reoccur yet evade review. See
Dykstra v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 473, 477 n.2 (Iowa 2010).
3Kolzow was convicted of three counts of intent to commit sexual abuse causing
no injury in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11, an aggravated misdemeanor. He was
also convicted of “dissemination and exhibition of obscene material to minors” a
“serious misdemeanor” in violation of Iowa Code section 728.2, but this offense does not
trigger a special sentence.
4
months, Kolzow remained detained in jail or a work-release facility
awaiting his formal parole-revocation hearing.
On August 17, the administrative parole judge continued Kolzow’s
revocation hearing for sixty days and ordered Kolzow to reside at the
Ottumwa Work Release Center. On November 6, the administrative
parole judge again continued Kolzow’s revocation hearing. On
December 11, the judge ordered Kolzow to return to straight parole
status. However, the ruling never went into effect because on
December 8 Kolzow was arrested for a second parole violation. Kolzow
was placed in the Wapello County Jail without bond.
On January 11, 2010, the administrative parole judge revoked
Kolzow’s parole and sent him to prison at the Iowa Medical Classification
Center “to serve a period not greater than two years as required by Code
section 903B.2.” Kolzow’s revocation period began that day. The State
stipulates that the revocation period is not a mandatory minimum
sentence and that IDOC has discretion, which it has previously utilized,
to release offenders from prison with less than two years served for the
first revocation of release.
IDOC applied earned-time credit to Kolzow’s ten-year special
sentence. Kolzow continued accruing earned-time credit throughout the
parole-revocation proceedings. IDOC, however, did not apply earned-
time credit or jail-time credit to reduce Kolzow’s two years served in
prison for this revocation of release.
On October 25, Kolzow filed an application for postconviction relief,
alleging IDOC must apply earned-time credit and jail-time credit to
shorten his prison time. The district court granted Kolzow’s application.
The district court concluded the legislature intended earned-time credit
to apply to the two-year revocation period because it would be “an
5
anomaly” to apply the credit to the ten-year special sentence and not the
two-year revocation period. The district court also awarded jail-time
credit, concluding “the two-year revocation period [is] essentially similar
to a sentence.” The court of appeals reversed. The three-judge panel
held earned-time and jail-time credit did not apply because the
“revocation of release” period was not a “sentence.”
We granted Kolzow’s application for further review.
II. Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s construction of a statute in
postconviction relief actions for correction of errors at law. Anderson v.
State, 801 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2011).
III. Special Sentence Provisions.
In 2005, the legislature simultaneously enacted two special
sentence provisions that commit offenders convicted of sex crimes4 to
IDOC custody for supervision after completion of the offender’s sentence.
See 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, §§ 39–40 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 903B.1–
.2 (Supp. 2005)). Section 903B.2 states in full:
A person convicted of a misdemeanor or a class “D”
felony offense under chapter 709, section 726.2, or section
728.12 shall also be sentenced, in addition to any other
punishment provided by law, to a special sentence
committing the person into the custody of the director of the
Iowa department of corrections for a period of ten years, with
eligibility for parole as provided in chapter 906. The special
sentence imposed under this section shall commence upon
completion of the sentence imposed under any applicable
criminal sentencing provisions for the underlying criminal
offense and the person shall begin the sentence under
supervision as if on parole. The person shall be placed on
the corrections continuum in chapter 901B, and the terms
and conditions of the special sentence, including violations,
shall be subject to the same set of procedures set out in
4The special sentences apply to offenders convicted of sex abuse under chapter
709, incest under section 726.2, or exploitation of minors under section 728.12.
6
chapters 901B, 905, 906, and 908, and rules adopted under
those chapters for persons on parole. The revocation of
release shall not be for a period greater than two years upon
any first revocation, and five years upon any second or
subsequent revocation. A special sentence shall be
considered a category “A” sentence for purposes of calculating
earned time under section 903A.2.
(Emphasis added.) We rejected constitutional challenges to section
903B.2 in State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 623–30 (Iowa 2008).
The offender is committed to IDOC custody either for life or ten
years. Section 903B.1 applies to offenders convicted of a “class ‘C’ felony
or greater” and the commitment term lasts “for the rest of the person’s
life.” Section 903B.2 applies to offenders convicted of class “D” felonies
or misdemeanors and imposes a ten-year commitment term. The
provisions otherwise are textually identical.5
The offender begins this special sentence “as if on parole.”6 Iowa
Code §§ 903B.1–.2. But, IDOC can seek to revoke the offender’s parole,
5Iowa Code section 903B.1 states in its entirety:
A person convicted of a class “C” felony or greater offense under
chapter 709, or a class “C” felony under section 728.12, shall also be
sentenced, in addition to any other punishment provided by law, to a
special sentence committing the person into the custody of the director of
the Iowa department of corrections for the rest of the person’s life, with
eligibility for parole as provided in chapter 906. The special sentence
imposed under this section shall commence upon completion of the
sentence imposed under any applicable criminal sentencing provisions
for the underlying criminal offense and the person shall begin the
sentence under supervision as if on parole. The person shall be placed
on the corrections continuum in chapter 901B, and the terms and
conditions of the special sentence, including violations, shall be subject
to the same set of procedures set out in chapters 901B, 905, 906, and
chapter 908, and rules adopted under those chapters for persons on
parole. The revocation of release shall not be for a period greater than two
years upon any first revocation, and five years upon any second or
subsequent revocation. A special sentence shall be considered a category
“A” sentence for purposes of calculating earned time under section 903A.2.
(Emphasis added.)
6The legislature later amended sections 903B.1 and 903B.2 to authorize IDOC to
begin the offender’s sentence on work release or parole. 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119, §§ 59–
7
which these statutes refer to as “a revocation of release.”7 Id. Unlike a
revocation of traditional parole, the offender is not incarcerated for his
remaining sentence. Instead, these special sentence statutes prescribe
maximum “revocation of release” periods. An offender’s first “revocation
of release shall not be for a period greater than two years.” Id. His
second revocation is limited to five years. Id. Both statutes state, “A
special sentence shall be considered a category ‘A’ sentence for purposes
of calculating earned time under section 903A.2.” Id. Neither provision
expressly refers to the jail-time credit statute, section 903A.5.
We have not previously addressed whether earned-time or jail-time
credits apply to reduce the maximum periods for a revocation of a release
in either section 903B.1 or section 903B.2.
IV. Interpretation of Section 903B.2.
The parties stipulate Kolzow’s ten-year special sentence is reduced
by earned-time credits. The fighting issues are whether his two-year
prison time served for his revocation of release should have been reduced
by earned-time or jail-time credit.
Kolzow contends he is entitled to both earned-time and jail-time
credit under the operative statutory language. The State argues the
earned-time and jail-time credits do not apply to “revocation of release”
periods because these periods are not the “special sentence.” The State
argues the credits apply only to hasten the end of the ten-year special
sentence without reducing the two-year period Kolzow was incarcerated
_________________________________
60 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 903B.1–.2 (Supp. 2009)) (authorizing the board of parole to
“determine whether the person should be released on parole or placed in a work release
program”). Because Kolzow began his sentence on parole, the amendments do not
change our analysis.
7The decision to revoke an offender’s release is made by an administrative parole
judge subject to review by the Iowa Board of Parole. Iowa Code § 908.6.
8
on a revocation of release. The State notes section 903B.2 does not use
the phrase “special sentence” in reference to the “revocation of release”
periods. Id. § 903B.2 (“The revocation of release shall not be for a period
greater than two years upon any first revocation . . . .”). The court of
appeals agreed with the State’s position, concluding earned-time credit
and jail-time credits did not apply because the revocation of release was
not a “special sentence.”
We reiterate the principles of statutory interpretation for this
special sentencing statute:
In interpreting section 903B.2, “our primary goal is to
give effect to the intent of the legislature.” In re Detention of
Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 2006). “That intent is
gleaned from the language of ‘ “the statute as a whole, not
from a particular part only.” ’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa 2001)). “In determining
what the legislature intended . . . we are constrained to
follow the express terms of the statute.” State v. Byers, 456
N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990). “When a statute is plain and
its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for
meaning beyond its express terms.” State v. Chang, 587
N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). In determining plain
meaning, “[s]tatutory words are presumed to be used in their
ordinary and usual sense and with the meaning commonly
attributable to them.” State v. Royer, 632 N.W.2d 905, 908
(Iowa 2001).
State v. Anderson, 782 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Iowa 2010).
“When construing a statute, we assess the statute as a whole, not
just isolated words or phrases.” Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank,
808 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Iowa 2011). “We look to both the language and
the purpose behind the statute.” Id. (quoting Iowa Comprehensive
Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 606
N.W.2d 359, 363 (Iowa 2000)). “If more than one statute relating to the
subject matter at issue is relevant to the inquiry, we consider all the
9
statutes together in an effort to harmonize them.” State v. Carpenter,
616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000).
We will address the applicability of earned-time and jail-time
credits separately.
A. Earned-Time Credit. Kolzow and the State each argue section
903B.2 unambiguously supports their respective position. Kolzow
alternatively argues the statutory language is ambiguous and should be
construed in his favor. The district court concluded section 903B.2 is
ambiguous before awarding Kolzow earned-time and jail-time credit. The
court of appeals disagreed and concluded the statute is unambiguous in
denying Kolzow both credits.
We conclude the operative statutory language unambiguously
provides that earned-time credit must be applied to accelerate the end of
the ten-year special sentence in IDOC custody, rather than to shorten
the revocation of release periods within that special sentence. IDOC
retains discretion to incarcerate a parole violator for the maximum
revocation of release period so long as the offender is released at the end
of his special sentence.
1. Section 903B.2 provides earned-time credit only for the ten-year
special sentence. We begin with the plain language of the statute.
Section 903B.2 expressly provides that “[a] special sentence shall be
considered a category ‘A’ sentence for purposes of calculating earned
time.” The provision only uses the phrase “special sentence” in referring
to the ten-year IDOC custody period. Section 903B.2 imposes on
offenders “a special sentence committing the person into the custody of
the director of the Iowa department of corrections for a period of ten
years.” The next sentence provides “[t]he special sentence imposed
under this section shall commence upon completion of the sentence
10
imposed under any applicable criminal sentencing provisions.” Section
903B.2 does not use the phrase “special sentence” in describing the
revocation of release periods: “The revocation of release shall not be for a
period greater than two years upon any first revocation, and five years
upon any second or subsequent revocation.” Section 903B.2 plainly
defines “special sentence” to mean the ten-year IDOC custody period, not
the revocation of release of periods. Accordingly, the directive in section
903B.2 that earned-time credit is applied to the “special sentence” refers
only to the ten-year IDOC custody period.
Our interpretation of the plain language of section 903B.2 is
consistent with the purpose of the statute. See State v. Walker, 804
N.W.2d 284, 290 (Iowa 2011) (“ ‘We seek a reasonable interpretation
which will best effectuate the purpose of the statute . . . .’ ” (quoting
State v. Johnson, 528 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Iowa 1995))). The authorities
make clear that the legislature’s objective in enacting the special
sentence provisions of section 903B.2 was to further protect the citizens
of Iowa from sex crimes. See Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 625–26, 629. We
noted the purpose of the special sentence in section 903B.2 is to ensure
the sex offender’s activities are supervised and monitored for compliance
with the law for an additional ten-year period. Anderson, 782 N.W.2d at
159. “The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and
high.’ ” Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 626 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,
103, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1153, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164, 183–84 (2003)). In
Wade, we concluded the legislature is free to provide for special
sentences for sex offenders because they “present a special problem and
danger to society,” given the “particularly devastating effects of sexual
crimes on victims.” Id. We emphasized the State’s “strong interest in
11
protecting its citizens from sex crimes.” Id. at 629; see also State v.
Kingery, 774 N.W.2d 309, 313 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (same).
Section 903B.2 provides IDOC discretion to administer a
community corrections program in a manner that best protects the
public from the risks posed by sex offenders. The revocation of release
periods are maximums that vest the Iowa Board of Parole with discretion
to parole offenders who do not pose a threat to society. Section 903B.2
expressly incorporates a discretionary community corrections scheme:
The person [serving a special sentence] shall be placed on
the corrections continuum in chapter 901B, and the terms
and conditions of the special sentence, including violations,
shall be subject to the same set of procedures set out in
chapter 901B, 905, 906, and 908, and rules adopted under
those chapters for persons on parole. The revocation of
release shall not be for a period greater than two years upon
any first revocation, and five years upon any second or
subsequent revocation.
Section 905.1(2) states community-based correctional programs are
programs “including but not limited to an intermediate criminal
sanctions program” under the continuum in section 901B.1 that are
designed to “supervise and assist individuals . . . convicted of a felony, an
aggravated misdemeanor . . . or who are on . . . parole in lieu of or as a
result of a sentence.” Section 901B.1(2) states an intermediate criminal
sanctions program authorizes IDOC to transfer individuals between
continuum levels two through four, ranging from supervised release on
parole to short-term incarceration in jail or work-release facilities.
Section 901B.1(4)(b) permits IDOC to seek parole revocation pursuant to
chapter 908 and impose level five incarceration sanctions. Section
908.5(2) cross-references chapter 903B and mirrors the maximum
periods of incarceration of two years upon a first revocation and five
years upon a second or subsequent revocation. Applying earned-time
12
credit to shorten the revocation of release period would conflict with the
legislature’s grant of statutory discretion to IDOC to incarcerate an
offender for the maximum periods prescribed (two years for first
revocation; five years for second revocation).
Our construction does not undermine the legislative purpose of
earned-time credits, which is to encourage prisoners to follow prison
rules and participate in rehabilitative programs. See United States v.
Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1148 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The good time credits system
encourages a prisoner to observe prison rules and facilitates
rehabilitation by allowing him to serve part of the sentence outside the
prison.”); accord State v. Bruns, 691 P.2d 817, 821 (Mont. 1984);
Woodring v. Whyte, 242 S.E.2d 238, 245–46 (W. Va. 1978). Parole
violators incarcerated on a revocation of release will remain motivated to
behave in prison to secure earned-time credit that reduces the length of
their ten-year special sentence and because the offender may be paroled
from prison at any time during the two-year maximum period. Offenders
will also be motivated to behave on the streets knowing a parole violation
could put them behind bars for the maximum period for a revocation of
release.
We find no textual support for Kolzow’s interpretation that the
period incarcerated on a revocation of release is a sentence within a
sentence to be shortened by earned-time credit. Rather, incarceration on
a revocation of release is simply a different placement on the corrections
continuum during the same ten-year special sentence. To hold otherwise
would undermine IDOC’s ability to protect the public by incarcerating
parole violators for up to the statutory maximum periods during the
special sentence.
13
2. Kolzow’s statutory construction arguments are unpersuasive.
Kolzow raises several arguments for applying earned-time credit to
reduce his time incarcerated on a revocation of release. We conclude the
court of appeals correctly rejected each argument.
Kolzow first notes the statement in section 903B.2 that “[a] special
sentence shall be considered a category ‘A’ sentence for purposes of
calculating earned time under section 903A.2” is also found in section
903B.1, which applies to lifetime special sentences. He argues the
statement in section 903B.1 cannot refer to the lifetime commitment
sentence because earned-time credit is inapplicable to a lifetime
sentence; therefore, the statement must apply earned-time credit to the
revocation of release periods. We acknowledge sections 903B.1 and
903B.2 create a complementary scheme and should be construed
uniformly. See Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d at 542 (construing complimentary
scheme uniformly). But, we do not believe uniformity requires earned-
time credit to be applied to revocation periods.
The court of appeals observed earned-time credit is calculated for
lifetime imprisonment sentences in the event the sentence is commuted
to a term of years:
Kolzow’s appellate brief, however, acknowledges that an
offender’s earned-time credit is calculated if the person’s
sentence is commuted. Therefore, earned-time credit may be
calculated even though a person is subject to a special
sentence for the rest of that person’s life under section
903B.1. Cf. Iowa Code § 903A.2(5) (providing that for
inmates serving a life sentence under section 902.1, earned
time “shall be credited against the inmate’s sentence if the
life sentence is commuted to a term of years under section
902.2”).
We agree. No specific statute contemplates commutation of a special
sentence; however, the governor retains a general power of commutation
under article IV, section 16 of the Iowa Constitution. Earned-time credit
14
might also be relevant in the event the lifetime special sentence is altered
through subsequent legal proceedings. Accordingly, the legislature could
provide for the possibility of earned-time credit under section 903B.1 if
the lifetime sentence changes, without the credit applying to shorten the
maximum revocation of release periods during the sentence.
Kolzow next argues he is entitled to credit because section
903A.2(1) provides all inmates are “eligible to earn a reduction of
sentence in the manner provided in this section” except for mandatory-
minimum sentences not listed in section 903A.5. He claims that,
because his two-year incarceration period is not a mandatory minimum,
section 903B.2 falls outside this exception to the general rule allowing
earned-time credit. This argument fails because the earned-time credit
applies to “sentences,” and his revocation of release was not a sentence.
Kolzow’s third argument is that the legislature intended IDOC to
treat revocation of release periods like sentences for an aggravated
misdemeanor under section 903.1(2), to which earned-time credit
applies. He relies on the similarity in the sentencing language in each
provision. Compare Iowa Code § 903.1(2) (the penalty for an aggravated
misdemeanor “shall be imprisonment not to exceed two years”), with id.
§ 903B.2 (“[T]he revocation of release shall not be for a period greater
than two years . . . .”). The court of appeals succinctly rejected this
argument: “This case does not involve an aggravated misdemeanor or a
sentence imposed under section 903.1. This code section has no
application to the present case.” We agree.
Kolzow next argues earned-time credit must be applied to shorten
the period incarcerated on a revocation of release in order to avoid the
absurd result of the ten-year special sentence ending before a five-year
incarceration period could be completed on a second revocation of
15
release. He notes the ten-year special sentence can be served in 4.54
years if the offender obtains earned-time credit. We use the absurd
results doctrine sparingly because of the risk of displacing legislative
policy. Anderson, 801 N.W.2d at 7–8. We find no absurd result here.
Some offenders—those who fail to accrue earned-time credit or who lose
credits when they violate rules—will have enough time within their ten-
year special sentence to spend five years incarcerated on a second
revocation of release. Others will be released within the revocation
period upon the end of their special sentence.
Finally, Kolzow claims we should apply the rule of lenity to the
special sentencing statute and that any ambiguity be construed in his
favor. Because we conclude section 903B.2 is unambiguous, the rule of
lenity does not apply. See id. at 6 n.3.
We hold that IDOC need not apply earned-time credit to shorten
the period incarcerated on a revocation of release. IDOC retains
discretion to incarcerate a first-time parole violator for up to the two-year
maximum period on a revocation of release or five-year period for a
second or subsequent violation, so long as the offender is released upon
the completion of his special sentence. Earned-time credits shall accrue
to advance the end date of the ten-year special sentence.
B. Jail-Time Credit. We next address Kolzow’s claim that his
two-year period in prison should have been reduced by jail-time credit for
the five and one-half months he spent in detention awaiting his parole-
revocation hearing. The jail-credit statute is entitled “Time to be served–
credit” and provides:
An inmate shall be deemed to be serving the sentence from
the day on which the inmate is received into the institution.
If an inmate was confined to a county jail, municipal holding
facility, or other correctional or mental facility at any time
16
prior to sentencing, or after sentencing but prior to the case
having been decided on appeal, because of failure to furnish
bail or because of being charged with a nonbailable offense,
the inmate shall be given credit for the days already served
upon the term of the sentence.
Iowa Code § 903A.5.
The defendant’s jail time must be “on account of the offense for
which the defendant is convicted.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.26(1)(f); accord
Walton v. State, 407 N.W.2d 588, 590–91 (Iowa 1987). Kolzow meets
these requirements for jail-time credit. Kolzow was detained in jail or a
work-release facility from July 28, 2009, until January 11, 2010,
awaiting his parole-revocation hearing. He was not provided bail. The
administrative parole judge ruled he violated his parole and ordered him
to prison “on account” of the parole violation, “to serve a period not
greater than two years as required by Code section 903B.2.”
The State asserts Kolzow is not entitled to jail-time credit to reduce
his prison time for a revocation of release because section 903A.5 does
not expressly apply to detention pending parole-revocation or revocation-
of-release hearings, only “sentencing.” We have concluded that the
revocation of release is not the “special sentence” to which earned-time
credit applies. Moreover, sections 903A.5 and 903B.2 do not cross-
reference each other. The State agrees that Kolzow’s time in jail or work
release counts day for day against his ten-year special sentence, but
argues his prehearing detention does not count against the maximum
period incarcerated for the revocation of release.
The problem with the State’s position is that it permits IDOC to
incarcerate offenders for a period greater than the two-year maximum for
a first violation in section 903B.2. Section 903B.2 unambiguously states
the offender’s revocation of release “shall not be for a period greater than
two years upon any first revocation, and five years upon any second or
17
subsequent revocation.” An offender’s release is revoked when he is
detained in a jail or work-release facility awaiting his hearing. Cf. State
v. Rodenburg, 562 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Iowa 1997) (permitting jail-time
credit “for time served in state correctional institutions or detention
facilities” awaiting sentencing hearing). Here, IDOC did not apply jail-
time credit to Kolzow’s revocation of release period, resulting in his
incarceration longer than the two-year maximum allowed by section
903B.2 for a first violation. We cannot construe the plain statutory
language in a manner that permits express maximum periods of
incarceration to be exceeded.
We hold an offender serving a special sentence under section
903B.2 is entitled to jail-time credit against the maximum periods for
revocation of release for each day he is detained in jail or a work-release
facility awaiting his parole-revocation hearing. Each day spent in such
detention also counts as a day serving the ten-year special sentence.
V. Disposition.
We affirm the district court ruling awarding Kolzow jail-time credit
and reverse the district court’s ruling awarding him earned-time credit
against his period incarcerated for the revocation of release. We vacate
the decision of the court of appeals. Costs are taxed half against the
State and half against Kolzow.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.