State Of Iowa Vs. Allen Robert Allensworth

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 118 / 06-1507
Filed May 9, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
ALLEN ROBERT ALLENSWORTH,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A.
Romano, Judge.
The district court suppressed drug evidence discovered during a
search of an impounded vehicle. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson and
Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorneys General, John P. Sarcone, County
Attorney, and Stephanie Cox, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellee.
2
HECHT, Justice.
We granted the State’s application for discretionary review of the
district court’s order suppressing methamphetamine seized by law
enforcement officers from a motor vehicle. We conclude the warrantless
search of the steering column of the vehicle was supported by probable
cause, and was therefore permissible under the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the
district court’s order.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
A Polk County sheriff’s deputy stopped a vehicle for speeding on
Euclid Avenue in Des Moines. As the deputy approached the vehicle, Allen
Allensworth rolled down the driver’s window, stated his name, and disclosed
that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The deputy noticed
Allensworth had a large snake draped around his neck. A warrant check
confirmed Allensworth had an outstanding warrant for a parole violation.
The deputy arrested Allensworth, contacted Allensworth’s friend to come to
the scene and retrieve the snake, and called a towing company to transport
the vehicle from the scene of the arrest. Due to the presence of the snake
and the amount of traffic at the intersection where the stop occurred, the
deputy decided to defer an inventory of the contents of the vehicle until after
it was moved to the location where it was to be impounded.1
1The Polk County Sheriff has a motor vehicle impoundment and inventory policy.
With exceptions not relevant here, the policy directs that if the driver of a vehicle is
arrested, officers are to impound the vehicle and perform an inventory of its contents. The
policy states the inventory is not to be used as a pretext to search for evidence, but is
designed to protect the citizen’s property and the county. If illegal substances are
encountered during the inventory, the policy directs the officer to (1) stop the inventory;
(2) contact a supervisor; (3) complete the inventory; and (4) consider obtaining a search
warrant authorizing “a more thorough search of the motor vehicle.”
3
After transporting Allensworth to the jail for booking, but before he
went to the impound lot to complete an inventory search of the vehicle, the
deputy received an anonymous phone call reporting there were drugs in
Allensworth’s car. Approximately two hours after the vehicle was towed and
impounded, the deputy and another officer began an inventory of the
vehicle’s contents. The deputy located a small bag of marijuana in the
center console. Knowing the steering column was “a known place where
people hide drugs,” an officer removed the horn button on the steering
column and discovered a small plastic bag containing approximately
twenty-five grams of methamphetamine.
Allensworth was charged with possession with intent to deliver more
than five grams of methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section
124.401(1)(b)(7) (2005), and failure to possess a drug tax stamp, in violation
of Iowa Code section 453B.12. He filed a pro se motion to suppress the
marijuana and methamphetamine, claiming they were seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 Following a
hearing, the district court concluded the seizure of the vehicle, the inventory
search of the console, and the resulting seizure of the marijuana did not
violate Allensworth’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court suppressed the
2Allensworth claims on appeal the search also violated his rights under article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, and that if we find the issue was not preserved below,
we should address it on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds. Allensworth did not
raise below, and the district court did not rule on, a state constitutional claim. Moreover,
he does not suggest on appeal that the analytical framework under the state constitution
should differ from the Fourth Amendment analysis in this case. Cf. Racing Ass’n of Cent.
Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2004) (declining to adopt a different equal
protection analysis under the analogous provision of the Iowa Constitution where no such
analytical framework was urged by either party). Accordingly, Allensworth has failed to
demonstrate prejudice resulting from his counsel’s failure to raise a state constitutional
claim. See State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 136 (Iowa 2006) (stating that in order to
obtain relief on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim one must prove “(1) the attorney
failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted”). Because the claim of trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness is without merit, we shall not further discuss it.
4
methamphetamine, however, on the ground that the search of the steering
column exceeded the proper scope of an inventory search.3
The State filed a motion requesting the district court reconsider its
ruling, advancing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as
an alternative ground for upholding the search of the vehicle and seizure of
the methamphetamine. The district court denied the motion, concluding
the automobile exception applies only if probable cause for the search and
exigent circumstances exist at the scene of the stop. The district court
reasoned that the automobile exception did not apply under the
circumstances of this case because probable cause for a warrantless search
extending beyond an inventory search did not exist at the scene of the stop
in this case, but arose only later after the vehicle was impounded when
marijuana was discovered in the course of the inventory search. We
granted discretionary review of the district court’s suppression order.
II. Scope of Review.
We review Fourth Amendment claims de novo. State v. Lam, 391
N.W.2d 245, 248 (Iowa 1986).
III. Discussion.
The State confines its argument on appeal to the validity of the search
of the steering column under the so-called “automobile exception” to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The State contends the district
3An inventory of the contents of an impounded vehicle pursuant to standard police
procedures is reasonable if the process is aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle and
its contents. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3098–99, 49
L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1007 (1976). “The policy or practice governing inventory searches should
be designed to produce an inventory,” and not simply be a ruse for “general rummaging in
order to discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S. Ct. 1632,
1635, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6 (1990). One factor considered by the court in its assessment of
the reasonableness of an inventory search is whether the officer “acted in bad faith or for
the sole purpose of investigation.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373, 107 S. Ct. 738,
741, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739, 746 (1987).
5
court erred in holding the automobile exception requires special exigency at
the time the probable cause arises. Allensworth asserts the district court
correctly suppressed the methamphetamine because the officers who
conducted the search of the vehicle exceeded the limits of an inventory
search when they invaded the steering column.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. “Searches and seizures conducted by governmental officials
without prior court approval are per se unreasonable unless they fall within
one of the few exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”
State v. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Iowa 1996) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585 (1967);
State v. Cook, 530 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1995)). The Supreme Court has
recognized a “specifically established and well-delineated” exception to the
warrant requirement for searches of automobiles and their contents.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114
L. Ed. 2d 619, 634 (1991).
A review of the evolution of the automobile exception is useful in the
analysis of the issue presented in this case. The United States Supreme
Court first applied the exception in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45
S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925). In Carroll, the Court held a search
warrant is unnecessary for the search of an automobile when officers have
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. 267 U.S. at
153–56, 45 S. Ct. at 285–86, 69 L. Ed. at 551–53. The Court concluded
warrantless searches of vehicles based on probable cause are
constitutionally permissible as it would be impracticable to require officers
6
to secure a warrant “because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.” Id. at 153, 45
S. Ct. at 285, 69 L. Ed. at 551. Thus, the original impetus for allowing
warrantless searches of automobiles based upon probable cause was the
exigency inherent in dealing with movable vehicles.
Forty-five years after Carroll was decided, the Court again addressed
the scope of the automobile exception in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970). In Chambers, the police stopped a
vehicle matching a description of the vehicle used an hour earlier by armed
gunmen who robbed a gas station. 399 U.S. at 44, 90 S. Ct. at 1977, 26
L. Ed. 2d at 424. The officers arrested the passengers on suspicion of
armed robbery, and impounded the vehicle at the police station. The
officers conducted a search of the vehicle at the police station and found a
gun concealed under the dashboard. Id.
Rejecting Chambers’ claim that the search by the officers at the police
station was unreasonable because no exigency existed to justify a
warrantless search of the impounded vehicle, the Court noted:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate’s
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be
permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only
the “lesser” intrusion is permissible until the magistrate
authorizes the “greater.” But which is the “greater” and which
the “lesser” intrusion is itself a debatable question and the
answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For
constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the
one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand
carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
On the facts before us, the [vehicle] could have been searched
on the spot when it was stopped since there was probable
cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a search. The
7
probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so
did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment
permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its
use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is
little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an
immediate search without a warrant and the car’s
immobilization until a warrant is obtained.
Id. at 51–52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 428 (emphasis added). The
Court concluded law enforcement officers’ encounters with vehicles that are
readily capable of movement are sufficiently “exigent” to allow for
warrantless searches based on probable cause. Id. The exigencies faced by
law enforcement officers dealing with motor vehicles do not evaporate when
the vehicle is removed from the scene of the stop to a police station or other
place of impoundment. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n.9, 102
S. Ct. 2157, 2163 n.9, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 583 n.9 (1982) (“[I]f an immediate
search on the scene could be conducted, but not one at the station if the
vehicle is impounded, police often simply would search the vehicle on the
street—at no advantage to the occupants, yet possibly at certain costs to the
police.”); see United States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he requirement of exigent circumstances is satisfied by the ‘ready
mobility’ inherent in all automobiles that reasonably appear to be capable of
functioning.” (Emphasis in original.)).
In a more recent phase of the evolution of the automobile exception,
the Court disavowed a “special exigency”4 requirement for searches of
readily mobile vehicles, and provided additional rationales for allowing
4We use the term “special exigency” to refer to some circumstance beyond the
inherent mobility of the vehicle that makes it impossible or impractical for the police to
obtain a search warrant prior to the vehicle being moved away. United States v. Graham,
275 F.3d 490, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting the Supreme Court “has emphasized that no
special exigency is required to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile when the car
is mobile and the searching officer has probable cause to believe that fruits of a crime may
be present in the automobile”). The Supreme Court has alternatively used the phrase
“separate exigency” to refer to the same concept. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465,
467, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442, 445 (1999) (“[T]he ‘automobile exception’
has no separate exigency requirement.”).
8
warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause. In California
v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985), a case
involving a search of a mobile home, the Court acknowledged the “ready
mobility” rationale for the automobile exception, but noted the exception is
also justified based on the reduced expectation of privacy, as compared to
the home or office, that individuals have in their automobiles. Carney, 471
U.S. at 391, 105 S. Ct. at 2069, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 413 (citing South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000,
1004–05 (1976)). This decreased expectation of privacy results from the
“pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public
highways.” Id. at 392, 105 S. Ct. at 2069, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 413.
In Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S. Ct. 304, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1975)
(per curiam), officers stopped the defendant at a bank drive-through window
on suspicion of attempting to pass fraudulent checks. 423 U.S. at 67, 96 S.
Ct. at 305, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 211. A bank employee had observed the
defendant try to put something between the seats of the vehicle he was
driving. Id. The officers arrested White and transported him and his car to
the police station, where they questioned White and searched the vehicle.
Id. at 67–68, 96 S. Ct. at 305, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 211. Although the trial court
found the officers had probable cause to believe contraband was in the
vehicle, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held four checks found during
the search of the vehicle were obtained in violation of White’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Id. at 68, 96 S. Ct. at 305, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 211. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding the search at the station house was valid
because probable cause to believe the car contained contraband did not
evaporate when the car was removed from the scene of the seizure. Id.
Probable cause persisted at the station house, and therefore no showing of
9
exigency beyond the vehicle’s inherent mobility was required to sustain the
warrantless search of the vehicle. Id. (“[P]olice officers with probable cause
to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could
constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a
warrant.”).
In Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 102 S. Ct. 3079, 73 L. Ed. 2d
750 (1982) (per curiam), law enforcement officers stopped a vehicle for a
traffic violation and observed an open bottle of liquor on the passenger seat
floorboard. 458 U.S. at 259, 102 S. Ct. at 3080, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 752. The
officers placed the driver, Thomas, under arrest for possession of open
intoxicants in a motor vehicle. Id. During an inventory search conducted
before the vehicle was towed from the scene of the arrest, an officer located
two bags of marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment. Id. at 260, 102
S. Ct. at 3080, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 752. A second officer then conducted a more
thorough search, which included checking under the dashboard and inside
the locked trunk. The officer located a loaded revolver inside the air vents
under the dashboard. The Michigan Court of Appeals held the search did
not fit within the automobile exception “because both the car and its
occupants were already in police custody [thus] there were no ‘exigent
circumstances’ justifying a warrantless search for contraband.” Id. at 261,
102 S. Ct. at 3080, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 752–53. The Supreme Court reversed,
stating that “when police officers have probable cause to believe there is
contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the
officers may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has
been impounded and is in police custody.” Id. The Court further clarified,
the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not
vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend
upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each
particular case that the car would have been driven away, or
10
that its contents would have been tampered with, during the
period required for the police to obtain a warrant.
Id. at 261, 102 S. Ct. at 3081, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 753.
In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 2014, 144
L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999) (per curiam), the Court expressly rejected the
argument that the automobile exception does not apply in the absence of a
separate showing of exigency. The defendant’s vehicle was stopped and
searched on the street based on a tip from a reliable informant that the
vehicle the defendant was driving would be carrying a large quantity of
cocaine. Id. at 466, 119 S. Ct. at 2013, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 444. The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for possession
of crack cocaine, holding that “in order for the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement to apply, there must not only be probable cause to
believe that evidence of a crime is contained in the automobile, but also a
separate finding of exigency precluding the police from obtaining a warrant.”
Id. The Supreme Court reversed, stating “under our established precedent,
the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement.” Id. at
467, 119 S. Ct. at 2014, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 445. The Maryland court’s finding
of “abundant probable cause” to believe the readily mobile vehicle contained
contraband “alone satisf[ied] the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Id.
We have previously applied the “inherent exigency” rationale for
warrantless probable-cause searches and seizures of readily mobile vehicles
undertaken prior to the vehicle’s impoundment. State v. Cain, 400 N.W.2d
582, 585 (Iowa 1987) (noting “recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and this court . . . have made it clear that the exigency requirement is
always satisfied by a vehicle’s inherent mobility”); Lam, 391 N.W.2d at 248
(“The Court’s decision [in Carney] makes it clear that under the automobile
11
exception which was created in recognition of the decreased expectation of
privacy accorded to a vehicle and the exigencies associated with it, a
warrantless search of a vehicle may be made if the authorities have
probable cause.”). We have also upheld against both federal and Iowa
constitutional challenges a vehicle search that was undertaken with
probable cause at a police station after the defendant’s arrest. State v.
Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Iowa 1981) (upholding against federal
and Iowa constitutional challenges a warrantless vehicle search based on
probable cause at a police station). In each of these cases, probable cause
supporting a warrantless search existed at the scene of the arrest or stop.5
This case requires us to decide whether probable cause to conduct a
warrantless automobile-exception search can arise during an inventory
search of a vehicle after it has been removed from the scene of the stop and
seizure. We conclude that it can.
In State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992), the defendant was
stopped for speeding. He was arrested after he admitted he was driving
with a suspended license. Before having the vehicle towed, the arresting
officer commenced an inventory search and discovered a loaded handgun
under the seat and a jewelry box and jewelry on the back seat. 487 N.W.2d
at 677. The inventory search was interrupted when the tow truck arrived
and took the vehicle away. When the search was completed at another
location, numerous stolen items were found in the trunk. We concluded the
search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle at the scene of the stop
was incident to the arrest and therefore valid. Id. at 678 (citing New York v.
5Although neither Cain nor Lam posed a challenge to a warrantless probable cause
search of a vehicle after impoundment, we have upheld searches that were undertaken, at
least in part, after impoundment as well. See State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d 675, 677–78
(Iowa 1992) (upholding later warrantless search of an impounded vehicle after a gun was
discovered under the seat during an inventory search at the scene of the stop).
12
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 775
(1981)). The discovery of the handgun and jewelry supplied the officers with
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained additional contraband.
Finding exigent circumstances and probable cause, we upheld under the
automobile exception the search of the trunk conducted after the vehicle
was towed from the scene of the arrest. Id. Having concluded the search
was valid under the automobile exception, we did not address Edgington’s
claim that the impoundment and the inventory search of his car violated the
police department’s regulations which required the arresting officers to
provide the defendant with an alternative to impoundment. Id. at 679.
Allensworth does not dispute that the marijuana discovered in the
console during the inventory search and the anonymous tip received before
the inventory began gave the officer probable cause to suspect the vehicle
contained additional contraband. He contends, however, the officers
conducting the inventory search were required, after they discovered the
marijuana, to stop the inventory and request a search warrant before they
could legally extend the search beyond the scope of the inventory. We
disagree. Allensworth’s Fourth Amendment challenge based on the claimed
failure of the officers to comply with their departmental rules governing
inventory searches is, like Edgington’s, without merit. The State correctly
posits that whether or not the search subsequent to the discovery of the
marijuana was completed in compliance with the sheriff’s inventory search
rules, the search of the vehicle driven by Allensworth at the time of the stop
was reasonable under the automobile exception. Probable cause for an
automobile exception search “may evolve from a proper investigatory stop of
a vehicle.” Id. at 678. We conclude it may also evolve from the discovery of
contraband in the course of a proper inventory search as it did in
13
Edgington. Id. at 678–79. An automobile exception search may be “as
thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant particularly
describing the place to be searched.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 800, 102 S. Ct. at
2159, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 578; accord Carroll, 267 U.S. at 172–73, 45 S. Ct. at
292, 26 L. Ed. at 559–60 (scope of automobile-exception search included
tearing open vehicle’s seat cushion to find suspected contraband). Thus,
what began as an inventory search expanded to a broader automobile-
exception search that properly included the opening of the horn cap on the
steering column.
In finding the automobile exception inapplicable in this case, the
district court relied upon language in Edgington and Holderness suggesting
probable cause and exigent circumstances must arise at the scene of the
stop to justify a later search at the station house under the automobile
exception. See Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 677–78 (“Previously, we have
stated that the automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement
of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist at the time the automobile is stopped by police.”);
Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736–37 (“[E]xigent circumstances are necessary
only initially; the absence of exigent circumstances at the time of the actual
search is irrelevant.”); see also State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa
1980) (“It is now clear that the absence of exigent circumstances for the
later search is wholly irrelevant. Exigent circumstances are necessary only
initially.”). As detailed above, under prevailing Fourth Amendment law, the
only exigency required to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle is the
vehicle’s ready mobility. Cain, 400 N.W.2d at 585 (noting “[m]ore recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court . . . have made
it clear that the exigency requirement is always satisfied by a vehicle’s
14
inherent mobility”). The essential teaching of Edgington, Holderness, and
Olsen is that sufficient exigency exists to justify a warrantless search of a
readily mobile vehicle even after the vehicle has been impounded and
removed to another location. Our decisions in those cases should not be
understood to stand for the proposition that if probable cause for an
automobile-exception search does not arise at the scene of a stop or seizure,
it cannot arise later in the course of an inventory search conducted after the
vehicle has been impounded and removed to another location.6
The fact that the vehicle had been impounded and removed from the
scene of the seizure before an inventory search was commenced and
probable cause arose for the broader automobile exception search is of no
constitutional moment. Under the substantial body of case law establishing
the automobile exception, the reasonableness of the search simply cannot
turn on the fortuity of whether the inventory search was commenced and
6Our conclusion is guided by the overriding concern in Fourth Amendment cases
that the reasonableness of the search or seizure be determined by balancing the need for
the search against the individual’s privacy interest. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
118–19, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 505 (2001) (“The touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”). As demonstrated by the cases permitting searches of impounded
vehicles under the automobile exception, the State’s need to conduct an immediate search
remains static once probable cause arises, regardless of whether the vehicle remains at the
scene of the stop or has already been impounded. Similarly, the individual’s privacy
interest in the contents of the vehicle remains static from the scene of the arrest
throughout the duration of the impoundment—the individual does not gain a greater
interest in keeping the contents of the vehicle secret simply because officers choose to
impound the vehicle. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 Harv.
L. Rev. 835, 840 (1974) (noting the privacy interest implicated in a vehicle search is the
defendant’s interest in “attempts at secrecy” of the automobile’s contents). The spatial and
temporal limitation on the emergence of probable cause urged by Allensworth and applied
by the district court would not provide any greater protection to the privacy interest at
stake in an automobile search. Requiring, as a precondition to a finding of reasonableness,
that probable cause to support an automobile exception search arise before impoundment
would therefore afford “no advantage to the occupants,” and we decline to impose such a
limitation. Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9, 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 583 n.9.
15
contraband was discovered before or after the car was removed from the
scene of the stop or seizure. When probable cause arose at the police
station, the vehicle was still sufficiently mobile to render the situation
exigent and the warrantless search supported by probable cause
reasonable. Allensworth’s motion to suppress is without merit and the
district court erred in suppressing the methamphetamine.
IV. Conclusion.
The search of the steering column of Allensworth’s vehicle was based
on probable cause that arose during a lawful inventory search. A
warrantless search of the vehicle’s steering column was therefore
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We reverse the district court’s
suppression of the methamphetamine found in the steering column and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Streit, J., who takes no part.