Debra A. Solland Vs. Second Injury Fund Of Iowa

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–1893
Filed July 16, 2010
DEBRA A. SOLLAND,
Appellant,
vs.
SECOND INJURY FUND OF IOWA,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winnebago County,
Christopher C. Foy, Judge.
Employee in workers’ compensation case seeks further review of
court of appeals’ decision regarding assessment of costs. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED.
Mark S. Soldat of Soldat & Parrish-Sams, P.L.C., West Des Moines,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Julie A. Burger, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
2
TERNUS, Chief Justice.
We have taken this workers’ compensation matter on further
review to consider the court of appeals’ taxation of costs. See Anderson
v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2005) (“On further review, we can
review any or all of the issues raised on appeal or limit our review to just
those issues brought to our attention by the application for further
review.”).1 The court of appeals assessed the costs on appeal “to both
parties equally.” It did not address the district court’s taxation of costs
on judicial review against the appellant. Because the appellant, Debra A.
Solland, is the successful party on appeal, we reverse the court of
appeals’ assessment of costs on appeal and the district court’s
assessment of costs on judicial review. All costs of the appeal are
assessed to the appellee, Second Injury Fund of Iowa. We remand this
case to the district court for assessment of the costs of judicial review to
the Second Injury Fund.
I. Standard of Review.
When evaluating the assessment of costs, our review is for abuse
of discretion. Robbennolt v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 555 N.W.2d 229, 238
(Iowa 1996); Dodd v. Fleetguard, Inc., 759 N.W.2d 133, 137 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s exercise of
discretion is clearly erroneous. IBP, Inc. v. Burress, 779 N.W.2d 210, 214
(Iowa 2010). In determining whether an abuse of discretion exists with
regard to the assessment of costs, we consider the relative success of the
parties on the merits. Robbennolt, 555 N.W.2d at 238. Further
supporting the standard that success controls the assessment of costs is
1On all other issues raised on appeal, the court of appeals’ decision stands as
the final ruling. See Everly v. Knoxville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 774 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa
2009).
3
Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1207, which provides that “[a]ll
appellate fees and costs shall be taxed to the unsuccessful party, unless
otherwise ordered by the appropriate appellate court.” Rule 6.1207 is
consistent with the rules governing assessment of costs in actions before
the district courts, as Iowa Code section 625.1 (2007) also provides that
“[c]osts shall be recovered by the successful against the losing party.”
II. History of Proceedings.
Because an analysis of the assessment of costs depends on a
party’s success on the merits, we briefly review the history of this case to
determine Solland’s level of success.
In her workers’ compensation case, Solland sought recovery from
the Second Injury Fund, alleging she had sustained two successive
qualifying injuries. A deputy commissioner denied her claim, finding
Solland’s injuries did not qualify her for recovery under the Second
Injury Fund due to the bilateral nature of her injuries. Solland brought
an intra-agency appeal, which she also lost. The commissioner taxed all
costs to Solland. Solland then filed an application for judicial review
before the district court. The district court affirmed the decision of the
commissioner on the merits and with regard to costs. The district court
then assessed all costs on judicial review to Solland.
The court of appeals reversed the district court on the merits,
concluding the bilateral nature of Solland’s injuries did not automatically
disqualify her from Second Injury Fund recovery. In so holding, the
court of appeals relied on our recent decisions of Gregory v. Second Injury
Fund of Iowa, 777 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 2010), and Second Injury Fund of
Iowa v. Kratzer, 778 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 2010). The court of appeals
remanded for the commissioner to reevaluate the evidence and make
specific findings under the principles set forth in Gregory and Kratzer.
4
On the matter of costs, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the
district court approving the assessment of costs by the commissioner
and remanded to the commissioner for redetermination. The court of
appeals then taxed costs on appeal to both parties equally.
III. Disposition.
Solland was the successful party on appeal, prevailing on all
substantive issues. We find the court of appeals abused its discretion
when assessing costs on appeal. It was clearly erroneous to divide costs
equally between the parties in light of Solland’s full success. Based on
Solland’s success on appeal, a reassessment of the costs of judicial
review is also warranted. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the
court of appeals assessing appellate costs to both parties equally. All
costs on appeal are taxed to the Second Injury Fund. In addition, upon
remand to the district court, that court shall assess the costs on judicial
review to the Second Injury Fund as well. In all other respects, the
decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED IN PART AND
AFFIRMED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND
CASE REMANDED.