State Of Iowa Vs. Wayne Samuel Barnes

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–0519
Filed December 23, 2010
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
WAYNE SAMUEL BARNES,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Calhoun County, Joel E.
Swanson, Judge.
State seeks further review of court of appeals’ decision reversing
defendant’s conviction for burglary and theft on ground trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to request a corroboration instruction. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, and Cynthia L. Voorde, County Attorney, for appellant.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia A. Reynolds,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellee.
2
TERNUS, Chief Justice.
The State seeks further review of a court of appeals’ decision reversing
the defendant’s conviction for burglary in the third degree and theft in the
second degree, both as a habitual offender, on the ground trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to request a corroboration instruction. Because we
agree the defendant failed to establish that, had the instruction been given, a
reasonable probability existed the outcome would have been different, we
vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the
district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
From the evidence presented at trial, a jury could find the following
facts. In March 2006, the defendant, Wayne Samuel Barnes, bought six to
eight pigs with the intent to raise them and sell them. His sister, Annette
Bellcock, and her husband, James Bellcock, allowed the defendant to keep
the pigs at an acreage they owned in rural Calhoun County. In return, the
defendant agreed to give the Bellcocks one pig when the pigs were ready for
market. No one lived at the Bellcocks’ acreage, but there were several
outbuildings on the property and the Bellcocks kept horses there.
The defendant cared for the pigs until sometime in May when he
abandoned them and moved to Kansas. The defendant did not contact the
Bellcocks, and they did not know where he had gone. James assumed care
of the pigs for about a month and then, tired of the effort and expense of
raising the pigs, sold them in June 2006.
In March 2007, the defendant moved back to Iowa from Kansas with
his girlfriend, Brandi Rex. The couple moved in with seventeen-year-old
Brian Sayer and his mother.
On April 6, 2007, the Bellcocks discovered the riding lawn mower they
kept on the acreage had been stolen. The lawn mower had been stored in a
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machine shed on the property. The key for the lawn mower was locked up at
the Bellcocks’ residence. Prior to these events, the sliding door on the shed
had been blown off by the wind, so James had moved a large farm tractor in
front of the door so nothing could be driven out of the building. It appeared
the mower had been removed through an opening in a wall of the shed where
someone had taken off a piece of the wall. The machine shed was
approximately one hundred feet from the building where the defendant had
been raising pigs. The lawn mower had been purchased in late March or
April of 2006, about the same time Barnes started housing pigs at the
acreage. James last recalled seeing the mower on April 3, 2007. A tire and
rim for a pickup truck parked outside the shed were also missing.
Approximately two months later, on June 6, 2007, a deputy county
sheriff received information that led him to a pawnshop in Ames, Iowa.
Records obtained from the pawnshop revealed that, on April 4, 2007, Rex
pawned a riding lawn mower fitting the description of the one taken from the
acreage. At the same time, Rex pawned a video game system and some
games. Rex’s signature and fingerprint were contained on the paperwork
completed for these transactions.
A former employee of the pawnshop recalled that two people brought
the lawn mower into the pawnshop, a male and a female. The female
identified herself as Brandi Rex and was the person who signed the
paperwork. The former employee estimated the woman was in her late
twenties or early thirties and the male was ten to fifteen years older than the
woman, though he could not identify the defendant when he saw the
defendant at his deposition. At trial, Rex testified she was twenty-eight. The
defendant was thirty-nine.
The riding lawn mower was subsequently sold to Eric Dalaba on
June 5, 2007, and was retrieved by the deputy sheriff on June 7. James
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Bellcock positively identified the lawn mower as the one taken from his
machine shed.
At trial, several witnesses presented testimony tending to connect
Barnes to the lawn mower’s disappearance. Douglas Geibe testified that he
had known the defendant for about a year and a half and that, in the spring
or summer of 2007, Barnes was at Geibe’s residence when a discussion
about a lawn mower ensued. According to Geibe, they were sitting around
talking when Geibe mentioned he needed a new lawn mower. Barnes, Geibe
testified, told him he had access to a lawn mower that he was going to be
picking up the next day and asked if Geibe was interested in it. Barnes told
Geibe he was getting the lawn mower from his sister in payment for a debt
she owed him on some hogs she had sold. Although Geibe indicated he was
interested in the lawn mower and asked Barnes to bring it over, he testified
Barnes never did, and he had no further discussions with the defendant
about any lawn mowers.
Rex also testified at the defendant’s trial. According to Rex, between
March and August 2007, she was living in Lake City, Iowa, and dating the
defendant. During this period, she claimed the defendant talked about his
sister and said “[n]ot very good things.” In particular, he told Rex that his
sister had sold some hogs that cost him $1600, and he acted “real mad”
about it. He also made comments about wanting to burn down his sister’s
house. He made those statements, according to Rex, before the lawn mower
was stolen. Rex stated Barnes told her about the lawn mower the Bellcocks
had at their farm.
Rex further testified that, on April 4, 2007, she was with the defendant
and Sayer when they retrieved a riding lawn mower from a farm near
Lake City where the defendant had left it the previous night. The lawn
mower was in a truck covered with a blue tarp. Defendant initially told Rex
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he had obtained the lawn mower in trade for some tattoo work he had done.
They took the lawn mower to the Ames pawnshop where Rex signed the
necessary paperwork, asserting she was the owner of the lawn mower,
because she was the only one with a valid identification card. She testified
Barnes was standing by her while she took care of the sale. She also
pawned Sayer’s game system because he was underage and could not pawn
it himself.
After the lawn mower was pawned, Rex testified Barnes informed her
the lawn mower was stolen. She recalled the defendant told her he had
knocked a couple of boards out of the back wall of the shed to remove the
lawn mower because the doorway of the shed was blocked by a tractor.
Based upon her involvement in pawning the lawn mower, Rex was charged
with theft and burglary. As part of a plea agreement, Rex testified she
pleaded guilty to tampering with records and received a suspended sentence
in exchange for agreeing to testify at the defendant’s trial.
Sayer also testified at the defendant’s trial. According to Sayer, the
night before he accompanied the defendant and Rex to the pawnshop, he
and Barnes and a number of other people were at Sayer’s house drinking
beer. During the evening, Barnes approached him and asked him to help
him steal a lawn mower. Sayer refused. After finding someone else to help
him, Barnes left the gathering in his truck. When he returned about an
hour and a half later, he told Sayer his truck was parked at one Dilly’s farm
about four miles north of Lake City and that they had gotten the lawn
mower. Later that evening, Barnes asked Sayer if he wanted to help him
pawn the lawn mower, and Sayer agreed.
The next morning Sayer took Barnes and Rex out to the Dilly farm
where the truck with the lawn mower had been left. The lawn mower was in
back, covered with a blue tarp. On the way to the pawnshop, they stopped
6
at a hardware store to obtain a key, as Barnes told Sayer he didn’t have a
key to the lawn mower. Sayer testified he walked around the pawnshop
while Rex pawned the lawn mower and that Barnes stood by Rex while she
completed the paperwork.
On January 17, 2008, the jury found the defendant guilty of burglary
in the third degree and theft in the second degree. They also found the
defendant had two prior felony convictions. The court denied the
defendant’s motion for new trial. Barnes received an indeterminate fifteen-
year sentence on each count. The sentences were ordered to be served
consecutively.
II. Issues on Appeal.
Barnes raises three issues on appeal. First, Barnes asserts trial
counsel was ineffective for eliciting and for failing to object to evidence of
other bad acts and for failing to request the jury receive an instruction on
the requirement of corroboration of accomplice testimony. Second, the
defendant claims the trial court applied the wrong standard to his motion for
new trial and erred in failing to grant the motion. Third, Barnes asserts the
court erred in imposing consecutive sentences without giving any reason for
doing so.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. Initially, the court of
appeals issued an order remanding the defendant’s case to the district court
for reconsideration of the defendant’s motion for new trial. The district court
found that defendant’s conviction was not contrary to the weight of the
evidence. 1 On the merits, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial on the ground trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
1The defendant has not further challenged that finding, and therefore, we give the
defendant’s claim that the trial court applied the wrong standard on his motion for new trial
no further consideration.
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request a corroboration instruction. The State filed an application for
further review, which we granted.
III. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims.
To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant
must show: “(1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2)
prejudice resulted.” State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008).
Normally ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are brought in
postconviction relief actions. “We will address such claims on direct appeal
only if we determine the development of an additional factual record would
not be helpful and one or both of these elements can be decided as a matter
of law.” State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa 2009).
Proof of the first prong of this claim requires a showing that counsel’s
performance fell outside the normal range of competency. Id. “ ‘Trial
counsel’s performance is measured objectively by determining whether
counsel’s assistance was reasonable, under prevailing professional norms,
considering all the circumstances.’ ” State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 785
(Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865, 878 (Iowa 2010)).
Proof of the second prong requires a showing by the defendant of a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
results of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Artzer, 609
N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa 2000). “In determining whether this standard has
been met, we must consider the totality of the evidence, what factual
findings would have been affected by counsel’s errors, and whether the effect
was pervasive or isolated and trivial.” State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 882–
83 (Iowa 2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695–96, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698 (1984)). “[I]t is the defendant’s
burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different result.” State
v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 845 (Iowa 2008).
8
A. Failure to Request Corroboration Instruction. Barnes contends
he received ineffective assistance because trial counsel failed to request a
jury instruction on corroboration of accomplice testimony. He contends both
Rex and Sayer were accomplices and the jury should have been instructed
that their testimony must be independently corroborated.
1. Underlying principles. The rules related to jury instructions in civil
cases also apply to the trial of a criminal case. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(5)(f).
“Therefore, the court is required to ‘instruct the jury as to the law applicable
to all material issues in the case.’ ” State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 141
(Iowa 2006) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.924).
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.21(3) provides:
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice
or a solicited person, unless corroborated by other evidence
which shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission
of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely
shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances
thereof.
We have defined an accomplice as “ ‘a person who willfully unites in,
or is in some way concerned in the commission of a crime.’ ” State v.
Berney, 378 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1985) (quoting State v. Johnson, 318
N.W.2d 417, 440 (Iowa 1982)). In general, a person is an accomplice if he or
she could be charged and convicted of the same offense for which the
defendant is on trial. Id.; accord State v. Douglas, 675 N.W.2d 567, 571
(Iowa 2004). It is not enough, however, to show mere knowledge of the
contemplation of a crime or mere presence at the time and place of the
crime; it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence the witness
was in some way involved in the commission of the crime. Douglas, 675
N.W.2d at 571. When the facts are not in dispute or susceptible to different
inferences, whether a witness is an accomplice is a question of law for the
9
court. Id. However, where the facts are disputed or susceptible to more
than one interpretation, the question is one for the jury. Id.
The requirement of accomplice corroboration serves two purposes:
[I]t tends to connect the accused with the crime charged, and it
serves as a counterweight against the dubious credibility of an
accomplice, whose motivation to testify is suspect because the
person would have a natural self interest in focusing the blame
on the defendants.
Berney, 378 N.W.2d at 918. “Corroborative evidence need not be strong as
long as it can fairly be said that it tends to connect the accused with the
commission of the crime and supports the credibility of the accomplice.” Id.
However, “the testimony of one accomplice may not corroborate the
testimony of another accomplice.” Douglas, 675 N.W.2d at 572.
2. Analysis. We assume, without deciding, that Rex and Sayer met
the definition of accomplices, thereby triggering counsel’s duty to ask for a
corroboration instruction, and focus instead on whether Barnes was
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request a corroboration instruction. See
State v. Lane, 743 N.W.2d 178, 184 (Iowa 2007) (noting the court may
dispose of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim if the defendant fails to
meet either the duty or the prejudice prong). Based upon the evidence,
Barnes has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating there was a
reasonable probability of a different result if counsel had requested, and the
jury had been given, an accomplice instruction. 2
We begin with the testimony of the alleged accomplices: Rex and
Sayer. According to Rex, she was Barnes’ girlfriend, and she accompanied
Barnes upon his return to Iowa in March 2007. Rex recalled Barnes’
2There
is no need to preserve this ineffective-assistance claim for further
development of the record, as the determination of prejudice for this particular claim is
made based on a review of the evidence introduced at trial. Therefore, the necessary record
is before us.
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negative comments about his sister and that the Bellcocks kept a lawn
mower on their property. Rex testified that she was with Barnes and Sayer
when they retrieved a riding lawn mower that had been taken from the
Bellcocks’ farm and left at Dilly’s farm, already loaded in a truck and covered
with a tarp, on April 4, 2007, the same day she pawned the lawn mower in
Ames. She asserted Barnes was standing by her in the pawnshop while she
took care of the sale. She also testified that Barnes eventually told her the
lawn mower was stolen and described how he had removed the lawn mower
from the shed by knocking out a couple of boards. Sayer testified that, on
the way to pawn the stolen lawn mower, the group stopped at a hardware
store to get a key made for the lawn mower because Barnes did not have
one.
Rex’s testimony connecting Barnes to the theft of the lawn mower was
corroborated by the testimony of several nonaccomplices. Rex’s testimony
the defendant knew about the lawn mower stored at his sister’s acreage is
supported by the Bellcocks’ testimony that the lawn mower was on the
property at the same time the defendant was raising his pigs there. Rex’s
testimony that Barnes contended his sister owed him money is corroborated
by Geibe’s testimony that Barnes asserted the Bellcocks owed him money for
the sale of some pigs and that Barnes was getting a mower from his sister in
exchange for the debt. Her testimony that Barnes stole the lawn mower by
knocking a couple of boards out of the back wall of the shed to remove the
lawn mower because the doorway was blocked by a large object was
corroborated by James Bellcock’s testimony that a tractor blocked the
doorway of the shed, a piece of the shed wall had been removed, and it
appeared the lawn mower had been removed through that opening. Finally,
an employee of the pawnshop testified Rex was accompanied by a man who
appeared ten to fifteen years older than Rex, a description that fit Barnes but
11
did not fit Sayer and corroborated Rex’s testimony that Barnes stood by her
while she took care of the sale of the lawn mower at the pawnshop.
Sayer’s testimony connecting Barnes to the theft was also
corroborated. Sayer testified that, on the way to the pawnshop, they stopped
to have a key made for the lawn mower because Barnes did not have a key.
The fact that Barnes would not have had the key to the stolen lawn mower
was supported by the testimony of James Bellcock that the key was not kept
with the lawn mower, but was kept at the Bellcock residence.
We conclude the defendant has failed to establish a reasonable
probability exists that, had his attorney requested a corroboration
instruction, the outcome of the defendant’s trial would have been different.
First, given the abundant evidence corroborating the accomplices’
testimonies, it is highly unlikely the jury would not have found adequate
corroboration. Second, even if the jury had been properly instructed and
found the corroboration insufficient, the remaining evidence was so
persuasive in proving the defendant’s guilt that we are not convinced there is
a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Therefore, defendant has failed to establish that, had the jury been given an
instruction on accomplice corroboration, there was a reasonable probability
the jury would have come to a different conclusion regarding the defendant’s
guilt. The court of appeals erred in finding the defendant met his burden of
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue.
B. Eliciting and Failing to Object to the Admission of Other Bad
Acts Evidence. Barnes claims evidence of two separate other bad acts
allegedly committed by him were improperly presented to the jury. The
evidence involved Barnes’ alleged involvement in the theft of a tire and rim
from the Bellcocks’ acreage and his alleged threat to burn down his sister’s
12
house. After reviewing the underlying principles governing the admissibility
of other bad acts evidence, we shall address each instance in turn.
1. Underlying principles. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that the person
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Thus, while other bad acts are inadmissible to show a defendant’s propensity
for criminal conduct, they may be admissible if offered for an appropriate
purpose, such as establishing motive or intent. See State v. Reynolds, 765
N.W.2d 283, 289 (Iowa 2009). If the evidence is found to be relevant and
material to a legitimate issue in the case other than the defendant’s
propensity for criminal conduct, a determination must be made as to
whether the probative value of the evidence on the issue for which it is
offered substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. Id. In making its determination, the court considers the
following factors,
the need for the evidence in light of the issues and the other
evidence available to the prosecution, whether there is clear
proof the defendant committed the prior bad acts, the strength
or weakness of the evidence on the relevant issues, and the
degree to which the fact finder will be prompted to decide the
case on an improper basis.
State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 124 (Iowa 2004).
2. Testimony regarding defendant’s alleged involvement in theft of tire
and rim. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited from James
Bellcock that when Bellcock reported the lawn mower stolen on April 6,
2007, he also reported a tire and rim were stolen from an old pickup truck
parked outside the machine shed. Defense counsel further elicited
testimony from Rex concerning an incident when she was traveling back
13
from Kansas with Barnes and their vehicle had a flat tire. According to Rex,
the defendant called his nephew, Steven Graber, and suggested Graber go
out to the Bellcocks’ property and take a tire from out there. Graber, she
testified, subsequently turned up with a tire. Rex testified that she could not
recall whether this tire incident occurred before or after the trip to the
pawnshop. 3 In closing argument, the State asserted that Barnes asked his
nephew to steal a tire and rim for him.
On appeal, Barnes argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the presentation of this incident of alleged other bad acts.
Specifically, Barnes contends the evidence supporting Barnes’ involvement
in the theft of the tire and rim was weak, it was not relevant, and it had a
tendency to improperly influence the jury.
Clearly, the State’s comment on Barnes’ conduct in asking his nephew
to steal a tire and rim for him was an allegation of other bad acts. In this
case, however, it is undisputed the defense opened the door to this allegation
during its cross-examination of witnesses Bellcock and Rex. Therefore, the
question is not whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the State’s argument, but whether defense counsel was ineffective in eliciting
this evidence in the first place. See, e.g., State v. Carey, 709 N.W.2d 547,
553 (Iowa 2006) (noting that, “[w]hile evidence of prior crimes is generally
inadmissible under [our rules of evidence], the ‘invited error’ doctrine entitles
the government to pursue inquiry into a matter, if evidence thereon was first
introduced by [the] defendant”).
The State suggests defense counsel made a reasonable strategic
decision to elicit evidence of the theft of the tire and the defendant’s request
3On direct examination, Rex testified that, after she, Barnes, and Sayer left the
pawnshop on April 4, 2007, they had a flat tire. She further testified that a man named
Paul showed up, after a call from Sayer, with a tire he had bought.
14
to his nephew. Based upon defense counsel’s opening statement, the State
surmises counsel was attempting to establish that other people were aware
of the property on the acreage and had a motive for stealing it. The State
contends that, although ultimately unsuccessful, it was a reasonable
strategy given the strong evidence against the defendant.
“ ‘[C]laims of ineffective assistance involving tactical or strategic
decisions of counsel must be examined in light of all the circumstances to
ascertain whether the actions were a product of tactics or inattention to the
responsibilities of an attorney guaranteed a defendant under the Sixth
Amendment.’ ” Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Iowa 2008) (quoting
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 2001)). We conclude an
additional factual record, providing trial counsel an opportunity to address
this issue, is necessary. Therefore, we preserve defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for postconviction relief. State v. Johnson,
784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010).
3. Defendant’s statement regarding desire to burn down his sister’s
house. On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Rex what Barnes had to
say about his sister. In response, Rex answered, “Not very good things.” On
further probing by the prosecutor, Rex stated Barnes told her about the pigs
he had been raising and that he wasn’t very happy that his sister had sold
them. She stated “he acted real mad about it.” She also testified that a
couple of times, before the lawn mower was stolen, Barnes remarked to the
effect that “if he could he’d burn [his sister’s] house down.” The prosecutor,
in closing argument, mentioned Barnes’ desire to see his sister’s house
burned down as an indication of the defendant’s motive.
Barnes claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
introduction of testimony regarding Barnes’ threat of arson. This argument
is without merit. First, the defendant mischaracterizes the testimony.
15
According to Rex, Barnes did not threaten literally to burn down his sister’s
house. He merely stated that “if he could,” he would. There was no
indication his remarks were other than rhetorical in nature, a venting of his
anger toward his sister. Second, as the State pointed out in its closing
argument, defendant’s remarks were important to show the relationship
between the defendant and his sister. The defendant was angry at his sister
for selling his pigs without his knowledge, he felt she owed him, and he
wanted to get back at her. One way to do this would be to steal her lawn
mower. Thus, the evidence was probative of a material issue in the case, the
defendant’s motive to deprive his sister of her property. The probative value
of the testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice to the defendant, as there was no evidence the defendant was
threatening to actually burn down his sister’s house. From the testimony, a
reasonable jury would understand the defendant’s comments were his way
of expressing his anger at his sister. We conclude, therefore, that this
evidence was admissible, and any objection by counsel to its admission
would have been futile. Consequently, counsel did not breach a duty in
failing to object to it. See State v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1999)
(stating counsel is not ineffective for failing to make an objection that has no
merit).
IV. Reasons for Consecutive Sentences.
Barnes was sentenced to two indeterminate fifteen-year sentences to
be served consecutively. Barnes asserts the trial court erred in failing to give
reasons for the sentences to be ordered consecutively.
We review the district court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003). An abuse of discretion is
found when the court exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable
or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 62
16
(Iowa 1999). Our rules of criminal procedure require a sentencing judge to
state the reasons for a particular sentence on the record. See Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.23(3)(d) (“The court shall state on the record its reason for selecting the
particular sentence.”); see also State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 342–43
(Iowa 1989). This requirement includes giving reasons for imposing
consecutive sentences. Evans, 672 N.W.2d at 331–32; State v. Jacobs, 607
N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). “Although the reasons need not be detailed,
at least a cursory explanation must be provided to allow appellate review of
the trial court’s discretionary action.” Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d at 690.
A review of the sentencing transcript reveals the sentencing court gave
sufficient and thoughtful consideration to the defendant’s sentences. The
court discussed at length the reasons for its selection of the sentence it was
about to issue. Specifically, the court noted the defendant’s long criminal
history, the majority of which dealt with crimes involving the taking of other
people’s property, burglary, and going places where it was illegal for him to
go; his lack of any real work experience; and the court’s belief the defendant
just did not “get it,” had no understanding of the rehabilitation process, and
did not understand that he was not supposed to take other people’s
property. The court then concluded that the best way to assist the
defendant and to protect society was to “take him out of society and remove
him . . . [so that] he’s not going to be taking other people’s property.” The
court concluded by stating, “So the best way, Mr. Barnes, that I can assist
you, the best way I can assist the public and protect society, is the sentence
that I am going to now give to you.” The court then proceeded to order the
defendant to serve fifteen years on each of the two counts and ordered the
sentences to be served consecutively. The court’s reasons for ordering
consecutive sentences were clearly expressed in its overall explanation for
the sentence it imposed. See State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 642
17
(Iowa 2002); State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Iowa 2001). The
defendant’s challenge to his sentence is without merit.
V. Disposition.
We vacate the decision of the court of appeals reversing the
defendant’s convictions for burglary and theft on the ground trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to request a corroboration instruction and affirm
the judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.