Clay County, Iowa Vs. Public Employment Relations Board And International Union Of Operating Engineers Local 234

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–1208
Filed June 4, 2010
CLAY COUNTY, IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
BOARD and INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 234,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, David A.
Lester, Judge.
The county appeals a district court judgment affirming a decision
of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Board requiring it to reinstate a
terminated employee. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND
CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Michael J. Houchins, County Attorney, for appellant.
Jan V. Berry, Des Moines, for appellee Board.
MacDonald Smith of Smith & McElwain Law Office, Sioux City, for
appellee Union.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
In this appeal, we must determine whether Iowa’s Public
Employment Relations Act (PERA) protects a public employee’s activity in
negotiating wages for himself and others with a nonpublic employer.
Because we find the PERA does not protect such activity, we reverse the
judgment of the district court affirming the Public Employment Relations
Board’s decision and remand the case to the district court with
instructions to remand the case to the board and order the board to
reverse its decision and dismiss the complaint.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
From October 19, 1984, until his termination on October 29, 2004,
James Sikora was a full-time equipment operator for Clay County. The
head of the department at the time of Sikora’s termination was county
engineer, Scott Rinehart. During Sikora’s employment with the county,
the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 234 was the
certified bargaining representative of a bargaining unit consisting of
certain Clay County secondary roads department employees, which
included Sikora.
In addition to his full-time job, the Clay County Fair Board, a
private nonprofit corporation, also employed Sikora part-time. Sikora
worked for the fair since 1993. Sikora was one member of a crew
performing maintenance on the gravel streets and the racetrack area
using equipment either loaned or rented to the fair by the county. The
other crewmembers consisted of two other full-time county employees,
Rob Kluender and Jim Montgomery, and two other men who were
employed full-time in the private sector. Sikora worked part-time for the
fair by working after his normal hours for the county, working on days
off, and working on vacation days. In 2003 Sikora was paid
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approximately $7.50 an hour at his part-time job with the fair and
roughly $16 an hour at his full-time job with the county.
In 2003 Sikora and Kluender met with Phil Hurst, the manager of
the fair, to request a raise for the crew. Sikora told Hurst he felt he and
the crew were doing a good job and that they needed to receive more
compensation for their work. Hurst told Sikora he would think about the
issue and get back to him. Hurst failed, however, to get back with
Sikora. In April 2004, and again in May or June, Sikora spoke with
Hurst alone in his office and asked about the status of wage increases for
himself and the crew. Hurst told Sikora the fair had a tight budget and
he had not yet made a decision on the issue.
In July Sikora went to Hurst’s office and discussed the issue of
wage increases again. Hurst said he had not yet decided to implement a
raise. At this point, Sikora claims he merely told Hurst that he did not
know if he could continue to work for the fair if he did not receive a raise.
Hurst claims Sikora told him, due to the expensive nature of the county’s
equipment the crew was using at the fairgrounds, Rinehart told Sikora
he could not operate the equipment unless he was being paid at the
same or a comparable salary as the salary he earned working for the
county. Regardless of which account is accurate, after learning how
much Sikora earned an hour while working for the county, Hurst asked
Sikora whether a raise to $12.50 an hour for Sikora, a raise to $10.50 an
hour for Kluender, and a $1.00 an hour raise for the rest of the crew
would be a sufficient raise. Sikora agreed to the raise, Hurst
implemented it, and Sikora and the rest of the crew continued to work
for the fair in the summer and fall of 2004.
Also in July 2004 the fair needed more gravel for its streets. The
county informed Sikora that he was not permitted to use county trucks
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to transport the gravel. Instead, the county would transport the gravel to
the fairgrounds during its regular work schedule. Accordingly, Sikora
told Hurst he could not haul gravel to the fairgrounds; instead, if Hurst
needed more gravel he should contact Rinehart’s office to arrange for the
county to haul the gravel to the fairgrounds during the county’s regular
workday. Hurst contacted Rinehart’s office to request the use of the
county’s trucks to haul gravel to the fairgrounds. Subsequently, John
Rosacker, the road and maintenance foreman and Sikora’s immediate
supervisor, went to the fairgrounds and relayed the same message that
Sikora had given Hurst. During this conversation, Hurst told Rosacker
that he “had been led to believe that Mr. Rinehart was requiring that we
pay comparable wages” to Sikora and the crew as a condition of being
able to use the county’s equipment. Rosacker relayed this message to
Rinehart, who came to the fairgrounds and told Hurst this statement was
a lie.
Upon Rinehart learning of Sikora’s alleged statement, he told Hurst
“there is probably some disciplinary action that needed to be taken” and
asked Hurst to write down what happened in a memo. Hurst agreed to
do so, but not until the fair ended due to his busy work schedule. At the
end of September or the first part of October, Rinehart called Hurst and
again asked him to write down what had happened. Consequently,
Rinehart set up a meeting on October 20 between Hurst and Clay County
assistant attorney, Michael J. Houchins. After the meeting, Houchins
summarized what Hurst had said in a letter and sent it to Rinehart.
Rinehart received the letter on approximately October 27 or 28 and it
stated in pertinent part:
Soon after Ike stated that he would not be coming back,
Sikora came to visit with Phil Hurst. At that time, Phil did
not know [Rinehart] and had not visited with [him] about
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using the County equipment at the fair. Sikora then stated
to Phil Hurst that because of the expense of the equipment,
approximately $100,000 worth of equipment, that [Rinehart]
stated that Sikora could not be operating the equipment
unless working at the same salary that he was receiving
while working for the County. Sikora emphasized to Phil
that they needed more money to work. He indicated that the
only way they could work and use the County equipment
was if they were paid more. It was then agreed that Jim
Sikora would receive $12.50 an hour, and Rob Kluender
would also receive a raise. Phil was led to believe that he
had to pay the $12.50 per hour to Sikora, or the Clay County
Fair would not be able to use County equipment.
On October 29 Rinehart met with Rosacker and Sikora and
terminated Sikora’s employment with the county. Rinehart gave Sikora a
copy of the letter detailing Hurst’s statement, handed Sikora his last
paycheck, and told him the county had terminated his employment. The
only reason given for Sikora’s termination was Hurst’s allegations
contained in the above-mentioned letter.
On November 29 the union filed a prohibited practice complaint
with the board against the county and Rinehart. The complaint alleged
the county and Rinehart had engaged in prohibited practices under the
PERA by discharging Sikora for engaging in “union activities and other
concerted activities for mutual aid and [protection] not prohibited by
law.” The board held a hearing on the union’s complaint before an
administrative law judge (ALJ).
The ALJ adopted Sikora’s version of events and stated, “I cannot
reasonably conclude that Sikora said what Hurst alleged without the
County providing Sikora with an opportunity prior to discharge to defend
himself against the allegation.” Consequently, the ALJ concluded the
county wrongfully terminated Sikora for engaging in protected concerted
activities under the PERA and ordered the county to reinstate Sikora to
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his former job with full back pay and benefits. The county appealed to
the board from the ALJ’s proposed decision and order.
The board did not adopt the ALJ’s findings of fact or conclusions of
law. The board determined Sikora’s testimony was more credible and
Sikora did not make the coercive statements Hurst attributed to him as
set out in the letter. Although the board applied a different legal analysis
than the ALJ, it ultimately concluded the county wrongfully terminated
Sikora for engaging in protected concerted activities under the PERA—
negotiating wages—and ordered the county to reinstate Sikora with full
back pay and benefits.
The county filed a petition for judicial review of the board’s final
decision. The district court affirmed the board’s decision. The county
appeals.
II. Issue.
The only issue we need to reach to dispose of this appeal is
whether the board correctly found that Sikora’s conduct in negotiating
wages for himself and others with a nonpublic employer was a protected
activity falling within the scope of the PERA.
III. Scope of Review.
To decide this issue, we must determine the proper scope of the
rights of public employees contained in section 20.8(3) of the PERA. See
Iowa Code § 20.8(3) (2003). Specifically, we must decide whether the
rights contained in section 20.8(3) protect Sikora’s activities in
negotiating wages for himself and the other employees working for the
fair. Our primary goal when we interpret a statute is to ascertain the
legislature’s intent. State v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 744 N.W.2d
357, 360 (Iowa 2008). In doing so, we seek a “ ‘reasonable interpretation
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that will best effect the purpose of the statute.’ ” Id. at 361 (quoting IBP,
Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001)).
Ordinarily, the interpretation of a statute is a matter of law for us
to decide. Id. at 360. However, when the legislature has clearly vested
the interpretation of a statute by a provision of law in the discretion of
the agency, we review the agency’s interpretation of the statute to
determine if its interpretation is irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(l). This is not one of those
situations.
We recently discussed the analysis used to determine whether the
legislature clearly vested an agency with the authority to interpret a
statute. See Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 784 N.W.2d 8, 11–12
(Iowa 2010). When the legislature has not explicitly given an agency the
authority to interpret a statute, we must examine “the phrases or
statutory provisions to be interpreted, their context, the purpose of the
statute, and other practical considerations to determine whether the
legislature intended to give interpretive authority to an agency.” Id.Here, the legislature has given the board the authority to administer the
provisions of chapter 20, collect data, perform studies, establish
procedures, hold hearings, and adopt rules. Iowa Code § 20.6. The
legislature has not given the board the explicit authority to interpret the
PERA. Therefore, we must examine the specific statutory provision at
issue in this case and decide whether the legislature intended the board
to have interpretive authority with respect to that provision.
The outcome of this case depends on the scope of coverage of the
PERA as indicated by the public policy of the act. The legislature has set
forth the public policy of the act in the Code. Iowa Code § 20.1. Only
the legislature can define the scope of legislative actions. The board can
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only act within that scope of coverage. Thus, it is our task and not the
board’s to determine the scope of the PERA. Accordingly, the board’s
interpretation of the scope of coverage of the PERA is not entitled to
review under section 17A.19(10)(l) and our review is for correction of
errors of law under section 17A.19(10)(c).
IV. Discussion and Analysis.
The Iowa Code provides:
Public employees shall have the right to:
....
3. Engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
insofar as any such activity is not prohibited by this chapter
or any other law of the state.
Iowa Code § 20.8(3). The union claims even though the fair is a private
employer, Sikora’s activity in negotiating wages with the fair for himself
and his fellow employees is a protected activity under section 20.8(3);
thus, Sikora’s public employer, the county, was prohibited from
terminating him for engaging in this activity. In support of its claim, the
union relies on the federal courts’ interpretation of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2000).
In interpreting the NLRA, the federal courts have refused to limit
the scope of the NLRA’s right to engage in “concerted activity” for the
purpose of “other mutual aid or protection” to conduct directed at the
employee’s own employer. Instead, the federal courts have extended this
right outside of an employee’s own employment relationship to third
parties, administrative and judicial forums, appeals to legislators, and
“concerted activity” for the purpose of “other mutual aid or protection”
aimed at another employer. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556,
565–67, 98 S. Ct. 2505, 2512–13, 57 L. Ed. 2d 428, 438–39 (1978)
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(recognizing employees can seek to improve the terms and conditions of
their employment outside the immediate employee-employer relationship
such as through administrative and judicial forums, and by appealing to
legislators to protect their interests); Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d
1285, 1291 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing “[e]mployees have the right to
engage in concerted communications with third parties regarding
legitimate employee concerns”); NLRB v. J.G. Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 585,
595 (9th Cir. 1943) (finding the fact that an alleged union activity
extends outside the employee’s own employment is immaterial when
determining if the NLRA was violated); Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co.
v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1940) (recognizing employees have
the right to join and participate in union activities outside of their
employment); A-W Wash. Serv. Station, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 164, 165 (1981)
(recognizing the NLRA forbids discrimination intended to discourage
union activity aimed at another employer); Wash. State Serv. Employees
State Council No. 18 & Local 6, 188 N.L.R.B. 957, 958–59 (1971) (holding
protesting employee was engaged in concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection even though demonstration was not aimed at the hiring
practices of her own employer); Bob’s Casing Crews, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 3,
5 (1969) (recognizing employee was engaged in concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection when he left jobsite of different employer in
protest of excessive work hours); Gen. Elec. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 1101,
1103–04 (1968) (recognizing that collecting money in support of
employees of other employers is concerted activity for the purpose of
other mutual aid or protection), enforced, 411 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1969)
(per curiam). These courts have recognized that: (1) nothing in the NLRA
limits this right to conduct directed at the employees’ own employer,
(2) the NLRA describes this right with the extremely broad language of
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“mutual aid or protection,” and (3) the rationale and public policy
underlying this right forbids such a limitation. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc.,
437 U.S. at 565–67, 98 S. Ct. at 2512–13, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 438–39
(recognizing the broad language of “mutual aid or protection” allows
employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment
outside of the employee-employer relationship and to hold otherwise
would frustrate the policy of the NLRA); Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper
Co., 111 F.2d at 874 (citing the national scope of unionism as a policy
reason for refusing to limit protected union activities to intracompany
relations); Wash. State Serv. Employees State Council No. 18 & Local 6,
188 N.L.R.B. at 958–59 (noting nothing in the NLRA places any limitation
on the term “concerted” which would warrant finding an employee who
engages in concerted activities with employees of other employers is not
protected under the NLRA); Gen. Elec. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. at 1103
(recognizing the NLRA does not limit the scope of the term “concerted
activities” to the employee-employer relationship and its rationale forbids
such a limitation).
Even though the federal courts have held the protection of the
NLRA extends to protected activities outside the direct employer-
employee relationship, we find the PERA does not protect a public
employee’s activities with another nonpublic employer. We reach this
conclusion for a number of reasons.
First, the purposes of the NLRA and the PERA are different. In
regards to the NLRA, Congress has stated:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United
States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
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freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151. The Iowa legislature has stated the purpose of the
PERA is as follows:
The general assembly declares that it is the public
policy of the state to promote harmonious and co-operative
relationships between government and its employees by
permitting public employees to organize and bargain
collectively; to protect the citizens of this state by assuring
effective and orderly operations of government in providing
for their health, safety, and welfare; to prohibit and prevent
all strikes by public employees; and to protect the rights of
public employees to join or refuse to join, and to participate
in or refuse to participate in, employee organizations.
Iowa Code § 20.1(1).
We can understand how the federal courts interpret the NLRA’s
protected activities broadly because its purpose is to “eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions.” 29 U.S.C. § 151. To
accomplish this purpose, it is necessary to protect an employee even
when that employee engages in a protected activity with an employer
other than his or her own employer.
On the other hand, the purpose of the PERA is not to deal with the
free flow of commerce, but “to promote harmonious and co-operative
relationships between government and its employees.” Iowa Code
§ 20.1(1). Thus, the PERA’s focus is more limited than the NLRA’s and is
centered on the relationship between government and its employees. The
protected activities under the PERA are not directed to any employer, but
rather are directed towards the government as the employer. The activity
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at issue in the present case was directed toward a private employer, a
relationship outside those identified in section 20.1(1).
Another reason we find the PERA’s protection is not as expansive
as the NRLA’s is that the acts define the protected employee differently.
The NLRA states, “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this
subchapter explicitly states otherwise. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court relied on the language, “shall not be limited
to the employees of a particular employer,” to find a congressional intent
“to protect employees when they engage in otherwise proper concerted
activities in support of employees of employers other than their own.”
Eastex, Inc., 437 U.S. at 564, 98 S. Ct. at 2511–12, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 438.
Iowa’s definition of public employee “means any individual
employed by a public employer, except individuals exempted under the
provisions of section 20.4.” Iowa Code § 20.3(10). By not including a
phrase similar to the phrase “shall not be limited to the employees of a
particular employer,” the Iowa legislature intended the PERA’s coverage
to be narrower than the NLRA’s.
Moreover, we do not see how allowing a public employee to
negotiate a contract for nonpublic employees promotes harmonious and
cooperative relationships between the government and its employees.
Factually, it may do just the opposite. If a public employee negotiates
favorable terms of employment with a nonpublic employer, the terms of
the nonpublic employment may be such as to cause the public employee
to leave public employment or become dissatisfied with the terms of
employment with the public employer. Either situation will not promote
harmonious and cooperative relationships between the government and
its employees.
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Accordingly, we hold the scope of coverage of the PERA does not
protect Sikora’s activity in negotiating wages for himself and other
employees with a nonpublic employer such as the fair. Consequently,
the board’s interpretation of section 20.8(3), holding these activities are
protected, is erroneous.
V. Disposition.
The board erroneously determined the PERA protected Sikora’s
activity in negotiating wages for himself and other employees with a
nonpublic employer. The district court affirmed the board’s decision.
Therefore, we reverse the district court’s affirmance of the board’s
decision. For that reason, we remand this case to the district court to
enter an order remanding the case to the board with instructions
requiring the board to reverse its decision and enter an order dismissing
the union’s prohibited practice complaint.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.